Slow Emergency and the Contested Politics of Loyalty: Reinterpreting the Territorial Dimension of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands prior to the 1982 Conflict

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Declaration of Original Authorship

I, HULL Max hereby declare that this thesis and the work presented in it is entirely my own. Where I have consulted the work of others, this is always clearly stated.

Signed : Max Hull

Date : 15 August 2019

ABSTRACT

I make the case for regarding the period from the mid-1960s to the very early 1980s in the Falklands as being a period of slow, rather than fast, emergency. This, I argue, was a time of real emergency in the Falklands, but one which did not accelerate to the point of an irretrievable fast emergency until the outbreak of Anglo-Argentine war in 1982. In unpacking this slow emergency I contend that the colony of the Falkland Islands experienced sustained, attritional socio-economic decline and political marginalisation over time. The prospect of the geopolitical demise of the Falkland Islands as a British entity became increasingly proximate, as time progressively 'ran out' for this struggling and neglected colony.

This speed-based framing is important as it helps to open up an important counter-narrative to the conventional perspective that the 1982 Argentine invasion of the Islands, and consequent war for the Islands, constitutes *the* Falkland emergency. Reflective of its 'under the radar' potency, the unfolding of slow emergency in the period prior to 1982 has simply been obscured by the dramatic fast Falklands emergency events of 2 April to 14 June 1982. However, it is this less speedy form of emergency which, had it been allowed to run its chronopolitically powerful and subtle course, offered Argentina a more certain path to securing *la recuperacion* of the Malvinas Islands.

Emergency is initially introduced in Chapter 2's 'Literature Review' followed by Chapter 3's focus on 'Methods and Sources'. The slow emergency for which I argue manifested itself in a variety of ways, with the following chapter structure focused on four key areas for investigation. These are sequenced thematically rather than chronologically, reflective of how the project seeks to bring to the fore the different aspects of the slow emergency.

Chapter 4 addresses how far there was a political emergency earlier on in the slow emergency era, and focuses on both the context to, and performing of, the crucial 1968 Chalfont mission to the Falklands, the first ever British

ministerial visit to this struggling colony. The visit brought into sharp relief and helped essentially frame the political issues which run throughout the slow emergency era, such as the degree of British commitment to the Islands, and Islander opposition to a 'British present (and past)' being over-scripted by an Argentine future. Chronopolitical discourse emerges as a prominent feature of the Chalfont episode, as do the practices and articulation of loyalty, which on occasions is expressed through what I call angry loyalty. The ways in which loyalty was 'narrated' by Falkland Islanders are considered, including the three-dimensional politicised use of objects such as flags and placards, and written and photographic renderings of loyalty. The mobilisation of performative loyal protest in the Falklands is considered, such as through the *Daily Express* photo-shoot of October 1968, and in Chalfont's November 1968 visit to the Islands. The role of elements of the British press, particularly the *Daily Express, Daily Telegraph and The Times*, in supporting and amplifying the loyal narrative are also considered, as well as the dissenting narrative of Richard Gott for the *Guardian.* Interviews, notably with Sir Cosmo and Lady Haskard*,* further inform this chapter.

Informed by Elden (2013), Chapter 5 considers how far there was a three-dimensional emergency in the slow emergency era up to 1982, in which the Falkland Islands as a territorial volume was penetrated by Argentine insurgency, particularly in the air, with the British reluctant to 'protect the volume' if this meant straining relations with Argentina. The chapter considers the Fitzgerald aerial incursions of 1964 and 1968, and the Condor hijacking of 1966; it asks 'what if the Falklands' volume were handed over to Argentina and no one noticed?' It argues that the 1971 Anglo-Argentine Communications Agreement led to the establishment of an Argentine 'aerotectorate' over the Islands, with the 1974 YPF Agreement and abortive 1980 leaseback initiative all exposing the weakness of the British three-dimensional position.

Chapter 6 introduces and explores the workings of slow emergency in the 'Shackleton-French era' of 1975-77. This framing was chosen as Lord Shackleton's work on the Islands throughout his Commission and then his

Report, ran from October 1975 through to July 1976, its (non)implementation remaining a live issue into 1977; this largely coincided with the tenure of Neville French as Governor of the Falklands, which ran from 27 January 1975 to 2 December 1976. The Shackleton-French era provides valuable evidence about, and insights into, the nature and processes of slow emergency in the Falklands. It also sheds new light as to why the Report became 'a cause of conflict in itself' (Rowlands in Charlton 1989, p.48), as did French's governorship, intensifying rather than alleviating the speed of emergency as it became chronopolitically outmaneuvered by Islanders.

Chapter 7 examines the extent to which there was a bodily emergency in the Falklands' slow emergency era, focusing on the mid to latter 1970s; depopulation of the Islander micro-community was exacerbated by the presence of Royal Marines and numerous marriages to young Islander women. I explore how these demographic difficulties played out in this period, and use what I call the 'Angry Islander' controversy to shed light on how the presence of Royal Marines and loss of Islander women amplified societal tensions, placing strains on relations between the sexes within the Islander community.

The thesis concludes by arguing for the period prior to the outbreak of the 1982 Conflict to be re-framed and known as 'The Slow Emergency'.

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The process of researching and writing this project has involved many people, all of whom have been instrumental in making this study happen.

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Similarly, I would like to record my sincere thanks to members of PEAS (the Politics, Economies and Research group) at the National University of Singapore, who gave me much support while I was undertaking research whilst based working in Singapore, in particular Professor James Sidaway and Assistant Professor Dr Woon Chih Yuan.

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When I arrived in Stanley, the assistance of Tansy Newman in the Jane Cameron National Archives proved extremely helpful. Similarly, I would like to

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DEDICATION

FOR MY WIFE:

Dawn, who has been ever supportive throughout the research process.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ARA – *Armada de la Republica Argentina* – Navy of the Argentine Republic

BAS – British Antarctic Survey

BBC – British Broadcasting Corporation

Camp – from 'El Campo', the Falkands term for the countryside outside Stanley

Cessna – small, US built aircraft, suitable for use in the Falklands

Circassian Circle – the 'signature' Falkland island dance

The Coast – Falkland term for the Argentine littoral

Eightsome Reel - Falkland Islands dance

ExCo – Falkland Islands Executive Council

FIBS – Falkland Islands Broadcasting Service Studio

FIA – Falkland Islands Association

FIEC – Falkland Islands Emergency Committee

FIG – Falkland Islands Company

FIG –Falkland Islands Government

FIGAS – Falkland Islands Government Air Service

FAA – *Fuerza Aerea Argentina* – Argentine Air force

HMG – Her Majesty's Government

HMS – Her Majesty's Ship

Junta – military dictatorship (in Argentina)

Kelper – Falkland Islander

LADE – *Lineas Aereras Del Estado* – State Airlines of Argentina

Leaseback – initiative proposed in 1980 by Nicholas Ridley under which Britain would cede sovereignty of the Falklands to Argentina, in return for which Argentina would then agree to continuing British administration of the Islands for a temporally finite period e.g. 25 years.

LegCo – Legislative Council

MP – Member of Parliament

MOU – Memorandum of Understanding

NP – Naval Party

RAF – Royal Air Force

RM – Royal Marines

RMS – Royal Mail Ship

RRS – Royal Research Ship

TARJETA PROVISORIA – Provisory Card (known as the 'White Card' in the Falklands); required Argentine documentation for travel to and from the Falklands

UK – United Kingdom

UKFIC – United Kingdom Falkland Islands Committee

UN – United Nations

YPF – *Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales* – Fiscal Oil Deposits Company (Argentine State Oil Company)

1 Chapter One – Introduction: 'Falklands foregrounded'

1.1 '*The Tin-Pot Foreign General and the Old Iron Woman*'

In 1984 Raymond Briggs' satirical children's book *The Tin-Pot Foreign General and the Old Iron Woman* was published, in which Argentine leader General Leopoldo Galtieri and British Prime minister Margaret Thatcher were presented as non-human metallic monsters fighting over the bleak and isolated Falkland/Malvinas Islands, both actors depicted as heartless belligerents. The striking cover of the book depicts the Falklands/Malvinas Islands as almost incidental in what he portrays as an angry territorial quarrel, evidenced in the faces of the metallic protagonists. The voice caption from non-visible Islanders vainly crying 'Help!' can be seen in the distance, the author's representation depicting the Islanders as helpless, vulnerable and lacking agency. Briggs (1984) depicts the Islanders as exposed to a dangerous present and future, sidelined marginal actors engulfed by the escalating geopolitical emergency of 1982's Anglo-Argentine confrontation.



Fig. 1.1. Cover of* The Tin Pot Foreign General and The Old Iron Woman, *Raymond Briggs (1984, London: Hamish Hamilton).

Source: original copy

While the focus of this thesis is from the mid-1960s prior to, but not including, the 1982 Conflict, Brigg's characterisation of Falkland Islanders provides an interesting point of departure. Unusually, in his depiction of the Islanders he considers their pre-Conflict condition in *The Tin Pot Foreign General and the Old Iron Woman* and how this changed. Briggs' image on the front of the book (Fig. 1.1) expresses the extreme vulnerability of Islanders in the 'angry' militarised emergency of 1982, whilst his post-Conflict image (Fig. 1.2) depicts the quotidian emergency encountered by Islanders in their new existence living in a recent war zone, outnumbered by British soldiers. In their exaggerated and satirical representations of the military emergency of 1982 (Fig. 1.1), and the post-Conflict emergency (Fig. 1.2), both images can readily be seen as providing a framing of emergency for the Falklands. However, Fig. 1.3 can similarly be read as a more subtle, less dramatic expression of Falkland emergency, in which Islanders endured a precarious existence



Fig. 1.2. Post-Conflict Falklands as depicted by Raymond Briggs (1984, London: Hamish Hamilton)

Source: original copy

characterised by poverty, isolation, a lack of opportunity and facilities, bad weather and poor diet. This theme of the 'Falklands as emergency' runs through Briggs' representations, with the struggle to survive in this hostile South Atlantic space a constant theme; as Briggs wryly records in *The Tin Pot Foreign General and the Old Iron Woman*, not all Islanders survived: 'Three of them were killed in the battle, but no one was to blame' (1984, p. 37).



Fig. 1.3. Pre-Conflict Falklands as depicted by Raymond Briggs (1984, pp. 2-3, London: Hamish Hamilton).

Source: original copy

Briggs' imagery in *The Tin Pot Foreign General and the Old Iron Woman* acquires new significance seen through the lens of emergency. Aulich, who studied Briggs' book, saw his depiction of Islanders more conventionally: 'He represented Islanders as simple shepherds, freeborn Englishmen living in liberty until they are interfered with, first by the Argentinian and then the British armed forces. Eventually, they return to their original pastoral state, their material conditions devastated under the rhetorical weight of *The Iron Lady and Tin-Pit General*' (Aulich 1991, p. 87). Yet such a reading only takes

us so far, with its focus on pastorality and war; applying the idea of emergency to these images not only obliges us to re-consider their meaning, but as with Fig.1.3, helps us re-consider what, from the mid-1960s up to 1982, the 'Falklands as emergency' involved. This alternate reading of Emergency within the Falkland Islands is the purpose of the thesis: to re-consider the pre-Conflict Falkland Islands and their inhabitants through the lens of speed-related emergency, to extend our understanding of what has been described as the 'Falklands problem' in this period. Unlike during the Falklands Conflict itself, the political emergency in the period from mid 1960s up to the 1982 conflict often proceeded at a slow pace, with occasional moments of acceleration; to that end, the thesis makes the case for slow even lingering emergency in relation to the Falklands of this era.

1.2 Key contributions of the thesis

There are two main contributions that this thesis seeks to make. Firstly, it makes the case for the importance of a temporally extended, (usually) slow emergency, with periods of acceleration and deceleration. The central positioning of emergency is this thesis is reflected in its title of *'Slow Emergency and the Contested Politics of Loyalty: Reinterpreting the Territorial Dimension of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands prior to the 1982 Conflict'.* The attritional nature of 'slow emergency' ensured that there was a very real prospect that the exigencies of the present would result in the end of the Falkland Islands as a British territory, either through socio-economic collapse or a territorial transfer to Argentina, the former potentially facilitating the latter. Each chapter in the thesis is therefore used to develop our understanding of how slow emergency as an analytic helps us understand the Islands in the period up to 1982.

The other key aim of this thesis is, for the first time, to examine the Falkland Islander experience through an island-centred study. It is conceived as a research project which takes the Falkland Islanders as its main empirical focus, and pays close attention to the Islander voice. In this way it seeks to re-focus our understanding of the Falkland Islands people away from the

dominant framing of the 1982 Conflict, and instead engage with the lived experience of Islanders in the Falklands in the period from mid 1960s up to the emergency of the 1982 Conflict. In its emphasis on the Islander experience, it also considers the role of those in the United Kingdom, often called 'The Falkland lobby', who supported Islander efforts to maintain their British territorial connection in their era of emergency. In focusing on the years from 1964 up to the outbreak of the 1982 Conflict, the thesis takes a longer and more nuanced view of emergency in relation to the Islands than that afforded by the prevailing scholarship of the islands, which sees the 1982 Conflict as *the* Falkland emergency.

1.3 Key developments in, and concerning, the Falklands 1964 -1982

The rationale for the choice of periodization of 1964-1982 is that, in these years, the future of the Falklands became increasingly uncertain. Two key moments in 1964 and 1965 respectively presaged geopolitical change, effectively marking the onset of the Falklands' slow emergency with its corrosive erosion and destabilisation of the Islands as a British territorial entity; in this way a difficult present anticipated an insecure future and cession to Argentina.

The first of these came on 8 September 1964, when Argentine aviator Miguel Fitzgerald flew from Rio Gallegos to Stanley racecourse, planted the Argentine flag and left a note asserting Argentine sovereignty. This flight's significance, as both a disruptive performance of Argentine sovereignty ambitions, and an unsettling harbinger of territorial change, can be seen as amplified by UN Resolution 2065, the second key moment which marks the start of the slow emergency era.

In a striking diplomatic breakthrough for Argentina, UN Resolution 2065 of 16 December 1965, formally recognised the existence of a sovereignty dispute over the Islands. In passing this, the UN General Assembly noted the 'interests' rather than 'wishes' of the Falkland Islanders, by implication opening up the distinct possibility of an Argentine future for the Islands against Islander wishes.

Both these events delivered a similar message to Falkland Islanders; Argentina and United Nations members were now actively questioning and challenging the *status quo* of the Falkland Islands as a British colony. The uncertainty these developments exacerbated existing socio-economic difficulties in the Islands, intensifying slow emergency processes which would corrosively eat away at the continuation of the Falklands as a British colony.

A rapid succession of disruptive developments for Islanders now followed; in September 1966 a DC4 was hijacked by the nationalist Argentine Condor Youth group, and diverted to Stanley racecourse, again highlighting the Islands' aerial vulnerability. British readiness to de-escalate this 36 hour hijacking, including deporting rather than arresting the hijackers, did little to reassure Islanders about the United Kingdom's commitment to the Falklands.

Confirmation that the territorial future for the Islands was in play came in early 1968, when it became apparent that the British government was seeking a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Argentina, which would transfer the Islanders to Argentine sovereignty. This prompted the March 1968 appeal from the four unofficial members of the Falklands Executive Council (ExCo), the colony's key governing body, to the British Parliament. With the support of the newly formed Falkland Islands Emergency Committee, as well as discreet backing from Governor Haskard, this initiative was frustrated, notwithstanding Lord Chalfont's unsuccessful November 1968 visit to sell the idea of territorial change to Islanders.

The July 1971 Communications Agreement, an Anglo-Argentine initiative to foster air and cultural links between Argentina and the Falklands, offered a softer way to develop Islander interactions and connections with Argentina than a sovereignty transfer. The importance of this Agreement was heightened by the December 1971 withdrawal of the passenger carrying RMS *Darwin*, which ceded practical control of transportation on and off the islands to Argentina; similarly, the eponymously named Anglo-Argentine YPF Agreement of 1974 gave Argentina's state oil company YPF a monopoly over the Islands' oil supplies.

In the same year as the Argentine Navy fired on the RRS *Shackleton* (February), and occupied the Falkland Islands Dependency of Southern Thule (September), the 1976 Shackleton Report was released (August). Its suggestion of ways in which the viability of the Falklands could be developed (for example, developing oil and fisheries, and extending Stanley's permanent airfield) proved awkward for the Anglo-Argentine relationship, and the report was soon shelved. By 1977, sovereignty talks were resumed, and the struggling colony was in 1980 offered leaseback, an arrangement under which sovereignty would be transferred to Argentina but British administration would continue for a limited period. As with Chalfont in 1968, Nicholas Ridley's 1980 ministerial visit to the Islands ended unsuccessfully, and attritional slow emergency looked set to reduce the Islands to the point of non-viability. This decay process was disrupted by the Argentine occupation of the Islands from 2 April to 14 June 1982.

1.4 A brief introduction to the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas

This section provides a brief introduction to the Falklands, both as general background but also to provide the context as to why the colony was structurally vulnerable to slow emergency. Mercau has noted of this southern oceanic archipelago that

> One feature peculiar to the Falkland Islands was their remoteness and marginality; their place in the British imagination was virtually non-existent and, until the 1982 conflict, few in the UK would even have been able to locate them on a map (2019 p.29)

Mercau (2019) identifies the importance of the Islands' remoteness and marginality (2019 p.29), and both will be addressed in this section, with a particular emphasis on marginality of the Islands, which is a key reason why slow emergency was readily available as a means for the British government to put pressure on the Islanders.

Geographically the Falklands or las Malvinas are remote; the islands are situated in the expanse of the South West Atlantic, the nearest continental land mass being South America 300 miles away, with Rio Gallegos, Argentina, as its the nearest point. The 7,500 miles between the Falklands and the North Atlantic-located United Kingdom renders the Islands even more

geographically remote in respect of the distance separating this archipelagic territory from this colonial power that, in the 1840s, established the Falkland Islander population



Fig 1.4 Reference map of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands
Source: Chater, T. 'The Falklands', Penna Press, St. Albans, 1993

The archipelago, the largest in the South Atlantic, consists of two main Islands, East and West Falkland, or Isla Soledad and Gran Malvina respectively, and hundreds of smaller islands; in total, the archipelago is approximately 4,700 square miles (Gibran 1998 16). The Islands too have a cool oceanic climate, with highly variable weather conditions; whilst gale-force winds are common, the temperature range - from approximately 21 degrees Celsius to minus 11 degrees Celsius - is not extreme (Gibran 1998 17).

Unlike other settler territories of the British Empire, the Falklands' remote geography, and climate, attracted few colonists, and compensations of land and other wealth for such challenges (in contrast with, say, more remote regions of Canada and Australia) were rarely on offer. From the mid 19th century onwards, Falkland Islands economic life, and much of the Islands' land, had come into the possession of the Falkland Islands Company, which effectively converted the colony into a great sheep-ranching concern, with neo-feudal conditions for its landless employees.

In *The Handy Atlas of the British Empire* (Bartholomew 1904, p.xvi-xvii) the Islands, the size of the population was noted as being a little over 2,000:

> Falkland Islands, group in the South Atlantic, east of Magellan Straits. There area about 200 islands in all, of which only East and West Falkland are of any large extent. Area 6500 sq. m., Pop. 2050. Cap. Port Stanley (916) inh., an Admiralty coaling station […] Crown Colony.

The population of the Falkland Islands, largely of British or European descent, continued to be stubbornly marginal, with the 1931 census recording a maximum population for the Islands of 2,392, and the 1980 census a figure of only 1813 (Gibran 1998 17). Those Islanders who did not live in the Camp, that is in the rest of the Falklands outside of the Lilliputian capital Stanley, were likely to be working in some capacity for the colony's government, in small business, ship repairs, or retired.

Whereas the development of the Falkland Islands can, in many ways, be seen as a history of marginality, there has been a similar marginality in historical agreement about the Islands' discovery and 'rightful' sovereignty. Contested narratives about which Europeans first discovered the Islands are used to fortify British and Argentine sovereignty positions, and offer very different accounts of the discovery of the Islands, the British claiming Captain John Davies did so in 1592, whilst Argentine histories counter-claim French, Spanish and Portuguese sightings of the islands throughout the 16th century.

By 1690 the British, who claim the first record landing in the Islands in that year began to call these Islands 'the Falkland Islands' after Viscount Falkland; in contrast French sailors, who are recorded as landing in 1701, named them *les Isles Malouines*, after the French Atlantic port of St. Malo, from which the

Spanish name of *las Islas Malvinas* is derived. With no indigenous population, the Islands remained uninhabited until 1764 when the French established a colony at Port Louis, East Falkland/Isla Soledad against Spanish wishes. Spanish-French competition over the Islands was however short-lived, with France leaving its Port Louis settlement in 1767. This did not, however resolve (for the Spanish) the British presence in West Falkland, which had been recently established in 1764; following the 1770-1 Anglo-Spanish confrontation over London's presence in West Falkland/Gran Malvina, Britain withdrew from the archipelago. Britain's presence ceased until 1833, when it seized control of the Islands from the *Confederación Argentina,* the successor state to Spain, and thereafter established a British colony (see Royle 2001 pp.135-6 for details of early Falkland history)

Notwithstanding the ensuing British settlement of the Ilsands, which emerged from the 1840s on, Argentina continued to maintain its claim, which Yale legal scholar Julius Goebel awkwardly (for Britain) endorsed in his influential *Struggle for the Falkland Islands* (1927); such academic backing proved useful in reinvigorating Argentine sentiment towards the Islands in the mid twentieth century. With the post 1945 dismantling of the British Empire, a new opportunity for Argentina to reverse the 1833 occupation/usurpation *of las Malvinas* appeared had arrived, and Argentine President Peron actively encouraged a *Malvinero* mentality to support the cause of 'la recuperación de las Malvinas', the recovery of the Falkands.

The establishment of a settled, British descended Islander population in the years since the 1840s ensured that a new 'actor' – the Islanders - now existed, who were opposed to Argentine territorial and sovereignty ambitions. Faced with both British disinterest and Argentine territorial ambition in the post 1945 era of decolonsiation, the future of the Islands as a British colony looked less certain. As Hepple observed:

> For many Islanders, the future of the Falklands mattered immensely as their home, whereas to the British they were inevitably a remote, low priority …British writers (and policy makers) did not evaluate the islands' potential in geopolitical terms (Hepple in Kelly and Child 1988, pp. 228-9).

As will be seen, it was from 1964 that the struggle for the future of the Falkland Islands became pronounced, especially with the passing of UN Resolution 2065. This was the point at which longstanding structural socio-economic weaknesses in the Falkland Islands became useful pressure points, as well as a reason for not continuing the colony, in what the thesis sees as the Islands' slow emergency era (1964 up to 1982).

1.5 Structure of chapters

The thesis seeks to develop an understanding of slow emergency through addressing different aspects of the emergency as experienced in the Falkland Islands in the period from 1964 up to the 1982 Conflict, for example political insecurity, socio-economic difficulties, a shrinking demographic, and aerial vulnerability. With slow emergency as the overarching theme/argument running through the thesis, each chapter is used to focus on a key area, specifically chapter 4 on 1968; chapter 5 on aerial matters; chapter 6 on socio-economic decline and the 1976 Shackleton report; and chapter 7 on gender and emotion. It should be noted that the concepts and ideas addressed in these chapters, such as loyalty, volume, gender and race, whilst important, come lower down the register of ideas and concepts used in this thesis than that of slow emergency.

In this way, using the lens of slow emergency, the thesis seeks to offer new interpretations of the Falklands as a British territory in this time, and to mobilise new understandings of emergency as a theoretical concept (see Adey and Anderson (2011), Neocleus (2006), and Aradau (2012)). Its focus is specifically on the Islanders and Islands, and quotidian/everyday experiences; it is not therefore intended to be a traditional diplomatic history such as Peter Beck's (1998), though significant diplomatic developments are addressed. Rather the selection of these chapters is designed to highlight particular aspects of slow emergency in the Falklands within the periodisation of 1964 up to the 1982 Conflict, with the empirical content illustrative of this. Drawing on extensive fieldwork undertaken by the author in the Falklands and Ireland

on the quotidian experiences of slow emergency, as well as research undertaken at Royal Holloway, University of London and the National University of Singapore, the thesis consists of seven chapters.

It should be noted that the use of each of the terms 'Falkland', 'Malvinas' or 'Falkland/Malvinas' in these chapters is applied as suits the particular context. For example, when specifically referring to developments in, or concerning, the Islands as a British colony, 'Falkland' is applied. When referring to the Islands in terms of a broader geopolitical, or specifically Argentine, context, the terms 'Falkland/Malvinas' and 'Malvinas' respectively, are used. Enabling the thesis to use more than one term to describe the Islands thus allows for a more contextually focused and nuanced handling of empirical content. Just as there has been no British colony called the 'Falkland/Malvinas', neither does simply calling the Islands 'Falklands' reflect the wider geopolitics, and Argentine dimension. Usage of any of these names for the Islands is not intended to denote any assumption, or position, on sovereignty by the thesis.

This Chapter (1) seeks introduces the thesis, and set out the main focus areas empirically and theoretically. It uses Briggs' vignette of Islanders in the Falklands Conflict era to introduce emergency, after which the chapter positions slow emergency and delivering an Islander based study as its two main aims. It positions slow emergency as the key argument running through the thesis, and explains the rationale for the periodisation of 1964 up to (but not including) the 1982 Conflict. It also offers an introduction to the Islands, after which the chapter structure is explained.

Chapter 2 is the literature review. The aim of this chapter is to make plain what slow emergency adds to the existing literature, describing Islanders experiences, which have hitherto not been studied in detail, and also provide a new framework for understanding British government policy in this period. It explains that while the main empirical of the thesis is on gaining new understanding of the Islanders' experience, the thesis also seeks to offer new perspectives on British government policy. After an introduction to the Islands, it offers an historiographical overview and sets out how the thesis advances

our understanding of the Islander experience, with theorisation, notably the work of Adey and Anderson (2011), Aradau (2012), Neocleus (2006), and Thrift (2000), particularly helping us to gain new insights into slow emergency. In this way, slow emergency is seen as integrating the Falklands into wider debate about decolonisation and the end of the British Empire. Lower order areas of focus such as volume, loyalty, chronopolitics, gender, race, affect, performance and visuality are also considered.

Chapter 3 reflects on 'Methods and Sources' and reviews the processes pursued, and challenges encountered, in gathering and deploying the material used in this project. It seeks to provide a clear overview of the research process for this project, including fieldwork in the Falklands. A particular challenge was that, in a community of rarely more than two thousand people, the range of available resources was finite; the challenges of interviewing in a small community and triangulating these with other written sources is considered. The importance of using quotations from Islanders and visual material is raised, and the value of these materials for giving voice to Islanders in the thesis.

Chapter 4 focuses on a key episode in the Falklands' slow emergency through '1968, Loyalty and All That: Political Emergency, Loyal Struggle and the Falklands Territorial Future'; it examines the sudden 1968 acceleration of slow emergency for Islanders, during which the British government proactively sought to reach a solution with Argentina to the Falkland Islands 'problem', according to which sovereignty over the Islands would be relinquished in favour of Argentina. This prospective future prompted the Falkland Islands Emergency Committee to be formed (so, literally, bringing emergency into Falkland discourse), and the first ever ministerial visit to the Islands by Lord Chalfont. Particular attention is paid to the role of Falklands Governor Sir Cosmo Haskard, who was interviewed for this project; the role of Islander loyalty and domestic loyal British support, including occasions of what the thesis calls 'angry loyalty', are also considered. In terms of slow emergency, much of 1968 represented an acceleration and acute intensification of emergency for Islanders as the Islands territorial sovereignty was seriously

brought into question. This was, however followed by a deceleration late in the year when, in the face of Islander objection and domestic criticism, the British government pulled back from arranging a definitive settlement with Argentina over the Islands.

Chapter 5 unpacks 'Volume Control: Volumetric Emergency in the Falklands/Malvinas in the period prior to the 1982 Conflict' which, particularly through drawing on Elden's (2013) theoretical work, seeks to address the volumetric aspect of the Falklands' slow emergency era. It considers the 1964 and 1968 volumetric incursions of the Argentine aviator Miguel Fitzgerald, and the 1966 Argentine nationalist Condor hijacking incident in the Falklands. It also addresses the significance of the 1971 Anglo-Argentine Communications Agreement, and argues that Argentina established a de facto 'Aero-tectorate'. In this way, the importance of volume as a component of the Falklands slow emergency is addressed.

Chapter 6, as its title suggests, develops the concept of 'Slow Emergency in the mid-1970s Falklands', in which emergency in this era is considered with an empirical focus on the 1976 Shackleton Report, and the governorship of Neville French (1975-77). In addressing symptoms and cause of slow emergency in the Falklands, the Shackleton Report offered recommendations to address the ongoing deterioration of socio-economic conditions, potentially offering hope to Islanders beleaguered of an amelioration, or even end, of slow emergency conditions. Its subsequent neutralisation by the Foreign Office ironically ended up making the Report another element of the Falklands' slow emergency. Governor French's rule at this time proved a source of disquiet and soon aroused significant opposition amongst Islanders, resulting in a political emergency, an accelerative episode which cost him his gubernatorial role.

Chapter 7 considers how slow emergency affected gender and race, with a particular focus on women's agency and manifestations of violence. Entitled 'The 'Angry Islander' Controversy: Bodily Emergency in the mid to latter 1970s Falklands', this chapter addresses the demographic emergency

affecting the Islands' population and Islander responses to this. This population decline was made more acute by the presence of Royal Marines who, somewhat counter-intuitively, undermined the long-term security and sustainability of the Islands, through marrying young Islander women. It then proceeds to unpack the nature and significance of what the thesis terms the 'Angry Islander' Controversy of November-December 1978. This chapter considers the conundrum of the Royal Marines' presence in the Falklands: intended to deter a military emergency, on a quotidian basis the Marines intensified the slow emergency affecting the Islands, with the demographic shortfall caused by the loss of young women accelerating the likely demise of the colony as a viable community.

Chapter Two – Literature Review

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an introduction to what slow emergency involves, and a review of key literatures which have both informed and shaped this research. In addition to its focus on emergency in its own right, this chapter will also consider how slow emergency relates to other concepts and ideas such as volume, loyalty, gender and race; while these are important in their own right, they are lower order concepts to slow emergency.

2.1 What Slow Emergency adds to our understanding of Falkland Islander Experience

Slow Emergency is used to address the main empirical focus of this thesis, that is the Islander experience from 1964 to the outbreak of the 1982 Conflict. This theorisation provides a means to see and describe Islander experiences which have not been studied in detail before; it also provides an important framework for interpreting British government policy, which while previously studied, has not until now been interpreted in this way.

As I researched the Falkland Islanders' experience in this period, it increasingly struck me that there was an everyday emergency facing the Islanders. Given that the Falkland Islanders' experience forms the main empirical focus of this project, it was vital not only to reflect not only on what this encompassed, but also to develop a theorisation which would further helps us understand the Islanders' experience. I also hoped that such a theoretical framework could be productively applied /adapted to other political geographic cases, in particular connecting with debates about decolonisation and the end of empire. Nixon's concept of slow violence (2011) and work on emergency, notably Adey and Anderson (2011), would provide the theoretical background from which slow emergency was developed. Before going further, it is important to consider Falklands historiography, and why this left a lacuna which slow emergency helps fill.

2.2 Falklands – historiographic understandings

Whilst there has been important academic attention on the Islands prior to 1982, including Peter Beck (1988), Lawrence Freedman (1988, 1990, 2005) and Klaus Dodds (2002), Aaron Donaghy (2014), scholarship about the micro-population of a geographically remote territory in the Southern Ocean has been noticeably limited. The 1982 Anglo-Argentine Conflict has meant that the Falkland Islander experience is often viewed through the prism of '1982 and all that', in which 1982 is viewed as a kind of 'Year Zero', with developments of the latter 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s becoming interpreted as part of its causation, or alternatively ignored rather than studied in their own right. Freedman's two-volume *'Official History of the Falklands Campaign'* (2005) is a clear example of a '1982' framing, in which his attention to the Falkland Islanders is positioned in the relation to the Conflict, as indicated in the title of his first volume '*The Origins of the Falklands War'* (2005), with the second volume entitled *'War and Diplomacy'* (2005). Even where there has been a recognition that there was more to the Falklands Conflict than '1982 and all that', as in and Jenkins' reference to the preceding period as 'The Seventeen Years War' (Hastings and Jenkins 1983 p.15), this description is still seen in the context of 'war' rather than Islander experience. Where the Islanders have been considered, it has usually been more as a casual element in the 1982 Conflict than as a subject in their own right.

Such historiography as exists frequently depicts the Islanders as expendable and disposable. Mercau states with 'It was clear that, in the eyes of the Foreigh Office officials, Britain was neither willing nor able to keep the colony indefinitely….. Without any material to invest in the Islands' future, a settlement with Argentina appeared to be the logical way forward' (2019 pp. 29-30). Regarding the Islanders' future, Bicheno argues 'There can be little doubt the intention was to force them into the arms of Argentina' (2007 p.40); according to Royle, the Falklands' economy and society was 'rather moribund' (2001, p.61) and Hastings and Jenkins (1983) claimed that the aim was for them 'eventually to be assimilated into the essentially European mainland community' (1983 p. 16). Popular historian of the Islands Cawkell took the

view that 'Successive British government… [had shown a] negative attitude to the Islanders, regarding them as small things that had to be adjusted' (Cawkell 2001 p.128).

That the Islanders were vulnerable to manipulation and potentially disposable is self-evident. Freedman states 'there were not many of them and their numbers were dwindling' (2005 p18), Gonzales sees them as a 'miniscule and exposed population' (2014 141), and Hastings and Jenkins state that in number they were 'almost comically small' (1983 p.25). Bicheno saw them as 'Unsophisticated and shy, all they wanted was to be left alone' (2007 p. 36) yet they faced 'a predicament which seemed particularly stark: they felt they were being handed over to an enemy' Hastings and Jenkins (1983, p.25). If unwilling to embrace an Argentine future, relocation to a Scottish island was one option mooted (Freedman 2005 p18), about which Middlebrook speculated that 'It might have been better to persuade the Islanders to leave their Islands and settle elsewhere – there was already a Falkland 'settlement' near Auckland in New Zealand' (Middlebrook 1987 p.87).

The British national interest clearly 'overrode' that of the Islanders (Hastings and Jenkins 1983 p.16), of which Livingston (2018) observed, in relation to the 1968 bid to effect a territorial transfer of the Islands, that;

> Chalfont's views reflected those of Foreign Office, which emphasised the 'national interest' prioritises political and commercial relations with Latin America above the 1900 islanders (Livingston 2018 p.5).

She also rejects the view that 'the FCO pursued a policy of appeasement towards Argentina' (Livingston 2018 p.227) in the years up to 1982, noting that there was a British governmental wish to resolve the matter, which has been highlighted by Gibran, who saw 'the government's determined effort to promote a negotiated settlement with Argentina in the period after 1976' (1998, p.45).

Yet, as Dongahy (2014) notes, British government efforts to manage and direct the Islanders after the failure of Chalfont's 1968 initiative, took a different and more subtle approach, and involved playing a longer game;

> After the 1968 diplomacy had ended in disaster, and facing mounting pressure at the UN, the Foreign Office devised a new strategy. They persuaded their counterparts in Buenos Aires to conduct a 'hearts and minds' strategy with the Islanders, thereby demonstrating the benefits of a close relationship with Argentina …. The objective was transparent. The Islanders beset by economic problems, would gradually come to accept that prospects depended on Argentina rather than Britain. This theory perfectly suited the British government, reluctant to bear the costs of sustaining the Islands from such a vast distance (Dongahy 2014 pp. 11-12).

What Donaghy describes is the wider contextual setting of slow emergency as experienced by Islanders, that is exploiting the colony's ongoing decline and neglect provided the British government with a useful (and highly cost-effective) means to exert pressure on Islanders to update themselves geopolitically, and re-orientate towards Argentina. Interestingly he calls this approach 'a theory' (Dongahy 2014 p12), with the clear implication that this method of political leverage over the Islanders was intended, not accidental. He also notes how Islanders increasingly viewed ensuing benefits from Argentina (such as travel, educational and cultural opportunities under the 1971 Communications Agreement) 'sceptically' (Dongahy 2014 p.12), highlighting that there were clear limits to the effectiveness of this approach. This argument, however, risks placing too much emphasis on such limitations, when the overall declinist trend was remorselessly hollowing out the viability of the colony.

Where slow emergency adds particular value to scholarship is that it provides a new way to bring together understand and interpret the Islander experience in the years up to the 1982 Conflict. As theorization it highlights the importance of decline over time as a subtle but cogent means to change the territorial status quo, both through undermining the viability of the status quo and support for it amongst those living there. In the case of the Falklands, either Islanders would have to engage with the new reality of an Argentine takeover or leave the Islands, both courses enabling Britain to divest itself of a

failing colony, and so remove a major source of contention from Anglo-Argentine relations.

Slow emergency enables us to see the elements of decline (such as those cited in the historiography) in a new framing, not as individual pieces in the disintegration of the colony of the Falkland Islands, but as part of an engine of decline, each element (for example, depopulation) functioning as cogs working together at different speeds to end viability of the colony. That this slow emergency process was prematurely and abruptly interrupted by the 1982 Conflict does not mean it was not already working; the process was already approaching the point where the Falklands were barely viable. Rather, as its name suggests, being a slow process, more time was needed time to run its course.

What the slow emergency does is for the first time to highlight the experience of those on the receiving end of these processes, namely the Islanders, a deliberate reversal of the telescope, so that slow emergency is understood on the ground. In this way the lens of slow emergency help us understand how this beleaguered Islander micro-community, faced with socio-economic decline/demise and the prospect of an unwanted territorial takeover, experienced the daily manifestations of this process.

Slow Emergency not only adds value to our reading of the Falklands in our periodisation, but also provides an important new way to join up the Falklands with the era of decolonisation, and in particular the Emergencies that British colonial authorities oversaw. The term ‘emergency’ was itself employed by the Falkland Islands Emergency Committee in 1968, and slow emergency provides a means to connect the Falkland Islander experience of this time, unique though it was, to the broader experience of colonial emergency and end of empire.

2.3 Developing a conceptualisation of slow emergency

As the empirical focus of the Falklands will be used to show, slow emergency provides a useful tool for examining a territory on the geopolitical margins, rather than at the centre, where detrimental change is happening; such places are likely to experience slower rather than faster emergency, being away from dynamic centres of power.

This approach opens the way for Islanders' exposure to everyday emergency to be considered, and moves beyond the traditional focus of Anglo-Argentine high diplomacy such as Beck (2002) or Freedman and Gamba (1990) have written about. I identified four sub-emergencies of slow emergency in Table 2.1, made up of these areas; socio-economic: geopolitical: governance and information control respectively. Additionally, as later set out in 4.1, logics of pre-emption, prevention and conditioning are also applied to the respective sub-emergency descriptor.

Constituent elements of the Falklands' slow emergency (as experienced by Falkland Islanders and British authorities)	*Sub-emergency Descriptor:*
Sub-emergency 1: Socio-economic	*Coping with ongoing socio-economic decline. Attitude to present/future.*
Sub-emergency 2: Geopolitical	*Containing/managing Argentine pressure for the eventual cession of the Falklands.*
Sub-emergency 3: Governance	*Corrosion of trust between the British authorities and Falkland Islanders.*
Sub-emergency 4: Information control	*Controlling dissemination of information to Islanders/ censorship over time.*

Table 2.1 Constituent elements of the Falklands' slow emergency

Slow emergency is, according to the framework, conceived as a collective term for four sub-emergencies; the overall acceleration or deceleration of slow emergency on the Falklands or elsewhere, at any one time, is relational to the

intensification or de-intensification of these sub-emergencies. As a case in point, an intensification of sub-emergency 2 (geopolitical) would result from an incident with Argentina, such as happened in 1976 when the Argentine Navy fired on the RRS *Shackleton*, near the Falklands; thereafter, as happened tensions may recede somewhat, until another disruptive occasion. Different sub-emergencies may also intensify or de-intensify synchronously, accelerating or decelerating slow emergency accordingly.

Whatever the speed of slow emergency was at any one time, as the term itself suggests, there is the real risk that slow emergency may destroy the polity item it is affecting. Sub-emergency 1 (socio-economic) lies at the heart of slow emergency, and 'stuck' most to the Falklands; the Islands were approaching the point of non-viability owing to depopulation and general-socio-economic neglect. This intensity of this sub-emergency was serious, to the degree that the Falklands appeared close to being without a demographic future, which irrespective of Argentina, would mean the end of the colony.

A sub-emergency intensification weakens the Falklands as a geopolitical entity during slow emergency, but sub-emergency 1 (socio-economic) was existential, even more so than sub-emergency 2 (geopolitical). Potentially, the Islander community could have continued to live under Argentine rule, but without an Islander population then there was literally no future for the Falkland Islanders as a people (although a successor population of Malvinas Islanders could be established on the Islands).

Underpinning the geopolitical dimension of slow emergency in the Falklands was that, for Buenos Aires the Islands were regarded as territorially integral to the Argentine Republic; for Britain, they were a territorial appendage, an appendix of a deceased empire. In this slow emergency era, the former's determination to recover the Islands met with the latter's prevarication; until such time as matters could be resolved by British diplomatic efforts, as nearly happened in 1968, the ups and downs of Anglo-Argentine diplomacy were effectively hard-wired to ensure that there would be heightened and lessened intensities of sub-emergency 2 (geopolitical) in slow emergency.

As will become evident in this thesis, the hydra of emergencies that composed slow emergency manifested themselves in many different ways – the loss of women and female reproductivity from the colony; multiple infrastructural inadequacies; numerous political and expert visits to address Falklands emergencies, the former (as with Chalfont's 1968 visit) having the capacity to engender protest; communications and mobilities; and disruptive reportage/comment, both locally and in Britain, particularly in the pages of the *Falkland Islands Times* and *Daily Express*, respectively.

2.4 Scholarship on emergency

In this section I review emergency-related literature that has helped me see how the concept of slow emergency could be developed.

Until recently, critical geopolitics has had little to say about emergency as a concept. Emergency as a term has often been positioned in a legal, medical or civil planning context, and yet in geopolitics, where emergency can be very productive, it has received comparatively little attention.

In foregrounding emergency in geopolitics, it is useful to consider the type of framings emergency has had in other areas, notably legal, medical and civil planning. To begin with emergency in a legal context, Stephen Morton (2013, p. 2) – who notes that 'a state of emergency […] is [a] profoundly elusive and ambivalent concept' – offers this explanation as to what it encompasses:

> Countries are considered to be in a 'state of emergency' when executive power is used to suspend the normal rule of law, and power is transferred to police or military. Emergency legislation is often associated with totalitarian governments or so-called terrorist states, but liberal democracies have also made use of emergency law in times of social and political crisis (Morton 2013, p. 1).

A profound conundrum inherent in legal forms of emergency is how emergency is legally introduced or implemented, given that it suspends existing legislation. John Reynolds maps out ways in which potentially oxymoronic legal emergency is effected:

> a number of mechanisms are triggered by a declared state of emergency. For one, the government is authorised to enact discrete administrative emergency regulations to circumvent 'normal' constitutional guarantees […] As regards international law, formal declaration of a public emergency allows the state to trigger the regime of emergency derogations contained in international human rights treaties, and to suspend certain legal obligations in responding to a "threat to the life of the nation" (Reynolds 2010, p. 43).

Yet, the conundrum of emergency remains, using law to suspend law. Agamben sought to address this in *State of Exception* (2005) and in so doing helped activate further interest in emergency, and what it can mean in a geopolitical, and interdisciplinary, context. Morton, whose *States of Emergency; Colonialism, Literature and Law* (2013) has done much to advance interdisciplinary understanding of emergency, draws our attention to how Agamben symbolically crossed through the word law with an erasure mark, to help articulate its binary exterior/interior nature:

> By placing the word 'law' under erasure, Agamben emphasises how the force of law used to suspend the normal role of law produces and maintains the state of exception from a position of exteriority to the state of exception as soon as the law is suspended. Yet at the same time, Agamben also emphasises that the state of exception is also 'interior' to the law in so far as the force of law is required to suspend the rule of law in a time of emergency. (Morton 2013, p. 4).

Yet emergency has been positioned in other ways too, such as in the medical and civil planning domains. A recent example of its usage can be seen in the rationalities behind a recent Harvard International Review article *Epidemics: Neglected Emergencies?* (Cone and Rull 2016) which examines the emergency of measles epidemic in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and its wider significance. The term emergencies is directly associated with epidemics, that is a medical/public health framing is given to emergency, in which the term is applied to describe the urgency and gravity of a medical situation out of control. In similar fashion, planning for civil emergencies also pays much attention to emergency in discourse. Indeed, as will be considered later, it is significant that in advancing critical geopolitical understandings of emergency, Adey and Anderson (2011) made much use of UK civil contingency planning schema in unpacking emergency conceptually. MI5's website helps to illustrate the importance attached to emergency in its work

and lexicon, providing its own framing or definition of what, for M15, emergency is considered to involve:

> Emergencies cover a wide range of situations. This includes not just man-made events such as terrorist attacks but also natural and accidental events such as disease outbreaks, industrial accidents and flooding. Responding to emergencies is usually the task of a number of agencies, including local authorities. In most instances, the police or one of the other emergency services will lead the response.

Source: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/emergency-planning

With emergency a term thus used in a number of key areas, developing emergency geopolitics offers much potential; this in turn led me to see it an area that would help critically unpack key aspects of Falklands geopolitics. It is wide-ranging, and involves areas such as: how a state deals with a crisis; how mobility, borders and regulation of objects are remade through emergency; how laws are suspended; and how emergency laws produce exceptional geopolitics. The attention scholars such as Anderson, Adey, Neocleous and Virilio have paid post 9/11 to emergency has helped bring emergency significantly more into critical geopolitical discourse.

This section has two key purposes: firstly, it will consider the relationality of emergency and speed, and secondly it will engage with scholarship that is productive in helping us to conceptualise emergency geopolitics, not least in unpacking how slow emergency functions.

To begin, Anderson and Adey (2015) have provided this definition of what emergency involves: 'Typically, emergency refers to an event or situation of limited but unknown duration in which some form of harm or damage is in the midst of emerging (Anderson and Adey 2015, p. 4). The themes of time, and injurious consequences which may result from this, are evident here. There is an unspoken assumption of speed, as implied in the phrase 'in the midst of emerging', but what does this mean for emergency geopolitics? Implicit, if not explicit, is the assumption of a fast speed, whether this is intended or not. Anderson and Adeys' (2011, pp. 1098-99) findings have inevitably been

caught up in a time-sensitive/pressurized reading as they are based on citing UK civil contingency planning schema, in which:

> The present is perched on the threshold of disruption once a range of threatening events have been identified and registered […] the action that responders prepare for occurs in an interval between the occurrence of the event and the expansion of that event from the initial site or set of sites (Anderson and Adey 2011, p. 1099).

There is a clear sense of a fast-moving imminent emergency; this immediacy of emergency, and its implied speed, are palpable in this cited civil contingency planning schema, reinforced through assumptions of 'correct, timely action' (Anderson and Adey 2011, p. 1099). Yet such renderings, implicitly based on a 'fast' reading of the unfolding of emergency, serve to obscure the more subtle, less dramatic dynamic of slow emerging emergency, which is particularly pertinent for geopolitics.

As an example of emergency geopolitics at state actor level, the progressive disintegration of an empire over time can be seen in the Ottoman Empire. The so-called 'the sick man of Europe' of the 19th and early 20th century experienced slow imperial decline, with instances of accelerated emergency such as the 1877-78 Eastern Crisis, and of deceleration such as the 1878 Berlin Congress. Nonetheless, the ongoing slow decline of the Turkish Empire meant that from 1908, after the Young Turk Revolution, 'The Empire that Europeans had dismissed as 'the sick man' of Europe was about to succumb' (Findley 2010, p. 193). This notion of 'sick' – that is, it was not 'well' enough to exercise full agency over a period of time - represents a slow emergency framing for Turkey which has endured to the 21st century, prompting Dimitris Livanios (2006, p. 308) to ask whether, in respect of Turkey and the vicissitudes – or slow emergency – of its relations with the EU, is there 'A way out for the sick man?' Unlike the temporally extended usage of the phrase 'sick man', the Turkish Empire itself disappeared, its final phase (1908-1922) of disintegration of the Turkish Empire representing the acceleration of a process that had been going on for many decades.

Inter-ethnic persecutions over decades, which suddenly accelerate to a new intensity – as happened between the Hutus and Tutsis of Rwanda in April to June 1993 – provide a further example of how slow emergency is a process that can extend over generations with acceleration and deceleration, before reaching its denouement, prior to the 1990 genocide, in which 800,000 Rwandans, predominately Tutsis, perished:

> Hutu-Tutsi violence had already broken out before independence, but in 1963 and 1964 perhaps 10,000 Tutsis were slaughtered in a planned and organised attack. The killings sparked a mass exodus of hundreds of thousands (the exact number is contested) of Tutsi into neighbouring countries. In 1973, a coup d'etat brought to power President Juvenal Habyarimana… Tutsi were [now] marginalised and discriminated against, but there were no more mass killings of Tutsi until the early 1990s (Smith 2012, p. 142).

In cases as geopolitically disparate as the Falklands, Turkey or Rwanda, it is clear emergency geopolitics has the potential to provide new perspectives over multiple temporalities. A move overtly slow 'approach' to emergency geopolitics allows for a 'drawn out' rather than fast reading of emergency, and so opens up new ways to unpack emergency geopolitics; this is particularly the case when extended temporality is involved.

Whatever its speed, emergency's capacity to be injurious over a longer, or shorter, time period remains, and the consequences of slow emergency can be as profound as a sudden emergency. In developing a speed-related understanding, Nixon's concept of slow violence (2011) has particular purchase, helping us to unpack what a more temporally graduated reading of emergency looks like: 'Violence, above all environmental violence needs to be seen – and deeply considered – as a contest not only over space, or bodies, or labor, but also over time (Nixon 2011, p. 8)'. This emphasis on the relationality of the application of violence to time is key; just as violence can be said to take place over a shorter or longer time frame, so too can emergency.

In unpacking the challenge of 'slow violence', Nixon (2011, p. 8) draws our attention to the contradictory binary implicit with it, 'the oxymoronic notion of slow violence'. As with emergency, violence is widely seen as immediate, visible and impactful, which lends itself to dramatic reportage; this, however, simply – and for practitioners of it, conveniently – serves to obscure more subtle, less obvious forms of violence over time.

There is also a real risk that embedded framings or understandings of emergency as a 'fast' phenomenon may actually prevent emergency being discerned, precisely because it is happening slowly. When an actual or anticipated emergency of 'limited but unknown duration' (Adey, Anderson and Graham 2015, p. 5) is 'obvious' and 'discerned', it is very likely be understood as 'fast', but that does not mean it is necessarily 'fast'. Indeed, actors' unawareness or inability to perceive that slow emergency, as with slow violence (Nixon 2011, p. 8), can operate 'under the radar' over an extended temporality, provides opportunities for those who do grasp this point. Nixon warns that when the 'challenge of visibility' (Nixon 2011, p. 5) is not met, an opportunity is created for 'patient' actors instigating violence – or in this case, emergency – to play a 'long game' in fulfillment of their aims. Undue attention to an immediately visible but transient emergency may, in fact, simply serve to divert attention from another, longer and more serious (slow) emergency. Slow emergency can, in this way, prove to be more injurious than a quickly contained fast emergency; in this sense, emergency over time has the potential to be a more dangerous form of emergency.

A particular benefit of emergency as a theoretical concept is its 'elasticity', and how this functions; he argues that '[i]t does not permit any exact definition, but merely points to a state of affairs calling for drastic action' (Neocleous 2006, p. 194). This in itself reinforces the point that an idée fixe of emergency as a 'fast' phenomenon is inaccurate. Through such conventional 'fast' understandings, emergency can be seen as having more in common with Virilio's 'hypermodern' emphasis on speed, rather than Nixon's' 'slow' perspective. Yet when emergencies unfold, they are a process rather than an event, and the longer the whole process has to run its course, the greater the

scope for the *emergence* of an emergency, within which 'lies the idea of something coming out of concealment or issuing from confinement by certain events' (Neocleous 2006, p. 194). This idea of concealment, which essentially is another framing of the 'challenge of visibility' (Nixon 2011, p. 5) when applied to emergency, also implies too that emergency can be subtly directed or weaponised as a technique to achieve certain desired ends, for instance as a discrete tool to persuade Falkland Islanders to see that the future was Argentine. However, the timing of an intensification of slow emergency is a crucial consideration when using it as a technique to pursue desired geopolitical outcomes. As a case in point, in 1980 the British Foreign Office sought – prematurely and so unsuccessfully – to maneuver 'squeezed' Islanders into accepting a 'leaseback' of the Falklands to Argentina. Although Islanders were in a geopolitical space 'where the conditions for sustaining life become increasingly but gradually degraded' (Nixon 2011, p. 3), that did not mean that sufficient numbers were ready to accept the rationality of accommodating Argentine sovereignty aspirations and accept leaseback. When actors seek to achieve desired outcomes through emergency geopolitics, slow emergency needs time as a technique to 'run its course', in this case to allow for mentalities to adjust to new rationalities.

This said, while it has been noted that 'life can be lived in and after emergency, but also in the presence of anticipated emergency' (Adey, Anderson and Graham 2015, p. 5), this is unlikely to be sustainable indefinitely. Emergency is a process felt by those on its receiving end, and in this sense can very much be seen as 'an experiential phenomena rather than a legal one' (Anderson and Adey 2011, p. 1102). When the cumulative effects of slow emergency – or its sudden intensification – occur, geopolitical change is likely to follow. In the Falklands case, the logic of slow emergency was the demise of the colony as a British geopolitical entity, involving a progressive degradation of the quality of Islander life and its viability as a community.

In extremis, however, slow emergency can extend to genocide, through the systematic loss of bodies, rights and life. Whilst not suggesting that the Falkland Islander experience prior to the 1982 Conflict is directly comparable

to genocide, or warrants the term 'slow genocide' (Zarni and Cowley 2014), it is worth noting that both communities face(d) a denouement in their continued existence. For Islanders, this was primarily one of political and socio-cultural demise, and for the Rohingyas their physical destruction, and accompanying political and socio-cultural demise.

Zarni and Cowley (2014) have unpacked the slow processes operative in 'Burma's slow-burning state-led process of deliberate destruction of the Rohingya as a population since 1978' (Zarni and Cowley 2014, p. 753); they identify four main 'mechanisms of the slow-burning genocide' (Zarni and Cowley 2014, p. 690), namely 'violence, forced migration, and illegalization'; 'marriage and birth restrictions'; 'deliberate destruction of social foundations'; and 'erasure of their legal and ethnic identity' (Zarni and Cowley 2014, p. 690). Elements of these mechanisms can be discerned in the Falkland Islander experience prior to 1982, for instance migration forced by the colony's socio-economic degradation; the assertion of Argentine bureaucratic control over Islander mobilities through the *tarjeta provisoria*, commonly known as 'the white card'; and the impending loss of British Citizenship for numerous Islanders under the 1981 British Nationality Act.

Slow emergency can in many ways be understood as a temporally-extended assemblage of processes presenting varying degrees of threat to life, its periodic acceleration resulting in an intensification of impact on life. This latter point, concerning the dangers inherent in acceleration, was pointedly invoked in an open, admonitory letter of 7 September 2017 to Aung San Suu Kyi by Archbishop Desmond Tutu. With regard to the speed-related intensification of the persecution of the Rohingya in 2017, he noted of the exacerbation of their plight: 'But what some have called 'ethnic cleansing' and others 'a slow genocide' has persisted – and recently accelerated (Tutu's letter in *The Guardian,* 7 September 2017)'. In such ways, accelerations of slow emergency amplify slow emergency's harmfulness to quotidian life and its exigencies, whether (for instance) in South East Asia or the South West Atlantic.

A further factor to consider affecting the speed of emergency is the

accelerative or declarative role of the crowd which, applied in the Falklands, holds particular purchase. As Aradau (2015) signposts, the chronopolitical agency of a crowd to act as an accelerant or decelerant in the development of emergency is important: 'Crowds have the potential to disrupt institutions and power relations, to disconnect from the status quo, and challenge the fictions of freedom and equality through momentary enactments of 'real' freedom and equality' (Aradau 2015, p. 171).

In terms of unpacking the role of the crowd in (slow) emergency, as experienced in the Falklands, a variety of types of crowd can be identified: politicised and emotional assemblage of bodies in a particular space, virtual radio or radio-telephone crowds and users/readers of local newsletter letter pages. What is common to these crowds is their potential to function as a technique to amplify the views of individual Islanders in resisting 'Argentine irredentism'; in this way, assembled bodies operate as an actor with potentially some measure of agency in influencing how the processes of slow emergency evolve.

The relationality of emergency to necropolitics is also important to consider, especially so when Europe's ongoing migrant crisis, itself a major slow emergency, with periodic intensification, highlights the relevance of a necro-dimension to emergency. However slow, or fast, Europe's migrant emergency is at any particular point in time, it nonetheless continues attritionally, with no prospect of an end in sight. Davies et al observe of the former Calais 'Jungle' that:

> the squalor and permanent wounding of the Calais camp can be likened to Mbembe's (2003:40) "death-worlds", where the conditions therein, as well as the political inactions of the state, assign its inhabitants the status of the "living dead" (2003:40); not actively killed - as would befit a "bare life" reading - but destined to suffer the harm and indignity of long-term cruel conditions (Davies et al 2017, p.18).

This idea – a technique of strategic, injurious state inaction through calculated neglect – holds some measure of purchase for the Falkands in the pre-1982 era. Whilst Mbembe's (2003, p. 40 cited in Davies et al 2017, p. 18) 'death-worlds' concept may be too strong a framing to apply to this empirical case, building on this perspective, the material in the subsequent chapters can

readily be used to substantiate 'decline-world' as an apt way to consider the Falklands at this time. Mbembe's 'living dead' framing can also, with some justification, be applied to Islanders at this time, with their community progressively allowed to decline into a zombie colony. Through this technology of zombification, that is the technique of 'sustained' British neglect and disinterest, the Islander population was 'kept alive but in a state of injury' (Mbembe 2003, p. 21, cited in Davies et al 2017, p. 7). Interestingly, Davies et al (2017, p. 7) refer to constriction as a necropolitical tool that can be discerned in Mbembean necropolitics, involving: 'being deprived of the opportunity or freedom to improve one's hazardous or miserable condition. This constriction can be operationalized through political action — but also through inaction'.

Unlike detained migrants, Islanders held the key to exit their own 'constrictive' South Atlantic 'Camp', should they have chosen to use it, that is accept the 'rationality' of accommodating Argentina and its sovereignty claim. This said, the utility of a necropolitical understanding of developments in the Falklands up to 1982 can be seen in British 'necropoliticking' techniques, such as when the 1976 Shackleton Report was sidelined, or when the withdrawal of HMS *Endurance* was announced (1981); the former symbolised 'no future' and the latter 'no protection' (Royal Marines garrison excepted), both necropolitically compounding slow emergency for Islanders, both actually and affectively.

Finally, in terms of further unpacking slow emergency, a schema of a supra-emergency, composed of sub-emergencies and logics, is used to offer a helpful framing for understanding how slow emergency functioned in the pre-1982 Falklands.

2.5 Emergency – historiographic understandings

Often framed as a transient part of the narrative of decolonisation and independence, colonial emergency has received less attention than it merits, both empirically and conceptually. One need only look at a number of significant texts on the British Empire, and many make no reference to it in their respective indexes, for example *The Lion's Share* (Porter 1984); *The Rise and Fall of the British Empire* (James 1994); *Cambridge Illustrated History of the British Empire* (Marshall et al 1996*)*; the *Oxford History of the British Empire in the Twentieth Century* (Brown and Louis 2001; *The British Empire* (Ferguson, 2003) and *Ghosts of Empire* (Kwarteng 2011). It is as if colonial emergency itself experienced a kind of slow emergency in its lack of empirical prominence.

Whilst there has been significant scholarship on colonial emergency, it has attention from a limited number of academics. Frank Furedi is notable as an early writer on emergency, publishing a number of articles, including one 'Creating a Breathing Space; the Political Management of Colonial Emergencies' which appeared in Robert Holland's seminal *Emergencies and Disorder in the European Empires after 1945* (Holland et al 1994). This book brought together key articles relating to British and European management of colonial emergency; academics whose work focused on British colonial states of emergency and is included in this collection include*;* John Kent (Egypt); A. J Stockwell (Malaya); Richard Rathbone (Ghana); Robert Holland, and David Anderson (Cyprus): John Darwin (Central African Federation). Over two decades since its publication, this remains a seminal collection on colonial emergency.

In recent years, colonial emergency has received attention in ways which have been uncomfortable for the British government, nowhere more so than Kenya. Caroline Elkins' research for her book, entitled *Britain's Gulag* (2005) in the United Kingdom and *Imperial Reckoning* in the United States (2005), confirmed that significant amounts of redacted material relating to the

management of colonial emergency has been secreted at Her Majesty's Government Communications Centre (HMGCC), at Hanslope Park, Buckinghamshire. Elkins' research on the Kenyan colonial emergency has proved expensive for the British government, providing the basis for a 2009 legal claim by five Mau Mau detention camps survivors, which resulted in 2013 in the British government having to pay millions of dollars to victims of colonial emergency human rights abuses in Kenya.

Cobain highlights the mass concealment of files from Kenya and other parts of the empire at the time of independence, naturally including those related to the handling of colonial emergency, describing it as 'one of the most extraordinary clandestine processes at the end of Empire; Operation Legacy' (Cobain 2016, p. 118). He draws attention to the scale of this officially sanctioned bid to suppress knowledge of – and so liability for – the excesses of colonial emergency and rule:

> Operation Legacy continued for more than two decades until the early 1970's. Hundreds if not thousands of British colonial officials were involved, as were Special Branch Officers and local MI5 liaison officers, all three branches of the armed forces, and countless service men and women (Cobain 2016, p. 130).

When one considers the geopolitical extent of the application of colonial emergency, it is hardly surprising that, as the secret repository of files at Hanslope Park confirms, the British authorities have been reluctant to encourage scholarship on colonial emergency. In this way, there has been a convenient alignment between the wishes of British officialdom and academics who have been content to position colonial emergency in the wider framing of independence and decolonisation.

Reflecting, however, the recent growth in interdisciplinary interest in colonial emergency, John Reynolds has approached colonial emergency from a legal perspective; this appears to be part of a wider interdisciplinary trend, as Stephen Morton's *States of Emergency: Colonialism, Literature and Law* (2013), which is written more from a literary and cultural perspective.

Reynolds provides an idea of the scale of the geographically extensive, decades long, British technique colonial emergency, highlighting that:

> There were states of emergency imposed in twenty-nine British colonial territories in total from 1946 onwards. The list reads like an A-Z of the Empire, from Aden to Zanzibar. These were simply the latest images of in the transmission of colonial emergency that had flared up in Ceylon in 1848, or Jamaica in 1865, at in Amritsar in 1919. This was emergency governance as a technique of control and population management, but one which allowed a certain formulation of order to be preserved (Reynolds 2017, p. 32).

Through the mechanism of emergency, a deteriorating geopolitical situation could – over time – be decelerated, but where was it applied? Inevitably, a list 'from Aden to Zanzibar' (Reynolds 2017, p. 32) is geographically extensive and temporally drawn out (see Fig. 1.5). For the purposes of this list, the focus is on the post-World War Two era; emergency action has been taken to cover not only formal declarations of a colonial state of emergency supported by British military backing, but also emergency military interventions on behalf of a British-dominated client state such as Oman.

Colonial emergency, handled successfully, provided a decelarative technology to slow emergency over time, framing the terms for a colonial territory's future independence on terms favourable to British interests. Fundamentallly, as Reynolds notes, with reference to Rajagaapol, Britain's

> last major wave of colonial wars during the late 1940s and 1950s were 'euphemistically self-styled as emergencies' so that mass resistance could be dealt with by special powers enacted in the name of the restoration of normalcy (rather than the competing, and less flattering, narrative of resort to force to sustain hegemonic control) (Reynolds 2010, p. 20).

The idea of restoring normalcy to an inherently abnormal situation is an interesting one – it implies that settled British curatorial governance was a more natural state than rule by indigents; it did, nonetheless, give British colonial emergency the sympathetic framing that it undoubtedly needed if political rights were to be curtailed and miltarised governance applied, with the attendant likelihood of human rights abuses. Emergency, applied to colonial territories such as Kenya, Malaya and Aden, thus entered the lexicon of terminologies applied in contemporary British discourse. Indeed, by the mid-

1960s post-World War Two colonial emergency had been normalised and running for two decades and in its 1968 co-option in the name *Falkland Islands Emergency Committee* it was cleverly, even subversively, re-imagined. Here the emergency was unusually a colonial people seeking freedom under – rather than from – the Union Jack, the perceived protagonist being a revanchist Argentina.

The Falklands emergency running from the mid 1960s up to the 1982 Conflict deserves to be seen as both part and consequence of Britain's 'era of emergency', one in which pre-independence British-prosecuted wars and neo-colonial hegemonism, were given the respectable cover of overcoming nihilistic emergency by destructive local elements. Whilst unpacking the empirical backgrounds of each colonial emergency lies beyond the scope of this thesis, the issue nonetheless arises of why pre-1982 emergency in the Falklands has received so little attention.

2.6 Empirical relevance of emergency – and the establishment of the Falkland Islands *Emergency* Committee in March 1968

As can be seen, emergency helps us position the Falklands into the wider context of British decolonisation and the end of empire, and its discourses. The establishment of the Falkland Islands *Emergency* Committee in March 1968 (my italics) provided an emergency framing, this terminology helping link the Falklands with recent and contemporary colonial emergencies in Kenya, Aden, Cyprus and Rhodesia. Fig. 1.5 (below) provides a sense of both the temporal and geographical scope of emergency in the post war era. By the time the Falkland Islands Emergency Committee was formed in March 1968, there had been over two decades of colonial emergencies from Africa to Asia to the Americas to Europe.

Date of Emergency	Territory
1945-48	Palestine
1947	Aden riots
1948	Gold Coast
	British Honduras
1948-60	Malaya
1948-51	Eritrea
1950	Singapore
[1950-53	Korean War]
1951	Aqaba
1952-56	Kenya
1953	British Guiana
1954-87	Cyprus
1955	Singapore
	Oman
1956	Bahrain
	Hong Kong
	Singapore
	Suez
1957	British Honduras
1957-59	Oman
1958	Bahamas
	Aden
	Jordan/Lebanon
1959	Maldives
1960	Jamaica
1960-61	Cameroons
1961	Kuwait
	Zanzibar
1962	British Honduras
	British Guiana
	Brunei
1963	Swaziland
	Zanzibar
1963-66	Borneo
1964	Zanzibar
	Tanganyika
	Uganda
	Kenya
1964-67	Aden
1965	Mauritius
	Bechuanaland
1966	Hong Kong riots
	Das Island (Trucial Coast)
	Seychelles
1967	Hong Kong riots
1968	Bermuda
	Mauritius
1969	Anguilla
	Bermuda
1969-2007	Northern Ireland 'Troubles'
1970	Oman
1979-80	Rhodesia/Zimbabwe
1980	New Hebrides
1982	Falklands and South Georgia

○

Fig. 2.1. (above) Post-WW2 Emergency deployments of British troops in colonial or client territories; adapted from 'Brush Fire Wars' (Dewar 1984, pp. 186-87).

What was odd, and indeed unique, in the case of the Falklands was the deliberate appropriation of the term 'emergency' by the newly formed Falkland

Islands Emergency Committee, itself rather than the British government deciding to mobilise this term. In the Falklands context, 'emergency' was applied in a different and original way. Rather than conceived as a framing for a decolonising 'hotspot', the term was re-imagined to describe a territory where the population wanted to continue British colonial rule, the policy of the British government (in conjunction with Argentina) - as opposed to its colonial subjects – the threat to the territorial status quo. The Falkland Islands Emergency Committee was therefore brought into existence to forestall the emergency of lowering the union jack against the Islanders' wishes

In our foregrounding of the use of emergency in this thesis, it is important to highlight the empirical circumstances which led the term 'emergency' to become formally associated with the Falkland Islands. The formation of the Falkland Islands Emergency Committee in March 1968 was in itself a response to an imminent acceleration of what I perceive to have been the broader Falkland 'slow emergency', one of political and socio-economic uncertainty and decline, with the apparent likelihood of an Anglo-Argentine settlement of the Falkland Islands' future the factor portending the demise of the territory as a British colony.

William Hunter Christie, Lincolns Inn barrister, former British diplomat in Buenos Aires (1946-48), and author of *The Antarctic Problem* (1951), is regarded as the 'prime mover' (Charlton 1989, p. 76) in the establishment of the Falkland Islands Emergency Committee. Hunter Christie offered the following, revealing account of how the Falkland Islands Emergency Committee was formed, which from its inception mobilised well-connected London-based networks in support of the 'keeping the Falklands British'. What is striking about the formation of the Falkland Islands Emergency Committee is that it appears to have been a pre-emptive, 'fast' response to the Islands' ongoing 'slow emergency'; the prospect of an imminent 'catalysation of emergency' loomed due to the British government's apparent readiness to cede sovereignty to Argentina, unless 'timely intervention' averted this.

As framed by Hunter Christie in the following interview transcript (Charlton 1989, pp. 78-79), the Falkland Islands Emergency Committee was a spontaneous initiative to assemble cross-party support to stop the 'madness' of Foreign Secretary George Brown's Falkland policy. 'Christie's source [...] a fellow [Falkands] sympathiser in the Ministry of Defence' (Gamba 1987, p.90) was Captain W.J.R. Pennefather. Hunter Christie's account describes how Pennefather initiated the pre-emption process through alerting Hunter Christie to the impending prospect of territorial cession, in a deliberate leak to thwart British government efforts to 'solve the Falkland problem'. Drawing on Hunter Christie's lobbying skills, and practical and financial support from the Falkland Islands Company and its Chairman Patrick Ainsley, an assembling of political support to prevent the territorial cession for the Falklands was rapidly put together.

> *Excerpt from interview of William Hunter-Christie by Michael Charlton for the BBC*
>
> Do you want to know its earliest roots? I attended a meeting of the Court of the Worshipful Company of Clockmakers …. another member of the Court came up to me. He was a senior officer, Captain Pennefather, Royal Navy, and a member of the Committee still. And he said "Bill, [Foreign Secretary] George Brown's gone mad! He wants to sell the Falkland Islands to Argentina. I can't do anything about it. *You* have to do something about it!"
>
> And so I came back and thought what to do. I knew the Chairman of the Falkland Islands Company, Patrick Ainsley, who was a solicitor in New Square, and I went round to see him, and I told him what I'd been told. He said "Well, it's astonishing. I'm just looking at a cable from my manager in Port Stanley saying more or less what you've said to me, and I haven't any idea at all what to do". And I said, "Well we must get a committee together, and we must resist this. *You* can't do it because everyone will say it's the Falkland Islands Company trying to defend its property, and the capitalists and so on. We must have an all-party committee, and we must run a political campaign and get this into the open and use the press". And he said "Right ho". And the next thing I heard, a few days later, was asking me to attend a meeting at the the offices of the Falkland Islands Company at 97 Piccadilly. ……We got Labour members of Parliament to join, we got Conservatives and we got Liberal members. And we set to work (Charlton 1989, pp.78-79).

Interestingly Argentine historian Martin Abel Gonzalez points to a 'slowness' in the process of the formation of the Falkland Islands Emergency Committee, which does not come through in Hunter Christie's account. With reference to

Anglo-Argentine negotiations which only officially being confirmed on 27 February 1968, he argues that:

> the explosive combination of slowness and secrecy that characterised the negotiations provided enough time and motivation for Islanders to become organised and to establish contacts with audiences in Britain most willing to embrace them' (Gonzalez 2013, p. 204).

The 'fast' and 'slow' interpretations are not preclusive; as Hunter Christie makes clear, the formation of the Falkland Islands Emergency Committee was a 'fast' response to the 'emergency' prospect of an Anglo-Argentine deal over the Falklands. Yet, as Gonzalez' comment implies, embedded and developing networks were available for activation in the event of the acceleration of emergency, such as those of Conservative MP and FIC Director Sir John Barlow who 'in 1968 became the Chairman of the Falkland Islands Emergency Committee – the main institutional face of the Falklands lobby'. (Gonzalez 2013, p. 142).

The Falkland Islands Emergency Committee soon made its presence felt: the swift mobilisation of parliamentary and press networks in support of the Falkland Islanders helped limit the scope of the Government of the day. For example, '[t]he front page of the Daily Express was to become one of the campaign's key weapons' (Gamba 1987, p. 90). The agency of the Wilson Government to territorially dispose of the Falkland Islands was compromised, to the degree that Freedman observed that: The future of the Falkland Islands was now a matter of domestic British politics' (Freedman 2005, p. 26).

Chapter four will consider the impact of the resistance to territorial cession of the Falklands as it materialised in the political emergency of 1968, with the focus of this thesis being on the Islander experience 'below' and representations of this rather than the 'high' politics of the Committee 'above'. It will also seek to place the 'Falkland problem' within the wider context of contemporary British discourse about decolonisation and the end (or loss) of empire, not least Commonwealth immigration at the time, including Enoch Powell's reaction to this, and the 'loyalty emergency' of Rhodesia. This wider political context helps explain why the cause of 'The Falklands' proved such a 'trigger issue' in contemporary British political discourse.

Notwithstanding Lord Chalfont's November 1968 ministerial visit to the Islands to 'win over' Islanders to the benefits of incorporation into Argentina, this sovereignty transfer initiative failed. As a consequence, emergency in the Falklands decelerated, stabilising to a point that in 1972 the designation of Falkland Islands Emergency Committee was changed. Merle Christie, Hunter Christie's widow, notes that 'at the request of the Falkland Islanders' (Christie in Tatham 2008, p. 151) 'emergency' was dropped from the Committee's designation, and was re-named the United Kingdom Falkland Islands Committee (UKFIC), alongside a 'sister' Falkland Islands Committee set up in Stanley, formalising a London-Stanley information network. The detaching of 'emergency' from the designation of what was now the UKFIC did not, however, remove the grinding reality of quotidian 'slow emergency' facing the Islanders, with its hydra of geopolitical and socio-economic challenges.

With the question of the Falklands' future still unresolved, emergency endured and periodically accelerated, such as when in 1976 the Argentine navy fired at the RRS *Shackleton*, and in 1980 when the Ridley leaseback initiative was rejected by many, though not all, the Islanders. The first and only time British authorities officially used the term 'emergency' to describe the Falklands in the slow emergency era came on 2 April 1982 at 04:30, when Governor Rex Hunt declared a formal state of emergency in response to imminent Argentine invasion. Thereafter, from April through to June 1982, the Falkland Islanders experienced a period of unprecedented military-political emergency, living under Argentine military occupation and experiencing what became the 1982 Falklands Conflict, a euphemistic appellation for Anglo-Argentine war. Three civilian Islanders died in this emergency, and the Falkland Islander community experienced first-hand the trauma and violence of war.

Given the centrality of 'emergency' to the Falkland Islands in the period from 1964 to 1982, the focus on emergency seems particularly apt for a study focusing on the Falkland Islander experience. The thesis' investigation into emergency does not extend into the outbreak, duration and consequences of the 1982 conflict, although, as with Raymond Brigg's representation in the Introduction, it nonetheless provides an important point of reference.

2.7 'When is an Emergency not an Emergency?'

This project is also intended to push back against a dominant historiography of the Falkland Islands as the 1982 Conflict, to reveal an under-studied history of Islander struggle. This is not 'a national liberation struggle of decolonisation involving emergency such as experienced in numerous parts of the former British Empire, such as Cyprus, Kenya and British Guiana. More conventional colonial Emergencies, once they had run their course, offered the prospect of independence from the (British) colonial power, of varying degrees of palatability to Britain. In contrast, post-World War Two decolonisation did not offer a route to greater Islander self-determination, instead it offered the prospect of an unwelcome territorial incorporation into a military dominated Argentina. This, for many Islanders, meant a hostile colonisation in an era of decolonisation, enabled by British acquiescence at best, and encouragement at worst.

During the slow emergency era, Islander resistance worked to maintain rather than remove British colonial rule and. as will be seen, manifested itself with different intensities; at times, this meant counter intuitively working against British officials and politicians, such as Governor French and Lord Chalfont respectively, who advocated an Argentine rather than British future for the Islands. It is difficult not to conceive such a state of affairs as being an Emergency for the Falklands, one which was intensified by official British neglect, and threatened the very viability of the Islands as a functioning socio-economic entity.

The aforementioned dominant discourse of emergency as a politically directed legal and military development runs the risk of obscuring less conventional forms of emergency, such as that experienced in the Falklands. Naming a set of circumstances as emergency makes a difference, both at and after the time; in the latter case, had the British government designated an emergency

in the Falklands prior to 1982, more academic attention to the Islands is likely to have been a consequence of such a labelling.

The same can be said of individuals in their labelling – or not – of a set of circumstances as emergency. An emergency framing makes a difference. This can apply to Islanders narrating everyday emergency through writing urgent letters to the *Falkland Islands Times,* as much as to a prominent politician, such as Enoch Powell. As is addressed in chapter 4, this right wing politician, who 'became the touchstone for speaking about race and nation' (Schwarz 2012, p. 12), appeared to experience more difficulty in naming emergency than in provoking it.

We now turn our attention to other areas, specifically volume; loyalty; end of empire; affect; performance; visuality and chronoplitics. With slow emergency as the thesis' dominant theme, these lower order (for the purposes of this thesis) areas shed valuable further light on its workings.

2.8 Volume

As will be argued in Chapter 5, a three-dimensional understanding of the Falklands offers an important way to understand its geopolitics, particularly in the thesis' periodisation up to 1982, in which slow emergency operated three-dimensionally, with aerial and submarine developments further eroding the viability of the colony. This requires us to think about volume, and (non) representations of space. Whilst two-dimensional maps 'textually' record the sovereignty of a state over territory such as Britain over the Falkland Islands, the control of volume and vertical power, which underpin this domination, is entirely neglected by such a flat representation. As Graham has argued 'a classical, modern formulation of Euclidean territorial units jostling for space on contiguous maps [is inadequate to explain] the (geo)politics of verticality (Graham 2004, p. 20). The problem of two-dimensional territorial representations, which obscure rather than reveal the realities of three-dimensional power, is highlighted by the (non-)depiction of airspace; illustrative of this, Crampton (2010, p. 96) has argued 'Often airspace is

missing from maps, but control and occupation of this 'territory' – what Weizman calls 'the politics of verticality' – is critically important to states'. As Argentine aerial incursions into Falkland airspace of 1964 and 1968 (Fitzgerald), the 1966 Condor hijacking, and then 1971's Communication Agreement show, British inability/unwillingness to assert sovereign control over the Islands' aerial volume, left a vacuum for Argentine actors to subvert Britain's territorial position.

Eldon (2013) in particular has sought to theorise what we understand about volume; in examining the meaning of 'volumetric', an important term he mobilises, he notes that:

> The Oxford English Dictionary suggests this word dates from 1862, is formed from Volume and Metric, and means "Of, pertaining to, or noting measurement by volume". While the term is used in cartography and physics, there is real potential in working out in detail its two aspects: the dimensionality implied by 'volume' and the calculability implied by 'metric' [...] Just as the world does not exist as a surface, nor should our theorisations of it; security goes up and down; space is volumetric (Eldon 2013, p. 15).

With Elden's 'Secure the Volume' (2013) a key contribution to current geopolitical theorisation about volume, further understandings have also emerged, such as those of Adey and Bridge, who have addressed areas such as how volume relates to bodies, and the sub-surface, respectively (Adey 2013, pp. 1-3; Bridge 2013, pp. 1-3).

Volume left uncontrolled and unclaimed creates both a geopolitical vacuum and opportunity, and seeking to exercise volumetric control becomes ipso facto a political act (and equally, not seriously defending Falklands volume until the 1982 conflict was a political act). Weizman's (2002, p. 2) conception of Israel/Palestine as 'a territorial hologram in which political acts of manipulation and multiplication of territory transform a two-dimensional surface into a three-dimensional volume' reflects how seizing the volumetric initiative advances a state actor's interests, in this case Israel, and Falklands/Malvinas geopolitics in the period up to 1982 similarly illustrate that, with use of vertical power, control can be asserted over volume. As a case in point, Argentina's technique of penetrating Falkland skies and waters through

aircraft, warships and submarines – along with its 1976 occupation of Southern Thule in the South Sandwich Islands – signified a politically driven bid for control over southwest Atlantic volume. Likewise, Buenos Aires' bid to develop oil from, and assert de facto sovereignty over, the Falkland/Malvinas seabed reflects the importance of asserting volumetric power on, and beneath, the waves. Gustafson (1988), who provides the definitive account of the Argentine-British volumetric struggle for sub-surface resource and sovereignty, concluded that:

> By March 1982 Argentina was perhaps well on its way to exercising de facto sovereignty over the seas around the Malvinas […] Argentina's creeping title would have been at best political and de facto, little worse than Britain's title to the Falklands based on contested acquisitive prescription. Had Argentina continued to license oil exploration around the Islands, it is difficult to imagine how Britain could have stopped it (Gustafson 1988, p. 116).

Slow emergency in, above and under the Falklands archipelago functioned three-dimensionally, and not just horizontally on the islands' land and sea surfaces - not only had the archipelago's aerial volume increasingly come under Argentine domination, especially after the 1971 Communications Agreement, but the Islands' submarine volume was also being simultaneously eroded.

On land, slow emergency continued to test the Islanders on a daily basis, but for Argentina, particularly after the collapse of Chalfonts's efforts to divest Britain of the Falklands in 1968, this technique created promising opportunities for establishing new, *de facto* geopolitical realities; volumetric *faits accomplis* in turn had the potential to hollow out existing geopolitical realities, so encouraging future territorial 'adjustments'.

For state actors alive to vertical geopolitics, tangible opportunities to extend, or defend, spatial control over a territory exist, be that on, above or below the territorial surface. On the other hand, Weizmann (2002, p. 2) warns of the risks inherent in an anachronistic, volumetrically unaware 'flat discourse' which 'largely ignores the vertical dimension and tends to look across rather than to cut through the landscape. This was the cartographic imagination inherited f rom the military and political spatialities of the modern state'.

In this way, volumetric outcomes can be shaped through political manipulation of the vertical, whether by politicians or officials; as Bridge explains: 'Verticality is significant because adding height and depth to the horizontal plane magnifies the possibilities of relative location, affording additional means of control' (Bridge 2013, p. 1). Depending on which actor exercises vertical control, volumetric power can be seen as relational to security or insecurity; such control can operate as a means of security (for some), as it 'can be found in the idea of no-fly zones, of providing security for the ground through a mechanism from the air' (Elden 2013, p. 5).

Volumetric impotence, however, functions as a source of insecurity, as in the Falklands in the period up to 1982, where there was no Royal Air Force operational presence. The volumetric vacuum was filled by the *Fuerza Aereas Argentina* (FAA) through the application of techniques such as unauthorised landings and flights over the Islands. In extremis, volumetric insecurity may result in one actor adopting 'atmos-terrorism' (Schlotedijk 2009, p. 49), whereby the air is turned into a 'terrorist' weapon, subverting it from a means of life to one of death. 'Atmos-terrorism' (Schlotedijk 2009, p. 49), is conceived in these terms:

> According to its principle of execution, all terrorism is thus conceived as atmos-terrorism. It has the form of an attempted attack against the environmental conditions of the enemy's life, beginning with the toxic attack on the most immediate resources of the surrounding of a human organism, the air that it breathes (Schlotedijk 2009, p. 49).

Whilst 'atmos-terrorism' (Schlotedijk 2009, p. 49) did not become a factor in determining Falkland/Malvinas geopolitics, Islanders did experience another form of 'terrorism', namely the September 1966 hijacking of a flight from Buenos Aires to Rio Gallegos by Argentine 'Condor' nationalists. This episode, along with other key volumetric developments, will be unpacked and critically examined in Chapter 5. What is clear though is that volume deserves to be considered as a significant factor in Falkands-Malvinas geopolitics; as is evident, securing dominant vertical control provides state actors with a technique to profoundly change geopolitics, irrespective of whether the

rationality of their control accords with the mentalities of the inhabitants living within the 'bubble' (Schloterdijk 1998) of territory three-dimensionally affected.

2.9 Loyalty

Loyalty is another clearly significant aspect of the Falkland slow emergency, and Islander loyalty was both tested, and counter-intuitively amplified, by it. As reflected in Chapter 5 and its focus on Islander loyalty during 1968's abortive attempt by the British government to maneuver/persuade Islanders to accept an Argentine future, loyalty was mobilised against government policy. When Chalfont made the first ever-ministerial visit to the Falklands to sell territorial accommodation of Argentina, he met organised loyal protest, which mobilised the Union Jack, loyal slogans and crowds; reportage and photographs were then relayed back to the British public by the accompanying Fleet Street journalists. The clear message was 'The Falklands was their home and that is where they wanted to stay under the union jack' (Freedman 2005, p.18).

Dodds, Lambert and Robison (p.368, 2008) note that loyal demonstration 'is *performed* …… It had to be imagined, planned and executed at a particular moment in space and time'. This assessment was made in respect of the 1954 Royal visit to Gibraltar, another small colonial territory with a revanchist neighbour but which, unlike the Falklands, *did* receive a visit from the reigning monarch; here, the nature of loyal demonstration was in support of Queen Elizabeth II's visit, with its implied rebuttal of Spanish sovereignty ambitions. Demonstrating loyalty required much preparation; Dodds et al further comment (2008, p.370) that the mobilising loyalty needs organisation, offering an insight into the practices behind the performance.

> The Gibraltar element of the 1953–54 Royal Tour illustrates the work that went into the performance of loyalty only too clearly: flags were waved, streets were painted and renamed, lunches were planned, gifts were organized, speeches were composed, Royal security considered and press coverage mobilized.

Invoking the monarch as a means to redress iniquitous policy was a loyal practice which had been applied elsewhere in the (former) British Empire. In relation to King-Emperor George VI's tour of South Africa in 1947, Sapire (2012, p.217) discerned the existence of 'a tradition of what has been

described as 'black loyalism' which stretched back to the indigenous empire loyalism of eighteenth-century Canada, pre-and post-Mutiny India and the nineteenth-century Cape.' Further, Sapire (2012, p.217) sees the readiness of many black South Africans in 1948 to express loyal support to the visiting monarch as reflective of a broader point, namely how 'the British crown figured as a source of protection and succour against the wrongs of colonial states and the 'betrayals' of British governments'.

Yet the nature of loyalty as practiced in the Falklands, unlike black South Africans who had African nationalism to turn to, was that it had no other obvious 'home'. Mercau argues that 'The Falkland Islanders saw themselves as distinctly British, and like other settler societies in the empire, they stressed their loyalty and whiteness' (Mercau 2019, p. 27).

In terms of developing a 'Greater British' loyalty in the inter-war period, there had been royal tours, notably those of the future Edward VIII in 1919-20, in which

> Assumptions about the superiority of British settler stock, with royalty cast as its apogee …were present in the intellectual thinking of most of the courtiers and politicians who pioneered the tours, both at home and in the dominions (Mort 2018 p6).

In this sense, loyalty was not colour blind in 'Greater Britain', with the 'white dominions' loyal to a 'white' House of Windsor monarch; indeed, this line of thinking appears to endure within the February 1968 Unofficial Councillors letter to Parliament, which as both Dodds (2002, p. 130) and Mercau (2019, p.36) observe, highlights that there was 'no racial problem' in the (white) colony.

The wider 'Greater British' context of Islander loyalty in terms of a identity is raised by Mercau; he highlights the profound damage done in the settler dominions of Canada, and especially Australia and New Zealand, to the idea of a transcontinental 'Greater British' community (2019, pp.22-3) by the British government's 1961 decision to join the emerging European Economic Community. Further, Mercau sees Donaghy's assessment (2014, p. 15) that 'the islanders could justifiably call themselves the 'abandoned Britons'

(Mercau 2019, p.26) as establishing itself from the early 1960s, the framing of 'abandoned Britons' originating from Curran and Wards' *The Unknown Nation; Australia after Empire'* (2010). Islander loyalty to, and self-identification with, Britain had, in the post-1945 era, gone largely unrequited; this in turn intensified an affective sense of being undermined and sold out by the British government, which was an enduring feature of slow emergency.

Even without the recrudescent pressure of Argentine territorial aspirations, the 'unraveling of Greater Britain' (Mercau 2019, p.29) meant that the Falkland Islands' status was vulnerable to change by the mid 1960s. With the United Kingdom's retreat from a 'Greater British' community and advance into a European one, the Falklands had effectively ended up as unwanted baggage from a former Empire, with Islander loyalty being both a product, and leftover, of an increasingly defunct 'Greater British' identity.

Developing a post-Greater British Islander loyalty to a Falkland micro-nation was not a serious option, even though real Argentine 'apprehensions' about the possibility of the Falklands progression to independence existed (Gonzalez 2013, p.35). Loyalty in the Falkland Islands had nowhere to turn other than to hold tight to a neglectful Britain, which still compared favorably with Argentina during the slow emergency period.

Pinkerton's ground-breaking work on radio in the Falklands throws interesting light on some of the practical difficulties which Argentina encountered in winning over Islanders' loyalty. Radio served as a vital means for 'ethereally connecting Islanders with the United Kingdom 8,000 miles away' (2007 p.386), reinforcing Islander loyalties' and keeping a struggling 'Greater British' connection afloat. Yet Islander loyalty was driven too by news about the domestic behaviour of the Argentine junta, such radio reportage being

> '….intensely geopolitical; news of the 'Dirty War' being waged in Argentina by successive military governments (broadcast by the BBC Overseas Service) had been instrumental in fortifying Islander resistance to ongoing Argentine claims over the Falklands throughout the late 1970s (Pinkerton 2007, p.349).

As can be seen, there are a variety of reasons for loyal performance, such as expression of support for the monarch of the day, criticism of an unpopular

government or its policies, and the mobilisation of identities. Loyal performance is selective, and can range from uncritical to highly critical. In the latter case, this can usefully be seen as evidenced in the Falklands of 1968, when loyal protest carefully distinguished the British monarch from the Government of the day, Elizabeth II representing the part of the British state that was trusted, unlike the 'disloyal' Wilson Government.

2.10 End of Empire

Chamberlain (1999, p.63) cites how, in 1829, the *Westminster Review* claimed that 'it is pretty much with colonies as with children'; whereas sons would make their own way in the world, some 'sickly infants' and 'unmarried daughters' would need to stay at home; using this analogy, he likened the Falklands to such a 'daughter', with Argentine advances rejected. However, the British Empire, the Islands' geopolitical 'home' since 1833, had by the start of the slow emergency period largely ceased to exist, the end of empire leaving the colony of the Falklands exposed; this section considers explanations for the end of empire, and its relationality to the Falklands.

The human and material costs of fighting two World Wars, the rise of nationalism in British colonies, domestic reluctance to maintain an Empire, US anti-imperialism and the Cold War conspired to bring about Britain's end of empire. In reviewing historiographical literatures about the end of the British empire, Darwin (in Winks 1999, p.542-5) highlighted four explanatory definitions, namely that this decolonisation was: the legal-constitutional event of the formal transfer of sovereignty to newly independent states, and the lead up to this; that independence was often a façade to maintain discretely, rather than end, British influence; and that since 1945 the global infrastructure and order which supported British and European imperialism generally, had collapsed. Darwin's preferred definition of decolonisation was the fourth, that is; 'the more or less complete overthrow of this structure of institutions and ideas between 1945 and the mid 1960s, and its replacement by a post colonial order whose first phase ended in 1990' (Darwin in Winks 1999, p.544). He also rejected the idea that a 'planned obsolescence' of Britain's

imperial mission had been fulfilled; and that changes in international capitalism led to colonies being seen as an anachronistic impediment to business (Darwin in Winks 1999, pp.544-5).

With no nationalist movement, and independence neither sought or achieved, the Falklands provide a highly unusual example; whilst clearly affected by the wider breakdown of erstwhile British imperial 'order', the Islands had traditionally had to 'make do' and received little nurturing under British colonial rule. Similarly, the colony's leading capitalist actor, the Falkands Islands Company, was no advocate of decolonising change, in the latter case supporting the Falkland Islands Emergency Committee from its inception in 1968. The Falklands' geopolitical predicament was that it was now a territory in the uncomfortable position of being a colony in a postcolonial world. Gonzalez notes the relationality of decolonisation to the failed 1968 bid to transfer the colony's sovereignty to Argentina; he saw decolonisation as a particularly pressing factor for Argentina rather than Britain, since 'could Buenos Aires remain indifferent to the fact that the UN regarded the Falklands not as an Argentine province but a non-self governing territory that had to be decolonised? (Gonzalez 2012, p.34).

More broadly historiographically-speaking, postcolonial critique has challenged traditional scholarship on British imperialism, and has highlighted 'how it continued to cling to the methodology and mentalité of 'the official mind', as Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher term it' (Kennedy in Sauer p.10, 2003). Whether from a postcolonial or other perspectives, there has been an increasing challenge to established official British narratives that the end of empire, by and large, ran smoothly, a point addressed by Ballantyne (2010, p.344), who notes:

> 'Anthropologists, literary scholars, feminist critics, and historians in South Asia have recovered the centrality of rape, violence, and displacement in Partition', and stress the long term traumas on political culture and social relations in independent South Asia'

Ballantyne (2010, p.344) similarly cites Elkin's reference to Britain's' Kenyan 'gulag' in the Kenyan Emergency (2005), and Bayley and Harper's (2007)

work on British neo-colonial ambitions in South East Asia as disruptors of a narrative that the end of empire was generally handled well. In contrast, Grob-Fitzgibbon (2011, p.3), argues that British decolonisation was actually more effective than much recent scholarship recognises, as the British government had across its decolonising territories ‘a concerted imperial strategy … in this endeavour the government met with considerable success’. Some common ground with more critical narratives of the end of empire, however exists, when Grob-Fitzgibbon acknowledges that (what he frames as) ‘liberal imperialism can only be sustained by illiberal dirty wars. Britain’s imperial endgame demonstrates that it is possible to achieve success in both’ (2011, p.377). Applying the logic of this argument, in this way the questionable and sometimes violent methods employed in Britain’s ending of empire can be, depending on one’s readiness to accept this, uncoupled from the political outcomes.

Whether a scholar’s preference is for contemporary research on the end of empire with ‘explicitly transnational approaches’ or one which is more focused on ‘diplomatic records and the official mind’ (Ballantyne 2010, p.347), it is clear that the slow emergency Falklands provides an atypical empirical case in this field.

2.11 Gender and Race

For the purposes of this section, gender and race will be considered the key areas for literature review, mindful of both their distinctiveness and interconnectedness, applying the rationale that “Both gender and race are real, and both are social categories…..And although the ideologies of race and gender and the hierarchical structures they sustain are substantively very different, they are intertwined (Haslanger 2000, p. 51)

Firstly, gender, in the wider framing of the British Empire, has been described by Wylie (p.286, in Winks 1999) in these terms

> the significance of gender in the context of Empire has invited scholars to understand gender as a creation of social and political circumstances rather than as a biological given, and to see how critical it was in the interaction between colonised and colonised.

who also notes there has been dispute about how much emphasis should be attached to gender 'as opposed to race and class'.

Gender-related literature provides a valuable perspective on the slow emergency Falklands, and offers new perspectives on (then) established perceptions and practices in the Islands which appear firmly based on a once-conventional understanding of gender as biological rather than social construct. This socio-cultural framing can be seen as part of the wider colonial experience - which as described in the seminal book *Imperial Leather* (Mcclintock 2002) - usually, if not always, worked to the detriment of colonial women 'Marital laws, property laws, land laws and the intractable violence of male decree bound them in gendered patterns of disadvantage and frustration' (Mcclintock 2002, p6).

Gender tensions were exacerbated in the Falklands owing to the numerical paucity of women; while sometimes this gave women a measure of power and agency, much would depend on the individual female and her circumstances as to how far this was, or could be, exercised. 'Gender-based violence' (Brickell 2008, p. 1668) was far from unknown, which some men used to re-balance 'power relations' with women, physical aggression being exercised not only to rein in women's agency, but also to assert hierarchical power over other men. Butler's (2004) argument that gendering and other binary categories enact violence (Mountz in Gallaher at al 2010 p.319) appears to hold purchase in the slow emergency Falklands, as a feature in some male-female relationships.

Blunt and Dowling (2006) have examined the cultural geographies of home; informed by approaches in this work, Brickell (2014) has investigated gender tensions in Cambodia, where home is often the site of violence and contention, and found 'the causes and consequences of [marital dissolution] which can be read through contestation and re-negotiation of the material and symbolic spatialities of home' (Brickell 2014, p.270), an understanding similarly applicable in the Falklands domestic environment. Gender, according to Pain (2014, p.129), cannot be detached from 'domestic violence

[which] is a gendered phenomenon, in its incidence and prevalence but also its social and political dynamics'. Gray (2016, p.139) similarly emphasises the connection between gender and violence in the home, highlighting that women are the 'overwhelming majority' of those abused; further, she contends that 'domestic abuse is a form of gendered violence that is shaped, facilitated, and understood through socially constructed ideas about gender and the unequal gendered roles and structures that these entail'. In this way, gender is presented as integral to, rather than incidental in, the making of domestic violence.

Inside, but also outside of the home, gender-related tensions and abuse have often been exacerbated by the presence of alcohol, in the Falklands and elsewhere. West highlights the relationality of 'liquour and libido' in another part of the British Empire, Southern Rhodesia, where 'cross-gender drinking' at beer halls proved problematic for African husbands who 'sought to control the sexuality of their wives by keeping them away from the beer halls' (West 1997 p, 645); he later notes that 'control of women's reproduction' (West 1997 p, 659) became another area for patriarchal focus. Smith (in Cloke et al 2005, p. 26) also highlighted, with reference to Pratt and Hanson (1994), that 'organisation of space … plays a role in constructing social difference'. In the predominately male-dominated spaces of the colony of the Falklands, particularly in Camp where the female presence was highly limited, gender roles and gendered practices were reinforced by the spatial organisation of work and recreation, be that in Camp sheep shearing sheds or Stanley's public houses, serving to feed into the aforementioned types of gendered behaviour.

Race holds purchase as another significant aspect, of the thesis. Representations of the racial homegenity of the Falklands provide an important dimension to how Islanders represented themselves to, and were seen by, others. In relation to the racial dimension, the February 1968 statement to Parliament and the Press from the four unofficial members of ExCo councillors petition to parliament, presented Islanders' white European ethnicity as an important, positive feature of the colony. Dodds (2002, p.130)

notes how the positionality of this claim in the then contemporary debate about how Britain was becoming an increasingly multi-racial society:

> By 1968 British discussions of race and nationalism were imbued with references to national belonging and the character of British society …..[In the Falklands] Unlike Britain, the Councillors were arguing that Britain did not have a 'racial problem' because 'race' was something that applied to other people'.

The essentialisation of white Britishness as a key feature of Islanders spoke to many white Britons that the Islanders were 'us' rather than some disruptive foreign 'other'. In this era of decolonisation, the idea that there was (still) a white, British-based, Commonwealth community which Britons could be connected to, endured, not least in migration to settler states such as Australia and New Zealand, a point which Schwarz (2011, p.60) has highlighted in his assessment that 'The presence of migration to the white colonies, both actual and desired, marks an important dimension of the postwar experience in metropolitan Britain'. Irrespective of the mismatch between the idea that white British emigration was desirable but Asian and Afro-Caribbean emigration to Britain was not, the framing of a lawful white British Falklands provided a powerful narrative in contemporary British politics. The Falklands invoked an enduring sentiment of the white imperial Briton, which implied that Britons were part of a wider Commonwealth world. Beaumont (2019, p.400) has outlined how this the affective experience of being a British imperial, subject had felt to many Australians during the First World War, who 'embraced an identity in which there was no contradiction in their being simultaneously Australian and British. Rather, as imperial citizens and British subjects, they gloried in the 'race patriotism.

One can see how this 'race patriotic' identity of the loyal, white Briton continued in the slow emergency era Falklands, with the cause of 'keeping the Falklands British' mobilising similar sentiments in the United Kingdom itself, the clarity of preserving this homogenous white British-descended population in stark contrast to the white/black racial binary of contemporary Rhodesia.

Contemporary theoreticisation of race recognises it social construction; Glassmann (2010, p.57) explains how race is understood in critical geography 'Critical geographers work within the schools of social theory that regard race as a powerful and irreducible social construct (eg, Hall, 1980; Omi and Winant, 1986; Gilroy, 1991; 2000)'. Hanafi (2016, p.365) is particularly critical of how race has traditionally been understood in geography, citing the 'discipline's over-reliance on a scientific/empirical approach to the issue of race and negligence of socio-historical explanations, its parochial conception of race, and its white-dominated racial composition'.

In moving towards a more critical and holistic understanding of what race involves, a discourse that takes into account the socio-political meanings of the body is needed. Tolia Kelly (2016 p.363) invites us to see 'the body ..[as] the site of the politicization of difference …… Questions of race, identity and 'other' bodies fuel our contemporary lived environments and world politics. As can be seen from the invocation of whiteness on behalf of the Falkland cause, politicised perceptions of 'the racial body' make a difference to narratives. Similarly, the spatial dimension of race needs to be recognised as more than a bodily space; Kobayashi and Peake (2000, p.362) argue that 'Racialization is part of the normal, and normalized landscape', whilst Glassman (2010, p.508) highlights the view that that 'space is also produced racially', citing Pulido's 2006 study of Los Angeles as one example of this. In a similar vein, Tolia-Kelly (2016, p.363) highlights socio-economic implications of the relationality between race and space, such that: 'racial stratification and economic mobility have been deeply correlated with the spatial distribution of the population.' In considering the Falklands as a racialised space, it is clear that the remoteness and literal insularity of the Islanders helped preserve 'British' ethnicity, as well as ensuring (for most Islanders) limited economic opportunities. The vulnerability, indeed precarity, of the Falklands as British racialised space deserves to be seen as a key feature of the slow emergency era. The fragile racial composition of the Falkland Islander community is recognised in Dodds' assessment: 'as the [1966] Condor [hi-jacking] incident had demonstrated, the sea did not always provide a natural defence against unwelcome cultural and racial influences' (Dodds 2002, p.130).

2.12 Affect, Performance and Visuality

Affect is an important element in understanding the Falkland Islander experience in the slow emergency era, even influencing behaviours, interactions and responses within the community. As Dittmer (2010, p.91) explains affect is a sensation that is linked to the environment; he outlines how 'affect means, in an academic sense, sensation that is linked to the environment, which may be can be biological or relational'. In the former case, affect can be understood as 'the connection between the social/cultural world and the biological realm of our bodies', and in the latter case, is seen as less biological, focused instead primarily on the relationships between people, or people and objects (Dittmer 2010, pp.91-2). Carter and McCormack (in Macdonald et al, 2019, p107) take a holistic view, explaining '*affect* (sic) can be understood as a kind of turbulent background field of relational intensity, irreducible to and not containable by any single body or object'. Pile (2009. P.17) has vigorously challenged how affect is re-presented and represented in affectual geography, arguing that seeking to communicate 'smiles, laughter, jokes or hope, anger, shame and so on…. and in language' is a contradiction in terms, and is 'straightforward hypocrisy'. Such a critique assumes that affect is re-presented and represented.

It is, however, the case, that affect may not be communicated. Take, for example, 'the affectual geographies of humour' (Dodds and Kirby 2013, p.53) in which they refer to laughter and Billig's (2005) notion of unlaughter (Dodds and Kirby 2013, p.48), in which an individual's sensation of laughter, and the bodily urge to express this, is suppressed in order to avoid unwelcome consequences. This helps highlight that while affective sensation may be outwardly expressed by individuals, it may not be; nor should assumptions be made about how, when (if) laughter is expressed, it is affectually received. Dittmer (2011 p.511) cautions that 'We should not assume the *effects* of humour from the *content* of humour'. In essence, however widely it is circulated, if at all, the affect experienced by individual/s is still felt by them, and if expressed outcomes may be unpredictable.

In the Falklands, affect, and the responses it engendered (whether expressed or not), were intimately interwoven into the practices and discourses of Islander life. It is important too to signal the relationality affect has with space, not least in a territorial dispute. Laketa (2016, p.680) addresses this, drawing our attention to how 'a focus on the spatiality of affect and emotions enhances our understanding of "how certain bodies stick to certain places" in ways that might undermine or enable peace-building'. Affective sentiments about their insular home (in both meanings of the word), underpinned Islanders' resistance to Argentine territorial aspiration; self-evidently, as the slow emergency period demonstrated, the expressed desire by many Islanders to 'stick together' with the Islands, was a key factor in frustrating Anglo-Argentine diplomatic efforts to resolve the dispute.

Performance and visuality, to varying degrees, depending on the particular context, interconnect with affect; in the case of the Falklands, performance and visuality were necessary for this remote community to communicate to a wider British audience what they affectively felt about wanting to remain British subjects. Performance, as 'the study of embodied practice' (Griffin and Evans 2008, p.10), brings to the fore the performer and his/her 'cultural store of expressive longings, sometimes explicitly articulated, sometimes ….left unsaid' (Thrift in Duncan et al, 2007, p.129).

As Craggs and Mahony (2014 p. 415) have argued, conferences provide 'a visible stage on which delegates can perform their legitimacy', highlighting the importance of visuality 'in the demonstration of political ideas and identities''; conferences, they argue, create 'sites for the negotiation and performance of consensus, but also of dissensus and protest – by both the delegates and activists outside of the formal conference programme' (Craggs and Mahony 2014 p.426). Evidence of the strength of Craggs and Mahony (2014) case for the significance of the 'visible stage' can be seen in the 1968 Chalfont ministerial visit; this served to create a publicly visual opportunity for the politically vulnerable Islanders to be seen together asserting their British identify. Militz and Schurr (2016, p.61) have argued that 'national community emerges in moments of affective encounter', with the Islanders performance

of 'British-ness' on a public stage designed to engender a response of affective solidarity in fellow Britons. Bright (2017, p.557) refers to;

> Homi Bhabha's argument that nations need to create a shared history, which gives them a shared ideology and legitimacy, a sense of "deep, horizontal comradeship." It cements who "us" is, that feeling of groupness, and who is excluded. That history has to be constantly performed to maintain that groupness.

A highly visual expression 'groupness' amongst Islanders was evident in Chalfont's public walk from Stanley's jetty with Governor Haskard, one in which Britishness 'truly' belonged to those who resistant to a territorial transfer of the Islands to the 'Argentine Other'; further, it can be seen as an affective performance of insecurity. Bright (2017, p.554) argues that 'insecurity meant that there was a constant need to reassert dominance through an "us" versus "them" performance'. The empirical case she refers to is the practice of some settler colonists in early twentieth century South Africa collecting Chinese scalps as trophies; in the case of the slow emergency Falklands of 1968, Islander insecurity and othering of Argentina was particularly driven by their struggle for the colony's survival, so that it did not become (to subvert the example) a metaphorical scalp for Argentina.

Shimazu's description of the importance of the performance of a high profile geopolitical walk holds particular purchase here; he describes the significance of the Freedom or Merdeka Walk at the 1955 Bandung Conference

> for our purpose of understanding the power of performance in international diplomacy. It acted as a crucial form of non-verbal communication between the leaders and the crowd, its symbolic meaning reaching out even to audiences globally who observed this performance through the media (Shimazu, 2013 p. 247)

Whereas the Bandung Merdeka Walk was a performance of inclusion, the Stanley Walk was one in which Islanders visually protested against (what was felt to be) Chalfont's efforts to exclude (and extinguish) their colony from the British community, affectively mobilising the symbols of their imperiled British identity such as the union jack. Further, Shimamzu (2013, p. 247) states:

> ''Walk', 'wave', 'smile' are all integral components of non-verbal communication…….physical movements speak out to the people as non-verbal forms of communication, and create a spontaneous shared space

between the leaders and the people.

Unlike in this example from Shimazu (2013), a 'shared space' may not necessarily be a comfortable one; as captured in photographs of the walk of Chalfont's bodily discomfiture and Islanders protesting, such a space may become a site of uncomfortable performance. Performance may, however, prove to be more positive than expected as an experience for both parties, such as when, at the 1979 Lusaka Commonwealth Conference, an evening dance between Zambian President Kaunda and British Prime Minister Thatcher resulted in a more positive relationship, seen by conference participants and non-participants, in the latter case through photographs in contemporary media. Not only did this episode serve to highlight the importance of public performance of identities at conferences, but 'the dance as staged performance, and its representation in text and image, helped to assure particular readings of the geopolitical event adhered in later narratives about the conference (Craggs 2014, p.50).

Tuathail's (1990) dissection of 'ocularcentrism' highlights the emphasis given to visuality in geopolitical narration, though MacDonald (2006, p.69) posits that this insufficiently recognises 'geopolitical agency [as]….the active character of observant practice (which is situated, embodied and connective with other sensory registers) is itself lost'. For the purposes of this thesis, the nature and practices of journalistic photography, not least in the Falklands in latter 1968, deserve to be considered, offering as it does the (then) geopolitical gaze of Fleet Street. Hughes (2007, p.980) addresses the 'backstory', practices and purposes of this type of visual culture, which can capture, and provoke, affective sentiment:

> Photography guaranteed a (visual) recollection of the past that was far more exacting, (apparently) objective, transmissible and manipulable than private remembrance….. While some photojournalists worked to expose otherwise under examined places, conflicts and suffering, much photojournalism suffered the same 'fixed spectatorial position' as earlier visual technologies in its readiness to show the world back to a select audience within dominant nation-states in ways that conformed with extant geopolitical scripts.

In sum, affect, performance and visuality often interlink, helping to establish, maintain and disrupt geopolitical narratives, which may well gain traction with

targeted audiences.

2.13 Chronopolitics

Chronopolitical understandings play an important part in the thesis. Within contemporary discourse surrounding the Falkland Islands, temporal framings permeate practices and language. Slow emergency draws on the work of Nixon (2012) and Adey and Anderson (2013), and its relationality to temporalities essential to the concept, as unpacked previously in this chapter. In the Slow emergency era, bookended by its periodisation by the 1964 flight and the 1982 conflict, chronopolitical framings feature consistently. Certain contemporary framings operated in a temporally backward looking way, such as when Islanders invoked past certainties of their post 1833 history as a British colony, in contrast with the unwelcome uncertainty of the slow emergency present; others framings look forward temporally, offering different conceptions of the future, be that territorial incorporation into Argentine or a continuance of the Islands as a British territorial entity.

Throughout the slow emergency period, time becomes politicised, be that in the 1971 Communications Agreement in which it was thought that over time Islanders would increasingly see their future as Argentine, or in the 1980 leaseback initiative which envisaged a time-limited period of British administration in the event of the Islands being ceded to Argentina. Norum and Mostafanezhad's (2016) focus on the importance of perceptions of authenticity and temporality holds particular purchase in the Falkland context; the following observation, whilst made about tourism, offers a much broader relevance, since they help highlight how chronopolitical understandings affect perceptions of what is authentic: 'Perceptions of authentic others, whether human or non-human, from other times and other places, are powerful agents of othering and of legitimizing such others as sites of touristic value and attention' (Norum and Mostafanezhad, p.158, 2016).

Depending on chronopolitical readings of authenticity in the Falklands, the discovery and naming of the Islands, commemorations, and their settlement become sources of temporal contention, with British/Islander or Argentine

narratives validated or invalidated according to how their respective legitimacies are perceived.

Within chronopolitics, the relationality of time and place has been a source of much discussion, notably in respect of Virilio's 'hyper-modern' thesis with its 'emphasis on speed, logistics and a radical restructuring of warfare and society itself: the move from geo- to chronopolitics' (Klinke 2012, p.685). Klinke strongly makes the case 'Contra Virilio' (2012, p.685), disagreeing with the premise that the politics of time can be made distinct from those of space. He instead argued:

> that time and space are to be approached not as separate phenomena but as intimately interwoven categories ….it is therefore best to think of chronopolitics as a discursive structure that operates inside rather than outside of geopolitical narratives (2012, p.685).

Whist Kaiser (2015, p.167) acknowledges Virilio's contribution to the discussion on the politics of time as 'an avowed political resource', he remains persuaded by the thesis' assumption that time is invariably a source of contest amongst political actors; 'It provides an understanding of the fact that various actors fight for this resource, try to exploit and diminish it, but it does not account for the less polemical facets of everyday politics (Kaiser 2015, p.168)

In the specific case of the Falklands, a space where the politics of time have been so conspicuous as a (de)legisitiming factor, and where chronopolitics is hardwired into place names and performance, the politics of time and space are self-evidently mutually entwined. Interestingly, in relation to Agnew's work, Klinke notes how space is often geopolitically organised into 'blocks with the help of often binary temporal attributes into 'modern', 'backward', 'primitive' and 'advanced' spaces' (Klinke 2015, p.677). When one considers how chronopolitical terms such as 'backward', 'feudal', and 'Victorian were used to frame the Islands, one is struck by how such understandings were used by politicians and officials to create narratives about the desirability of future geopolitical change.

Applying temporal pressure as a means to persuade Islanders that change was needed, and so remove the Islands as a source of Anglo-Argentine

tension was done not only through verbal narratives but economically convenient British government inaction. Whilst Islanders waited to see what was going to be the 'next development' in their faltering colony, the urgent attention was needed to arrest/reverse the Islands socio-economic decline was largely left unattended (as the non-implementation of the 1976 Shackleton Report illustrates).

The chronopolitical 'theory' behind the 1971 Communications Agreement to was that Islanders would progressively opt for an Argentine future was effectively an inversion of a more usual process such as that Olson (2015, p.523) described; *'Waiting can be productive or unproductive for radical praxis, but urgency compels and requires response'.* Chronopolitical manipulation of treatment of the Islanders, as per the 1971 Communications Agreement bid to wean the Islanders off their British connection, implied that they were remote and marginal enough to be made to wait, effectively consigned to a temporal 'internal exile' of waiting, urgency only entering the equation in Whitehall in early 1982, when the Argentine junta itself grew tired of waiting.

An interesting contrast to the Islanders' waiting experience in the slow emergency period can be found in the waiting pressures on exiled Tibetans in north India. McConnell (2011) relates how waiting pressures have led to some disparagement of efforts made by the Tibetan Government in Exile to develop welfare programmes, which have been criticised as they

> over-prioritised the welfare needs of the exile population at the expense of the freedom struggle and the ultimate aim of returning to Tibet. As a student in Majnuka Tilla, Tibetan colony in Delhi put it: ….There is too much time wasting going on here. Our people shouldn't be owning buildings, restaurants here – this isn't our country (McConnell 2011, p.12).

This reflects how even if authorities are seriously trying to improve socio-economic conditions, which self-evidently not the case in the slow emergency Falklands, the pressures of waiting can be divisive, and this is also reflected, to varying degrees and with different intensities, in the Islander experience of the Slow Emergency period. The phrase 'Time wasting' appears an apt way to describe how the chronopolitical pressures of the slow emergency Falklands worked out, both for Islanders in the non-development of their territory, and for the British and Argentine

governments, neither of whom saw the ‘longer game’ of chronopolitical manipulation pay off with ensuing geopolitical change

3 Chapter Three – Methods and Sources

3.1 Research pursued and challenges presented

The research undertaken was conceived in order to provide an original understanding of the experience of the micro-community of the Falkland Islanders, through mobilising empirical material and theoretical understandings which offer a fundamentally new framing for understandings of the Falklands. It specifically seeks to draw on the Falkland Islanders' experience, and unpack how this relates, and adds, to the theoretical concept of emergency.

The positionality of this project combines respect for, and empathy with, the Islander community, with an openness to understand the undoubted challenges of living in the Islands. The thesis takes no position on the ongoing sovereignty dispute concerning the Islands; this said, my own perspective on the question of territorial possession of the Islands is that this is a matter best left for the Islanders, rather than external state actors or supra-national organisations, to decide. In this sense with the positionality of the thesis is reflective of my own perspective, with its emphasis on the importance of the role of Islanders.

In particular, I seek to give voice and agency to Islanders as a community in their own right, so challenging narratives of the Islanders as peripheral and incidental. The thesis speaks as it finds, and while this often means it is empathetic in its approach, it is also unsentimental about the Islander experience in the period up the 1982 Conflict. It is intentionally focused on developments in - and concerning - the Islands, and understandings of these, as articulated by both Islanders and contemporary observers such as journalists, experts, politicians and expatriates. The beating heart of this project lies in Stanley rather than in Whitehall. Such an Islander based approach does not denote or presuppose an uncritical eye by this author; it instead represents a conscious effort to rebalance and reframe our understanding of Islanders' experiences in this era. In repositioning Islanders as central, rather than peripheral, actors the thesis seeks to gain original

insights as key aspects of the Islanders' experience in this critical period leading up to 1982 are unpacked and revealed.

This project's aim of engaging with the Islander voice and experience has its genesis in early 1984 when I spent several months in the Falklands as part of a 'gap year' prior to university. This was soon after the 1982 Conflict, and a number of books from that time had stimulated my interest. One in particular had caught my interest, namely *'Authors take sides on the Falklands'* (and Moorcroft Wilson 1982), which had highlighted the striking and sometimes polarised range of perspectives on the Falklands as a (then) contemporary issue. The contested discourse within *'Authors take sides on the Falklands'* provided a thought-provoking platform for the views of those who did, and did not believe, that the Falkland Islands and their people were worth fighting for. An example of the debate in the volume which developed my interest can be found in Roald Dahl's argument that;

> In 1939 we were all prepared to risk our skins to fight against aggression.
> Today excessive socialism seems to gave bred a flabby and idle breed of people who would rather compromise than fight. I would fight. Thank goodness there are still some left who would do the same' (Dahl in Woolf and Moorcroft Wilson 1982 p.26).

A counter-example can similarly be found in (the aforementioned) cartoonist Raymond Briggs' response, in which he posed a number of questions about the Islands and their inhabitants, positing a clear overall answer;

> If the Falkland Islands are so important to the British, it would be interesting to know why the Falkland Islanders lost their nationality under the 1981 Bill; why they are not entitled to a British pension; why they all get their major education in Argentina; and also, if the Argentine regime is so bad, how is it that several thousand British people chosen to live there? If the regime is so corrupt, why have the British been selling them arms and training their service men?
> This issue was not worth the sacrifice of a single life
> (Briggs in Woolf and Moorcroft Wilson 1982 pp.113-4).

It struck me that Falklands were being discussed more as a 'political football' than as an established place and community in its own right. Other Falkland-related literature from the time which further encouraged my interest included '*The Falklands War*' (Hastings and Jenkins 1983), *'One Man's Falkla*nds'

(Dalyell 1982) and *'Iron Britannia'* (Barnett 1982). Having read much on the subject, it was increasingly apparent that such accounts largely narrated 'The Falklands' as a 'war' or a 'political issue', rather than focus on views and experiences of the Islander community, which for me lay at the heart of a deeper understanding of Falkland related issues. Aware of this incomplete picture, I thought it would be interesting to learn more about the Islands and its people during my 'gap year', and so in the hope that this might lead to the opportunity to visit the Islands, I contacted the Falkland Islands Office, which led to several months work in the in the civilian Stanley Post Office, alongside the BFPO also operating from the same building.

The Stanley Post Office provided an excellent opportunity for me to experience aspects of life in the Islands first hand. The Post Office on Ross Road was a social hub for Stanley residents, who would come into collect their mail from individual post boxes, as well as indirectly for Camp residents whose mail would be collected by FIGAS pilots and distributed to the various settlements across the archipelago. My duties included preparing mail to go to the different Camp settlements, which in a short space of time meant I had acquired a clear sense of the geography of the Islands, and the respective size of the settlements.

Through my work in the Stanley Post Office, I soon experienced and became part of Island life. Through renting a room in the house of Mrs. Ada Watts in Davis Street, Stanley, I was able to live within the Islander community, who was a kind and generous host. Living and working in Stanley led to many conversations with Islanders about their views from the prosaic, such as the post-conflict potholes in Stanley's concreted roads and the availability of food items, to the profound, such as concerns about a future Argentine invasion (it should be noted too that a number of Islanders then had to cope as best they could with what today would be recognised as the symptoms of Post-traumatic stress disorder, PTSD).

Listening to the Falkland Islands Broadcasting Service (FIBS) alongside the BBC World Service both in and outside of working hours meant I was able to

gain insights into how the world, both locally and internationally, was sonically presented to, and understood by, Islanders. One also heard broadcasts on then FIBS of passenger lists of who was arriving and departing from the Islands, as well as travelling by air between Stanley and the Camp, and within the Camp itself; in this way, mobilities were widely known. Similarly, the Falkland Islands Government operated Radio-Telephone system enabled Island residents, myself included, to hear messages often of a personal nature broadcast across the Islands as these would interject across the airwaves.

The emphasis on the importance of the Islander community, which is central to the positionality of this thesis, stems from this first hand experience of living and working within the Islander community, an experience which also gave me numerous insights into the challenges of life in the Islands. Of the latter, a couple of instances are salient, the first being a kind invitation from Sally and Tim Blake to stay a week at Hill Cove on West Falkland. This visit enabled me to experience settlement life first hand, with the warmth of the community, elemental vicissitudes (such as a sudden storm on Mount Adam) and an affective sense of being in a geographically remote location among the abiding memories. The second, and still very memorable instance, was seeing the fire at Stanley's King Edward Hospital on 10 April 1984 in which eight people died. In the days immediately afterwards, this tragic episode powerfully demonstrated the closeness of the Islander community as Islanders rallied around; it also brought home, even in Stanley, the potential vulnerability and fragility of life in the Islands.

I felt privileged to have been part of the Falkland community in 1984, and these formative experiences stayed with me over the years, and I had in mind that someday, drawing on both my subsequent experience of tertiary education and my time in the Islands, I might seek to write academically about the Islands. It was when I was working in Singapore from 2002-2016 that I decided to do so.

There was a moment which acted as a spur for me to embark on this thesis. It was on a visit to the Sembawang district in the north of Singapore in 2009 where I saw Falkland Road (once home to British officers and their families), one of a number named after British colonies. This road, with its direct, visualised connection between Singapore and the Falklands as part of an erstwhile British Imperial network, prompted me to reflect on my time in the Islands, and to re-visit the Falklands as an area of academic interest.

It was no coincidence that I began this academic journey in another small island territory; as with the Falkands, Singapore sits somewhat uncomfortably, even precariously, in its immediate geographical region. As the possibility of incorporation by Argentina remains an enduring geopolitical concern amongst Falkland Islanders, so too in Singapore the possibility of a takeover by Malaysia or even Indonesia is not taken lightly. Living in Singapore, one is presented with frequent reminders of invasion, such as an extensive network of museums, sites and memorials connected with the 1942-5 Japanese invasion and occupation, and the ubiquity of National Service, which gives Singapore significant military manpower to resist an invasion (until assistance arrives from the United States or other friendly states).

The similarities between Singapore, and the Falklands in the twentieth century, became increasingly apparent, with both island territories having experienced first hand invasion from an external power. In the case of Singapore this came in 1942, and in the Falklands, forty years later in 1982. Whilst both cases are distinct, certain similarities can be discerned; in both territories after a dramatic and humiliating initial displacement of the British colonial authorities, the territorial *status quo ante bellum* eventually ended up restored, notwithstanding the respective Japanese and Argentine efforts to the contrary.

In re-visiting Falklands-related literature, I was hoping to learn more about the Islanders' experience, but it soon became apparent that as in the 1980s, Islanders were not accorded a central role, the first volume of Freedman's 'Official History' (2004) being a case in point, in which the Islander voice is

rarely heard. It has been noted that "Historians of the British Empire have largely ignored the Antarctic" (Jones 2014 p.857), and it became evident that a similar neglect of the Islanders' role and experience endures, not least in respect of developments in the Falklands community prior to the 1982 Conflict.

Professor Dodds' *Pink Ice* (2002), with its real interest in the Islanders, proved a welcome exception to this marginalization of the Islander's role, further to which I contacted him about the possibility of writing a thesis on the subject. The encouraging response I received from Professor Dodds led me to embark on this project (part-time), with support and guidance from both himself and Dr. Alasdair Pinkerton at Royal Holloway, and further assistance from Professor James Sidaway and Assistant Professor Dr Woon Chih Yuan at the National University of Singapore.

In respect of the period stretching from the mid 1960s to the early 1980s, this research project therefore consciously set out to remove the Falkland Islands and its people from the dominant framing of the 1982 Conflict, and reposition the Islanders' experience as central rather than peripheral to the research. In seeking to provide Islanders with more prominence than they have previously been afforded, it was important to take advantage of whatever original material was available which articulated Islander sentiments. The finite amount of sources available meant that, where appropriate, important content is intentionally deployed at some length, including through the use of longer quotations and photographic records. As an example of the former, Islanders' letters published in local newsletters are, at times, cited through the use of longer quotations, and visual material is also often deployed, for example the mobilisation of the Union Jack as a symbol of loyal protest. Using such key primary source material helps fulfill the thesis' aim of giving voice to the Islanders in the period up to 1982, repositioning them to a central role in our understanding of this period.

Theoretically, emergency became key to this research project. The Falkland Islands Emergency Committee, which later became the Falkland Islands

Committee, was formed in 1968 to frustrate the British government's then initiative to arrange a sovereignty transfer of the Islands to Argentina through a Memorandum of Understanding. The term 'emergency' not only reflected the perceived exigencies of the time, but also drew on the widespread use of the term in recent British conflicts in the post-World War Two era of decolonisation, which were either recent or contemporaneous, notably Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus and Rhodesia. Emergency thus not only has a particular contextual and empirical relevance to the Falklands, but it is a theoretical term which has received much new attention through the work of scholars such as Anderson and Adey (2012, 2015). Emergency became the natural theoretical focus for this research, offering a valuable means to understand the Falklands 'emergency' and to test emergency conceptually.
In the iterative processes of unpacking how emergency related to the Falklands conceptually, it became increasingly clear that the speed of emergency was a vital factor. Nixon's *Slow Violence* (2011) was key in helping me to address this, leading me to put forward and interrogate 'slow emergency' as a concept for understanding developments in the Falkland Islands.

In unpacking 'slow emergency', the research became focused on four main areas of investigation, namely socio-economic, the body, three-dimensionality and political. The research has consciously sought to understand Islanders as actors in their own right, however much 'structures' circumscribed their agency. Similarly, the role of slow emergency in shaping, and being shaped by, Islanders will also be examined. Through unpacking the Islanders' socio-economic and political experience, and critically opening up the body and three-dimensionality for interrogation, the research seeks to offer original interpretations of the Falkland Islands in the period prior to the 1982 Conflict.

For this project to be viable, research in the Falklands was a *sine qua non*. Professor Dodds wrote to Sukey Cameron, the Falkland Islands Government Representative in London about my planned research, whom I then contacted and subsequently met at the Falkland Islands Office, in Westminster, in March 2011. This was a crucial meeting for this project, in which the Falkland Islands

Government support was secured, without which this research project would have been simply impractical. Sukey Cameron was most encouraging, and also informed me about the Shackleton Scholarship Foundation, chaired by former Falkland Governor, David Tatham. I subsequently applied for a scholarship to visit the Islands, and was awarded funds to do so in April 2012. Being able to undertake research in the Islands was a remarkable opportunity, enabling me to carry out research 'on the ground'. A grant from the Shackleton Scholarship Foundation provided me with the financial support to fly to the Islands, with Falkland Islands Office also arranging a subsidised rate for me on the UK-Falklands 'Air Bridge' form RAF Brize Norton, Oxfordshire to RAF Mount Pleasant Airport.

Sukey Cameron also put me in touch with former Falklands Governor and former President of the Falkland Islands Association, Sir Cosmo Haskard, and his wife Lady Haskard, who would be very important sources for this project. I was able to undertake two visits to their home in Bantry, Ireland, in July 2011 and July 2012 to interview them about their time in the Falklands, as well as in Malawi (Nyasaland), when it was part of the Central African Federation; in both cases, the Haskards had experienced periods of emergency. The Haskards were generous with their assistance, and provided valuable content for this project, notably interviews and photographs from their private archive. During the writing of this thesis, Sir Cosmo sadly passed away (February 2017 at the age of 100); this, I believe, adds further to the importance of the research undertaken with the Haskards at Bantry, a research opportunity which now no longer exists.

In pursuing a research project with a specific, empirical focus on the Falkland Islander experience, it was essential to be able to access the Islander 'voice', both in terms of accessing rarely accessible contemporary newsletters and speaking with Islanders. The logistics of conducting the research in these remote South Atlantic islands was complex, with the additional complication that I was then working in Singapore. Assistance from the Falkland Islands Office made the whole process very manageable, and in October 2012, I flew from Singapore Changi to London Heathrow, thereafter proceeding to RAF

Brize Norton where I connected with the weekly 20-hour long 'Air Bridge' to Mount Pleasant Airport, East Falkland (Fig. 3.1). As can be seen in Fig 3.1 this journey included a stopover (for refuelling) at the British overseas territory of Ascension Island, the mid-way point of the Royal Air Force (RAF) 'Air Bridge' linking Britain and the Falkland Islands, via Ascension Island. In this way, the journey to the Falklands can be seen an Atlantic archipelagic itinerary, stretching from Great Britain to Ascension to East Falkland.

Fig 3.1 Air Bridge from RAF Brize Norton, Oxfordshire, UK to RAF Mount Pleasant, Falkland Islands

Source: http://thefalklands.info/falklands_air_travel.html

Reaching Mount Pleasant Airport on East Falkland therefore marked the end point of an 8000-mile journey from the UK, which was followed by an hour-long minibus transfer to Stanley (Fig. 3.2.) As Fig. 3.2 shows, the journey to Stanley is in close proximity to the Southern Ocean, with the Malvina House Hotel my destination, sited next to the sheltered waters of Stanley harbour. After the Upland Goose Hotel having closed in 2008, the Malvina House - its name a recognition of the Islands contested geopolitics - serves as Stanley's

largest hotel, and along with Government House, fulfills the five key functions identified by Craggs (2012).

Fig 3.2 The route from RAF Mount Pleasant to Stanley's Malvina House Hotel

Source: Google maps

Of the qualitative methods employed during my visit to the Islands, recorded interviews and informal conversations were a particularly important means for gathering, and understanding, authentic Islander perspectives. The location of the Malvina House Hotel on Ross Road proved valuable in terms of meeting with Islanders. It is situated on Ross Road, Stanley's main east-west road which runs alongside the harbour, and is in close proximity to the West Store (the Islands' main supermarket) and Government House. It thus provided a convenient venue for many of the interviews and conversations that I had with Islanders. The oral histories resulting from these interviews proved consistently valuable, and could then be triangulated with other primary and secondary sources, such as letters and autobiographies, to scaffold a clear picture of the Islands in the era prior to the 1982 conflict.

One Islander explicitly said to me that he trusted me to use what he said responsibly, and this was a common – and entirely understandable – sentiment that I encountered. There was a clear and generous willingness to help my understanding of the Islander experience in the period leading up to 1982, but a discernible reluctance for words to be quoted directly did exist. In the numerically small community that the Islanders in, where there can be an immediate accountability for what is said, discretion in what is said is a prudent course; there is also the concern about who might read those words outside the Islands, including in Argentina, where comments made can be manipulated by a third party for political ends.

For this reason, the thesis primarily uses the comments made as part of the aforementioned triangulation of evidence, with a conscious decision to be sparing in use of directly quoted oral content cited in this thesis. Importantly, the backgrounds of Stanley and Camp-based Islanders that I interviewed – from farming to building to education to aviation to journalism – gave me access to a cross-section of Islander society, one which was clearly representative of much of Islander society in the period prior to the 1982 Conflict. Indeed, all the Islanders I spoke with in these conversations had been part of the Islander community prior to 1982, often very prominently as Islander leaders such as Councillors and Farm managers.

Other key methods underpinning the research included obtaining access to, and then systematically reading through, print materials in the Jane Cameron National Archives in Stanley, with its extensive collection of contemporary Falklands newsletters, such as *Falkland Islands Times, Falkland Islands Monthly Times* and *Penguin News*; this was a unique opportunity, as it is the only research facility where such an extensive array of Falkland primary sources exists. In terms of securing access to materials, the Shackleton Scholarship Foundation award was most helpful as it gave me an ‘official’ academic introduction, and chief archivist Tansy Newman regularly liaised with me by email before my arrival, and was ever helpful once I was in the Archives. This enabled her to plan ahead with scheduling files for me to study during my fortnight in the Islands, so ensuring that during my numerous visits

to the Archives, time was used most productively, and I had access to the sources I needed whilst in the Islands. With no other researchers at the Archives during my visits, she was available to answer my questions whenever they arose, which also helped me to keep the research focused on the most relevant files, a vital consideration when my time in the Islands was so finite.

This archival research enabled me to access generally complete runs of local publications, particularly the *Falkland Islands Times, Falkland Islands Monthly Times* and *Penguin News* files. They are rare records, both in the sense that not only were original print runs low in the first instance (a few hundreds), but also very few copies – and sometimes none – survived. It soon became clear that letters from contemporary local publications would be particularly important for unpacking the challenges of 'Falkland life'. Correspondence in the *Falkland Islands Times, Falkland Islands Monthly Times* and *Penguin News* yielded not only a rich seam of hitherto neglected primary source material, but also helped me develop a growing understanding of how slow emergency was manifested in the Islands prior to 1982. I refer to these publications as newsletters; while they have many of the attributes of a newspaper, the limited scale and frequency of these publications means that newsletter is a more apt description, though it is clear in the unique context of the Falklands they functioned as a local newspaper.

It came as no surprise to find that there were certain recurring themes in Islander epistolary anxiety in these newsletters about the future. These included Foreign Office 'appeasement' of Argentina's sovereignty ambitions; frustration at colonial neglect; and concern about a variety of other issues including the impact of resident 'non-Islanders' (including Royal Marines and Argentinians), Islander emigration, and Falkland Islands monopolism. These themes can clearly be seen in the following chapters.

Through studying these files, I was able to access articles, speeches and letters which were unobtainable elsewhere, and offered a unique and invaluable 'window' into pre-1982 Falkland perspectives, mentalities and

experiences. As will be evidenced in subsequent chapters, the primary materials gained there proved invaluable to the research, enabling me to draw on many contemporary Islander voices in unpacking 'slow emergency' in the Falklands discourse, which invariably involved disappointment about the present, and anxiety about the future.

As anticipated, the sources studied during my time in the Jane Cameron National Archives, notably the *Falkland Islands Times, Falkland Islands Monthly Times* and *Penguin News*, offered content which provided distinct and authentic Falkland points of view to me a researcher. One particular value of the contents of these newsletters was that the views expressed and experiences recorded stood exactly as originally published; unlike with the human memory, there was no risk of accounts becoming faded or distorted over time. Whilst a lack of impartiality in such primary material is a source limitation, this need not be overly problematic if the sources are read, and approached with, critical awareness; the reality is that the perspectives which feature in these publications are in themselves accurate evidence of views then present and circulating in the Falklands.

As per my interactions with the Jane Cameron National Archives, for a researcher visiting the Islands undertaking the necessary preparations to engage with the Islander community is absolutely essential. The method that needs to be applied can be described as 'preparing the ground'. As will already be evident, this was achieved with assistance from the Falkland Islands Government, financial support from the Shackleton Scholarship Foundation, and the connection with Sir Cosmo and Lady Haskard.

The importance of undertaking pre-visit preparation should not be underestimated for researchers who wish to meaningfully engage with Islanders, who have become accustomed to treating visiting external actors such as academics and journalists with caution. I was also visiting at a sensitive time, with the policies of then Argentine President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner widely perceived as hostile to the Falklands continuation as a British Overseas Territory. This caution, or at times

suspicion, amongst Islanders is, however, not a new phenomenon; illustrative of this point is a memorable passage from Velma Malcolm's *As Ignorant as Sheep* (2002), which reveals much about the context an academic researcher in the Falkland Islands is likely to encounter in undertaking field work there. In this, Malcolm articulates perceptions and frustrations about external actors which are widely present within the Falkland community. I have italicised parts of the passage which are of particular significance:

> As I finish writing this, it is already 2002 and the Falklands 20th anniversary of its invasion by Argentina and many journalists and a few of the many TV teams intending to visit have already called writing or voicing their *usual disparaging remarks about the Islands and Islanders* […] I'm sorry for those people who have already voiced opinions about *why did we bother to come* and it's *just a windswept rocky outcrop inhabited by a few shepherds* […] Well people, we have *a way of life* which is the *envy* of however millions there are in the world […] We have a much *wider knowledge of world affairs* than is generally the case elsewhere. Even children at school are aware of world affairs […] One last sentence, *do not pity us, try living in the Falklands*, or even just think about it, you may end up *envying us'* (Malcolm 2002, pp. 294-95).

Essentially these sentiments articulate views that were shared with me in the course of my visit. Islanders did not wish to be dismissed, or described through 'disparaging remarks' (Malcolm 2002, p.294), as ill-informed backwoodsmen living on some inhospitable South Atlantic 'rocks', and wanted external actors to listen to their voices without prejudice. They did not want to be regarded or portrayed as ill informed, as the emphasis Malcolm places on Islanders' knowledge of 'world affairs' makes clear (Malcolm 2002, pp.294-95).

Unpacked, behind Malcolm's reference to the Falklands being an 'enviable' place to live (Malcolm 2002, pp.294-95), lies a belief in the value of the Falkland community and Islands. Researchers who are unaware of such Islander perceptions are unlikely to have as productive a dialogue as they might otherwise have achieved. Similarly, the Falkland community lives in a post (1982) war era, in which there is a 'Cold Peace' with Argentina, and Islanders continue to have very real concerns that interviews or conversations with them could be appropriated or manipulated for the purposes of advancing the political agenda of the Argentine government. As previously earlier,

discretion in interviews, both within and outside of the Islands is a prudent course for Islanders, and researchers in the Falklands are well-advised to be aware of the context in which they are working, and mindful of Islander sensibilities and sensitivities. Interestingly *As Ignorant as Sheep* as a publication usefully highlights the challenges posed to a researcher in the Islands. Obtaining this important but privately published document was difficult as it had only been distributed within the Islands. After making numerous enquiries as to where I might find a copy, I was eventually able to obtain one in person from Velma Malcolm's daughter and son-in-law, Aisla and Tony Heathman, whom I met at their home in Estancia, East Falkland in the course of fieldwork.

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Falkland Islanders who met me did so knowing that my research project had already been positively received by the Falkland Islands Government and the Shackleton Scholarship Foundation; this was of great value in helping Islanders feel comfortable about sharing their perspectives and experiences in our interviews and conversations, both formally in the Malvina House Hotel, and informally. An announcement of my impending arrival was also publicly disseminated on 3 October 2012 to the wider Falkland community, through the medium of a Shackleton Scholarship Foundation press release to the locally read, but Montevideo based, English language website MercoPress (see Appendix B).

At no point was there ever a sense that this official help carried with it any expectation as to what I might write about the period from the mid-1960s prior to 1982. With my research being under the auspices of Professor Dodds at Royal Holloway, University of London, both Sukey Cameron and David Tatham as the 'gatekeepers' for my research visit to the Falklands, were very receptive to the project, seeing the academic value of a study of the Falklands in this era. Indeed, there was a widespread recognition amongst Falkland stakeholders that I met that this period from the mid 1960s to early 1982 had been understudied.

As a researcher in the Islands, it is ever important to be aware of historical context of the relationship with both Argentina and Britain, both within and beyond this period. In many ways the Argentine dimension was more straightforward; Argentina had aspired to territorially incorporate the Islands both before and after 1982, providing a continuity of objective, albeit one unwelcome to Islanders. Perceptions of Argentina among Islanders were inevitably framed by the experience of the 1982 Conflict, as they are in Stanley's townscape, notably the 1982 Liberation Memorial, as well as street names such as Jeremy Moore Avenue and Margaret Thatcher Drive, the latter with its own Thatcher memorial bust.

In contrast the relationship with Britain appears more complicated, and it became very apparent during the course of this research that Islanders' experience with the '1982 Conflict Britain' that recaptured the Islands, is not the same as with the 'pre-Conflict Britain', which neglected the Islands and discussed sovereignty with Argentina; 'our dark years' is how one Islander informally described this period to me, and is a subject that neither Islanders nor the British authorities today would prefer to dwell on.

For this research, it was vital to unpack the everyday realities of the pre-Conflict 'slow emergency' era for Islanders, which were no rural idyll. As will be evidenced in the thesis, the research uncovered many sources in local publications attesting to the hardness of life, so that the researcher is left with the impression that at least for some Islanders, daily existence felt like an oppressive sentence, comparable to living in a prison. One source I uncovered explicitly said this: 'A Kelper (one of the pawns)', an anonymous contemporary letter-writer to the *Falkland Islands Times,* likened the Islands to 'A political prison for 2000 British subjects in the South Atlantic' (*Falkland Islands Times,* 15 April 1977, p. 3). Whilst this is but one perspective from an individual who did not feel able to share his/her name in a public forum in this micro-community and was particularly exercised about mobilities, his/her view helps the researcher appreciate how keenly aspects of everyday emergency were felt by an individual disenchanted with Falkland life.

As the research unfolded, it became palpably clear that for Islanders of less social importance in Stanley or in the remoteness of Camp, this was an everyday existence of limited opportunities, mobilities and infrastructure, with no 'Government House as Hotel' to ease life. As also became apparent in the research, emigration was the obvious solution for Islanders who concluded quotidian conditions in the colony were too hard; the ensuing further depopulation of the colony resulting from such a choice gave Britain more leverage over remaining Islanders, in encouraging an accommodation with Argentina.

In the research, it was important to consider how Falkland slow emergency was positioned in relation to other colonial emergencies. Whilst there was no formal declaration of emergency in the Falklands until the 1982 Argentine invasion, during this slow emergency period the experience of the 'Islands as an affective prison' appears to have existed, with the Islands' geographical isolation effectively functioning as a territorial container of neglect.

This was not the obvious type of imprisonment which characterised other British colonial emergencies, such as (say) that of the Kenya Emergency (1952-6). By 1956, in what has been termed 'Britain's Gulag' (Elkins 2005), 24,000 'detainees' in thirty-nine camps and 8,400 convicts in twenty-one prisons (Dewar 1987, p.62) had been incarcerated; in contrast, this was a subtle 'below the radar' everyday emergency for a 2,000 strong community, the incarceration - for those who felt - it being of a geographical rather than legal nature. Numerous recollections - often poignant - of the toughness of this period remain within the Islander community, and helps the researcher appreciate that Islanders' perceptions of British behaviour are more multi-layered than a simple narrative of '1982 and all that'.

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With so much to investigate whilst in the Islands, keeping a daily record of the visit was a vitally important method employed, from which the table below is constructed; this sets out the research schedule undertaken whilst in the Islands, as well as an overview of the Islanders whom I met, and in many cases formally interviewed in the Malvina House Hotel. Collectively this group

constituted over 0.5% of the Islands' population (16 people out of 2,932, the estimated total population in 2012). Details of the interviews conducted in the Falklands are set out in Appendix C; these ranged in length from one to two hours, and focused on the period of the slow emergency, excerpts of which are used in the following chapters. These conversations with Islanders also proved valuable in communicating the daily challenges that quotidian existence posed to Islanders in this period.

As recorded in Appendix D, interviewees' backgrounds provided a wide geographical coverage of the Islands; this was intentional to ensure that, within the limited time frame I had in the Islands, voices with first-hand experience of Stanley, the East Falkland Camp and West Falkland Camp respectively, were heard. Temporally it was necessary that the Islanders who were interviewed were living in the Falklands during the period of slow emergency, which meant that all were of mature and in some cases advanced years. Within the group, Camp farm managers were represented, as well as white and blue collar professionals from Stanley, so creating a cohort that was aware of, and familiar with, the broad spectrum of Falkland life during the period of slow emergency. While the Camp farming settlements were clearly represented, had time allowed and the opportunity been available, a former Camp farm worker would have also been a very welcome addition to this cohort.

The wider temporal context of slow emergency, which necessitated a focus on a period which was between 30 and 45 years earlier, was potentially a concern, as interviewees were invited to recall experiences and perceptions which, inevitably, were no longer recent. However, the interviews in no small measure allayed this concern as interviewees' recollections appeared credible, and proved consistent both with other interviewees and my wider research, especially in the Jane Cameron National Archives.

Undertaking research in a small, geographically isolated community presented both opportunities and challenges. It enabled me, in a short space of time, to connect with Islander networks, and it was often the case that

interviewees were able to suggest who else I might interview or have an informal conversation with, which meant that I was able to meet more Islanders than originally envisaged. I also had one other (probably unique) benefit in my Falklands research, namely my experience of working in the Stanley Post Office in 1984, and there were still a few Islanders, in particular Patrick Watts and Tim and Sally Blake, that recalled me from then. This meant that for me as a researcher I had some pre-existing contacts in the Islands, which proved helpful in helping me establish connections, and engage with, the wider Islander community.

This context also gave me a better understanding of the community than if this 2012 research visit had been my first time in the Islands. Whilst it was from nearly three decades before, it nonetheless meant I did have an understanding of the sensitivities involved in undertaking the research, and was also aware of how information passes around quickly in this small community. When I had visited the Islands in 1984 information could be quickly passed on person to person via 2-metre sets, the 'R/T' (Radio Telegraph), and phone calls in Stanley which idiosyncratically required a variable number of rings to call the recipient. Alasdair Pinkerton's *Strangers in the Night; the Falklands Conflict as a Radio War* (2007) gives a comprehensive overview of the communication technology then in use in the Islands. By way of contrast, in 2012 Islanders had access to the internet and mobile phones, but the operative point is that in both instances the technology of the day facilitated prompt dissemination of information throughout the Islands.

The interviews and discussions I conducted with Islanders included some potentially controversial areas, such as how the Islanders were treated by the British authorities in the period from the mid 1960s to 1982 appear to have been positively received, as more Islanders offered to speak with me. My research interviews took place either at the Malvina House Hotel or in the homes of the interviewees. It should also be mentioned that however much of a particular interview I was ultimately able to use in this thesis, each interview – along with numerous informal conversations with Islanders – was used in

triangulation with letters, histories and articles, to provide a deeper and clearer understanding of the research topic. These conversations increasingly confirmed the view that a less conventional approach, more focused on the Islanders' everyday experience would be essential to better understand the Falklands in relation to emergency.

Capturing Islanders' contemporary political experience and perspectives was vital, dominated as these were by the Anglo-Argentine sovereignty dispute; it was, however, essential to capture other aspects of the slow emergency. Socio-economic pressures were an area demanding close attention, and lay at the heart of the slow emergency. Similarly, the importance of three-dimensionality in the Falklands, including but not limited to Argentine aerial incursions, was also very apparent; it made little sense to regard the Falklands two-dimensionally as islands, when aerial vulnerably and sub-marine resources, especially oil, all contributed to the slow emergency. Likewise, the role of bodies in the slow emergency also demanded a major focus; for such a micro-community, the (limited) number of bodies presents a particular challenge to the community's practical and biological survival, with emigration and immigration having a potentially destabilising impact, whether in terms of an influx, or loss, of bodies.

As was evident both in formal interviews, informal conversations and contemporary local newsletters, the loss of families and young people had been keenly felt by Islanders, a challenge which was exacerbated by the presence of several dozen Royal Marines stationed in the Islands; ostensibly there to help defend the population in the event of an Argentine invasion, while in practice they were siphoning off young female Islanders to the 'outside world', the progressive and cumulative loss of their bodily presence a key feature of slow emergency. The chapters of this research project are therefore organised to reflect this quartet of political, socio-economic, three-dimensional and bodily challenges. As will be demonstrated, any one of these had the potential to be the decisive element in slow emergency, and collectively were contributing to an attritional and ongoing demise of the Falkland Islands as a viable colony.

A wide range of other sources were employed to develop this research project. Further interviews, such as with Islander Graham Bound and Joaqin Allolio, a Uruguayan who had worked in the Falklands during the period of slow emergency, were valuable in their corroboration of the profound challenges facing the Falklands at this time.

As evidenced in the bibliography, a wide range of reading was undertaken, and primary sources such as *The Times,* Hansard and *Panorama*, a contemporary mass-circulation Argentine magazine which took a particular interest in the Malvinas question, were used. The invitation of Professor James Sidaway at the National University of Singapore to present a paper on the Falklands and sovereignty to the PEAS (Politics, Economies and Space) group in January 2013, encouraged me to reflect on the nature and processes of the Falkland emergency, and what made it distinct. Similarly, a guest editorial I submitted in September 2013 to *Political Geography* about three-dimensionality, entitled *Geopolitics of Volumander – the Falklands/Malvinas and East Asian Island disputes*, led me to reflect further on the relationality of different key areas of slow emergency to each other.

The process of assembling literatures for ongoing study related to the Falkland Islands did not prove straightforward, owing to a relative paucity of sources on the period of the 1960s and 1970s. Inevitably the Falklands War of 1982 is the dominant strand of literature on the Islands, this 'lens' however serving to obscure important geopolitical and socio-economic developments taking place in the Falklands prior to 1982. Investigating the pre-Conflict period of slow emergency was a key motivation in writing this thesis, but crucially I wanted it to address and unpack the Islanders' everyday, first hand experience. It was not intended to produce a more conventional, diplomatic-related account of the period such as Peter Beck's *The Falkland Islands as an international problem (1988)*, but rather produce original research specifically related to the Islanders experience.

Owing to this relative lack of sources, it became important to fill some of the gaps by assembling evidence of different types of provenance. An important early example of this, and a key first stage in its own right, was to build up an overview of the formative period of 1964-1970 as I was due to meet Sir Cosmo and Lady Haskard in the initial stages of the project (July 2011). Research undertaken at Royal Holloway, University of London helped me gather empirical evidence about the Falklands during the period of Sir Cosmo's gubernatorial incumbency. I therefore drew on a range of primary and secondary Falklands related literatures to put together the detailed overview which can be found in Appendix A. It was particularly helpful in providing me with a clear oversight of the sequencing of developments, in relation to each geopolitical actor (I am including the Falkland Islands in this description as both Governor Haskard and the Falkland Islands Councillors exercised degrees of agency, notwithstanding London's wishes). It proved, as intended a valuable resource in my discussions with Sir Cosmo and Lady Haskard; it also gained a further purpose, namely as a timeline for use by the Haskards themselves recording their time in the Falklands, and I provided a copy for their own private archive.

With the focus of this project firmly on everyday experience in the Falkland Islands, it was imperative to source locally produced newsletters such as the *Falkland Islands Times, Falkland Islands Monthly Times* and *Penguin News* which proved invaluable, as well as the reportage of London papers such as *The Times* and *Daily Express*. I was keen to leverage contemporary accounts in the research to shed new light on developments in, and concerning, the Falklands. Stubbs had recently shown the importance of the *Times of Cyprus* during the Cypriot independence struggle, and how it 'conveyed the lived experience of emergency rule' (Stubbs 2016, p. 87); this thesis similarly aims to give everyday press accounts of the Falkland slow emergency era due attention. It should also be mentioned that whilst I uncovered much material whilst in the Jane Cameron National Archives, I also able to bring back e-copies of many pages of the Falkland newsletters, so continued to discover new information in my ongoing research.

In terms of a sustained narration of the Islander voice, the aforementioned privately printed *As Ignorant as Sheep* (Malcolm 2002) can, in many ways, be regarded as important a document as the relatively well known John Smith's *74 Days* (1984*)*, which was an Islander account of the period of Argentine occupation, and proved a popular account in the mid-1980s (attesting to its significance at the time, Margaret Thatcher provided the foreword for it). Rex Hunt's *My Falkland Days* (1992) provides a valuable gubernatorial account of the Islands in this period; similarly Southby-Taylor's (2003) *Reasons in writing* provides important insights into contemporary interactions between Islanders and the Royal Marines. Considering how high profile Chalfont's 1968 visit to the Falkland Islands was, it is perhaps surprising that there is no published definitive account of this, though it has been covered in different histories, such as Mary Cawkell's *The History of the Falkland Islands* (2003) and Martin Abel Gonzalez' *The Genesis of the Falkands (Malvinas) Conflict* (2013)*,* often framed as best suits the narrative or the author. Jean Austin's (2009) *Falkland Diary* provides an important perspective of quotidian life in the Islands in the early 1970s, and draws on her own experiences as a contemporary expatriate observer. In its narration of Islander lives, former Governor David Tatham's (2008) privately published *The Dictionary of Falklands Biography* provides valuable insights into the Falklands of this slow emergency era, as do official reports, notably Shackleton's (1976), which offer further insights into the (often hard) realities of Island life.

Photo journalistic narrations of the Islands from this era, notably *Panorama magazine (1968)* and *The Sunday Times Magazine (1977*) provide a kind of visual time travel in which scenes from the Islands from contemporary moments in time are two-dimensionally captured 'in perpetuity'. As can be seen in these pictures, and those from the Haskards' private archive, there was something distinctly visual about emergency in the Falklands. As mentioned previously, there was the counter-intuitive but politically shrewd use of the union jack against the policies of the British government which appears in published photographs. It is also illuminating to consider how the physical appearance of Islanders' was presented by photo-journalists (often to narrate Kith and Kin), as well as the aspects of the Falklands enviroment they

visually highlighted, such as numerous manifestations of a 'hard life' in the Islands. With the daily challenges of living, indeed surviving (be that economically, socially or physically), in the Falklands intensifying during this era of slow emergency, photographs published in the British press offered a direct and immediate way to inform Britons and other audiences of their struggles. Dodds et al (p. 17) argue that 'The act of looking is an act of the state as well as of the individual', and the way the Islanders were represented in photographs suggest that the British state had been 'looking the other way', neglectful of its responsibilities to the Islanders; in this way, photos could act as *agents provocateurs*.

Photographic representations of the Islanders published in the British press, notably in the *Daily Express* often offered the prospect of a sympathetic, supportive observance, and were addressed to a largely 'Kith and Kin' British readership to win domestic support for the Islanders. Rose (2007) draws our attention to how 'Visual imagery is never innocent; it is always constructed through various practices, technologies and knowledges' (Rose 2007, p. 26); photographic images have a back story, and do not merely 'appear'. They can be used to reify a particular narrative, such as the *Daily Express* photoshoot of 20 September 1968, when Islanders gathered en masse with union jacks at Stanley's Christchurch cathedral and Whale Bone Arch to 'keep the Falklands British' and frustrate a British government 'betrayal'. Whatever the motivation in the producing and dissemination of an image, photographs along with other visual imagery provide a means to deliver a particular narrative, and the capacity to influence public opinion.

For the research, it was also important to be aware of the unique aural and oral communications culture of the Islands in this era; 'With radio as their primary communication technology, Falkland Islanders were part of a 'sonic' community framed around a complex radio environment' (Pinkerton 2008, p. 344). Jean Austin recalled how the airwaves were central to Falkland life:

> The government-operated radio-telephone plays an essential part in islands communications keeping the forty-odd settlements in touch with Stanley and each other…[this] godsend to the housewife as she tunes in while at her Rayburn each morning to listen to the daily weather reports from camp

> settlements as well as local gossip. The network also fulfills the role of a flying doctor service with medical officers in Stanley able to give advice to patients in camp, and when accidents are reported, a Beaver can, if necessary, be alerted at short notice (Austin 2009, p. 191).

During Austin's time in the Islands (1972-1975) Edith McMullen operated the Radio-Telephone (R/T) from Stanley, and her account conveys both the intimacy of knowing the operator as an individual, and the unavoidable public intimacy of private matters being broadcast throughout the Islands,

> Edith McMullen, or Radio Edith, as she is code-named and popularly known everywhere in the islands…[is] At the controls daily, morning and afternoon, she tunes in to the settlements. The radio-telephone however is public. Consequently all gossip is common knowledge down to the most intimate detail (Austin 2009, p. 191).

Whilst 2 metres 'walkie-talkie' radio system replaced the Radio-Telephone as the main form of intra-Island aerial communication from the mid-1970s, personal privacy, however, continued to be hopelessly compromised. 'In both, the radio signals were open for all to hear, and 'listening in' to other people's calls became a form of entertainment in the Islands. No information was private—and the effect was to create an unusually open and transparent' (Pinkerton 2008, p. 348). While there was a greater degree of privacy in making a call in Stanley through the Islands' capital telephone lines, there was a similar personal intimacy, with the operators providing;

> a very direct and personal service – far more than just connecting lines, they were seen as a general point of information for the entire Stanley community. They would often be called to answer questions ranging from "When is this power cut going to end?" to "What is the best way to make gravy?" ….If it was quiet, the operators were happy to listen and provide companionship when it was needed (http://www.falklands-museum.com/r-t---telephone-exchange.html).

It is important for the researcher to be aware how aurally and orally engaged this community was in its communications. The closeness of the Islander community surmounted the intra-archipelagic distances between Falkland settlements, and adds weight to the importance of contemporary textual sources, such as letters and comment from the *Falkland Islands Times*. These textual sources capture and record everyday discourse within the Islands, which otherwise would have been permanently lost; such discourse

ranges from the geopolitics of territorial control, to an intimate geopolitics of bodies.

It should be noted too that this was also a very geopolitically informed community, which would listen on 'The Box' (as radios were known) to international news from the BBC Overseas Service; similarly Islanders were sonically kept in touch with the (growing) Falkland diaspora through the 'Calling the Falklands' show;

> Every morning, except Sundays, broadcasting begins at 8:00am in summer, 9:00 am in winter, with relayed BBC news… On Sunday evenings listening is more limited... the highlight being a half-hour broadcast 'Calling the Falklands', a programme of record requests and messages from relatives and friends in Britain, relayed by the BBC (Austin 2009, p. 192).

With Islanders very aware of developments both within the Islands, and in Britain and Argentina through the BBC, their geographical remoteness did not mean a lack of information (which in the case of Argentina during the 'Dirty War' era, was entirely counterproductive to efforts to win over the Islanders). Ian Strange (1981, p. 152) noted how Islanders had a tradition of sonic independence:' The amateur has played an important part in the history of the Falklands, with amateur radios being used when official circuits have failed… it was often the 'ham' who was the first to receive incidental news'. As will be considered later, Falkland Governor Neville French in particular did not fully grasp the importance of Islanders' sonic culture, which added a sonic dimension to slow emergency. Along with the Rayburn stove, the radio was a mainstay of Islander living rooms, regularly informing Islanders about world news as part of the daily routine. Indeed, during my 1984 visit to the Islands, I saw how central radio was to the community, and my impression then was that many Islanders were better informed than many of their contemporaries in the United Kingdom, a geopolitical awareness that is often evident in Islanders' discourse in the *Falkland Islands Times*.

4 Chapter Four – '1968, Loyalty and all that' - Political Emergency, loyal struggle and the Falklands' territorial future

4.1 The Falklands as part of a British slow emergency

This opening section sets out to examine why, from the mid 1960s, the Falklands appeared to have become less secure as a British geopolitical entity. It identifies key developments for Britain, and the implications and logics of these for the Falklands. As will be seen logics of vulnerability and anachronism left the Falklands particularly exposed unless some counter-polarity were applied; this would be done through the mobilisation of loyalty.

Accelerated emergency in the Falklands was most pronounced in 1968, yet the period up to 1982 remained predominately characterised by slow emergency. The Falkland emergency of 1968 can also be understood as enveloped within another emergency, that of the slow emergency of what type of country post-imperial Britain was, particularly regarding its own ethnic composition and place in the world.

Whilst a wider examination of the post-war dismantling of the British Empire is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is important to note how the latter 1940's witnessed a period of accelerated international emergency for Britain's status in the world, as the former British imperial hegemon effectively became a client state of the USA. Nor had Britain's Dominions grouping of Australia, Canada, the Irish Free State, Newfoundland, New Zealand and South Africa survived, post Second World War, as a means to cushion the loss of great power status. As Darwin (in Brown and Louis 1999, p. 85) has argued:
'Long before the final erasure in the mid 1960s of British pretensions to world power through a system of satellite states, the Third British Empire had broken up, an event presaged by the lapse of the old term 'Dominion' after 1947'.

Within two years of Britain's' dismantling of the Raj and Indian and Pakistani independence in 1947, Britain had become one of a grouping of a dozen countries subsumed within the anti Soviet politico-military alliance of NATO, as it sought US geopolitical protection from Soviet domination. By the 1960s, Britain – its residual pretensions to great power status devastatingly exposed by the Suez emergency/debacle of 1956 – was still coming to terms with what might be regarded as the national psychodrama of its reduced status; the bipolar geopolitics of the Cold War era, and relentless advance of decolonisation, meant that this once 'Big Three' victor power of 1945, had now become relegated to the role of a supporting actor. As Dean Acheson, US Secretary of State, bluntly put it in 1962 'Great Britain has lost an empire but has not yet found a role'" (cited in Brinkley 1990, p. 601).

This challenge to British identity coincided with the arrival of mass Commonwealth immigration from the former British Empire, which had once created the Falklands colony. There remained much 'unfinished business' from Empire; as discussed previously, Britain was still dealing with numerous 'emergencies' from former – or soon to be former – colonies, even though the Cold War struggle had now become the overriding focus of British policy. However, it did not necessarily follow that Britain itself was entirely reconciled to its newly diminished role in the world, or had come to terms with the hard lesson administered by the United States in the 1956 Suez Crisis. Darwin (in Brown and Louis 1999, p. 86) posits that it is no longer

> 'as clear as it once seemed that Britain has escaped unscathed from the wider loss of a wider Britannic identity, or that shrugging off the Imperial burden has had the liberating and energising effects once confidently predicted'

By the latter 1960s, Rhodesia and Northern Ireland had also become pressing issues in the debate about Britain's identity and role in the world and, along with the Falklands and Gibraltar, can be seen as part of another emergency, that it is the disintegration of the British Empire during the twentieth century.

Macro-development – key aspects of British slow emergency	**Implications for Falklands as a British territory**	**Logic**
Disintegration of the British Empire after the Second World War	Falklands no longer part of British Empire – now effectively a territorial appendage to a post war Britain which appeared in decline as a global power	Anachronism; vulnerability
Identity – ethnic composition of post war Britain	Falklands' ethnic composition fit the traditional profile of a white Britain – but post-war Britain was becoming increasingly multi-cultural	Anachronism?
Northern Ireland, also Gibraltar	Falklands at risk if Northern Ireland's Unionists, or Gibraltarians, are transferred against their wishes to the sovereignty of the Irish Republic or Spain respectively	Vulnerability
Rhodesia	Falklands at risk? White settler community of British descent abandoned by British government - but over the issue of white minority rule which did not apply in the Falklands	Vulnerability

Table 4.1 '*The Falklands as part of British slow emergency' – how the beleaguered colony became enveloped in Britain's own slow emergency of finding its place/role in the post war world, and changed ethic composition*

The relationality of the Falklands to the wider issue of whether Britain's future was – or was not – to be exclusively as a regional, European power is clear; British territorial retention of the Falklands implied not only an extra-regional presence for Britain in the South Atlantic and Antarctic region, but also upholding a loyal 'kith and kin' population, who were effectively a 'micro-dominion'. The Falklands provided a way for lingering sentiments of dominion and 'kith and kin' to find an outlet and updated expression in Britain's reduced post-war circumstances. However, by the mid 1960s, change at the British macro-level already threatened the Islands' continued existence in a number of ways, adding to the numerous difficulties it faced during the colony's own slow emergency era. As explained in Table 4.1, such developments had serious implications for the Falklands' continuation as a British territory; logics

of vulnerability and anachronism suggested that the Falklands' future was likely to be finite.

The issue of the future of Northern Ireland, which potentially had implications for the Falklands own future, came to the fore in the month before the Chalfont visit to the Falklands, with the domestic United Kingdom emergency of 'The Troubles' commencing in Londonderry on 5 October 1968. As with Falkland Islanders, Ulster's Unionists were determined to maintain the territorial status quo under the British crown. 'Surrendering' the Falklands to Argentina might presage a similar fate for Northern Ireland, or Gibraltar to Spain, hence the logic of 'No surrender' for those like Biggs-Davison applied as much to the Falklands as Ulster.

Donaghy (2014, p. 30) sets out the relationality of the two cases through the example of Conservative John Biggs- Davidson MP, who became a leading Falklands supporter;

> When rumours of a Falkland sell-out abounded in the late 1960s, the Northern Irish question was at the forefront of British politics. Biggs-Davison saw the danger of a precedent being established in transferring sovereignty over a small British community abroad, and its possible implications for the loyalist population of Ulster.

Whilst the struggle between the British government and Irish Republicans is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is important to highlight how Northern Ireland became enveloped within legal emergency, which 'included the Emergency Provisions Acts (EPA) of 1973, 1975, 1978, 1987 and 1991 and the Prevention of Terrorism Acts (PTA) of 1974, 1976, 1984, and 1989' (Wartchow 2005, p. iv). This was an accelerated emergency, in which Britain's 'attempts to introduce colonial measures – internment, interrogation-in-depth, curfews – proved to be politically disastrous within a UK context' (Burke 2015, p. 21), amounting to 'an emergency regime' (Wartchow 2005, p. vii). For the Falklands' continuation as a British colony, however, the fate of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom was a key factor in surviving its own slow emergency; had the British state lost the will to support Ulster's retention within the United Kingdom, with Unionists transferred to Dublin's control, a

similar outcome for Islanders under Buenos Aires was foreseeable. In Fig. 4.1 the union jack has been – and continues to be – mobilised as a symbol of identity, including on buildings, through which a landscape of loyalty is scaffolded.

Fig. 4.1 In both unionist Northern Ireland (left), and in the Falkland Islands (right) the union jack is used on buildings

Sources; (left) https://petermoloneycollection.wordpress.com/1988/01/31/no-surrender-1690-2/
(right) https://www.gettyimages.co.uk/videos/falkland-islands?page=2&sort=mostpopular&offlinecontent=include&phrase=falkland%20islands

Another area of vulnerability for Falkland Islanders was that Britain was changing demographically, potentially making the Islands appear anachronistic and expendable as an imperial relic of a bygone age. Post war mass immigration from Commonwealth countries brought home, in both meanings of the phase, the ethnic diversity of the erstwhile empire to the once overwhelmingly white British population, and challenged British residual colonial mentalities about the 'superiority' of white bodily pigmentation. This 'fast' demographic change, however, was also a source of anxiety and/or resentment amongst many Britons, with New Commonwealth emigration rising from 200,000, 0.4% of population, in 1951's census to over 1 million or

2.1% of population by 1971 (Webb 1989, p. 617). As Ward explains, mass immigration from Commonwealth countries into Britain challenged perceptions of Britishness, not least in its embodied (white) pigmentation, for some a bodily emergency: 'Difference, and particularly that of skin colour, was therefore seen as a problem in itself because it challenged the presumption of homogeneity and rigidity associated with Britishness' (Ward 2004, p. 126). With the slow emergency of what type of country post-imperial Britain was crystallising around the subject of immigration, the mono-ethnic Falklands appeared increasingly less relevant to a multicultural Britain, more focused on supporting the welfare state than maintaining limpets of empire. The degree to which modern Britain was still, however, attached to 'kith and kin' remained to be seen, with the Wilson government's approach to Rhodesia not necessarily being a reassuring case.

In November 1965, white-minority-ruled Rhodesia declared its Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from Britain, in a bid to maintain the supremacy of 224,000 whites, largely of British 'kith and kin' descent, over the black majority. UDI proved a humiliating geopolitical experience for post-imperial Britain, with the Wilson government placing the 'white settler-dominated Rhodesia under an ineffective sanctions regime. What offered some hope for the cause of 'keeping the Falklands British' was the attachment that many members of the British public showed for their Rhodesian 'kith and kin', who still claimed to be loyal to the Crown (whilst revolting against British rule). In his memoirs, Dennis Healey, then Defence Secretary, expressed the view that so substantial was support for UDI Rhodesia amongst British military personnel that 'the British armed forces could not be trusted to execute orders for a military intervention against their Rhodesian "kith and kin."' (*The Time of My Life*, p. 332).

As with domestic British support for Northern Ireland's Unionists, Rhodesia had primed the Falklands issue, establishing that despite the many changes affecting post-war Britain, support for 'kith and kin' was a trigger issue in political life. The same Falklands' ethnic homogeneity which, compared to post-war Britain, appeared an anachronism also offered the possibility of

gaining support from members of the public resistant to the dilution of 'traditional Britishness', and unhappy about the treatment of Rhodesian 'kith and kin'. In this febrile atmosphere, in the month after the Falkland Islands Emergency Committee was formed, came Enoch Powell's speech of 20 April 1968 in Birmingham; its assertions of white Britons increasingly being disadvantaged through mass immigration were followed by a chilling prophesy: 'As I look ahead, I am filled with foreboding. Like the Roman, I seem to see 'the River Tiber foaming with much blood' (cited in Heffer 1998, p. 453).

Powell was subsequently dismissed from the Conservative opposition's front bench for this speech, which was widely regarded as racist and incendiary amongst politicians. The speech was, however, well received by the British public, with a Gallup poll indicating that 74% agreed with it, and that only 15% disagreed; this considerable public support for Powell prompted his biographer, conservative journalist Simon Heffer, to conclude that 'he spoke for the majority of the country, however unsophisticated that majority may be' (Heffer 1998, p. 457). The public support for a 'traditional Britain' presented Falkland Islanders with the opportunity, as white subjects of the crown, to appear as a part of a 'true' Britain to be supported/defended, not discarded.

This then was the wider British context that the Falklands were positioned within – tied to and dependent on a Britain going through its own slow emergency, as it sought to re-position itself in the post-imperial world and come to terms with the implications of Commonwealth immigration.

Schwarz (2012, p. 12) also indirectly provides for us an important insight into why, at this unsettled time in British history, the Falklands proved such a charged issue. He describes the significance of what, in a meeting with him, Powell termed as 'The Thing', essentially a Powellite narration of British slow emergency.

> He [Powell] explained that at the end of the 1960s he had opened a file called 'The Thing'. In it, he had recorded all examples of subversion that he had encountered… I came to understand why Powell had been unable to name the disorder he saw all about him… What was 'the Thing' and what did it represent?... My own view is that in this disorder, or in perception of disorder, we can discern the political-cultural effects of the end of empire 'at home' (Schwarz 2012, pp. 4-5).

In this way, Schwarz sees the end of empire and Commonwealth immigration as significantly impacting on the Britain of this era. For contemporary Britons who had concerns about 'Thingly' developments, the 'disruptive' political and social change – or 'disorder' - of the 1960s offered little reassurance. Large-scale immigration from former colonial subjects had also led to a stronger awareness of 'whiteness' amongst the British public, meaning that: 'At the very moment of decolonisation, a language of racial whiteness assumed a new prominence at home' (Schwarz 2012, p. 12). Fig 4.2, of a pro-Powell march in the west Midlands, captures the white, racial homogeneity of these protests, with the union jack transformed from an imperial symbol into an expression of anti-immigration sentiment.

The idea of 'The Thing' as a Powellite articulation of slow emergency provides an important insight into why, both in the latter 1960s and subsequently, the Falklands issue elicited support from conservative elements concerned about the direction of Britain. Contemporary support for the Islanders' cause from such quarters helped provide a palliative, if not an antidote, to their aversion to aspects of 'the modern world', such as post-imperial disorder and the diminished status of 'the 'white Briton'. In a small, but nonetheless symbolic way, it acted as an affirmation of support for order, maintaining a community of beleaguered white, Anglo kith and kin, and their 'traditional' (British) way of life. In this sense, the Falklands issue was driven by both Britain's past and the Islands' future.

Fig. 4.2 A contemporary march in support of Enoch Powell's 20 April 1968 'Rivers of Blood' speech

Source: https://www.expressandstar.com/editors-picks/2016/10/26/enoch-powell-look-back-at-the-express-star-archive-on-eve-of-new-play-to-see-how-rivers-of-blood-speech-whipped-up-storm/

4.2 The Falklands and the 'Foreign Other'

As substantial support for Powell's views confirmed, there evidently remained considerable resistance to the 'foreign other', and such mentalities were not necessarily confined to those with traditional or reactionary views. In relation to the future of the Falklands, William Hunter Christie recalled the perspectives of left wing Labour MP Stan Newens about Argentines.

> William Hunter Christie: I'd like to instance a Labour member of Parliament, Stan Newens, who said in a Foreign Affairs Labour Party Committee that he'd spent his whole life working for the freeing of the subject peoples of the

> British Empire, and he wasn't going to hand the last two thousand over to a bunch of… er… he used a word which would not be very popular and I won't repeat it.'
>
> Michael Charlton: 'To a bunch of what?'
>
> William Hunter Christie: 'I think he said 'dagos'. He was a left-wing Labour Member of Parliament, and he took the view that he wasn't going to see his life's work finished by simply handing over a colonial people against their will. It did not matter whether they were black, white or khaki. He felt just as strongly about white people in the Falkland Islands as he felt about black people in Africa (Charlton 1989, p. 88).

Irrespective of precisely whatever representation of Argentines Newens may have offered, in a British political landscape where immigration was such a divisive and heated issue, the representation of the Falkland Islanders as 'authentic' Britons in the South Atlantic gained traction in, and from, 1968.
The 'Falkland cause' was able to point to Islander 'kith and kin' who were upholding British territory under threat from Argentina.

Nor did the politics of compelling white 'British' Falkland Islanders to be 'handed over' to Argentina, a 'third world' Latin American county with a military dictatorship and home to a significant number of former Nazis, play well in a country which, only a couple of decades earlier, had defeated Hitler's Germany. As with Rhodesia, the Falklands had stood loyally by Britain in that conflict as part of the Empire, with the colony donating funds for five spitfires.

Discourse associated with British 'kith and kin' meant that the Falkland Islanders' plight would prove highly controversial. Thus, owing to 'the highly charged nature of issues involving 'kith and kin'' (Charlton 1989, p. 19) there was no British official confirmation of negotiations with Argentina, or discussion in Parliament, until 1968, as slow emergency catalysed to reveal to Islanders that a sovereignty transfer was close.

Yet this very diplomacy coincided with a wider narrative in Britain about neglecting the interests of Britons for the benefit of 'foreigners'. The reality, however, that British diplomacy had been responding to the Falkland Islands' colonial status, became increasingly asynchronous in the new post-colonial era; matters has come to a head in December 1965 when Resolution 2065 at

the UN, unopposed by Britain, called on Britain and Argentina to resolve this colonial dispute.

Significantly, Resolution 2065 merely affirmed the 'interests' rather than 'wishes' of the Falkland Islanders; as has been noted, 'the use of the word 'interests' rather than 'wishes' implied only a limited regard for whatever misgivings the islanders had' (Freedman and Gamba Stonehouse 1988, p. 8). The choice of the word 'interests' is of critical importance; it implied that, unlike other 'colonial peoples', the Falkland Islanders' wishes were not a decisive consideration in resolving this inter-state dispute, and were therefore expendable.

Lord Chalfont, who in 1968 would become publicly associated with the Falklands, later acknowledged that 'The 'interests' of the islanders' was the key phrase. […] we all realized, or thought we realized, *we* were the people who could decide upon the interests of the Islanders, not so much the Islanders themselves' (Charlton 1989, p. 19). Whereas 'interests' offered a convenient mechanism to disregard Islander views, 'wishes' implied an Islander 'right' to approve or veto a settlement, something which neither the British and Argentine governments, nor the UN, wished to concede. Royle's assessment (2001, p. 134), that 'the (more) usual insular position regarding politics, especially for small islands, is one of powerlessness, dependency and insignificance' appears to reflect the dilemma of the Islanders, geodeterminstically caught between two state actors.

At serious risk of being denied the right to their (geo)political 'wishes', the Falkland Islanders' lack of agency appears self-evident. Such 'powerlessness' anticipates an inability to determine an outcome, which Resolution 2065 appeared to confirm for the Islanders, though as will presently be considered there was much political 'strength' to be derived from their embodiment of British 'kith and kin' at risk.

It is important to note that other forms of 'powerlessness' were also at play; the Argentine government itself had for over 130 years been powerless to reverse the British seizure of the Malvinas, but with UN support, there now seemed a real possibility of achieving this, implying that this powerlessness

need not be a permanent condition. Britain too began to face up to intimations of powerlessness and constrained agency, further to the 1966 Defence Review:

> The British Ministry of Defence renounced carriers and landing […] of troops against sophisticated opposition outside the range of land-based air cover. From 1966, the U.K demonstrated an increasing willingness to compromise on the Falklands (in contrast to Argentine military belligerency) and an increasing reluctance to make naval shows of force in response (Kinney 1989, p. 49).

The Falkland Islanders fitted this 'traditional' perception of embodied Britishness, which meant the representational, if yet unrealised, power of the 'white' Falkland Islanders posed a political challenge for the British government; its geopolitical options over the Falklands would be seriously curtailed should a narrative of white 'kith and kin' being 'sold out' to the Argentine Other gain traction. The Falkland issue also unhelpfully fitted into the wider narrative of what some Britons saw as the 'white plight' of UDI Rhodesia. It is worth reflecting that had the residents of Diego Garcia had bodily representations of 'whiteness' (rather than 'colour') to enlist in their defence, the Chagossians' deportations from 1967-1973 would have been more difficult to undertake.

The Falkland question was no longer one of two state actors and its citizens claiming competing sovereignties over this South Atlantic archipelago, regularly using the tools of banal geopolitics to assert their claim. The emergence of the Falklands Islanders created a new political context, one in which linking the fate of the colony and its inhabitants to British domestic politics, and invoking loyalty (openly) and race (implicitly) opened up the chance to assert some agency as to their future. The deployment of representations of loyalty and 'Britishness' offered Falkland Islanders and their supporters the possibility of significantly influencing British domestic discourse and governmental policy about the future of the Islands. Calculated usage of key banal objects would help determine the fate of the Islands in a post-colonial world, particularly the Union Jack with its affective loyal symbolism, British newspapers, and (what I later call) the 'loyal camera'.

4.3 Contested Falklands futures: unfolding emergency and mobilising the politics of loyalty

In the early 1960s, the future of the Falklands as a British territorial entity had appeared more certain, with British colonial governance and the union jack's vertical presence in the Islands seemingly secure, notwithstanding Argentine irredentist aspiration. There was no prospect of the Falklands progressing to being a 'micro-New Zealand', and the politics of loyalty' to Britain, and an emphasis on being 'kith and kin', provided a natural route to carving out a future and identity apart from Argentina. In an era of decolonisation, this was an improbable path; as Skelton noted of Montserrat's continued preference for British colonial status 'from a postcolonial perspective, … it complicates the assumption that all colonial territories ipso facto seek independence' (Skelton 2000, p. 116). Argentina's wish to end the perpetuation of such a British colonial anachronism meant that it was unlikely the era of decolonisation pass by and leave the Falklands colonial status quo intact.

Argentine interest in the future of the Islands was demonstrated in the mass circulation magazine *Panorama*, which in latter 1966 challenged the assumption that there was a British future for the Islands. It subverted the image of the Islander's new Governor Haskard on its front page. The meaning of this photograph was reversed; far from the new Governor's image being seen as the affirmation of continuing British authority and control, he was represented as '*El ultimo gobernador ingles?*', signifying the embodied decline of British power in the Falklands. The cloth and metallic objects of Haskard's traditional, colonial attire appear anachronistic, 'on borrowed time', this message consistent with the anticipatory headline. This mass circulation magazine thus sent a powerful signal to the Argentine public – and to the Falkland Islanders and British government – that territorial change to an anachronistic status quo was expected.

The interaction between the politics of loyalty in the Falklands and Argentine irredentist ambition from the mid-1960s proved to be a mutually reinforcing dynamic, the former encouraging the latter. Whilst the three-dimensional

Argentine geopolitical gestures of Fitzgerald's 1965 flight and the 1966 Condor hijack helped develop a 'siege mentality' in the Islands, Islander perceptions of the progressive betrayal of the British government became the accelerative factor in mobilising the politics of loyalty. As will be demonstrated, a mutually reciprocated mistrust between Islanders and the Wilson government slowly ended up with a tentative commitment to the other, occasioned because neither party was able to replace the other with a politically acceptable alternative.

When on 9 September 1965 Argentine aviator Miguel Fitzgerald successfully flew his Cessna 185 from Rio Gallegos to Stanley he obliged both Islanders and Argentines to re-imagine the archipelago's position in relation to the 'mainland'. He had made a symbolic three-dimensional reclamation of the Islands for Argentina; entering into, and descending from, Falkland airspace, he vertically planted an Argentine flag into the ground, leaving the object of a letter for the Falkland authorities, asserting that 'having awakened from a long sleep and conscious of her moral and material grandeur, [Argentina] had resolved not to permit England to continue occupying an archipelago that for geographical, historical, political and just reasons belonged to Argentina' (*Falkland Islands Monthly Review*, 5 October 1964, p. 1).

That Fitzgerald had effectively used Falklands aerial volume as a conduit to establish the first airbridge to the Falklands was a source of deep anxiety, and encouragement, for Islanders and Argentines respectively. For the former, this symbolic gesture proved alarming; popular historian Mary Cawkell characterised this flight, in her pro-Falklands narrative, as 'the start of the extraordinary years' (Cawkell 2001, p. 111), implying the arrival of a new three-dimensonsal insecurity and vulnerability for Falkland Islanders. Whilst this sense of vulnerability was one causal factor in the development of a mobilised loyal politics in the islands, its impact would have been significantly reduced had there been more confidence about the seriousness of Britain's commitment to 'keeping the Falklands British'. For the latter, Fitzgerald's narration of possession of the islands functioned as an expression of national 'grandeur', a 'badge' of Argentine honour and loss, consistent with Escude's

(1988) analysis of the significance of territorial loss in the Argentine national psyche.

Islander anxieties about the mother country's intentions were intensified by a July 1966 BBC World Service programme aerially transmitted through Falkland volume which advocated the Falklands' incorporation into Argentina, and was broadcast at the time of (secret) Anglo-Argentine exploratory talks about territorial change.

> On 23 July 1966 listeners were give an unwelcome shock by a surprising broadcast from London of a talk by a member of the Bank of London and South America which seemed to advocate a transfer of sovereignty to Argentina. That such a broadcast should come from London rather than Buenos Aires was the first public indication that the British government were inclined to appease Argentina (Tatham 2008, p. 275).

A narrative of potential betrayal by London was emerging, an unfolding slow emergency for Islander loyalists: that the BBC World Service had been used as a vehicle to challenge, rather than reinforce, the Falklands' connection with Britain prompted leading Falklands Islanders on the Executive Council (ExCo) to express their dismay to Haskard. This was conveyed to London in Haskard's telegram of 24 July 1966, in which he represented the broadcast as an 'inaccurate, biased and unsympathetic BBC commentary', and robustly affirmed that the 'Council wishes to emphasise that Falkland islanders have no desire whatsoever to be handed over to Argentina. On the contrary population wishes to retain closest possible ties with Britain and rejects any suggestion that Colony of Anglo-Saxon stock should be used as pawn for any transitory political or material advantage' (Haskard 24 July 1966 FCO 42/67)

As with Fitzgerald, this BBC commentary broadcast had used Falklands volume as a conduit to subvert the status quo and advocate the Falklands as part of Argentina, challenging Falkland loyalty existentially and prompting Haskard's loyal counter-discourse on behalf of the Islanders.

Haskard's representation of 'Anglo-Saxon' Islanders being 'handed over' to a foreign dictatorship, as recently experienced by the Channel Islanders from

1940-45, had a very strong resonance. The synchromatic invocation of 'Anglo-Saxon stock' emphasises that the Falkland Islanders were kith and kin, very closely related to the 'traditional' (white) British population, and should be treated accordingly. The politics of loyalty were thus being framed by Haskard; the very need for these implied that there was also politics of subversion being practiced by the Foreign Office, as suggested in the reference to appeasement. As ExCo's reaction indicated, far from encouraging Islanders to engage with Argentina, the broadcast had prompted performative declarations of loyalty, made all the more 'necessary' by the perception that London needed reminding about this loyalty. Indeed, given the afore-mentioned context of contentious, contemporary British political discourse, the Falkland issue was already an unfolding slow emergency, both for the Islanders, and the Wilson government, though the latter had yet to anticipate the depth of domestic political waters they were entering in, in trying to divest Britain of this 'remote' colony.

A sense of a besieged loyal Falkland community (as the Summerhayes Report noted the following year) deepened through another three dimensional intrusion on September 28, 1966, when '20 young Argentine extremists belonging to the Movimiento Nueva Argentina (The New Argentina Movement) staged Operación Condor, a 'symbolic' seizure of the islands, which made the British public generally aware of the existence of the dispute' (J.C.J Metford 1968, p.464). What for the hijackers had been a 'geography of re-possession' served to fortify a narrative of Argentines as the hostile Other, as the Falkland population 'began to wonder after that whatever next' (Lady Haskard, 23 July 2012, recorded interview with author). This comment not only reveals the uncertainty of the time in the Islands, but implies too that the Haskards too were uncertain about what might happen to the Islands in the near future. This slow emergency era uncertainty was neatly captured in the October 1966's edition of Argentina's mass circulation *Panorama* magazine, which presciently posed the question 'The Falklands: the final English Governor?', as seen in Fig. 4.3 (translated).

Fig. 4.3. October 1966's* Panorama *magazine featured Governor Haskard on its cover.

Source: Original copy

Panorama's subversion of Haskard's formal image in gubernatorial garb, depicting him as potentially the last, representative of British colonialism in 'las Malvinas', a figure of decreasing relevance, was in fact uncomfortably close to the truth. Haskard's efforts to represent Islander concerns had made his views count for less in Whitehall, as he acknowledged: 'I think to a certain extent they thought that this chap has gone native, and is over-influenced by the people who are around him, which is to a certain extent true' (Sir Cosmo Haskard, 23 July 2012, recorded interview with author)

The following photo, obtained by *Panorama* for its October 1966 publication (Fig 4.4), and therefore taken comfortably before the events of February 1968, suggests a warm working relationship already developing between Councillor Barton and Haskard. Both parties' gaze and attention are focused on the other rather than towards the camera taking the shot, with both displaying relaxed body language. This photo, when taken together with Haskard's preceding comments, offer an insight into the human interactions that the Governor's 'going native' (Sir Cosmo Haskard, 23 July 2012, recorded interview with author) involved, leading Haskard to be closely engaged with the colony's leaders.

4.4. Sir Cosmo Haskard and ExCo Councillor Arthur Barton at Government House, Stanley

Source:* Panorama*, October 1966, pp. 14-15

At this time of growing diplomatic momentum to resolve the Falklands dispute, and with Governor Haskard thus marginalised, the Islanders were becoming increasingly vulnerable - at real risk of being without agency in responding to this developing slow emergency. By December 1967, Britain was ready to cede the islands to Argentina, through a proposed Memorandum of Understanding [MOU], based on Islander interests, rather than wishes. The logic of the politics of loyalty in the Falklands required that leading Islanders needed to step forward to take matters into their own hands, to press for the

continuation of colonial rule. However, such a dependence struggle, mobilising the politics of loyalty, implied adopting the politics of resistance, to apply political pressure on London to think again.

A significant point in reinforcing the loyal counter-discourse came unexpectedly through an initiative of Haskard's, whose invitation to Councillor Summerhayes, from the British Embassy in Buenos Aires, to visit the Falklands (January 1968) led to a highly significant report submitted to the British Ambassador in Argentina, Sir Michael Cresswell. This confidential report provided valuable insights into the ways in which the 'politics of loyalty' had formed within the islands:

> In my talks with all the leading Falklanders I made it my first task to give them an up-to-date picture of Argentina, its politics and economy and […] a realistic idea of Argentine intentions and feelings about the islands. For many this was the first time that they had heard such an account' (Summerhayes Report 1968, p. 2).

This clearly suggests that Islander perceptions and representations of Argentina, key aspects behind the politics of loyalty, were based on a lack of knowledge, which can also be taken as an implied criticism of Haskard and his Colonial Office predecessors for not sufficiently informing the Islanders about Argentina. Furthermore, Argentine banal geopolitical behaviour had:

> done great damage to a relationship which was never close or cordial. The cutting-off of sea communications, the holding up of mail and over-stamping of letters with Islas Malvinas, the petty interference by immigration and customs officials, the jibes and irredentist propaganda directed at Britain, as well as the 'Fitzgerald' and 'Condor' Incidents, has convinced most Falklanders that the Argentines mean them nothing but harm (Summerhayes Report, 1968, p. 2).

The politics of loyalty were thus, in part, conceived as a reaction to Argentina's performative assertions of sovereignty, though Summerhayes Report does not more fully examine British responsibility for enabling this too. The report concluded that the gap between Falkland politics of loyalty and Argentine hopes for territorial restitution 'will in my view be virtually unbridgeable' (Summerhayes Report, 1968, p. 4), a finding accepted by Cresswell who, on 9 February 1968, advised that current diplomatic efforts to

accommodate Argentina were unwise, effectively ending Haskard's isolation in arguing against how Falkland policy was being managed.

The political, and indeed geopolitical, problem of Falkland loyal resistance had thus been recognised, but as confirmed in London on 14 February 1968 to Haskard by a displeased Foreign Secretary Brown, policy direction would not change. The scale of the challenge posed to Falkland politics of loyalty, and the degree to which the emergency had accelerated, was made clear on 20 February 1968; the long-feared 'betrayal' was confirmed when Haskard confidentially showed ExCo a draft Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), based on Islanders interests rather than wishes, which if uncontested would reduce the Islanders to disempowered actors.

As confirmed by Haskard (23 July 2012, recorded interview with author), during this sensitive period of MOU related diplomacy - or for Islanders, of unfolding emergency - he had been 'instructed not to refer to Gibraltar in public', as this was seen as unhelpful to ongoing official efforts to settle the future status of the Falkands. Both in Whitehall and the Falklands, the Gibraltar and the Falklands were recognised as geopolitically related territories and issues. As Lady Haskard confirmed, 'we were always anxious to know what view HMG would take regarding the Spanish claim to Gibraltar' (Lady Haskard, 23 July 2012, recorded interview with author). This observation helps confirm that this interconnectedness was well understood in the Islands, particularly in a population that, through hearing 'intensely geopolitical' BBC Overseas Service radio news broadcasts (Pinkerton 2007, p.349) was exposed to a wider geopolitical perspective, an assessment which also challenges Summerhayes' representation of an ill-informed Islander parochiality (Summerhayes Report 1968, p. 2).

In managing potentially disruptive politics of loyalty, the British Government's wish to keep apart the 'twin situations' (Sir Cosmo Haskard, 23 July 2012, recorded interview with author) of small British colonies facing the territorial ambitions of an authoritarian, larger, hispanic neighbour was understandable, if understandable. Whereas Gibraltar was sufficiently near and strategically

valuable to be maintained, the Falklands were not geographically proximate to Britain, potentially a geo-military liability rather than asset.

From a Falkland loyal perspective however, Gibraltar offered a hopeful precedent, namely that a population that wished to preserve its British colonial status against a larger neighbour's irredentism, had agency to mobilise loyal performance and build up networks of influential domestic British support within parliament, press and the public. Gibraltar's recent and decisive rejection of Spain's territorial ambitions in June 1967 had shown how loyal resistance could be – and had been - mobilised, when a referendum on the colony's future status had been held, resulting in 12,138 voting for the British status quo and 44 for absorption into Spain. Hills described how, in this referendum, 'Gibraltar took on an aspect resembling the areas of Belfast where Orangemen are in a majority. A pro-British frenzy developed' (Hills 1972, p.465), in which loyalty was affectively demonstrated throught the extensive use of union jacks, pro-British signage and patriotic gatherings.

Whilst the Falklands population was less than a tenth of that of Gibraltar and, unlike Gibraltar, geographically dispersed, patriotic performance and establishing support networks in London offered Islanders counter-emergency mechanisms that could yet derail British government efforts to secure the MOU with Argentina. Gibraltar had demonstrated the importance of mobilising the politics of loyalty as a means to decelerate the emergency that faced the Falklands.

By February 1968, notwithstanding Summerhayes report or Ambassador Cresswell's interventions, it was clear that a polite politics of Islander loyalty had brought no discernible benefit. Within a week of Haskard sharing a draft of the emerging MOU at ExCo, its unofficial members Councillors Barton, Goss, Miller and Bonner publically broke with the British government and Foreign Office, and decisively began to mobilise the politics of loyalty.

On 27 February 1968 the four Councillors sent an open letter to all Members of Parliament and to national and regional British newspapers, calling for their

urgent assistance in what was represented as the patriotic cause of saving the Falklands from cession to Argentina. On the one hand, this was a difficult escalatory move for loyal politics, given that it challenged the authority of Her Majesty's government which governed the polity to which Islanders were asserting loyalty. For the Councillors however, the impending MOU represented an accelerating emergency that necessitated a mobilised, and combative politics of loyalty. The official Falkland Islands Government publication *'Our Islands, Our History'* (2012) explains the rationale for the Councillors' conduct, including breaking their oath of secrecy as ExCo members, in this way:

> In February 1968 Barton led three other councillors in making a direct appeal to the British members of Parliament against the Memorandum of Understanding reached between British and Argentine officials. This represented a breaking of his oath of secrecy but he considered the need overwhelming.
>
> **Source: Falkland Islands Government (2012), *'Our Islands, Our History'* http://www.falklands.gov.fk/assets/OurIslandsOurHistory.pdf**

This perception that there was an overwhelming need to make a 'Unilateral Declaration of Dependence' on the British state comes through strongly in the letter that Barton and his fellow councillors wrote. Its power lies in its themes, and appeal to many British parliamentarians, press and public. That it had now become necessary (from the Councillors' perspective) to appeal to British public opinion over the heads of the Wilson Government and Foreign Office, to the point of oath-breaking, is testimony to a cornered politics of loyalty, which sought to decelerate this emergency.

As can be seen immediately below, this appeal invoked contemporary touchstone issues, for example that the Islanders were 'kith and kin', performatively using this implied 'whiteness' to enlist domestic British support. The letter consciously emphasised that the Islanders are 'as British as you are, mostly of English and Scottish ancestry, even to the 6th generation', with 'no racial problem', and unlike the British Government, 'without debt'.

> To Members of Parliament From Unofficial Members of Falkland Islands Executive Council (A.G. Barton - R.V. Goss - S. Miller - G.C.R. Bonner)
>
> ARE YOU AWARE THAT -
> Negotiations are now proceeding between the British and Argentine Governments which may result at any moment in the handing-over of the Falkland Islands to The Argentine.
>
> TAKE NOTE THAT -
> The Inhabitants of the Islands have never yet been consulted regarding their future - they do NOT want to become Argentines - they are as British as you are, mostly of English and Scottish ancestry, even to the 6th generation - five out of six were born in the Islands - many elderly people have never been elsewhere - there is no racial problem - no unemployment - no poverty, and we are not in debt.
>
> ARE YOU AWARE THAT -
> The people of these Islands do not wish to submit to a Foreign Language, Law, Customs, and Culture because for 135 years they have happily pursued their own peaceful way of life, a very British way of life, unique in fact, when you consider that the Islands are 8,000 miles from the Country which they still call 'Home' in spite of the Immigration Act.
>
> Lord Caradon said to the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1965: "The people of this territory are not to be betrayed or bartered. Their wishes and their interests are paramount and we shall do our duty in protecting them." British Ministers have said the same until 1967 since when there has been silence.
>
> QUESTIONS -
> Is our tiny community to be used as a pawn in Power Politics? Do you not feel ashamed that this wicked thing may suddenly be foisted on us? What can you do to prevent it? What are you doing?
>
> *WE NEED YOUR HELP!'*
>
> ***Source:*** **Unofficial Members of Falkland Islands Executive Council Appeal, 27 February 1968, in *The Times***

The themes raised and language used – 'this wicked thing' (Falkland Appeal 27 February 1968) – was calculated to mobilise British patriotic sentiment about an imminent deal with Argentina, a 'call to arms' for concerned parliamentarians to save a far flung corner of Britain from a foreign power.

The councillors discreetly received loyal support Governor Haskard, who subsequently confirmed that he had actively sought to make the case for the Falklands' continuation as a British colony. In relation to four Councillors standing up in their own capacity to argue for British retention of Falklands

territory and people, he noted: 'They'd taken on really what I'd been doing for several years' (Sir Cosmo Haskard, 23 July 2012, recorded interview with author). This recognition of Haskard's role in frustrating Foreign Office efforts to end the existence of the Falklands as a British entity reflects how the politics of loyalty had not only led to Falklands Islanders councillors directly challenging the Government and Foreign Office, but had caused profound dissent within the ranks of British officialdom. Haskard had helped the Councillors decelerate this accelerative emergency.

Through mobilising the politics of loyalty, the Councillors began to build up some counter-emergency deceleration to stymie the MOU's momentum; as has been noted of the Councillors' Appeal of 27 February 1968, 'The letter had the desired effect. An all-party Falkland Islands Emergency Committee was established, under the chairmanship of a director of the Falkland Islands Company. MPs deplored the very idea of negotiating with Argentina and editorials warned of betrayal' (Freedman 2005, p. 7).

This mobilisation of loyal sentiment in Britain was essential to redrawing the power asymmetry between Falkland Islanders and the British Government. In terms of a loyal Falkland Islander narration of February 1968 as a watershed in the Islanders' deployment of loyal politics, Velma Malcolm's privately published and locally printed autobiography *As Ignorant as Sheep (2002)*, provides a valuable perspective. She became a leading practitioner of mobilised loyal politics in Stanley through her work in the Falkland Islands Association (Stanley Committee), later becoming the first ever Islander Vice President of the Falkland Islands Association. She narrated developments in 1968 in these terms:

> As a result of all the goings on behind closed doors in the Foreign Office the Falkland Islands Government Emergency Committee was born in 1968. Fortunately for us the Governor of the day, Sir Cosmo Haskard, was so incensed when he realized what was secretly planned he put his head on the chopping block and told councillors what was going on (Malcolm 2002, p. 85).

In unpacking what loyal politics meant in the Falklands, Malcolm's choice of title for her autobiography is particularly apposite, since the world view it offers was formed fron the events of 1968 onwards. The choice – and subversion -

of the image of the 'ignorant sheep' is highly significant. The sheep itself was, and is, the symbol of the Falkland Islands, with the implication that Islanders were ill informed in the eyes of expert external actors, a stubborn flock to be corralled into union with Argentina.



Fig. 4.5.* As Ignorant as Sheep *by Velma Malcolm; this was printed and privately published in Stanley.

Source: original copy

As explained by Malcolm (2002, foreword):

> The title is chosen because this was my feeling of the way the Colonial Office, now Foreign and Commonwealth Office, tended to view us along with hundreds of journalists and many, many visiting diplomats and others who voiced their opinion in one way or another with no knowledge of the Falklands whatsoever.

Malcolm's cartoon sheep on the front of the object of this book visualised the 'ignorant sheep' (Fig 4.5). At first sight, the sheep – used as a metaphor for the Falkland Islander – is simply exercising its mobility, seemingly content in its loyal ignorance, which arguably was the position prior to 1968. Considered

further, however, this representation of the sheep subverts the notion of ignorance. The smart ovine biped is depicted as knowing where it is going and, as indicated by the rucksack, has already prepared for the journey to its Falklands – but not Argentine – future. The cartoon's significance is that Falkland Islanders were shown as capable of independently exercising their own agency in pursuit of a loyal agenda, this principle asserted through the unofficial ExCo Councillors' Appeal of 27 February 1968.

In connecting with influential parliamentarians and journalists, the unofficial members of ExCo – the politicised incarnation of Malcom's Falklands sheep - had effectively initiated an attritional campaign of loyal politics against British government policy. To that end, the all-party Falkland Islands Emergency Committee was established in March 1968 to defend the colony against cession to Argentina. Ellerby's (1990) unpublished thesis *British interests in the Falklands Islands: Economic Development, the Falklands lobby and the Sovereignty Dispute*, remains the key academic work on the Falklands lobby. Unpacking the processes through which this political networking/pressurising mobilised domestic British support for loyal politics is beyond the scope of this thesis, since its predominant focus is centred on the Falkland Islander experience. It should though be noted that in setting up as a cross party organisation, the political reach of loyal politics was amplified:

> The Falklands lobby was an alchemy of politics drawn largely from the right of the Conservative Party but extending also to Fabian socialists, who saw in the Commonwealth a secular agency for good. The lobby was linked to great names which stirred the memory, like the last of the great imperial adventurers, Scott of the Antarctic (Charlton 1989, p. 78).

The use of the term 'Emergency' emphasised that Islanders and their supporters recognised that the Falklands faced an emergency, in relation to the MOU and the Foreign Office/British Government support for this.

In terms of mobilising loyal support in the Islands, Arthur Barton proceeded to organise an unofficial 'referendum', a mechanism of loyal politics used in Gibraltar the previous year (but there, unlike in the Falklands, with official British approval). This exercise gave Islanders the opportunity to sign a petition calling for the Falklands to remain British. As implied in Malcolm's

account (below), the politics of loyalty in this exercise left no room for ambiguity; it was a binary choice, with the choice made being remembered within the community thereafter.

> Arthur Barton played a big part in all this, and he also held his own referendum by coming on to the radio and asking people if they wanted to remain British and if so to make their way to various stores to sign a paper he had put there for that purpose. I think practically everyone who was capable of making the trip to a shop did so and Mr Barton had the support he needed in visible evidence. There were two or three on the other side of the paper, one at least still lives here today but very recently printed a letter in the *Penguin News* saying I was born British and I wish to die British so may be there has been a change of heart (Malcolm 2002, p. 88).

Through Barton's activism and the work of the Falkland Islands Emergency Committee, the future of the Falkland Islands assumed a much higher profile, bringing with it growing British public scrutiny of Government policy, as evidenced in this *Daily Telegraph* report from 14 March 1968. This report's headline – the 'Islands Britain may give away' - offered a politically charged framing of territorial loss, which would result in the abandonment of a loyal community. The article pointed out that 'The Islanders anxiety runs deep, so deep that if Britain does hand over the Falklands to Argentina, not a single kelper will want to remain'

This type of counter-discourse served to erode public trust in the Wilson Government's handling of the Falklands' future. This narrative of letting down 'kith and kin' was reinforced with the photo of Barton, his image and name effectively acting as metaphor for an imperiled traditional Britain, whilst the caption immediately below it conveyed a real sense that an emergency about the Falklands future could erupt at any time; Mr Arthur Barton, the Falklands emissary, seen in London. Back home, they wait and wonder'.

Notwithstanding such sympathetic press coverage, the Councillors' appeal to Parliament and Press and a fortnight 'fact-finding' visit to the Islands by *Daily Express* reporter Jack Comben in April/May, Anglo-Argentine diplomacy continued to advance to the point that by August a final version of the 'Memorandum of Understanding' was agreed:

> The Government of the United Kingdom, as part of such a final settlement, will recognise Argentina's sovereignty over the Islands from a date to be agreed. This date will be agreed as soon as possible after -
>
> (i) the two governments have resolved the present divergence between them as to the criteria according to which the United Kingdom Government shall consider whether the interests of the Islanders would be secured by the safeguards and guarantees to be offered by the Argentine Government, and
>
> (ii) the Government of the United Kingdom are then satisfied that those interests are so secured.
>
> **Source:** cited in Oliveri Lopez 1995, p. 51

By now however, the Wilson's Government's diplomatic efforts to implement the MOU faced the prevailing headwinds of the disruptive power of the Islander allies in Parliament and the press, who had nearly half a year to organise loyal politicking. This domestic scrutiny increasingly limited the scope for delivering the MOU; as a case in point, in September 1968 fears were expressed in cabinet that the Memorandum would cause 'an absolute howl of anger in Parliament', especially as it would be interpreted as a precedent 'for a betrayal in Gibraltar too' (Beck 1988, p. 101).

The Falkland Islanders' most vociferous support came from the *Daily Express;* its report of 20 September 1968 dramatically re-ignited the Falklands for domestic British audiences, running *'Britain gives in to Argentine demands: FALKLAND SELL OUT'* as its lead headlne (Fig.4.6). This was the Falkland accelerated 'slow emergency' framed as front page news, and designed to stir opposition in Britain to what was presented as an unworthy abandonment of British subjects by the British government.

Squire Barracalough reported that an announcement of a sovereignty transfer to Argentina could occur as early as October 1968, which would provoke:

> a tremendous row […] it now appears that Whitehall, and particularly Foreign Secretay Michael Stewart, has decided that the best interests of the Falklands will be served by some kind of unification with the Argentine.
>
> The government's thinking appears to based on the cynical idea that once this long-term decision is announced the population of the Falkland Islands – largely British in origin – will emigrate, and the territory they eventually hand over will be inhabited only by sheep.

The Government is expected to argue that the Falklands are naturally part of the Argentine and that they can have no future apart from the mainland (*Daily Express,* 20 September 1968, p. 1).

DAILY EXPRESS

FRIDAY SEPTEMBER 20 1968

Britain gives in to Argentine's demands

FALKLANDS SELL-OUT

By SQUIRE BARRACLOUGH

THE GOVERNMENT is to hand over the Falkland Islands to the Argentine. It has now been decided in principle — after a tremendous tussle between Ministers — that the Colony must eventually pass under the sovereignty of the Argentine.

Frightened gunman

HIS MOTHER-IN-LAW TELLS: 'HE'S TERRIFIED OF POLICE, AND DREADS RETURN TO HOSPITAL'

2 am: FARM SIEGE DRAGS ON THROUGH SECOND NIGHT

WHITEHALL MAN FLIES TO TALKS IN RHODESIA

A fight

Wife sues Sir Hugh

Back to earth

Boost for Danish bacon puts Minister's fat in the fire

CAUTIOUS BANK CUT

See how the Express makes your business grow

BEGINNING IN THE EXPRESS TOMORROW

£5,000 ON THE BALL CONTEST

Golf boy killed

Meal break

LATEST

Start something with EL CID

Fig. 4.6 'Falklands Sell-Out' – the* Daily Express *makes the Falklands front page news

Source:* Daily Express, *21 September 1968, p. 1

The *Daily Express* report had thus significantly catalysed what was now becoming an accelerating slow emergency for the Wilson government's Falkland policy, particularly holding Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart, backed by Harold Wilson, to account, and noting the efforts of Commonwealth Secretary George Thomson to resist this. Official confirmation of a sovereignty transfer would, according to Barraclough's report, intentionally catalyse emergency for the Falkland Islanders by driving them to emigrate, leaving the Islands depopulated, and so able to fulfil the geopolitical logic of their propinquity to Argentina, namely integration, which the Wilson Government was said to believe was their future.

Moreover, the article also reported: 'It has also been strongly suspected in the Falkands that the Governor, Sir Cosmo Haskard, has known that these moves were underway but was forbidden by London to talk about them' (*Daily Express,* 20 September 1968, p. 1). The *Daily Express* report thus employed (accurate) Islander rumours about Sir Cosmo's permitted agency to discuss this matter in its reportage.

Adding to the Wilson government's discomfiture was the strongly worded *Daily Express* editorial of 21 September, which accused the government of betrayal and arrogance, and demanding that Wilson or Stewart personally deny that there would be a surrender of sovereignty. It also cited an uncommon geographical association between the Falklands and the Isles of Scilly. Ostensibly this was because both of these Atlantic archipelagos had British populations in excess of 2,000 people; however, it was also an implied criticism of Harold Wilson himself, who had been a property owner on St. Marys since 1958 (and is now buried there). Whereas Wilson was known for a strong affiliation for one group of islands where he owned a bungalow, his government was preparing to abandon the other group of British islands to a foreign power:

> The report that the British Government means to hand over the Falkland Islands to the Argentine has been received in Buenos Aires with 'amazement and glee'. It has been heard throughout Britain with stupefaction, incredulity and horror. For this would be the worst of all betrayals. It has been denied by an anonymous official in the Foreign Office. This is not good enough. It must

> be categorically and authoritatively denied by the Prime Minister or Foreign Secretary […]
>
> In the Falkland Islands there are living 2,184 (or thereabouts) people of British stock. Is it suggested that they do not have the same right to determine their political future as, say, the 2,273 people of the Scillies?
>
> (*Daily Express,* 21 September 1968, p.8).

The *Daily Express'* Squire Barraclough and Maurice Trowbridge also predicted that:

> A Government minister is expected to go to the Falklands shortly to tell the 2,000 inhabitants that Britain is ready to let the Argentines have sovereignty over their islands […] Disclosure in the *Daily Express* yesterday that a deal was near caused joy in Argentina, dismay in the Falklands and sharp reaction in London (*Daily Express,* 21 September 1968, p. 8).

The cabinet minister later chosen to be the 'trouble shooter ready to soothe the Falklands' (*Daily Express,* 21 September 1968, p. 8) would be Alun Gwynnne Jones, better known as Lord Chalfont, Minister at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. His mission was to decelerate the growing political emergency surrounding the future of the Islands, through encouraging Islanders to 'think again' about an accommodation with Argentina.

4.4 Visualising Loyal Politics; the 'loyal camera', *Daily Express* photoshoot and mobilisation of accelerative emergency pressures on British government Falklands policy

The despatch of *Daily Express* reporter Aubrey Mathews to the Falklands followed, 'with instructions to take as many photographs of residents as is possible in the short time at his disposal' (*Falkland Islands Monthly Review,* October 1968, p.17) enabled a further mobilisation and mass dissemination of the politics of loyalty for British audiences prior to the upcoming ministerial visit. The object of the 'loyal camera' provided a means for the visual narration of an imperilled British community, offering a vital decelerative tool for maintaining the territorial status quo in the unfolding Falkland emergency.

In preparing for the arrival of the *Daily Express'* 'loyal camera', the *Falkland Islands Monthly Review* mobilised a range of exhortative comments from Islander leaders, such as Arthur Barton, Wickham Clement, Richard Goss, Nanette King, Richard Hills and Robin Pitaluga, all of whom were members of ExCo. Their 'pitch' emphasised the vital importance of this occasion as a visual statement of loyalty, with the clear expectation, and implied social pressure, that Islanders should attend. Wickham Clement stated 'Of course I am going to be there – we are all going to be there. Everyone must be there. This is a vital time and it is an important opportunity to show who and what we are' (*Falkland Islands Monthly Review,* October 1968, p. 17). Clement's comment signposted how important attending the photo-shoot would be, to show British audience who the Islanders were, that is, fellow white Britons loyal to the motherland.

Arthur Barton's message to fellow Islanders was that 'this photograph has my fullest support. It will be a great disappointment if anyone fails to turn out' (*Falkland Islands Monthly Review,* October 1968, p. 17), reflecting that there was a clear social pressure to be seen there as members of the Falkland community, and that 'non-participation' was not expected, and would be remembered.

In a similar vein, Richard Hills highlighted that staging such a photographic event carried risks – if Islanders did not turn out in strength, Matthew's visit ran the risk of being a counterproductive exercise. 'The danger is that if only half the population turns out someone might think that only half the population is interested in the future of the Falkland Islands. We must make sure everyone turns out' (*Falkland Islands Monthly Review,* October 1968, p. 17). This comment in itself reflects that it was at least thought possible that there could be a less than convincing turnout, although any such fears proved unfounded, notwithstanding a number of Islanders having measles. Whether there were any cases of some Islanders diplomatically claiming to have measles to avoid appearing in the photograph, and so being seen by Argentine government operatives, is unknown.

On 2 October 1965 Mathews' 'loyal camera' did its work. The dramatic result was the widely seen counter-emergency photo, published in the *Daily Express* on 3 October (Fig 4.7), of a large Falkland Islander crowd at the vertical object of Stanley's Whalebone Arch; this proved a critical – and successful – moment in visually constructing and publicising the Falkland Islanders as a white British community, loyal subjects who should not be bartered away to Argentina.

The symbolism in this *Daily Express* photograph proved a cornerstone in creating a narrative for the British public that the future of the Falkland Islanders concerned the fate of kith and kin, that the Falklands were not some obscure colonial 'loose end' to be disposed of but Britons who needed protection from the motherland against the 'otherland' of Argentina. Similarly, the backdrop of 'seascape' in Stanley harbour offered another familiar association to Britons, the windy, elemental Atlantic waters suggesting a further tie with these fellow Islanders.


PHOTONEWS SCOOP • Falkland Islanders mass in force for historic Express picture

Standing together, the Colony that roars: 'We stay British'

Express Cameraman Aubrey Matthews

How we got the picture

The man with a taste for adventure

DECIMALISATION

You don't have to buy a new cash register

With NCR you have the widest-ever choice

Your present cash register converted

A decimal machine that works in £ s d now

A new decimal machine after D Day

decimalisation Talk it over now with NCR

BANNERS

HEART

HERO

MEASLES

PIPE MAN MIXTURE

5'11

Fig. 4.7. The* Daily Express *picture of the Falkland Islanders , 3 October 1968. Source:* Daily Express, *3 October 1968, p. 1

Matthew's picture unambiguously, and therefore successfully, conveyed the physical appearance of the Islanders as white Britons who, in terms of their attire, were shown wearing the types of overcoats, tweed jackets, ties and

headscarves worn by millions of Britons in their daily lives. This performative moment captured by Matthew's camera allowed the Falkland Islanders to represent themselves as a traditional 'little Britain', and was described by the *Falkland Islands Monthly Review* in these terms:

> On Wednesday 2nd October, in bright but slightly windy conditions, the *Daily Express* photographer, Mr Matthews, viewed hundred of the town's residents who had gathered on Arch Green for the purpose of being photographed as mentioned earlier. Dozens of placards were on display, all on the same theme "Keep the Falklands British", and Union Jacks were fluttering from the hands of the adults as well as children. Such a demonstration should convince those who might be contemplating handing us over to the Argentine that the wishes of the people of the colony are: 'keep us British" and "Leave us where we are, in our homeland (*Falkland Islands Monthly Review*, October 1968, p. 17).

The turn-out of almost eighty per cent would undoubtedly have been greater, but the measles epidemic has confined many to their homes – these, we are sure, were, in thought, supporting those who were fortunate to be present.'
The staging of the *Daily Express* photograph came at a very sensitive time for official efforts to manoeuvre the Falkland Islanders into an accommodation with Argentina. For millions of *Daily Express* readers and other Britons seeing this picture, Falkland Islanders were shown to be no unknown exotic foreign 'other'; put simply, this photograph was 'us''

In the course of this research, Sir Cosmo and Lady Haskard made available two further images of this photo session (Figs. 4.8 and 4.9), which add further insight into how Mathew's picture worked.

In Fig 4.8, the use of Christ Church cathedral as a vertical 'actor' amplifies a familiar, British sense of place; its architecture, name and site as a consecrated place of Anglican worship helps construct a narrative of the Falklands as a sacred far-flung corner of Britain. The height and depth of the cathedral similarly provide a striking three-dimensional perspective, articulating British possession of Falkland volume.

Fig. 4.8. Falkland Islanders gather in front of Christ Church cathedral Stanley for the Daily Express photo, 2 October 1968.
Source: Haskard private photograph collection.

The Union flags in the crowd, in Fig 4.8, also collectively function as a dramatic vertical actor, especially the one attached to the flagpole in the foreground; these loyal objects 'called' on fellow Britons to stand by their kith and kin in the South Atlantic. Islanders' placards, produced to perform loyalty in Mathews 'iconic' picture (Fig 4.7) served to narrate patriotism and protest

This picture (Fig 4.8) enables us to see the affective, emotive Islander slogans deployed by the crowd on the placards, such as: *'British and proud of it/*

Kelpers want to remain so' and '*As British as the British'* featured, as Islanders invoked and appealed to 'Britishness'. The message conveyed here, and in Mathews published picture (Fig 4.7) was that this was not any crowd, this was a loyal crowd

Fig. 4.9. ***Falkland Islanders gather on Arch Green, at the Whalebone Arch, 2 October 1968***.
Source: Haskard private photograph collection

In Fig. 4.9, the Falklands' whalebone arch and the elemental seascape of Stanley harbour as the background, which along with the Islander crowd and the cathedral created the visual assemblage of Mathews' picture (Fig 4.7), provide a maritime framing. With Atlantic waters as the physical connector between Great Britain and the Falkland archipelago, this suggested that the Falklands could be supported by the residual maritime power of the Royal Navy.

Through visually combining the kith and kin crowd, the Anglican cathedral and maritime setting in his picture (Fig 4.7), Mathew's 'loyal camera' had strikingly

mobilised powerful narratives against British Government policy on the Falklands. Bonnet (1997, p. 194) noted that 'the issue of race returned to British geography when the Empire 'returned to Britain''; in an unexpected way, as the *Daily Express* photo (Fig 4.7) showed, this was true of the Falklands Islanders too in their struggle for dependence on, rather than independence from, Britain.

The *Daily Express* photo-shoot visually brought home to Britons that loyal kith and kin compatriots in the South Atlantic faced a very real prospect of an emergency outcome to Anglo-Argentine diplomacy, namely the demise of their territory as a British colony. From the Islanders' perspective, scaffolding this narrative was a vital decelerative counter-emergency move; in exposing their treatment by the Wilson government, the potential political cost to the latter was raised, so reducing its capacity to exercise agency in terms of delivering the MOU to Argentina.

Now on the backfoot, and facing its own accelerating emergency in its conduct of Falkland policy, the British government sought to regain the initiative; in an effort to offer a counter-narrative of reassurance about a future accommodation with Argentina, the Government made a direct appeal to the Islanders, to be undertaken by Lord Chalfont. In the *Dictionary of Falklands Biography* (2008, pp. 146-47), Chalfont, writing in the third person, described the mission in these terms:

> Chalfont's task was not merely to emphasise to Islanders that there could be no change in sovereignty against their wishes. He also hoped to convince them that maintaining the status quo was not in their real interests; permanent isolation from Argentina and a refusal even to negotiate was damaging to their own economic interests and could be dangerous in the longer term. Britain was no longer the great imperial power, but if the Islanders could bring themselves to face the future realistically they could rely on the British government to defend their rights and allay their fears about closer ties with Argentina.

This was to be an effort to enjoin the Islanders to engage with the new postcolonial era. Radical journalist Richard Gott, who accompanied the

mission on behalf of *The Guardian*, reflected this sentiment, retrospectively framing it in these terms:

> Lord Chalfont, then a minister at the Foreign Office, was the leader of this expedition. He had the unenviable task of trying to persuade the 2,000 islanders that the British empire might not last for ever – and that they should start to entertain the notion they might be better off being friendly to their near-neighbour, Argentina, which had long claimed the islands.
>
> *Source:*
> *https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2007/apr/02/comment.falklands*

The perceived need to impress a 'modern' *weltanschauung* on Islanders lay behind the mission; as events would however show, the possibility that Islanders' loyal protest and resistance would reinforce and expand support for the Falkland Islands remaining British was significantly underestimated by Chalfont. Nor was it fully appreciated that this visit created an unprecedented opportunity for the Falkland Islander loyal display to be mobilised against a minister of the crown, with a subsequent mass circulation of politically damaging press reports and photographs.

That the Anglo-Argentine MOU was not published prior to the visit also proved highly problematic for Chalfont who was therefore deprived of the opportunity to cajole Islanders into 'accepting the inevitable'. Chalfont explained the importance of the MOU in these terms:

> The Memorandum of Understanding that I was taking to them was roughly on these lines; that Argentina, and Britain, had a common objective which was to settle amicably, but finally, the dispute over sovereignty – taking into account the 'interests' of the population, not the 'wishes', the crucial word.

The political space for loyal politicking created by the absence of the MOU's publication was enlarged by a similar absence of any British Government statement of intent as to the Falkland's future. Chalfont's mission therefore faced the prospect of failure before it had even happened, with the Wilson Government unwilling to incur parliamentary and press opprobrium, and public unpopularity, over this seemingly peripheral but certainly emotive issue.

Gonzalez's assessment of how Chalfont's mission was politically exposed from the outset implicitly recognises this British Government's lack of resolve;

> Chalfont's visit had been planned under the expectation that the Memorandum of Understanding and the British unilateral statement would be published before his arrival in the colony, so the minister could explain its contents to the Falklanders while at the same time presenting them with a fait accompli. Deprived of a statement that – however weak – was at least an unmistakable indication of Britain's intent, Chalfont was utterly disarmed to confront the unwelcoming community of devotees to the Crown (Gonzalez 2013, p. 209)

Chalfont was heading into deep political waters in seeking to loosen Islanders' allegiance to the United Kingdom. As a former military chief and defence correspondent for *The Times*, he was an experienced political operator, but was to find the visceral politics of loyalty difficult to manage. As implied in the *Daily Express* photographs, the binaristic of loyalty suggested that a politics of disloyalty existed, and his support for territorial cession of the colony of the Falkland Islands placed him on the 'wrong' side of these for those who were determined to defend its continued existence. Loyal narratives, such as the following by Conservative MP John Biggs Davison, offer an insight into what was felt to be at stake in the struggle for the Falklands: 'It fits into the very nature of the British nation. It is an offshoot of the British nation. It is perhaps the most *British* part of the British nation. To betray that is to betray the nation itself' (cited in Charlton 1989, p. 82).

Before he had even set foot in the Islands, Chalfont had effectively assumed the role of British Government 'messenger to be shot', his visit to the Falklands allowing the Islanders to showcase their loyalty to Britain, whilst exposing the emergency in British Government Falklands policy. Particularly damaging to Chalfont's mission would be the way it was narrated in much of the press, with the 'loyal camera' again helping subvert official efforts to reach an accommodation with Argentina.

4.5 Chalfont's arrival in Stanley on the morning of Sunday 24 November 1968, and the loyal crowd

The speeding up of the emergency in relations between the Wilson government and Islanders was graphically exposed through the protests which Chalfont met on his arrival. Chalfont's arrival in Stanley on 24 November 1968 followed his first day in the Islands on West Falkland, which is addressed later in Section 7.7. This was the first time a serving government minister had set foot in the Islands capital, and provided the opportunity for a loyal Islander crowd to express their rejection of his initiative to secure an accommodation with Argentina.

In loyal narratives, Chalfont's visit is not remembered as a happy event; activist Velma Malcolm portrayed Chalfont's visit as a patronising British government initiative to 're-educate' Islanders into accepting Argentine sovereignty and accompanying territorial cession.

> Lord Chalfont gave us a very stern talking to telling us our future lay with Argentina, it was in our best interests, and all that other rubbish they had been feeding us for the last eight years. The theme of his message was that you belong to Argentina (Malcolm 2002, p. 87).

Ferdinand Mount, writing in *The Spectator* (10 April 1982, p. 4) shortly after Argentina's 1982 invasion recalled, not without a certain flippancy, the difficulties that Chalfont faced in persuading Islanders to embrace his narration of the future:

> Back in 1968, Lord Chalfont, then Minister for Peace and Disarmament at the Foreign Office (one of Sir Harold's masterly fancies), was nearly debagged by the islanders when they gathered the impression that Britain intended to discuss a transfer of sovereignty with Argentina.

Crowd protest against Chalfont's efforts to settle the Falklands' future status had been anticipated. Patrick Keatley, foregrounded for the *Guardian's* readership the circumstances of the Falklands issue. In a succinctly entitled article 'Islander Loyalists' (*The Guardian,* 22 November 1968) he raised the spectre of pre-World War Two British appeasement of Germany; decoded,

this reporting of Islander fears of an impending 'second Munich' implicitly cast Chalfont in the role of a South Atlantic Neville Chamberlain, ready to sacrifice the colony and its inhabitants to appease Buenos Aires.

> Approximately half of the 2179 people who comprise the total population are expected to line the quayside or take their places along the main street, to watch the minister ride by in company with the Governor Sir Cosmo Haskard.
>
> But these people mostly the descendants of Welsh Scottish and west country sheep farmers who emigrated in Victorian times, will not be motivated by loyalty and kinship alone when they make their demonstrations for the distinguished visitor.
>
> Their aim is – bluntly – to try to head off another Munich agreement, south Atlantic version.
>
> Bitter Phrase
>
> This is the bitter phrase one encounters now, and private conversations with the Falklanders, although they are careful not to put it on the record in public statements lest it bedevil relationships with Whitehall which are already bedeviled enough (Keatley, *The Guardian,* 22 November 1968, p.11).

Averting this feared betrayal by the Wilson Government, and so decelerating this loyal emergency, required Islanders to demonstrate in substantial numbers, and to assemble objects of protests such as placards and union jacks, preparations that Government House did not disrupt. A national stage to perform Islander loyal politics was guaranteed by the presence of Fleet Street journalists accompanying the Chalfont party, namely Richard Gott (*The Guardian*); Donald Seaman (*Daily Express*); Richard Wigg (*The Times*); Michael Field (*The Daily Telegraph*); Donald McLachlan (*The Daily Mail*). Whereas Donald Seaman and Michael Field proved strongly supportive of loyal politics, and Richard Wigg and Donald McLachlan largely so, Richard Gott stood out for his radical views, making him much less sympathetic to the Islanders. Indeed, Gott's coverage of the Falklands made him a 'bete noir' for Islanders during, Velma Malcolm acerbically recalling:

> Accompanying him [Chalfont] was a young reporter from *The Guardian* newspaper called Richard Gott. Once the party left the Falklands Richard Gott's report came over on the BBC World Service saying how Lord Chalfont had told us at the public meeting in no uncertain terms where our destiny lay but he doubted if many of us were capable of grasping the message (Malcolm, 2002, p. 88).

Malcolm (2002, p. 88) also noted that Gott was subsequently alleged to have been exposed as a Soviet agent of influence, further associating the 'project' of transferring the Falklands to Argentina with mentalities of betrayal. Whilst Gott proved himself no friend of Islander loyal politics, he nonetheless acknowledged the visual impact of the organised, loyal protest that met the Chalfont party on their arrival at Stanley on 24 November 1968. His account also brings out the three dimensional nature of the occasion, referring to the usage of aerial and maritime volume, and the vertical objects of protest that were union jacks and loyal signage.

> This morning with a helicopter overhead, a naval hovercraft circling around and the Antarctic survey ship Shackleton moored near by, Lord Shackleton went ashore from HMS *Endurance* to be greeted at the jetty of Port Stanley by 500 citizens. All the children carried union jacks and most of the banners they held bore the single slogan "Keep the Falklands British". Since the population of the town is only 1,000 this was a most impressive turnout (*The Guardian,* 25 November 1968).

Donald Seaman of the *Daily Express* was markedly enthusiastic about the loyal demonstration, and articulates a sense of the type of affective experience perceived by Islanders and the supporters. His reportage brings out the powerful visual impact of the waiting mass assembling of Islander bodies, the collective physical presence and facial expressions of the Islanders helping to transform their loyal performance into an emotional experience felt by both participants and sympathetic observers such as himself.

> You could see it in their faces as they stood, 700 men, women and children, on the windswept quay waiting for Lord Chalfont's boat to come in. You could see it in their Union Jacks and in their placards. The message was "Keep the Falklands British".
> There were many ways of putting it.
> One was: 'We are loyal to you – stay loyal to us"
> Another was: "Don't sell us to Argentina for tins of bully beef".'
> (*Daily Express,* 25 November 1968, p. 2).

Michael Field of the *Daily Telegraph and* Donald McLachlan for the *Daily Mail* both estimated crowd numbers of 700 and emphasised the use of signage as activised objects of loyalty, as well as the reception that Chalfont received.

Field commented on how 'A typical poster bore a portrait of the Queen and read – "We are loyal to you – be loyal to us" ' (*Daily Telegraph*, 25 November 1968, p. 21), so appropriating monarchial imagery against a minister of Her Majesty's Government. McLachlan similarly drew readers' attention to the patriotic sentiments on signage, as well as the crowd's weaponisation of silence to express dissent.

> There were plenty of placards and stickers saying "Keep the Falklands British" and "British we are, British we stay". But the reaction from 700 Islanders as Lord Chalfont came ashore from warship Endurance was a stiff silence.
> (*Daily Mail,* 25 November 1968, p. 2)

Richard Wigg of *The Times* estimate of the number of Islanders present was markedly less than that of his fellow journalists, but similarly reflects on the powerful affective display of loyal sentiments, through the assembling of bodies, a censorious crowd of silence protested, mobilising patriotic signage and claiming the image of Elizabeth II.

> A crowd of about 250 Falklanders with posters saying "We want to stay British in the British Falkland Islands" silently lined the harbour in icy winds when Lord Chalfont, Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, came ashore to the tiny capital town of Stanley… Other signs included one on the side of a corrugated-iron general store with a portrait of the Queen and the words "We are loyal to you. Be loyal to us", chalked beneath it (*The Times,* 25 November 1968, p. 4).

The representations offered by these journalists were critical in narrating for a domestic British audience the loyal emergency which faced Islanders; the presence too of these journalists indicated too the importance that the Falklands had assumed as a domestic political issue in 1968. Ostensibly Chalfont was the actor with political capital; through his visit, however, he provided Islanders with both the occasion, and the means (through press reportage) to articulate their loyal protest directly from the Falklands; in this sense, he effectively walked a loyal trap largely of his own making.

Accompanied by Haskard, who had ceremonially greeted him at Stanley's public jetty, Chalfont began to walk up the jetty towards Ross Road, towards a crowd with placards and flags, using the British flag against a British minister.

Before he reached the crowd, Chalfont was introduced to Council members, including the four unofficial ExCo Councillors whose efforts had contributed to the Government's present Falkland difficulties.

4.6 Loyal politics three-dimensionally reinforced through the buildings and spaces of Stanley's townscape

The backdrop of the Jubilee Villas Terrace as seen to the rear right of Figs 4.10 and 4.11 incongruously juxtaposed an image of suburban Britain with colonial protest in the foreground; this protest though was one in which all visible bodies were of white ethnicity, powerfully signalling to the British public that the Islanders were 'kith and kin'. In constructing a narrative that the Falklands were a trans-oceanic corner of Britain, the Jubilee Villas played a particularly useful role. Strategically sited by Stanley's public jetty and vertically prominent, and so highly visible to those arriving in the Islands by boat, these villas - built in 1887 to commemorate Queen Victoria's Golden Jubilee - were built in a style similar to many substantial, late Victorian British

terraces***Fig.4.10. Members of Executive and Legislative Councils and other prominent Islanders introduced to Lord Chalfont on his arrival at the public jetty, Stanley.***

Source: Haskard private photograph collection.

Lord Chalfont is greeted by pro-British placards and Union Jacks on arriving in Port Stanley, capital of the Falkland Islands. Lord Chalfont (back to camera) is shaking hands with Mrs. Sloggie, wife of the manager of the Falkland Islands Company. Richard Wigg writes on page 11.

Fig. 4.11. The Times' photograph of Chalfont's arrival in Stanley (very similar to 4.10 the Haskards' private photograph)

Source: **The Times*, 2 December 1968, p. 5***

The familiarity of this type of building to British eyes acted as a declaration that the Islands were part of Britain, a declaration of British sovereignty through objects of assembled bricks. Other visible quotidian objects of domestic British life in this photograph served a similar function such as Islanders' overcoats, a policeman in uniform and a parked estate car in the distance; these objects scaffolded the decelerative counter-emergency narrative that the Falklands were British.

The 'stage' on which the Islander crowd met Chalfont was, given the nature of his mission, a politically and historically uncomfortable space 'populated' by street names, buildings and public areas, which evoked the traditional British imperial connection, as mapped out in Fig 4.12.



Fig 4.12. Map of Stanley, Falkland Islands: on the far left can be seen the Public Jetty where Chalfont arrived, with Ross Road running along the harbour side.

Source: David Sami, Falkland Malvinas travellers reference map, Design and Cartography Multi-Mapping Limited (1997)

Ross Road itself was named after British Antarctic explorer James Clark Ross, whose 1839-43 expedition charted much of Antarctica, including discovering the eponymously named Ross Sea and Ross Ice Shelf. Another significant commemoration of the British connection was the immediately adjacent Victory Green, which marked the Royal Navy's 1914 victory over the German East Asian squadron in the Battle of the Falklands Islands, whilst the Upland Goose tavern and hotel opposite signified the 'British-ness' of the practices of pub life, as well as class distinctions with its 'Colony Club' section hosting expatriates and leading Islanders such as farm managers. Other important buildings with strong British resonance along Ross Road included the Post Office, with its banal usage of British royal insignia, and the Falklands' main retail outlet, the Falkland Islands Company-owned West Store, where imported British foodstuffs could be purchased.

Christ Church cathedral, itself the setting of the aforementioned *Daily Express* picture of the Islander community only a few weeks earlier (2 October), was a key element in the construction of the Falklands as a distinct 'place' with a British identity. The most southerly Church of England cathedral in the world, it was consecrated in 1892; this place of worship was the colony's tallest building and vertically dominated the Stanley 'skyline', a solid affirmation of British identity and connection. An impression of the permanence of the British presence in the Falklands volume was conveyed through the solidity of its British designed vertical stone and brick construction, while its Bishop traditionally claimed episcopal authority over all South America (except British Guiana).

Within the cathedral's grounds stood the whalebone arch, which had been erected to commemorate the 1833 centenary of British rule over the Islands, and which also featured prominently in the *Daily Express* pictures of the Islander community. The four whalebone jaws from blue whales signified not just the continuity of British administration, but also the British colony's connection with the whaling industry and presence in the Southern Ocean. The narrative of British maritime power was also further conveyed by the nearby obelisk commemorating the Royal Navy's 1914 victory, whilst nearby Government House where Chalfont later retired with Haskard after his walkabout, built in and much extended since 1845, represented over 120 years of British gubernatorial rule.

4.7 Walking westwards on Ross Road; Chalfont's ambulatory encounter with the loyal crowd, on the morning of Sunday 24 November 1968

Walking onto the Ross Road 'stage' presented a real challenge for Chalfont, as standing Islanders had effectively taken three-dimensional possession of Ross Road space; in standing alongside the road, they had made their bodies vertical objects of protest. In their othering of Chalfont, the Islander crowd assumed the role of the loyal self against the unpatriotic other of Chalfont and

the Wilson government, who sought to 'sell out' the Falkland Islanders to Argentina.

As soon as Chalfont and his team left the Public Jetty, they turned right on to Ross Road, encountering a ribbon-like crowd of Islanders as they progressed westwards. A number of photos from the Haskard private photo collection were made available for this research, which makes it possible for us to gain new perspectives on Chalfont's reception in Stanley.

Fig. 4.13 shows an early encounter in front of Jubilee villas, at the eastern extremity of Ross Road, in which a couple of Islanders made their loyal three-dimensional protest with a vertical banner reading: *'God save the Queen, God save our Islands, 'Falklands' British for ever!',* invoking both the monarch and the divine in affirming the Falklands as a British.

Figure 4.13. In front of the Jubilee Villas, Ross Road, Stanley: Lord Chalfont meets different generations of Islanders, with Sir Cosmo Haskard to his left.

Source: Haskard private photograph collection

The appearance of the Islanders conveyed their quotidian Britishness, for instance evidenced in the style of overcoat and scarf of the female protestor, and the anoraks of the boys. As previously unpacked, the presence of Jubilee villas created a scene redolent of provincial Britain, and can be regarded as a powerful object-actor in conveying the idea of Britishness. Whilst the 'wriggly tin' fence adds an authentic touch of Falkland identity to the picture, the role of the large hedge behind it visually emphasises the Britishness of the colony. The hedge, a familiar feature of many British gardens, stands out as a living vertical object in its own right, with its subterranean roots reflecting the established nature of the Falkland Islander community. The ordinariness of the suburban scene was powerful as a means in narrating the Falklands from a British colonial to provincial space, with Chalfont's mission inadvertently catalysing this process.

As Chalfont walked further down Ross Road with Governor Haskard (Fig. 4.14), he encountered hundreds of protesting Islanders and was followed – or pursued – by many of them, with their placards mobilising loyalty against this minister of the Crown.

Fig. 4.14. On Ross Road: Lord Chalfont with Sir Cosmo Haskard to his left, and his private secretary Michael Tait to his right.

Source: Haskard private photograph collection.

What is noticeable in this and other pictures is the participation of a wide variety of ages engaged in loyal protest, Fig 4.15 (below) for instance showing a number of children with Union Jacks, with Fig 4.14 (above) even showing a baby's pushchair repurposed as a mobile object of loyal protest.

4.15. On Ross Road: Lord Chalfont and Sir Cosmo Haskard walk past Islander children.

Source: Haskard private photograph collection

The ethnocultural appearance of Islanders – white Britons, dressed in 'ordinary' British clothes – was problematic for Chalfont. Such representations of the Islanders were conveyed and amplified through press reportage and the 'loyal camera' to the British public, so reinforcing a narrative of the Falkland Isanders as a 'British us', rather than an 'exotic other'. As these pictures show, this narration of familarity included an elemental dimension; the Islanders protesting loyalty did not live in sunnier climes such as Rhodesia, and so could not be depicted by critics as using professions of loyalty to maintain a comfortable existence. In contrast, as recorded photographically, the Falkland Islanders evidently lived in a climate which was cold and breezy; this was evidenced in the widespread use of overcoats,

including Chalfont's, headscarves, the (largely tree-less) vegetation and the fluttering flags. This gave further credibility to the Islanders as authentic Britons, living with the vagaries of a changeable and often cold climate.

Whilst Chalfont's arrival in the Falklands had provided the occasion for the formation of the Islander crowd, further insights can be gained by unpacking photographs from the occasion *after* Chalfont and Haskard had walked by. Figs 4.16 and 4.17 reveal mechanisms of loyal protest which helped undermine the former's mission, both within the Islander community and domestically with British audiences.

Fig. 4.16. Ross Road Resistance: walking westwards in the direction of the Post Office and Government House

Source: Haskard private photograph collection

In the first photograph (Fig. 4.16), the bodily concentration immediately by the public jetty and Philomel Store (the white building with green roof) show how numerically significant this loyal protest was in terms of Islander population. Assembling and equipping the crowd with objects of loyalty, notably flags and placards, required organisation on a significant scale over a period of time; that, as the photograph evidences, the organised crowd was allowed to proceed indicates premeditation rather than spontaneity.

Fig. 4.17. Ross Road Resistance: Islanders take possession of Stanley's most important thoroughfare.

Source: Haskard private photograph collection

The westward flow of the crowd from the public jetty is evident in both photos, with the affective experience of loyal protest particularly evident on some faces, notably the placard carrier in the second photograph (Fig. 4.17) who, flanked by fellow Islanders on either side, has effectively taken possession of

the road. This placard-carrying Islander, alongside the woman to his left, are the same individuals who met Chalfont by Jubilee villas shortly after he had left the Public Jetty. With their loyal message of 'God, monarchy and Britishness', they led what had effectively become a processional crowd. This was a crowd of faith asserting loyal tropes, but also very much one of demonstrated popular sovereignty. Chalfont's visit to the Islands had inadvertently updated the case for British sovereignty, with this unprecedented loyal crowd protest asserting Islander self-determination, whilst (ironically) appropriating the Union Jack as their symbol of rejection of the policy of the British Government (as well as Argentina).

Richard Field' s assessment of how Chalfont's first day in Stanley on Sunday 25 November had proceeded did not seek to conceal the real anxiety and frustration experienced by Islanders. He noted that 'The dominant mood among the Islanders is perplexity that the British government could even consider discussing sovereignty with Argentina. But normal politeness and natural pleasure at seeing a group of people from Britain does not conceal hurt feelings and indignation' (*Daily Telegraph*, 25 November 1968, p. 21).

To undertake loyal protest, however, implied motivation to do so; that this was felt necessary by many Islanders accustomed to living with varying speeds of emergency is hardly a source of surprise. Islanders ongoing experience of 'emergency life', at both a political and personal level, had left a deep sense of insecurity about the future, as well as anger as Chalfont experienced first hand at ExCo immediately after his walkabout on the afternoon of 24 November, and then the following day.

4.8 'Angry loyalty' – Chalfont and ExCos' emergency meetings on the afternoon of Sunday 24 and morning of Monday 25 November 1968

With the performance of the walkabout completed, and initial public duties completed, Chalfont faced what were effectively two emergency meetings with ExCo. Loyal protest had already provided a public outlet for Islander indignation and anger at their treatment by the Wilson Government. This anger came out (even) more directly behind the closed doors of ExCo; in this

private space, much 'straight talking' occurred. Revealing contents of these discussions appear to have been leaked from both the Islander and Chalfont parties, and notwithstanding the 'spin' of each article, are remarkably consistent in the emphasis they place on Islander anger as a driving force behind the politics of loyalty. In considering these accounts, behaviours connected with anger, confrontation and accusations have been italicised.

Richard Field of the *Daily Telegraph* reports how at the first ExCo meeting, Sidney Miller, one of the ExCo Councillors who had signed the letter to parliament and press, angrily confronted Chalfont.

> He looked Lord Chalfont *straight in the face* and said 'If you agree we are British, why talk about it with Argentina?' Lord Chalfont gave him the usual reasons - the United Nations obliging Britain to hold talks, the interests of the large British community in Argentina.
> (*Daily Telegraph*, 25 November 1968, p. 2)

Similarly, Richard Wigg reported for *The Times* that Arthur Barton accused the Labour government undermining (and so accelerating emergency) in the colony. Barton offered Chalfont the advice that official Falkland policy should be changed fundamentally, with the Government hereon reciprocating loyalty towards the Falkland Islanders as British subjects:

> Mr Arthur Barton, a member of the Executive Council, and former manager of the Falkland Islands Company, who emerged as an *opponent* of any change to status at any time […] *blamed* the Government for the prevailing uncertainty about the colony and said that if 40 or 50 families left the Falklands "I think the colony may well go under … the minister should go back to London and say:
> '"Look, Mr Stewart, all we have heard about the Falkland Islanders attitude is correct, and we can not let them down, now or ever"' (*The Times*, 27 November, 1968, p. 6).

Similarly, McLachlan of the *Daily Mail* highlighted anger amongst ExCo members at both ExCo meetings. So strained do these ExCo talks appear to have been that he claims that Chalfont had to point out that the Councillors needed to honour their oath of secrecy (unlike in February, when the four unofficial ExCo Councilors' letter to parliament and press was made public).

> The Islanders' five representatives had a *stormy meeting* with Lord Chalfont last night [Monday 25 November].

> And when they *tangled with him* again today [Tuesday 65 November] they were still *seething*... Before leaving they were reminded of their 'secrecy oath'.
>
> But the *angry faces spoke volumes* and were enough to strengthen rumours of a scuttle, although Lord Chalfont has pledged there will be no transfer of sovereignty to Argentina against the islanders' wishes *(Daily Mail*, 26 November 1968, p. 2).

With the headline *'Falklands diehards hold out' (The Guardian,* 26 November 1968, p. 2), Gott also presented a narrative to readers of ill-tempered and stubborn loyal resistance led by Arthur Barton and Sidney Miller. 'Diehard' is a revealing description, suggesting that the author perceived Barton and Miller to be implacably against Chalfont's efforts to advance the MOU, irrespective of their merits; interestingly, he implies that their approach may have caused some anger on Chalfont's part too. While his report makes light of Islander anxieties and exaggerates Chalfont's effectiveness in addressing these, it clearly reserves its disapprobation for the duumvirate of Arthur Barton and Sidney Miller.

> While Lord Chalfont has had little difficulty reassuring the shepherds and old ladies that Britain is not going to abandon them, he has already run into *problems* with the *tough-minded Executive Council* after giving them an outline yesterday [Monday 25 November] of the state of Britain's' negotiations with Argentina […] Lord Chalfont has *not hidden his displeasure* with the Executive.
>
> Part of the *trouble* stems from the fact that the two men leading the *anti-Chalfont group* in the Council, Mr Arthur Barton and Mr. Sidney Miller, are both old men who lack the vision to foresee anything for the Falklands except a continuing colonial relationship with Britain. It is not easy to persuade those people who want to keep the Falklands British that they are in favour of a Britain that no longer exists' (*The Guardian,* 26 November 1968, p. 2).

The Economist's assessment, anonymously written and published a fortnight later, offers a more balanced account of the interaction between Chalfont and the Councillors, and significantly it addresses the angry and emotional nature of the ExCo meetings with Chalfont.

> But from all accounts Lord Chalfont's sessions with the islands' executive council were **tough going.** He showed them the draft of the 'agreed position' that the British Government hope soon to issue with the Argentineans and they did not like it all, They were **angry, hurt and baffled** that Britain should be telling its subjects that if they wanted to stop being British it would not stand in their way […] 'I lie awake at night wondering if it can really be true ' said one

> unofficial member of the Council […] In the end sophistication won out over simplicity. The Council, half dazed, accepted London's good faith, bolstering its insecurity with Lord Chalfont's promise that sovereignty will not be transferred against the Falklanders wishes.
>
> *(The Economist,* 7 December 1968, p. 33).

The importance of anger as an energy in mobilising Islander loyal sentiment is evident in these accounts. The breakdown in trust between Islanders and the Wilson government had clearly been an accelerative aspect of Falkland emergency, and as Chafont's interactions with ExCo showed, angry loyalty was the result. As is evident, loyalty extended to much more than the vertical display and performance of vexillogical fabric; it was an emotional geopolitics, and the Wilson government's apparent indifference to the fate of this loyal community had created the dichotomy of a loyalism that was both angry towards, but still wanted to be under the authority of, the British government. The perceived disrespect to the Islander community by London was a humiliation (Moisi 2007) for the colony, and as Chalfont experienced first hand, there was no shortage of anger about this.

Moisi's cultures of 'fear-humiliation-hope' (2007) trope argued that: 'The Western world displays a culture of fear, the Arab and Muslim worlds are trapped in a culture of humiliation, and much of Asia displays a culture of hope' (Moisi 2007, p. 8). Applied to the Falklands in 1968, the strength of Islander loyalism can, in many ways, be explained by the colony's humiliation at the hands of the Wilson Government and Foreign Office; this, combined with fear of cession to the Argentine government, meant there was no hope other than the continuation of an imperfect status quo. Angry loyalty was the product of emergency in Falklands, and emotions notwithstanding, the ExCo Councillors had little option but to accept whatever assurance Chalfont was prepared to give – which they did. Angry loyalty was a loyalty that felt acutely betrayed by London, but was locked into a geopolitical 'catch 22' of there being no alternative to British rule - except Argentina. Writing at the end of the Chalfont mission - and after one last meeting with ExCo on 28 November had occurred - McLachlan informed his readership that ExCo had been tamed:

> The sheep-farming members of the Islands' ruling executive council were no

> match for Lord Chalfont, surely one of the most polished persuaders of the political world.
>
> After hours of talks, their confidence gone and their minds bewildered by Whitehall arguments, they agreed to accept at least the 'good faith' of the British government. They are beaten and they know it *(Daily Mail,* 29 November 1968, p. 2).

This was, however, a fundamental misreading of matters – Islander leaders had to put their scepticism to one side and accept Chalfont's pledge to respect their wishes, however much they doubted it. Islander loyalism had grown accustomed to, and fortified by, humiliation, be that from a seemingly indifferent Wilson government, or those like McLachlan or Gott, who used language in their reporting that suggested that Islanders were 'As ignorant as Sheep' (Malcolm 2002).

4.9 Aerial vicissitudes, Tuesday 26 and Wednesday 27 November 1968

With the public emotional 'atmospherics' of the mission already so difficult, and after two bruising meetings with ExCo, Chalfont now spoke to Islanders collectively through a radio interview on Tuesday 26 November, which was also repeated the following day, to provide Her Majesty's Government's perspective on the Falklands future.

Aerially disseminated across the Falklands volume, this broadcast offered an opportunity to provide a counter-narrative of reassurance, taking the form of a 'question and answer' with Arthur Barton and *The Guardian's* Richard Gott, the former having kept Chalfont preoccupied at ExCo.

Chalfont's responses consistently suggested that on further reflection and with the passage of time, Islanders might well come to regard their loyalty to Britain as anachronistic, positing that:

> a good deal of Islander attitudes can be traced to the present lack of communications, and unsatisfactory relations with the mainland especially Argentina […] Mr. Barton pointed out that a number of people here would welcome the opening of communications with Argentina – for holiday purposes, schooling and the like – but he would not agree to this if it meant changing the Union Jack for the Argentine flag..

(*Falkland Islands Monthly Times,* 2 December 1968, p. 3)

Whereas Gott's questioning was purposed to assist Chalfont's case for engaging with the 'modern world' and territorial change, Barton's was framed in terms of loyalty and security; his closing comments were significant in the way they highlighted the maximal size of the Falkland audience who had been listening to the broadcast, and the extant deep sense of insecurity. It is noticeable too that Chalfont implicitly acknowledged that this uncertainty about their future had prompted Islanders to write to him about how they wished to maintain British rule.

> Mr. Barton, in winding up the meeting, told Lord Chalfont that a maximum audience would have been listening to this broadcast, as all these people want comforting words and lasting security. Lord Chalfont expressed his gratitude to everyone who made him so welcome, and thanked those who sent him telegrams from the Camp and Stanley – these made it quite clear to him what the Islanders wanted.
> (*Falkland Islands Monthly Times,* 2 December 1968, p. 3)

Reassurance through aerial volume appears to have improved the emotional atmospherics surrounding Chalfont's mission with *The Times'* Richard Wigg suggested that this broadcast had helped reassure the majority of Islanders - so reducing anxiety about the degree of emergency that Islanders faced.

> Sampling the reaction this morning of those islanders, who had listened to the broadcast – which was almost everyone in this town of 1,000 inhabitants – I found that while some continued to mistrust the British Government's promises, the majority felt that their doubts had been reduced now they had heard the position for themselves' (*The Times,* 28 November 1968, p. 4).

Chalfont's efforts to create a calmer atmosphere were, however, disrupted on Wednesday 27 November, with a dramatic new aerial incursion made by Miguel Fitzgerald in a patriotically liveried *Grand Commander* aircraft, this time sponsored by the Argentine *Cronica* mass-circulation newspaper. Fitzgerald however, proved unable to land safely at Stanley racecourse, and had to make an emergency landing at the narrow Eliza Cove Road, on high ground in east Stanley, by the Murray heights. The crashed plane can be seen in 4.18, in patriotic Argentine blue and white paintwork, with the newspaper's name *Cronica* at the front.

Fig. 4.18. Fitzgerald's return: the crashed Cronica plane

Source: Haskard private photograph collection

With his plane immobile, Fitzgerald was now detained by the colonial authorities, and shortly afterwards deported from the Islands (departing on the HMS *Endurance* with Chalfont). Whilst this dramatic performance generated Malvinas-related publicity for *Cronica*, its aerial subversion of British sovereignty at this highly sensitive time was damaging to Chalfont's efforts to encourage Islanders to consider seriously the possibility of an Argentine future. *The Economist* commented on this dichotomous situation: 'The crash-landing of an Argentine journalist's plane reminded the inhabitants of Port Stanley again how exposed they are to the crazy stunts of Argentine irredentists, the people they are supposed to learn to love (*The Economist,* 7 December 1968, p. 33).

Whilst Fitzgerald had created his own micro-emergency, this performance had done nothing to decelerate the wider Falkland emergency, from either the

Islanders or Chalfont's perspective. What it had achieved though through its volumetric disruption was to further unsettle Islanders about the possibility of an Argentine future; given that achieving this was Fitzgerald's objective, the timing of this aerial incursion was spectacularly misjudged.

4.10 Stanley Town Hall meeting, evening of Wednesday 27 November 1968; the temporal dimension of Falkland emergency, and anachronisation of the Falklands territorial future

Loyal resistance to an Argentine future had, when Chalfont arrived in Stanley, drawn strength from assembling a crowd as an actor in its own right. The large outdoors crowd of protest of Sunday 26 November, however, proved a unique event, and Islander insecurity about the present and the future – a temporal emergency - had not gone away. The sombre seated crowd in the picture (Fig 4.19 below) of Chalfont's address at Stanley Town Hall on 28 November 1968 stands in marked contrast to the expectant standing crowd on Ross Road three days earlier. The sitting bodies of the crowd, and Chalfont's too, appears defensive; the pensive facial expressions, hands placed on faces and folded arms in the picture appear to suggest an attritional experience in the town hall for audience and speaker alike.

Chalfont used the temporal dimension of Falklands emergency to persuade Islanders in a bid to consider an Argentine future, exploiting Islanders' uncertainties. Richard Gott, in an article entitled, 'Falklanders warm to Chalfont's cold comfort*' (The Guardian,* 29 November 1968, in Beck 1968, p. 1), reported to his readership how Chalfont had encouraged Islanders to let go of the British past and present, and engage with an Argentine future, appealing to them in these terms:

Fig. 4.19. Chalfont addresses Stanley Town Hall, 28 November 1968.

Source: Haskard private photograph collection.

> You are reluctant to realise that things are changing in the world outside. Great Britain is not the imperialist power of the nineteenth century. It is still a great power but in a different sense. It's your future. I am not offering any assurances, but, when you say 'Keep the Falklands British', make absolutely certain you know in your own minds what this means. It means something different to what it meant in 1900 (*The Guardian,* 29 November 1968, p. 1).

The strongly implied criticism of Islander loyalism in Chalfont's speech was that the Islanders' geopolitical attachment to the United Kingdom was proving temporally subversive, and would be anachronising the Islands territorial status for as long as it was allowed to continue. Chalfont's representation of Islanders wanting the Falklands to be maintained as 'islands that time forgot' was not well received, but notwithstanding this, the meeting ended in a surprisingly positive note. In his discourse, Chalfont conceded that the Wilson Government would respect their wishes, that is that the Islanders heard what they wished to hear and so far as they could, disregarded the rest. While

Gott's reportage of the event framed Islander loyalism as anachronistic, he acknowledged that this was what Islanders wanted:

> For all the tough talking, the Islanders clapped him enthusiastically, chiefly because he told them emphatically that the Islands' status would not be changed against their wishes. He hinted as broadly as possible that economic necessity will probably force them to change their minds, though I am uncertain how many got the message (*The Guardian,* 29 November 1968, p. 1).

Chalfont's anticipation of accelerating economic aspects of Falkland emergency appears not to have diminished Islanders' wish to retain the territorial status quo of British sovereignty. This point – about how the audience wishfully read too much into Chalfont's promise to respect Islander wishes - was similarly picked up by the *Daily Telegraph's* Richard Field, who cited an anonymous 'local official' (*Daily Telegraph*, 29 November 1968, p. 1) questioning the wisdom – for both the speaker and the audience – of Islanders' affective applause for Chalfont's assurance that their wishes would be respected:

> One local official, however, asked "Can he really be happy that he has been applauded too much?" He answered his own question: "Doesn't it mean that they simply haven't understood that whatever we want, it means the end of the colony is in sight?'' (*Daily Telegraph*, 29 November 1968, p. 1).

Yet as the audience applause demonstrated, assurances from Chalfont about respecting Islanders' wishes were taken at face value, even though accompanied by a strong ministerial warning that the continuation of British rule would be both anachronistic and economically insecure. *The Economist*'s assessment that such assurances 'were "straws" worth clutching for a crowd resistant to a future geopolitical change' (*The Economist*, 7 December 1968, p. 3) is a convincing interpretation. As the Wilson government's efforts to secure the MOU and encourage Islanders to accept an Argentine future had shown, Islander loyalty already had substantial grounds for feeling itself betrayed. This said, it was still preferable to accept the debased currency of British government assurances minted by Chalfont, rather than simply end up empty- handed, even more vulnerable to emergency.

4.11 Chalfont and the Loyal Camp: focus on Saturday 23 November in West Falkland, and conclusion

Loyal resistance to Chalfont's initiative was geographically spread throughout the Falklands archipelago, extending from Stanley throughout the Camp. Chalfont spent two dedicated days in Camp, Saturday 23 November in West Falkland prior to sailing to Stanley, and Tuesday 26 November on East Falkland. With East Falkland already considered at length through the focus on Stanley's loyal display in section 4.4, which included many East Falkland Camp residents including Councillor Sidney Miller, this section will focus on West Falkland.

Unlike the large crowd which would concentrate on Ross Road in Stanley the following day, the small West Falkland groups – effectively loyal 'micro-crowds' – that met Chalfont on Saturday 23 November, his first day in the Falklands were spatially dispersed, but consistently made use of vertical protest signs and Union Jacks. Chalfont's self-penned entry in the *Dictionary of Falklands Biography* (writing in the third person) recalls his landfall at Port Howard, West Falkland:

> where he was greeted by Islanders in what he assumed was traditional welcome – only to see that their placards say 'Chalfont go home!' Despite this the Islanders were unfailingly courteous and Chalfont met about sixty people in the village hall. He sensed that the profusion of union jacks was more than an expression of imperial nostalgia. The Islanders clearly felt a deep sense of insecurity about the future (Chalfont in Tatham 2008, p. 147).

Whilst Chalfont's mission was in itself an affective contributory factor to insecurity about the future, the Islanders' connection to the United Kingdom and its former empire was, as Chalfont perceived, also being performed: to use the Union Jack was to express and affirm three- dimensionally their imperiled Islander identity, as the minister would experience performed much more extensively the following morning in Stanley (as addressed in section 4.4).

Fig. 4.20. Port Howard protest, West Falkland, on 23 November 1968.

Source: Haskard private photograph collection

The prominent (left) vertical placard in this photograph of West Falkland Camp residents (Fig. 4.20) serves as both an object of loyal protest, and as an expression of Falklands identity:

> We want the Falklands to remain British
> We are all under the same old flag
> Brothers in arms are we
> God save the Queen

On this sign, a credo of Islander loyalism is articulated through national, racial and cultural identity, as well as through divinity and monarchy. Unpacking the phrase 'remain British', Islanders' unconditional allegiance to Britain is asserted (notwithstanding Whitehall's efforts to detach them from their fellow British 'brothers in arms'), and so protect their Falkland sub-culture; this affirmation also operates as a scarcely concealed rejection of geopolitical, and ethno-cultural ties, to Argentina.

The fabric object of 'the old flag', the Union Jack, operated both as a symbol of national origin and allegiance, with divinity and monarchy also invoked to reinforce the narrative of British sovereignty as the 'natural order' in the Falklands. The flag's use in Camp at the time of Chalfont's visit also narrated an angry loyalty, stirred by the humiliation of the Wilson government's seeming indifference to their fate.

The Guardian's Richard Gott confirmed the archipelagic scope of such Islander loyalist sentiments throughout the Islands, citing rejectionist slogans such as in the preceding photo (Fig 4.20); the loyal reception that Chalfont received on West Falkland on his first day in the Islands proved consistent with how he was greeted throughout in the East Falkland Camp, and of course in Stanley. Gott also implied that loyal sentiment encountered across the Falklands' geographically dispersed settlements had, on occasion, more to do with being anti-Argentine than pro-British.

> Over 10 days, we visited just about every farm and homestead in the two principal islands. We were greeted everywhere – and we could see the slogans and the union flag from the air before we landed – with the same messages: "Chalfont Go Home" and sometimes "We Want To Stay British". The islanders were adamant. They wanted nothing to do with Argentina, and Chalfont left them with a promise that nothing would happen without their agreement. (*The Guardian* [online], 'Argentina's claim to the Falklands is still a good one', 2 April 2007).

Whilst Gott is hardly a neutral source, given the Islanders treatment by Whitehall, this assessment suggests, not without reason, that Argentophobia or Argentoscepticism, rather than Anglophilia, was a more important element in loyal sentiment than might at first appear to be the case.

Richard Wigg for *The Times* reported on the prevalence of Islander loyalist sentiment in the Camp, and the framings that underlay Islanders' loyal assertion of their British connections. Again, the use of the Union Jack as an object and expression of loyal protest is prominent, this time deployed on Islanders' bodies, on their windcheaters. There is an inversion of the argument that Chalfont expressed, namely that the Islands' future progress

lay with Argentina; in comments heard whilst on Carcass Island, off West Falkland, on Saturday 23 November 1968, Wigg reported that he had heard the view expressed that Argentina was a country of 'primitive' attitudes, a backward actor rather than the harbinger of progress envisaged in Chalfont's 'future narrative'.

> These Islanders, too, had their signs out, proclaiming that they were British. Some wore union jacks on their windcheaters. The signs revealed their underlying suspicions about the British Governments intentions […] The conversation between the Minister and Mr. and Mrs. Cecil Bertrand, owners of Carcass Island, 4000 acres in extent with 2000 head of sheep, typified many of the day. Lord Chalfont asked Mrs Bertrand what their attitude would be if Argentina was more friendly towards them and established better communications. She replied: "We might not be so bitter perhaps, but the thing that worries us is giving us away."
>
> After Lord Chalfont had reassured her on this point, she came back with "The Falklands are as British as parts of Britain and always want to remain so." [...] Mr Bertrand, who was born in Argentina 59 years ago, said it was Argentina's "primitive attitude" to them which caused the hostility *(The Times*, 25 November 1968, p. 4).

It is clear in this reportage that Islander loyalism in the West Falkland Camp saw the Falklands as a micro-Britain; regarded association with Argentina as effectively a means of backwards time-travel to an era of 'primitive attitude'; and – echoing Gott's observation – incorporated Argentophobia, or at least Argentoscepticism, as an element of loyalty.

Based on exposure to Islander loyalism in the West Falkland Camp, and then in Stanley, the *Daily Express* report of 25 November 1968 reinforced the rejection of Chalfont's time-travelling argument that future generations of Falkland Islanders may wish to integrate with Argentina. In a robustly pro-Islander, loyal article entitled '*From Carcass Island to Port Stanley, they left Chalfont in no doubt: 'We want to stay BRITISH''*, reporter Donald Seaman rebutted this entire 'future' premise:

> Since everything about these Islands, every custom, every neat house, every afternoon tea, is so British, it is difficult to see why children now starting school might think any differently to their parents when they grow up (*Daily Express,* 25 November 1968 p. 2).

This bid by the Daily Express' Seaman to debunk one of Chalfont's pivotal arguments was based on loyal mentalities he had encountered in West Falkland. His account (below) has value on a number of levels; it appears to confirm the loyal views of remote Camp Islander communities from Carcass and West Point Islands, and how Camp micro-crowds mobilised the Union Jack as an object of loyal three-dimensional protest and resistance. Other volume-related observations in his report include Chalfont's need to use a helicopter and Beaver seaplane to access this; these were the sole means available to provide him with the necessary bodily mobility to be transported quickly throughout the Falkland volume to deliver his message to remote Camp settlements. His reference to the white-painted stones on West Point Island proclaiming '*Keep the Falklands British'* illustrates one highly visible politicisation of West Falkland Camp volume, a loyal trope designed to be seen by descending and ascending aircraft, including Chalfont's. Seamans's reference to ongoing Islander surveillance of Chalfont as he journeyed around the Camp is also revealing, and highlights how Islanders networked, using radio to apprise each other of what had happened, and what to anticipate in their interactions with Chalfont on his Camp visits.

> What the Falklands think now was made perfectly clear when Lord Chalfont's West Falkland's visit took him to Carcass Island. The whole population – eight – turned out with Union Jacks to meet him off his helicopter. Alongside them stood eight more – all the people living on nearby West Point Island […]
>
> Said 81-year-old Mrs. Gladys Napier: 'My father came here more than 100 years ago. I would willingly give my life to save this land'…
>
> Wherever he went by helicopter and by Beaver seaplane round the lonely settlements, they talked over their radios: 'How did you get on?' Did you tell him straight?' 'What did he have to say?' Islanders 'compared notes.
>
> APPEAL
>
> These islanders have said time and time again 'Tell the *Daily Express* to keep fighting for us'.
>
> (*Daily Express,* 25 November 1968, p. 2)

As Chalfont's West Falkland induction had shown, his mission faced an uphill struggle to win Falkland 'hearts and minds'; the response from the West Falkland Camp was that the emergency of gradual disintegration of the

Falklands' socio-economic fabric had not yet proved so parlous that Islanders were ready to embrace an Argentine future.

Inevitably, discourse about the future aroused strong loyal emotions, particularly anger at Chalfont's advocacy of reaching an accommodation with Argentina. Donald McLachlan described the raw emotions that Chalfont encountered in West Falkland on 23 November 1968 in these terms:

> There were few people to see. He talked with little groups where he could find them, but they had their hackles up.
>
> There were three angry confrontations – one with an English sheep farmer, who has only been here for only two years and who gave Lord Chalfont lunch at a lonely windswept farmhouse. The arrival of the soup did not finish it but it calmed temperatures a bit (*Daily Mail,* 25 November 1968, p. 2).

Three angry encounters on West Falkland, even before the numerous angry encounters in Stanley, gave Chalfont exposure to a range of 'Angry Islanders' a decade before that term was appropriated by the anonymous letter-writer to the *Falkland Islands Times* (Chapter 7*)*. By the time his mission was over on 28 November 1968, Chalfont's experiences in certain respects suggested that the Falklands were 'The Angry Isles'. This, however, would be an unfair representation. In their cumulative experiences of emergency, Islanders had encountered humiliation, insecurity and uncertainty, with their loyalty to Britain unrequited.

The emotions that Chalfont had, through his visit, brought into the domain of national news in Britain were powerful for residents of Stanley and the Camp alike. Behind expressions of loyalty and anger, which coalesced as angry loyalty, lay a distinct lack of hope; as Donald McLachlan in the *Daily Mail* (29 November 1968) observed 'there is an air of helplessness and hopelessness about most of the 2,000 people scattered over the Falklands inhospitable rock and peat bog wash'. Llewellyn Chanter, the *Daily Telegraph's* Commonwealth correspondent also highlighted to his readers how Chalfont's visit had exacerbated matters, informing them immediately after Chalfont's departure, that:

> A telephone conversation between London and Port Stanley, the Falklands, showed clearly that Lord Chalfont's visit, while being welcome as a gesture by the Government, has left the 2,000 Islanders in a depressed and nervous state (*Daily Telegraph*, 28 November 1968, p. 1).

Rather than 'Angry Islands', the Falklands appeared to be islands lacking hope, anachronistically locked in the past, facing an uncertain and without a viable future; this at least was the temporally and socio-economically focused narrative of emergency that Chalfont himself had publicly and unsentimentally signposted to Islanders, in his bid to deconstruct and dismantle their loyalty. *The Economist* noted that 'Lord Chalfont was very gloomy about the Falklands' future when he talked to the Islanders. He emphasised the fall in the price of wool on which the Islands depend' (*The Economist,* 7 December 1968, p. 20). Encouraging an atmosphere of gloom can be seen as Chalfont's Parthian shot to Islanders, in which this pessimistic narrative of an accelerated emergency of decline would become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

4.12 Angry loyalty and Chalfont's humiliation

As Chalfont was to experience first hand, angry loyalty was not geographically confined to the Falklands. Owing to the high profile of his mission, Chalfont, rather than Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart, had become the ministerial 'face' associated with efforts to accommodate Argentina; his efforts to win Islanders over to a future of integration attracted much press criticism.

On 28 November 1968, a hostile *Daily Telegraph's* lead story had been 'Britain ready to surrender the Falkland Islands' (*Daily Telegraph,* 29 November 1968, p. 1); with a hostile editorial the following day entitled 'Fog over the Falklands' acerbically noting that 'Lord Chalfont has a lot to explain at home and in the Falklands' (*Daily Telegraph,* 29 November 1968, p. 18); for its part too, *The Times* ran an editorial, entitled 'More Grounds For Suspicion', reinforcing a critical narrative:

> Lord Chalfont had spent five days trying to persuade the 2,000 inhabitants of the Falkland Islands that they have nothing to fear, and nobody can blame them if as a consequence they remain very worried indeed… The whole business looks more and more shabby and unnecessary (*The Times,* 30 November 1968, p. 11).

The front page of *The Times* on that day (29 November 1968, p.1), Fig 4.21, conspicuously presented Chalfont's Falklands visit as an unconvincing failure, with the damaging headline 'Minister fails to allay fears on Falklands' stoking domestic anger.

THE TIMES

IN BUSINESS NEWS:
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK
BRIGHTER

Plea for later school is rejected

Box that may contain new Enid Blyton stories

Fears for children in morning darkness

Minister fails to allay fears on Falklands

Man is shot dead in street

23 Labour rebels in taxes vote

Fig. 4.21. Chalfont's Falkland visit on the front page of* The Times *(29 November 1968, p. 1).

Source:* The Times*, 29 November 1968, p. 1

Even before this edition of *The Times* had gone to press, Chalfont was being angrily assailed by Conservative MPs John Biggs Davison and Michael Clark Hutchinson through the letters page. They penned a public condemnation of Falkland policy, denouncing Chalfont and the Wilson government for prioritising the interests of a foreign power over loyal British subjects, treasonable behaviour being implied: 'The discussion with a foreign power of the sovereignty of a British colony of entirely British stock, against the will of

the people and without consultation, is surely unprecedented' *(The Times,* 29 November 1968, p. 11).

A motion calling for the British government to assert that the Islanders were British was signed by 100 MPs (Beck 1988, p. 102), and as John Biggs Davidson confirmed in parliamentary debate on 3 November, the possibility of Chalfont's impeachment had been seriously investigated (House of Commons debate, 03 December 1968 vol. 774 p. 1268). Vigorous denunciation of Chalfont's activities in both the Commons on 3-4 December 1968, and in the Lords on 11 December 1968, confirmed the deep parliamentary loyal anger that existed. This, combined with the associated transformation of the Falklands into a domestic British political issue, testify to the effectiveness of the original Falkland Islands Councillors' Appeal to Parliament, the Falklands Emergency Committee's hard lobbying and critical Press coverage; together these elements coalesced to to position the Falklands' future as a matter for domestic British loyal politics, and also resulted in a personal emergency for Chalfont's parliamentary reputation as a reliable political operator. Adding to Chalfont's difficulties Richard Gott, ostensibly a journalistic ally of the embattled minister, published a spectacularly ill-timed article in *The Guardian* on 3 December 1968 that approvingly signposted that the kith and kin of the Falklands faced being 'sold down the river'. In this article, entitled '*Still Edwardian',* Gott claimed that:

> The Islanders loved him [Chalfont]. So palpably debonair, he melted the suspicion from all hearts. Even the terrible gang of old sheep owners who have misruled the colony for years had to admit that they had met their match, prompting the irreverent thought that if they are going to be sold down the river Islanders would prefer it to be done by a lord.
>
> For they live very far back in the past. The Falkland Islands is probably the only place in the world where Edwardian Britain is maintained intact.
> (*The Guardian,* 3 December 1968, p. 8)

Gott's somewhat irreverent article which suggested that the demise of this territorial anachronism was a real prospect, served to add fuel to the loyal Falkland parliamentary fires of December 1968, not that any more was needed; further to the intense loyal condemnation that was meted out to, and

about, Chalfont regarding his Falkland mission, Robin Edmonds, Head of the Foreign Office's Latin American Department, observed:

> He was howled down on the floor of the House, this gentle, kind, humane man. Howled down by members, and nobody, no Member of Parliament in any party, and above all not in his own party, ever forgot that. That is why I regard December 1968 as an absolute watershed. From then on, in my view, in this country the Falkland Islands issue became primarily an issue of domestic politics (Edmonds, in Charlton 1989, p. 28).

Chalfont had become the 'lightning rod' – or perhaps more appropriate to this particular context, 'the sacrificial lamb' - for press and parliamentary criticism of Falkland policy, but the Wilson government as a whole was widely held responsible for an ill-judged initiative, as this memorable cartoon from *The Times* of 29 November 1968 (Fig 4.22) indicates. The cartoon unflatteringly portrays Harold Wilson's Falklands policy as akin to leaving a vulnerable baby on a stranger's doorstep, in this case Argentina. Implied in the characterization of the Falklands as a baby is that a family member, bereft of agency, has been abandoned to a third party.

***Fig. 4.22. Harold Wilson's approach to the Falklands unflatteringly portrayed in* The Times.**

Source:* The Times*, 29 November 1968, p. 7

Recognising the intractability of the Falkland issue, by 11 December 1968 the Cabinet opted to abandon the MOU, and Foreign Secretary Stewart assured the Commons that there would be no sovereignty transfer of the territory of the Falkland Islands against Islander wishes. The Wilson Government's bid to respond to UN Resolution 2065, and diplomatically resolve this dispute with Argentina, had (for now) been frustrated by a powerful mobilisation of the politics of loyalty in both the Falklands and Britain, leaving Argentina empty-handed. With the Falkland Islanders, after Stewart's announcement, seemingly in possession of a veto over a sovereignty transfer to Argentina, the power of this politics of loyalty, which strongly resonated with many influential parliamentarians, journalists as well as members of the British public, had been tangibly demonstrated. Loyal anger had mobilised the struggle to keep the symbolic object of Union Jack flying over this South Atlantic archipelago, so affirming the de jure, if not necessarily de facto, volumetric status quo. The absence in 1968, or at any other point prior to April 1982, of a definitive territorial settlement with Argentina, however, ensured that the British government had now become enveloped in its own slow Falklands emergency, which ultimately accelerated into the 1982 Conflict.

5. Chapter Five – 'Volume Control': Volumetric emergency in the Falklands in the period prior to the 1982 Conflict

5.1 Introduction

In its efforts to contain and subdue colonial emergency, Britain had become accustomed to using air power in pursuit of its geopolitical objectives. From Mesopotamia in the 1920s to South Arabia in the 1960s, the Royal Air Force policed emergency across the globe, though its achievements are open to question, as Mumford has noted; 'historical reassessment of airpower in Malaya, Kenya, and South Arabia highlights is that aerial bombardment against insurgent units is either futile or detrimental'. Adey cites contemporary figures indicating the lack of effectiveness of aerial bombing unless undertaken intensely, noting that, in the Malayan Emergency, to achieve 'near certainty' of eliminating communist fighters in a four mile square area of forest, 74,000 projectiles would be needed (Adey 2010, p. 163). However great the impact on the ground, in periods of colonial emergency, Britain had become accustomed to being aerial hegemon; in the Falklands, however, in an unusual role reversal, Britain effectively ceded this role to Argentina in the slow emergency era, specifically from 1971 onwards.

This chapter examines the Falklands in the slow emergency era as a three-dimensional space, and explains how land, sea and air were enrolled in an unwelcome project, the result of the British government's decision to scrap the RMS *Darwin* and adopt the 1971 Communications Agreement through which Argentina became master of the Falklands/Malvinas skies. These two developments are of much greater geopolitical significance than has hitherto been recognised, amounting to a British cession of volumetric control, and thus de facto sovereignty, over the Falklands/Malvinas; through this reading, it is argued that this is the moment when both British and Argentine governments explicitly and formally re-framed/recognised the Falklands/Malvinas as a three-dimensional geopolitical dispute. Consequently, it is contended that Argentina established from 1971, what I term an 'aerotectorate' in the Islands, with LADE (*Lineas Aeraeas del Estado)* staff as administering agents of the Argentine state.

5.2 Falklands/Malvinas volumetric foregrounding

Agnew's paradigm of four types of sovereignty over territory – classic, imperialist, integrative, globalist – reflects how under more rigorous scrutiny, sovereignty becomes a more complex proposition than a traditional Westphalian representation allows for offering the perspective; 'We do not live in a world that is singularly imperialist, globalist, integrative or Westphalian' (Agnew 2005, p. 456). Given the complexities of sovereignty which Agnew's assessment implies, 'simple' categorisation can be problematic, and it is productive to think in terms of sovereignties rather than (merely) sovereignty. This is a helpful position from which to start when thinking about volume, and states' ambitions to exercise territorial control over this. In conceiving land, sea and air collectively as volume, it becomes clear that sovereignty can be exercised over some or all of these spaces, whether in a *de facto* or *de jure* manner.

In encouraging us to re-think what volume involves, Elden has deconstructed the term (2013, p. 15) 'volumetric', highlighting 'the dimensionality implied by 'volume' and the calculability implied by 'metric' … Just as the world does not exist as a surface, nor should our theorisations of it; ...space is volumetric'. Three dimensional, volumetric control, underpinned with political calculation, force and violence, has foregrounded the binaries of possession and dispossession of sovereignty in Falklands/Malvinas geopolitics and history. Out of these struggles, sovereignty has become a legitimising cipher for state power over volume, the slow emergency Falklands/Malvinas of the mid-1960s to early 1982 being shaped by previous volumetric outcomes.

As will be examined, volume can be filled and altered by 'intrusive' objects, which enable sovereignty protagonists to leave their volumetric mark, even if for a limited temporality; in this way altered volume creates geopolitical effects and potentially emergency for the population living within the disputed volume. Significantly, geopolitical manipulation of volume shows that emergency has an elemental quality. In vying for volumetric hegemony, competing state actors seek to regulate and manage control of air, water and land, such as

terrain, rocks and seabed, both accelerating and decelerating emergency as their transient geopolitical fortunes ebb and flow. This elemental perspective offers us a different reading of emergency, but one which is ultimately a geopolitical legerdemain. Objects of power offer only a temporally finite means to assert volumetric control over air, water and land unless replaced by successor objects; nor may a power, in the first instance, be in a position to exercise control over all three volumetric components.

Fig. 5.1. Philatelic representation of the 175th Anniversary of the British occupation of the Falklands

Source: https://www.stampworld.com/en/stamps/Falkland-Islands/Postage%20stamps/1878-2016?user=0&page=23

Whilst Britain traditionally had been able to assert control over Falkland/Malvinas land and sea, it had not done so over air. As a case in point, HMS *Clio's* forcible re-occupation of the Falklands/Malvinas on 3 January 1833 enabled Captain Onslow's party of Royal Marines to raise the Union Jack at Port Louis, East Falkland, asserting British sovereignty over the archipelago; in this way, an imperialist sovereignty (Agnew 2005, p. 456) was asserted over land and adjacent sea, but without the means to assert power over it, aerial space remained effectively unclaimed. Fig. 5.1 provides an imagined philatelic representation of Onslow's assertion of sovereignty in which the union jack is hoisted in Falklands aerial space; the reality, however, is not as one might deduce from in the stamp. Whether in 1833 or 1968, Britain was not in a position to exercise three-dimensional control over the Islands, notwithstanding 'stirring' vexillogical displays.

The 1914 Battle of the Falklands too signified another critical moment when, in the worst militarised violence in the Islands' history (until 1982), the metallically encased, militarised volumes of the Royal Navy and German Pacific Fleet confronted each other, as prosecuting agents for their respective states' war aims; the latter lost the *Gneisenau, Scharnhorst, Danzig, Nurnberg* and the lives/bodies of 2,200 sailors, tragically encased within the sub-marine volume of the South Atlantic. A British, imperialist sovereignty (Agnew 2005, p. 456) was re-asserted over Falkland/Malvinas land and sea, but again this only comprised partial volumetric control, with aerial space still unsecured.

It is clear that, for Britain, the elusive part of volumetric control was aerial space, signifying an incomplete hegemony. With the advent of aircraft accessing the Islands, the opportunity to exercise control over the Islands' airspace finally arose, which Britain partially did through the introduction of a civilian air service. From December 1948, following the introduction of the de Havilland Canada DHC-2 Beaver float plane, the Falkland Islands Government Air Service (FIGAS) was operational, the name itself a banal geopolitical signifier of British sovereignty. A new inter-connectedness was established between Stanley and the Camp, with Beavers' encased metal volume providing aerial mobility of bodies, produce and objects within the Falkland/Malvinas archipelago. Aerial inter-connectedness, however, also had the potential to revolutionise the Islands' connections with southern cone countries, which provided new opportunities for asserting Argentine involvement with, and sovereignty claims over, the '*volumen irredenta'* of las Islas Malvinas especially in relation to aerial space.

5.3 Volumetric insurgents: Fitzgerald and the Condor hijackers

Argentine aerial volumetric insurgency of the Falklands/Malvinas profoundly altered the Islands' geopolitical position, signaling to both Islanders and the British authorities that the Islands air space was very much within Buenos Aires' reach. Whilst these flights were unofficial, they did not need to be 'official', for the significance was clear; the potential to command aerial volume (in the absence of a Royal Air Force presence) had given Argentina

the opportunity to disrupt British land and sea domination of the Islands, and usefully create anxiety in the Islands as to when the 'next' aerial incursion might happen. For the first time since 1833, Argentina had the opportunity to mount a volumetric counter-offensive, with an aerial corrosion of British sovereignty.

The appearance of Argentine aviator Miguel Fitzgerald's Cessna in Falkland/Malvinas skies on 9 September 1964 signified that a profound volumetric moment had occurred; that Falkland/Malvinas aerial volume *wa*s open and vulnerable to Argentine aircraft, introducing a new, volumetric dimension to the Islands' emergencies. On landing, Fitzgerald planted the Argentine tri-band flag reclaiming the Islands, and in making the return trip from Stanley back to Comodoro Rividavia he created the now proven elemental reality of a two-way 'air bridge' from Argentina to the Falklands/Malvinas.

Fitzgerald's insurgent performance subverted British sovereignty, his flight dramatically asserting Argentina's sovereignty over the Islands' aerial volume and territory. Indeed, the union of air, surface, and sub-surface (accessed through planting the Argentine tri-band) provided a powerful three-dimensional performance that forced the geographical imaginations of Islanders to reflect on the proximity of the Falklands/Malvinas to Argentina.

A particularly relevant and still unpublished source which directly addresses aspects of the Islanders' volumetric experience is Malcolm's *As Ignorant as Sheep.* So far as the Falklands in the period prior to 1982 can be said to have had a leading political activist, it was Velma Malcolm. Her role was described in Harold Briley's entry in the *Dictionary of Falklands Biography* in these terms:

> From the early 1970's, Velma Malcolm was the driving force behind the Falkland Islands Emergency Committee (later the Falkland Islands Association) as secretary of the Local (Stanley) Committee. She was also a vice-president of the Association and indefatigable fundraiser. She ceaselessly monitored and energetically countered Foreign Office attempts to accommodate Argentina's sovereignty claim, in liaison with Hunter Christie and the Association's other leaders in London (Briley in Tatham 2008, p. 355).

Malcolm witnessed first-hand the volumetric and political developments of the period. Whilst her loyal agenda was to 'Keep the Falklands British', and her discourse therefore altogether partisan in its approach, Malcolm nonetheless provides a unique and under-studied narration of contemporary perceptions and experiences that existed within the Islander community.

Anxiety was felt within the Falkland Islander community over Fitzgerald's aerial incursion into the Islands' air space and territory; far from seeing his flight as a logistical achievement, Malcolm regarded it as an aerial object to advance neo-colonial Argentine sovereignty ambitions, and gave vent to her objections to these:

> This was a protest about the British being in the Falklands, and they [Argentina] had been working up to going to the Committee of 24, the Decolonisation Committee of the United Nations, claiming that Britain was a colonial power and the colony had to be decolonised. However, they just wanted to colonise us from Argentina instead of Britain (Malcolm 2002, p. 81).

Fitzgerald made a further aerial incursion to the Island' during Lord Chalfont's November 1968 visit, this time resulting in an ignominious emergency landing in the Falklands/Malvinas. Whilst this crash landing undermined the geopolitical symbolism of this 'repeat' performance, it again illustrated that whilst Britain claimed the formal trappings of volumetric control – de jure sovereignty – it lacked the aerial-military capability to assert that control against one solo Argentine aviator insurgent, let alone the *Fuerza Aerea Argentina* (FAA).

As volumetric insurgents, the twenty Argentine Condor hijackers of 28-29 September 1966 had a more powerful impact than the maverick actor Fitzgerald. The hijacking of the 'micro-aerial' volume encased within a DC4 flying from Buenos Aires to Rio Gallegos, and its diversion to/through Falkland/Malvinas 'macro-aerial' volume, led to a short emergency standoff at Stanley race-course; during this the passengers' bodies, as well as those of five captured Islanders, were commodified as a resource in dramatically performing Argentine sovereignty on, and through, the 'stage' of the hijack.

Fig. 5.3. Operation Condor – DC4 performs Argentine sovereignty.

Source: **Panorama*, October 1966, pp. 16-17***

This sovereignty performance, consummated through the hijackers' planting Argentine flags in the Falkland soil, produced the most powerful post-1833 assertion of Argentine sovereignty in the Islands – the combination of bodies (hijackers/hostages), fabric (flag) and metal (DC4) subverted/contradicted the narrative of British sovereignty, reviving the Islas Malvinas palimpsest; indeed, it was not so much the DC4 that was 'hijacked', as the facade of British control/power over the Islands stood exposed. Through aerial performance, Argentina had made a practical and highly symbolic assertion of its volumetric power.

The equivocal nature of British support for the Islanders became increasingly evident, as its 'soft' response to the 1966 Condor Incident – a significantly more serious instance of aerial infiltration than Fitzgerald in 1964 – reflected. Velma Malcolm was highly critical of Britain's 'soft' response to the Condor hijackers seeing it as performative weakness; she recalled that immediately after the hijack was over:

> I had occasion to visit [Acting Governor] Les Gleadell in his office in the Secretariat and he said how good it was that the aircraft had flown away without mishap. I'm afraid my comment then was as it would be now, that the aircraft should never have been returned to Argentina. He further commented about all the poor innocent children who had been on it to which I replied there was no such thing as an innocent Argentine and that in 20 years time those children would be adults and perhaps come back (Malcolm 2002, p. 83).

The intensity of Malcolm's narrative shows the anger that existed within elements of the Islander community about the hi-jacking. The removal of both the Condor and hijackers from the Falklands volume in Malcolm's account is effectively narrated as evidence of de facto British collusion with Argentina resulting in an aerial and bodily volumetric infiltration. For Malcolm, this was a threat that was being ignored, one so great in her view that even Argentine children are not regarded as 'innocent', and may well pose a future threat to the Islands.

Falkland/Malvinas aerial volume had thus been proven to be unsecured by both the Condor hijackers and Fitzgerald volumetric insurgencies of 1964 and 1968, and the Islands' volume was three-dimensionally altered, exposing the spatial hollowness of British sovereignty claims. Without the necessary militarised aerial objects of power to resist Argentine aerial incursions, unofficial or official, the Falklands lay entirely open/vulnerable to both *Fuerza Aerea Argentina* (FAA) incursions/ 'sovereignty-performance', as well as those of unofficial, insurgent Argentine actors. For an economically stretched Britain which was pulling back from 'East of Suez', creating a major new Royal Air Force (RAF) base on the Islands was not a serious option. There was, however, one obvious way to manage the Falkland/Malvinas aerial volume, namely transfer the responsibility for aerial volume to Argentina, so ensuring the FAA secured/policed aerial volume.

In this implied de jure cession of aerial volume, the 1971 Anglo-Argentine Communications Agreement made a virtue of British volumetric weakness, and effectively sought to avoid future aerial emergency through relinquishing responsibility for Falkland airspace. This Agreement acknowledged the Argentine government alone had the capacity and will to exercise the

volumetric control over aerial volume. Framed as an arrangement about communications, the inventive 1971 Anglo-Argentine Agreement ceded in all but name the Islands' aerial volume to Argentina, though appearing to be about 'closer practical collaboration' between Islanders and 'their mainland neighbour' (Smith 1991, p.21). Britain assumed the role of administering power within an Argentine volumetric aerial imperium, enabling it to maintain the face-saving facade that it continued to govern the Islands. This agreement confirmed that the volumetric status quo had been altered, with British agreement.

5.4 'What if the Falklands' volume were handed over to Argentina and no one noticed?' - The 1971 Communications Agreement, and aerotectorate

This was (metaphorically) a ground-breaking agreement – the impasse of 1968, when a prospective British-Argentine sovereignty transfer had been thwarted by a combination of Falkland Islander and British parliamentary resistance, had been successfully circumnavigated. The appearance that the geopolitical outcome of 1833 still stood had largely been maintained, but had been volumetrically disrupted, Argentina recognised by Britain as having the capacity to assume aerial dominion. Whilst the 1971 Communications Agreement can be seen as a kind of undeclared Argentine-British condominium, this seems misleading; this was British cession of aerial space, the foregrounding to a subsequent formal transfer of British sovereignty over the remainder of Falkland volume. The uneven nature of the Anglo-Argentine volumetric binary is not conveyed in the diplomatic wording of the 'Joint Statement' of Communications Agreement, which effectively concealed its profound geopolitical implications:

> Special conversations were continued in Buenos Aires from the 21st until the 30th of June, 1971, about communications and movement between the Argentine mainland and the Falkland Islands by delegations of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of the Argentine Republic, the former including participants from the Islands [...] The delegates concluded that, subject to the approval of their Governments, the following measures should be adopted on the understanding that they may contribute to the process of a definitive solution to the dispute between the two Governments over the Islands which is referred to in Resolution No. 2065 (full document available at Falkland Islands Association website).

Source:http://www.fiassociation.com/shopimages/pdfs/2.%201971%20Anglo-Argentine%20Joint%20Statement%20on%20Communications.pdf

The opportunities provided by the Communications Agreement for Islanders to have new aerial transport links and connections also opened the way for Islanders to be won over to their formal absorption into the Argentine state, their bodies – and conceivably loyalties – increasingly subsumed within Argentine geopolitical control.

This clearly was a 'high point of Anglo-Argentine diplomacy' (Welsh 1995, p. 158) but not in the conventional way Welsh conceived it; its achievement lay in the 'inconspicuous' transfer of responsibility for the Islands aerial volume from Britain to Argentina, tacitly recognising that, pending a final territorial, settlement Britain's continuing role in the Falklands was conditional on Argentine co-operation.

That air provided the basis for Argentina to exercise its power over the Islands suggests that a new term is needed for conceptualising this arrangement from 1971 through to 1982; this can usefully be conveyed in the term 'aerotectorate', a(n Argentine) aerial 'protectorate'. Through the writ of the aerial pro-consul that was the resident LADE (*Lineas Aeraeas del Estado)* commander, Argentina not only exercised control from above, but on the surface too.

As Fig 5.3 shows, the Falkland Islands Company RMS *Darwin* functioned as a highly visible statement of British commitment to the Islanders and their mobilities, linking Islanders to Montevideo and the outside world. The withdrawal of the RMS *Darwin* and its sea-link to Montevideo in late 1971, meant the mobilities and communications of Islanders and those visiting/staying on the Islands now came under the de facto control of the LADE commander, including for the volumetrically disempowered British governors of the era. Falkland Islanders were aware that there was a political dimension to this envelopment within Argentine de facto control, severing the non-Argentine link with 'Monty', as Islanders affectionately called the

Uruguayan capital

> I personally think the withdrawal of the (R.M.S) *Darwin* was partially at least politically motivated […] we had a visit from (Foreign Office officials) David Scott […] (and) Fred Burrows […] Communications was the theme of their visit and communications with Argentina was the plan. This was a very unpleasant shock for us and hardly anyone willingly wanted to come and go through Argentina […] Basically its content was that Argentina was responsible for air travel to and from the Falklands and would build a temporary airstrip and Britain would maintain a shipping service which never materialised (Malcolm 2002, pp. 91-92).

Whilst not conceiving it in terms of volumetric domination, Islander Ian Strange (1981, p. 240) too was aware that there were sovereignty implications to the Communications Agreement, retrospectively calling it 'Probably (sic) the largest single step in the Falklands' history concerning the very longstanding dispute with Argentina over sovereignty'.

Fig. 5.3. R.M.S Darwin serving the Falklands prior to its 1972 withdrawal.

Source: **Panorama*, October 1966, p. 12***

With a de facto aerotectorate agreed, Argentina deployed/embedded LADE staff in Stanley, effectively operating as a shadow administration with its own officials, and significantly for the first time since 1833, a concentrated Argentine bodily presence was established in the Islands.

Another core aspect of volumetric control lay in the airwaves, a further opportunity for Argentina to establish its imprint, albeit aurally rather than visibly, on the Islands' aerial volume. Whatever the accuracy of Velma Malcolm's various claims, her account is valuable as it reflects the deep suspicions which existed amongst members of the Falklands community of Argentine, and particularly LADE' s, activities;

> Following quickly on the communications agreement Argentina certainly took communications seriously. They installed a very powerful radio transmitting office straight across the road from Gerald Cheek's house […] They used it to the full. Every little anti-Argentine incident was quickly relayed to Buenos Aires and our punishment was no mail that week […] The radio station in the LADE office was used to blot out reception of the radios in people's houses along the airway and affect their 2 metre sets (Malcolm 2002, p. 97).

Under the aerotectorate, Islanders became subjects of this Argentine volumetric imperium, their mobilities now regulated from Buenos Aires; they were required to use the 'white card', the *tarjeta provisoria*, a de facto Argentine passport for islanders. With LADE as gatekeeper to the Islands and thus final arbiter of the aerial mobilities of bodies and objects, the 'white card' – and not British passports – became the key travel document, with all flights routed to Argentina. Velma Malcolm relates the significance of the *tarjeta provisoria* as an object of bureaucratic power, one which subverted performances and practices of British sovereignty on entering and exiting Falklands volume aerially.

> Another very distasteful point of the Communications agreement was that Islanders had to travel through Buenos Aires on a White Card which was in effect an Argentine cedular and Argentines would travel here on the same documentation… in fact everyone who visited the Falklands had to travel on a White Card and many people even British ones had to have three or four days in Buenos Aires to obtain this White Card (Malcolm 2002, p. 92).

Through exercising dominion over Falkland/Malvinas air volume, LADE also acquired the power of life and death over Islanders' lives, but also brought benefits. In the event of urgent medical treatment, evacuation to an Argentine

hospital was available, such practical humanitarian assistance potentially offering Buenos Aires the opportunity to win over Islander 'hearts and minds', as this instance clearly illustrates:

> In November 1971 Matthew McMullen who was a lighthouse keeper became seriously ill with internal bleeding for about a week. The only way to save his life was to have him lifted out. It ended with an Argentine albatross flying boat coming to get him (Malcolm 2002, p. 95).

As Fig 4.6 shows, Argentine Grumann HU-16 Albatross Aircraft were able to transport people and objects between the Falklands/Malvinas and Argentina; this new mobility, in contrast with the slow RMS *Darwin*, enabled Argentina to offer a quick response in the event of medical emergency. Designed to take off and land on water, the amphibious Albatross was able to use Stanley harbour as an aqueous runway (subject to weather conditions) during this period, helping overcome the medical shortcomings of the Islands in the slow emergency era. As the 1970s developed, Argentine aerial connections with the Islands grew tighter; a temporary land airstrip in Stanley was established in 1972, and a permanent airstrip was developed from 1976.

Fig. 5.4 Argentine Grumann HU-16 Albatross Aircraft takes off in Stanley harbour Source: Haskard private photograph collection.

The 1971 Communications and subsequent 1974 YPF (Oil) Agreements awarded Argentina an extra-territorial position in the Falklands, through which control of mobilities, communications and fuel had re-cast the Islands into a

latter 20th-century volumetric equivalent of a Chinese treaty port, with air and land, rather than air and sea, as the main theatres of operation. In respect of tacitly yielding aerial and, increasingly under the aerotectorate, territorial control to Argentina, the term 'graduated sovereignty' (Ong 2000) holds some purchase; 'volumetric sovereignty' would however seem more apt as a term, as this articulates the extent to which Islanders' lives, bodies, mobilities and communications had become subsumed by the 'volume creep' of the Argentine state. For Islanders committed to the retention of British rule this development encompassed and intensified all four sub-emergencies (Socio-economic; Geopolitical; Governance; Information control); in contrast, for the British government, giving Argentina a volumetric role in the Islands offered a means to contain Buenos Aires' sovereignty ambitions, and de-intensify emergency in the Islands.

On a practical note, everyday links with Argentina were now more achievable. Some islanders more open to these connections than others, but this did not necessarily imply a continuing growth of Islander-Argentine interactions; as has been pointed out:

> a growing number of Islanders were able to have direct contact with Argentina for health, recreational and commercial purposes. Between 1972 and 1975 some 30 children attended school in Argentina, but by 1978 the numbers had declined due to the deterioration of the political and security situation in Argentina (Dodds 2002, p. 148).

Morover, LADE could inadvertently also end up reinforcing cultural ties with Britain, and become an accidental enabler of British connections. This can be seen in this recollection from Islander Steph Middleton, in which she recalled how Falklands Film Officer Joe Booth, who showed films in Stanley's Parish Hall;

> went further when the LADE air link was established by obtaining films from the UK sent by air parcel post on a three week hire. These were hectic times as the film would take one week to arrive, had to be shown every night of the week to recoup costs, then put back in the post for return to the UK. Two specials from this period were "My Fair Lady" and "The Sound of Music (Steph Middleton, account sent to author, November 23 2012, Appendix G)

In theory, the aerotectorate could serve Islander interests – offering new mobilities, trade and links with Argentina – and offer a route for Islanders

wishes about the future of the Islands to align with interests. In practice, its degree of success was conditional on prevailing Argentine political circumstances; these deteriorated from 1974 as the Junta pursued its 'Dirty War' against left wing opponents, representing a major emergency for Argentina. What is interesting is that a combination of growing connections with Argentina, and the *BBC Overseas Service* reportage of that country, seems to have had the reverse effect of that intended under the 1971 Communications Agreement, confirming Islander doubts about too close a connection. In essence, Argentine power extended into Falkland volume, rather than winning Islanders 'hearts and minds', provided a more effective means of advancing Argentine influence.

The 1974 YPF Agreement emphasised the degree to which the aerotectorate had subsumed the Falklands economically, with Argentina's YPF now becoming the sole supplier of petrol, diesel and oil to the Islands. Not only had Argentina secured the Falklands/Malvinas' aerial volume, it now monopolistically consolidated its control over provision of all energy resources facilitating mobility within the Islands. The YPF Agreement signified a further consolidation of Argentine volumetric power, exploiting what might be called the harsh reality that 'the apparent flexibility of mobile technologies such as the aeroplane are entirely dependent upon the liquidity of the resource oil' (Dennis and Urry 2009 cited in Adey 2010, p. 207). Not only did Argentina possess the objects of aerial control, it now had a monopoly on the fuel-powered FIGAS and all Islander engine-based transport. To an Islander loyalist such as Malcolm, the 1974 YPF Agreement further symbolized the ongoing erosion of British sovereignty, and only Argentine 'bad intentions' were discernible: 'Argentina didn't mind losing out on freight on fuel since it now had its greedy big hands on communications, immigration and fuel. Next step the handing over the document of sovereignty. They were firmly convinced of this' (Malcolm 2002, p. 98).

The Wilson Government's abortive 1974 condominium proposal flattered Britain's role in the Islands; the notion of joint sovereignty bore little relation to the volumetric reality of the Argentine position in the Falkland/Malvinas built

up since 1971. Similarly, the geographical range of aerotectoral power over maritime volume was extended by the *ARA (Armada de la Republica Argentina)* as it built up its power over the 'Argentine sea', as 1976's RRS *Shackleton* incident, and the establishment of an Argentine base at South Thule to the South, confirmed. The YPF Agreement also brought more Argentine personnel into the Islands. For some Islanders, this was very much a case of the 'wrong bodies', not simply because of their perceived Argentine origin, but also gender. It is striking that while Malcolm acknowledges some Falkland girls had entered relationships with Argentine males, she also notes uncritically that violent chastisement was administered by fellow Islanders to girls who fraternised in this way with Argentines.

> A huge workforce arrived to build the tank farm to hold the fuel […] With the arrival of all these men there were problems and some girls had Argentine boyfriends. Those who were opposed to Argentines being here would sometimes slap those girls with Argie boyfriends. Result – no mail that week. Once we had no mail for three weeks (Malcolm 2002, p. 98).

Given the envelopment of the Falklands/Malvinas within Argentina's 'national' volume, Lord Shackleton's 1977 re-envisioning of a future for the residual 'archipelago' of Islander settlements as a revived Falkland Islands represented a disruptive counter-proposal. In conceiving of the Falklands as having the possibility of a future as an economically viable British territory, Shackleton opened up the (then) slim possibility of British volumetric re-engagement, so posing a geopolitical challenge to the Argentine aerotectorate. The eponymous 1976 Report saw the potential for three-dimensional development of the Islands. In the maritime volume, fisheries, kelp and politically sensitive oil were cited as areas with potential, whilst the development of a long-range airfield – entirely counterproductive to Argentine aerial interests - would facilitate the usage of aerial volume, particularly for tourism. Furthermore, subdivision of Falkland Islands Company land, and the development of grasses, and roads, also offered re-imagined territorial usage as part of this three-dimensional re-invention.

Notwithstanding the Shackleton Report's disruptive impact on the volumetric status quo and subsequent Foreign Office marginalisation of it, James

Callaghan's Labour government did in fact appear to discretely re-assert, if only temporarily, some measure of (maritime) volumetric presence. Further to Argentina's 1976 occupation of Southern Thule and its growing impatience at not already having acquired formal possession of the Falklands/Malvinas, Operation Journeyman was launched in which the nuclear-powered hunter-killer submarine HMS *Dreadnought* was 'secretly' deployed to the Falklands/Malvinas' watery volume. HMS *Dreadnought's* rules of engagement included the instruction that in the event of a hostile Argentine act 'minimal force should be used to restore the status quo' (cited in Donaghy 4, p. 172) – emphasises the volumetric reality, that Britain did not seek to challenge the geopolitical reality of Argentina as dominant volumetric actor in the archipelago.

5.5 Volume, invasion and sovereignty

The Communications Agreement of 1971 had resolved which state actor controlled Falklands/Malvinas' aerial volume; the issue of the Islands' political status, however, remained unresolved, to the increasing dissatisfaction of the Argentine junta. Anglo-Argentine talks about a transfer of sovereignty, initiated in 1977, finally led to the 1980 leaseback initiative in which it was proposed that sovereignty be formally ceded to Argentina, with Britain being granted a limited lease over the islands. Leaseback was envisaged as a means to 'solve' the political issue of accommodating Argentine sovereignty aspirations and Falkland Islander 'anxieties'. Michael Freedman in *The Times* on 28 November 1980 explained its rationale:

> An outright transfer would be politically unacceptable. The leaseback idea, on similar lines as for Hong Kong, is the one Whitehall has been suggesting behind the scenes for some time. A freeze would merely defer the decision. A break-up of talks would probably lead to a confrontation *(The Times*, 28 November 1980, p. 7).

Behind these 'options', the geopolitical reality was that Britain was the state actor largely denuded of volumetric control. Consistent with the Communications Agreement/aerotectorate, leaseback meant that Argentina would continue as volumetric hegemon, the key difference being that Britain would formally recognise Argentine sovereignty. In return for this, the 'micro-

archipelago' of Falklands settlements in the Camp, three-dimensionally surrounded Argentine volume would temporarily remain under British administration. Islander resistance, and parliamentary opposition, to this initiative unsuccessfully handled by Nicholas Ridley, Foreign Office Minster for Latin America, in 1980 resulted in a freeze on sovereignty talks; Britain was thus left in a fundamentally, untenable geopolitical position, maintaining the forms of sovereignty, without the reality of volumetric control.

The submarine volumetric around the Falklands/Malvinas further demonstrated Britain's volumetric vulnerability. Owing to oil, the maritime sub-surface was acquiring greater significance, notably in the Magellanes Este block (within ninety-six miles of the Islands). Gustafson has postulated that: 'Had Argentina continued the policy of unilateral oil development that it had been following since the late seventies, it would have taken de facto sovereignty of the Falklands waters' (Gustafson 1988, p. 116). In fact, there is a strong argument that it was the other way around, because Argentina already exercised de facto volumetric sovereignty over Falklands waters (and territory), its issuance of licenses was simply a post facto 'legal' rendering of volumetric reality (and as Operation Journeyman had demonstrated even when Britain had the capability to take on Argentina, the political will to use this was still lacking).

British volumetric weakness was compounded with the decision to withdraw the militarised volumetric object of HMS *Endurance* in 1981; such British 'signals' to Argentina - which subsequently led Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse to write *'Signals of War' (1990*) - meant that when April 1982's Argentine invasion occurred, it was an unsurprising *deus ex machina*. Whilst catalyzed by the Argentine junta's emergency short-term domestic calculations, this was simply the moment when the geopolitical reality of Argentine volumetric control was dramatically revealed/performed to a global audience. This invasion represented a military consolidation of the status quo, since Argentina had increasingly been in control of the Falklands/Malvinas volume since 1971. What had been geopolitically implicit through the aerotectorate was now made explicit through this final 'three-

dimensional' securing of the Falklands against Britain, as performed by Argentine planes 'above', submarines and naval vessels 'below', and its forces on the territorial 'surface'. Residual agents of the British state such as Governor Rex Hunt, colonial officials and captured Royal Marines were expelled from the Falklands/Malvinas' volume in April 1982, signifying that the aerotectorate had now been superseded by full incorporation of the Malvinas' volume into Argentina.

Before 2 April 1982, Argentina had controlled the Falklands' volume; after 2 April 1982 Argentina (initially) controlled the Falklands' volume. In failing to take into account the (geo)political 'face' of the British government, the Argentine junta, however, had given the Thatcher government a powerful incentive to overthrow the volumetric status quo of the Communications Agreement/aerotectorate. In this sense, Argentina had itself profoundly de-stabilised the extensive volumetric control it already secured, through its overt, dramatic militarisation of volume. Control of volume was, in itself, not the immediate *casus belli* of the 1982 Conflict. Rather, it was the political wish of both Argentine and British governments to be seen to be in control of the Islands, with the former's unilateral actions in early April 1982 making the same a political imperative for the latter.

5.6 The challenge of volume

Volume challenges our geopolitical understanding. As in the case of the Falklands a volumetric perspective leads us to re-visit widely accepted understandings about a geopolitical issue, not least in relation to emergency.

Understanding the Falklands/Malvinas through volume means that the period from the mid-1960s to 1982 looks very different. This period has widely been understood as one in which, diplomacy notwithstanding, Argentina was still denied the Falklands, primarily owing to the resistance of Islanders and their domestic British political allies, the 'impasse' only broken by the 1982 Argentine invasion. In this narrative, volume is not evident; however, when volume is considered, new perspectives emerge which re-write this two-dimensional story. There are strong grounds for seeing a volumetric

emergency, but principally for Islanders opposed to engagement with Argentina.

Argentina was able to establish de facto volumetric domination over the Falklands, through the aerotectorate. To a large extent the 1971 Communications Agreement, with its three-dimensional implications, represents the point when the Falklands/Malvinas space were tacity ceded to Argentina, though the full significance of this arrangement was not immediately apparent in the Islands or in Britain.

Whilst the Communications Agreement helps us to see how volume was used/manipulated to assuage Argentine aspirations and save British face (including managing aerial insurgency) from 1971 to April 1982, it signifies a more profound meaning, namely that domination of volume, rather than simply the cipher of sovereignty, lies at the heart of this geopolitical dispute, with sovereignty simply functioning as a legal expression of volumetric control (or the contested lack of it).

For the cause of 'keeping the Falklands British', the Communications Agreement represented a particularly dangerous form of slow emergency, one more serious threat than Chalfont's efforts because it actually happened, and consequently Falkland volume was filled and altered by Argentine three-dimensional power. Islander loyalism, which Velma Malcolm's memoirs *As Ignorant as Sheep* (2002) help gives voice to, was simply unable to overcome the volumetric hegemony of objects of Argentine intrusion such as planes, transmitters and militarised bodies.

In counterproductively focusing on the formal assertion of sovereignty, Argentina's junta lost sight of the de facto reality of its power over the Falklands' volume, hence its dramatic and unnecessary militarisation of the Islands' volume on 2 April 1982. This invasion had profound three-dimensional implications; in essence, Argentina had clumsily converted a slow volumetric emergency for Islanders into an accelerated volumetric emergency for themselves. In breaking with the British, who had effectively enabled Argentine volumetric domination over the Islands since 1971, the Galtieri junta

unraveled Argentina's decade-long, slow volumetric absorption of the Islands, provoking this extra-regional state actor to reclaim the volume.

An emphasis on volume therefore provides a very different perspective on the Falklands: that the Islands were effectively 'handed over' to Argentina in 1971; that, unlike 'usual' colonial emergency, Britain did not dominate aerial volume, quite the opposite; that Argentina snatched volumetric defeat from the jaws of victory in 1982; and that control of volume, rather than sovereignty, ultimately lies at the heart of this dispute. As Weiszmann (2002) has demonstrated, applying volume (literally) adds another dimension to our understanding; similarly, interrogating the Falklands from a volume-related perspective offers profoundly different readings of the Islands' geopolitics and slow emergency in the years prior to 1982. Elden's (2013) focus on volume is thus useful in encouraging us to think three-dimensionally about geopolitics; as the case of the Falklands shows, such an approach can lead to unexpected findings and conclusions.

6 Chapter Six – Slow Emergency in the mid-1970s Falklands

6.1 Introduction

'The Falkland Islanders can not shelter behind their much beloved British flag until it drapes their coffin.' So warned *Times of London* journalist Michael Frenchman, as he exhorted the benefits of economic engagement with Argentina (*The Times,* 23 February 1977, p. 19). Through invoking the banal nationalistic image of the union flag as a potential 'patriotic shroud' in this imagined demise of the colony of the Falkland Islands, the readers of *The Times* were presented with a potent image, one which conveyed a powerful sense of unfolding emergency facing this British micro-community in what appeared to be a failing struggle for survival, one which was running out of time.

That such a warning should emerge from the pages of *The Times*' principal, and often supportive, writer on Falkland matters is particularly significant, attesting not only to the Falklands' continuing decline, but the continued erosion of hope after the Shackleton Report, released in July 1976, was subsequently disregarded by Whitehall. Far from delivering any 'escape velocity' to a future without socio-economic emergency and absorption into Argentina, the Report, or rather its non-implementation, had simply become another element of the Falklands' slow emergency, with its attendant chronopolitical pressures.

Slow emergency provides an important framing for understanding developments in the Falkland Islands of the mid-1970s, both empirically and theoretically. As a contemporary term to describe and manage representations of British colonial crises such as in Malaya and Kenya, 'emergency' holds a special, indeed unique, empiric purchase as the preferred explanatory/obfuscatory British official word of choice to simplify and manage serious colonial turmoil. Theoretically, the term 'emergency' is also highly relevant, with the work of Adey and Anderson (2011), Neocleus (2006), Aradau (2012) et al on emergency providing new conceptual understandings,

with a Virilio (1977) and Nixon (2011) inspired speed-related framing adding a further dimension to emergency.

This chapter seeks to explore this slow emergency in relation to the Falklands and uses socio-economic developments immediately before and after, the Shackleton report as its empirical basis. It seeks to bring together ideas of speed and time in relation to emergency. Regarding the former, Rob Nixon laid particular emphasis on slow violence, explaining it in these terms:

> By slow violence I mean a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is not viewed as violence at all. It is this idea – of speed, and particularly the lack of it – that I seek to relate to emergency, where it is temporally drawn out, less obvious but nonetheless potentially destructive (if not averted) (Nixon 2011, p. 2).

Inbuilt in slow emergency are the political implications of time, the availability of which is determined by the speed of a given emergency. Virilio's chapter 'The State of Emergency' from the seminal *Speed and Politics* (1977, p. 147-67) placed emphasis on speed as a determining factor in civilisational struggle, with 'the war of time' superseding 'wars of space' in significance. His assessment was that: 'The transition from *the state of siege* of wars of space to *the state of emergency* of the war of time took only several decades' (Virilio 1977, p. 157).

Such an emphasis on the importance of speed for emergency is important in unpacking the Falklands dispute; indeed, until the dramatic new speed brought to Falkland chronopolitics by the *deus ex machina* of the 1982 Argentine invasion, there had been a 'long game' played out through slow emergency, with a 'cast' of Islander, British and Argentine state actors. Klinke has argued that:

> Questions of prediction, historical analogy, and even periodisation have played key roles in the analysis of geopolitical discourse, but the many references to geopolitics as the politics of space alone inhibit a full appreciation of how these questions are chronopolitical (2012, p. 675).

It is in this spirit that this chapter seeks to consider slow emergency, that is, as a factor of both spatial and temporal political significance. I see slow emergency operating as a less 'obvious', subtler form of spatial and temporal struggle, with its effects cumulatively manifested. In combating slow emergency, the Islanders and their lobby allies faced not only the geopolitical aspirations of the Argentine government, but strategic chronopolitical pressures from those British diplomats and politicians who prioritised accommodating Argentine, over Islander, wishes. As this chapter will evidence, the Falklands of the mid-1970s were, in essence, a 'failing colony', and it appeared only a matter of time until this geopolitical domino would, through attritional slow emergency, be toppled by Argentina.

As will also be unpacked, the logics of prevention and preemption were vital in this struggle for the future of the Falklands, and can be summarized in these terms:

> At the core of the chronopolitics of prevention, we find a striving for normalization and conservation of the present vis-à-vis dangerous futures. In contrast, the chronopolitics of preemption are geared towards a reformation, if not even a revolution of the present (Kaiser 2015, p. 166).

Applied to the Falklands context, prevention would allow slow emergency to continue as the norm, so avoiding a dangerous future of Anglo-Argentine confrontation, whilst pre-emption would involve the correction of slow emergency to save the Falklands from a future of socio-economic collapse. In essence, applying Klinke's framing (2015), slow emergency left un-pre-empted would inexorably lead to Islander (chronopolitical/geopolitical) defeat, as there would be a moment when the British government would quite literally 'call time' on a no longer viable Falkland Islands colony, to Argentina's benefit. Pre-emption – or however much of this as Islanders and their allies could muster – therefore offered a means to resist, if not reverse, slow emergency, and 'buy time'.

6.2 Slow emergency experienced in the mid-1970s Falklands

Nixon-inspired (2011) 'slow emergency' is thus used in this chapter to articulate the speed of the parlous and deteriorating state of the Falklands socio-economic existence in the mid-1970s, both prior to and during the Shackleton-French era. The atrophying state of the Islands by the mid-1970s can be seen as widely pervading Island life, and a major causal factor in emigration, bringing into question the colony's survival. As will be seen, it largely fell to external observers with expert, political or journalistic backgrounds to summarise of the Islands' predicaments and to frame characteristics of slow emergency. Elements common to these narrators of slow emergency, ranging from the Argentine Dr. Ronald K. Crosby to the British Lord Shackleton, were that they invariably Caucasian males, usually (though, as journalist Ian Jack shows, not always) older, and as a general rule undertook a 'fact-finding' visit to the Islands in person. Everyday characterisations of elements of slow emergency also feature in the pages of the *Falkland Islands Times*; both male and female Islanders such as Ron Reeves and Margaret Davidson respectively, addressed aspects of these.

Contemporary observers commented at length on the deterioration of quotidian life in the Falklands. As a case in point, Malvinas scholar Dr. Ronald K. Crosby, an Anglo-Argentine rancher from Patagonia, and author of *El Reto de las Malvinas* ('The Falkland Islands challenge') (1968) was interviewed for a 26 November 1974 article entitled 'MALVINAS: Will we have to invade them?', by the influential mass circulation Argentine current affairs magazine *Panorama* (full translation is in Appendix F). Notwithstanding the attention-catching nature of the article's headline, itself raising the chronopolitically and geopolitically threatening prospect of an 'invasion emergency' for Islanders and the British government, Crosby himself offered a detailed summary and overview of the socio-economic conditions in the Islands based on field research he had undertaken there, in which he effectively identified key features of the slow emergency.



Fig. 6.1.* Panorama *magazine, 26 November 1974, 'Malvinas special' – ' Will we have to invade them?'

Source: Original copy

Before addressing the contents of this article, it is important to consider the visual framing that *Panorama* magazine, of 26 November 1974 (Fig 6.1), offered to its domestic Argentine audience. The magazine's colour cover is devoted exclusively to a powerful cartographic representation of the Islands, so articulating the importance of the Malvinas geopolitically. As can be seen, the Malvinas Islands are given an imagined prominence through raised vertical lines around the Islands' littoral, designed to convey an impression of height and salience, so providing a striking three-dimensional representation of the Islands for the magazine's cover.

Adding to this dramatized three-dimensional visual impact, and highlighting for readers the inhabited geo-strategic site that would need to be seized through invasion, is a photograph of the Islands' capital, Stanley [or Puerto Rivero], looking immediately towards Port William sound. This photographic view of this geographically small part of East Falkland is enlarged to cover the entirety of both East and West Falkland, attesting to the significance attached in *Panorama*'s representation to the Falklands capital, the symbolic and quotidian seat of the Falklands British colonial government – and key geopolitical target for an Argentine invasion. Significantly, too, the three-dimensional map of the Islands rises out of what appears to be the blue waters of 'the Argentine Sea', with the words 'MALVINAS: HABRA QUE INVADIRLAS?' starkly placed below them; this headline is written in white capital letters, and so Argentina's national colours of blue and white are powerfully referenced through the combination of blue sea and white lettering, emphasising the patriotic nature of the objective of bringing the Islands under the Argentine flag.

Panorama sought to popularly disseminate the research of Dr. Ronald K. Crosby; senior reporter Rodolfo del Gallo del Catillo pointed out to its many readers that Crosby's analyses were based on significant research and reflection, noting that: 'His observations, product of seven-weeks staying in the archipelago, are summarized in a book called *El Reto de las Malvinas* ('The Falkland Islands challenge')' (del Catillo in *Panorama,* 26 November 1974, p. 34). Del Catillo proceeded to ask Crosby the following questions:

> *Del Gallo del Catillo:* What type of population is living in the islands?
>
> *Crosby:* A decreasing population. In 1946 there were 2239 people. Currently there are no more than 1.900 inhabitants. In the 60s the decrease declined to 30 Falklanders per year.
>
> *Del Gallo del Catillo:* What causes this exodus?
>
> *Crosby:* Mainly the lack of communication, the poor level of education and training, the lack of opportunities to progress in work and the inability to acquire lands. The only port from the whole South American continent they have been in touch with for decades was Montevideo, 1,600 kilometres away.

> The lack of inner routes and the *Estrecho de San Carlos* (Falkland Sound), which divides the main islands, increases the feeling of isolation. There is no secondary education and children between 5-15 years old receive a very poor level of education, in fact below our Primary School. Therefore, important job positions are given to native English or Scottish people, with a higher level of education. There are also very few entertainment opportunities. I think due to these factors, isolation and lack of incentives, a very serious drinking problem arose. Added to the negative factors just mentioned, this exerts a very unfavourable influence upon the home life, resulting in a very high divorce rate' (Crosby in *Panorama,* 26 November 1974, p. 34).

Crosby's overview of socio-economic problems, such as emigration, isolation, lack of education and opportunities, outline a number of critical aspects of the slow emergency, a beleaguered Islands community under chronopolitical pressure that was gradually but inexorably wasting away, in which depopulation, decline and deterioration were pervasive, attritionally shaping the affective experience of Island life and responses to that, such as drinking and divorce.

Opportunities were highly limited in what was increasingly becoming a 'zombie' colony; Governor Rex Hunt recalled being told by Dick Baker, Chief Secretary, that only three factors that made the Islands function: 'FIG, FIC and DIY' (Hunt 1980, p. 31)'. This 'story of neglect' is effectively an 'anatomy' of the Falklands' slow emergency, with the colony facing a future of terminal, drawn-out decline through the effects of progressive degradation rather than a fast *coup de main* from the Argentine military, such as in the Fast Falklands Emergency of 1982 on 2 April 1982.

Crosby's perceptions closely align with those of British oil expert Richard Johnson, which shed further light on the slow emergency. Similar to Crosby, Johnson had spent several weeks in the Islands in 1976, in this case as part of Shackleton's team of experts. Published soon after his visit, Johnson's article 'The Future of the Falklands' (1977) likewise outlined socio-economic features of the colony's slow emergency which, over time, threatened its very survival:

> One hesitates before using the word 'survival' […] as experience has shown in the Highlands and Islands of Scotland in the face of migration and a weakening economic base, that communities have remained after predicted

> 'survival' thresholds were reached. However, the circumstances are rather different for a group of islands 7,500 miles away from the mother country, which must support their own government of much wider responsibilities than those of UK authorities, and where a population trend leading to the continuous shrinking of the proportion of indigenous islanders (currently about 80%) must eventually colour the attitude of a government defending the sovereign wishes of Falklanders against outside claims. For it is among kalpers that migration has been most marked. The position has now been reached with the islands cannot afford to lose many of the present and next generation of young Falklanders (Johnson 1977, p. 225).

Depopulation, decline and deterioration in the colony feature strongly in Johnson's summary of the Islands' drawn out socio-economic disintegration, and similar to Crosby, feature strongly as elements of slow emergency in the Falklands. Johnson's report highlights particular challenges to the socio-economic viability of the Islands, laying emphasis on the current and future difficulties of sustaining wide-ranging government functions for a dwindling micro-population. In decoding Johnson's observation that continuing depopulation 'must colour the attitude' of the British government, the chronopolitical and geopolitical implications of slow emergency for the survival of the Falkland Islands as a British community, and territory, are clear – unless this was reversed, the Islands' future as a 'British space' was now on 'borrowed time', that is, the chronopolitical would determine the geopolitical. As will be seen, slow emergency within the Islands was composed of diverse elements, not least anxiety about the future, depopulation and neglect; these elements functioned with different intensities as they ebbed and flowed (for instance the temporary breakdown in FIGAS services mentioned in this Chapter), but the overall 'direction of travel' of slow emergency was a corrosive hollowing out of the Islands as a British geopolitical entity.

Colin Phipps, Labour MP for Dudley West from 1974 to 1979, also an oil expert and geologist, visited the Islands in 1975; this subsequently led him to pose the question 'What future for the Falklands?' as the title of his Fabian Society Tract (1977), again highlighting the centrality of depopulation for our understanding of what slow emergency in the Falklands involved. The cartographic representation of the Islands on the pamphlet's cover is itself a revealing source, and clearly articulates the Anglo-centric lens through which

Phipps viewed the Islands. The Islands are described solely as the Falkland Islands with no acknowledgement of their Spanish name designation as las Islas Malvinas. The sense of geographical separateness from South America is emphasised through their cartographic golden shading, distinct from the white of Argentine and Chilean territory (with the golden line of the Argentine-Chilean border excepted).

It is interesting too to see how this map sets the Islands in a localised, regional setting, rather than in a wider international framing; only Argentine and Chilean Patagonia are present, to the exclusion of the rest of their respective national territories, with Uruguay and Brazil similarly absent. The inclusion of the term 'Scotia Sea' (rather than 'Argentine Sea') provides a reassuringly British geographical framing for the Islands, as does the use of the name Stanley for the Falklands' main centre of population as opposed to the Argentine designation Puerto Rivero (later changed to Puerto Argentino in the 1982 Conflict). In this way, the Islands are effectively made other from South America, a distinct insular offshore space, and whilst the map acknowledges that Argentina and Chile are (unlike Britain) geographically proximate, a sense of offshore British-ness is cartographically conveyed. In this way, the map on Phipps' report reflects its contents, namely a focus on the Falkands Islands as a British entity, albeit a precarious one with an imperiled existence.

Phipps (1977, pp. 2-3) referred to:

> the tiny population, over half of whom live in Stanley. The rest is dispersed among 33 widely separated settlements known collectively as the Camp. There are two characteristics of the population which mainly strike the visitor (a) the almost feudal nature of the social structure - especially in the settlements and (b) the remarkable way in which such a tiny population manages to sustain the infrastructure of modern society, running everything from schools, hospitals and a publicly employed civil service of more than 150 people, to an airport, radio telephone system and a power station. All of the principal social problems, especially drink and divorce, arise from the isolation of a small tightly integrated community. It is the increasing impact of the outside world upon this community which is now breeding the most urgent social problem – emigration.

Notwithstanding Phipps' rather sympathetic and generous understanding of

the challenges faced in the Falklands, the logic of depopulation was remorseless. Unless the haemorrhaging of population was pre-emptively staunched and reversed, there was little, if any, socio-economic – or British – future for a demographically hollowed out colony affected by social dysfunction, in which emigration by those who chose to leave 'for something better' amounted to a form of self-deportation.

The chronopolitical logic was clear: progressively, over time, the slow emergency of attritional socio-economic conditions was effecting a demographic clearance of this contested insular space, ultimately paving the way for an Anglo-Argentine territorial settlement, no longer complicated by a 'viable' Falkland population. Unlike in the Indian Ocean in 1968, no Diego Garcia-type forcible deportation would therefore be necessary to 'clear' the Islands in the 'British South Atlantic Territory' of the Falkland Islands, and unlike in the 18th-century Scottish Highlands, effecting a 'Falkland Clearance' would require no military compulsion by Britain – or Argentina.

The potency of slow emergency over time lay in the cumulative effects of deterioration over time, and further, future socio-economic deterioration was also widely anticipated, offering grounds for chronopolitical hope or apprehension, depending on one's perspective, of a Falkland Clearance. Argentine Foreign Minister from 1973-75 Alberto Juan Vignes believed that 'the Islands' economy […] was getting worse steadily. There did not seem to be a real future there' (Alberto Juan Vignes in Charlton 1989, p. 47), with the Islanders' socio-economic plight offering hope to Argentine irredentism. For many Islanders profound apprehension about the Falklands' socio-economic viability coalesced with geopolitical uncertainty regarding the Islands' future, ensuring the continuing appeal of emigration. Islanders Joan and Terry Spruce articulated such fears in an article in the *Charrington Review* of 1976 (the house journal of Charrington Industrial Holdings, the then parent company of the Falkland Islands Company), when they explained:

> Lots of people do actually worry whether it's worth planting their gardens this year or painting their houses" says Joan Spruce, a fifth-generation Islander. "It

> might be handed over next week". And her husband Terry says "we get the feeling that the Government are trying to force the islanders to say "alright we'll go with the Argentine", and the Islanders are very much against this. They want full contact with Britain, to live their own life, but now they think that the British government are selling us out – 90% of the Islanders believe this (*Charrington's Review* 1976, cited in *Falkland Islands Times,* 7 December 1976, p. 11).

In using the phrase 'force the islanders' Terry Spruce was articulating the perception that socio-economic conditions were being exploited by the British authorities against Islanders whose community was running out of time, effectively a strategic chronopolitical weaponisation of slow emergency.

Another key actor, the Falkland Islands Company, also contributed to slow emergency; aalthough employer and provider for many Islanders, the Company's economic monopolization and quotidian domination of life in the Islands meant that, over time, it had also effectively functioned as a 'recruiting sergeant' for emigration. The limited opportunities to function economically outside of the domain of the Falkland Islands Company are set out by Crosby. When asked by *Panorama's* Rodolfo del Gallo del Catillo:

> "Is there a Monopoly managed by the Falkland Islands Company?", he responded: "Doubtlessly, there is. Not only because they own 46 per cent of the territory, but also they exert a real monopoly over the trading of the Islands. From 31 farms existent in the islands, only 4 of them do not sell their production through this company. Besides, this company sells the farms most of the supplies arriving to the archipelago, as well as what they sell at the two convenience stores they own at Stanley Port" (*Panorama,* 26 November 1974, p. 34).

The over-concentration of economic power in the hands of the Falkland Islands Company was similarly noted by Jean Austin who observed in her diary that:

> the Falkland Islands Company still enjoys the monopoly[…] in particular in Camp where[…] farm hands went to the Company store for everything, including postage stamps. Stanley residents had to eat whatever the Company thought fit to provide, a complaint of present day Stanley (Austin 2010, p. 122).

The Company existed to make money for shareholders, and was not a philanthropic enterprise; in *The Sunday Times Magazine's* 'Report on the

Falkland Islands and their uncertain future' (*Sunday Times Magazine,* 13 August 1978, p. 14), Ian Jack presented the Falkland Islands Company as a monopolistic, stultifying and exploitative entity; the title of the piece with its reference to a chronopolitically 'uncertain future' conveys a powerful sense of slow emergency. Interestingly, in referring to the phrase 'held fast', he cites an historic association from 1896 of the word 'fast' with the Falklands, albeit with a different meaning, in which the phrase 'held fast' actually implies the prevention of speed. As presented in Jack's rendering, the extended process of slow emergency had been impeding development in the Falklands for nearly a century, with the cumulative consequences very evident.

> Today it owns about half the total land area, more than 1.3 million acres. Even in 1896 the *Daily Telegraph* was moved to describe the Falklands as 'a strangled economy, fast in the grip of the land monopolist', and some in the Falklands would say the position is little changed today. The men of the Camp live in tied Company houses on Company land. They shop in the Company store for goods delivered by Company ships, and have bills deducted from Company wages. Many of them use the Company as a bank […] By means of directorship and shareholdings, and by owning the only means of transport and marketing, the Falkland Islands Company extends its influence over the islands' few other landlords. For better or worse, the Falklands are Company Islands […] This fact breeds apathy. There is little local enterprise in the Falklands and their recent history is peppered with little projects, the bright ideas of outsiders which have met failures; canning factories, mink farms and the like (*Sunday Times Magazine,* 13 August 1978, p. 14).

Jack's dissection of the Falkland Islands Company's impact on the Falklands unpacks what the slow emergency meant there; an economically dependent and disadvantaged population with little stake, or opportunity of a stake, in the betterment of their lives, or of the Islands, in which there was – as the contemporary 1977 Sex Pistols song 'God save the Queen' opined – 'No Future'.

The logic behind Jack's narration of the Falklands as 'Company Islands' and the claim that this bred apathy is clear(*Sunday Times Magazine,* 13 August 1978, p. 14).; this was an economically disempowered population, in which Islanders had to be resigned to their temporally drawn out fate, unless they opted for a 'future' by emigrating overseas. In either instance, slow emergency applied through, over time, futures for Islanders of either further demoralisation of the

population, or greater emigration. Royal Marine commander Ewan Southby Taylor was highly critical of what he saw as the corrosive effect of this unequal relationship, and claimed that 'The Islanders' greatest mistake was to accept a decline in self-respect, but this in turn was based on the lack of investment due to a poor return on their GNP – and for that most blamed the FIC' (Southby-Taylor 2003, p. 45).

An atmosphere of disempowerment and apprehension for those living in the Islands function as a vital part of the Slow Falklands Emergency, with the prevailing uncertainty leading to corrosive outcomes, notably depopulation. An insight into the quotidian atmospherics of work in the Islands is provided by a letter from Ron Reeves to the *Falkland Islands Times*, written from Hill Cove on 17 March 1977, in which he laid bare the implications of an imbalanced power relationship between Islanders and their employers:

> There are in the colony three main outlets for employment; the camp, which encompasses all farms, Falkland Islands government and the Falkland Islands Company for town, and a few independents. This has some bearing on the situation as assuming you have a desire to see reforms made in the camp then it is of no use chasing from one farm to another as they all have a tendency to have the same basic problems. If you fall out with the government, you're left with the F.I.C, assuming you haven't crossed swords them in the camp, which then leaves you little choice (Ron 'Pseudo' Reeves in *Falkland Islands Times,* 14 April 1977, p. 4).

Limited opportunities for work, initiative and self-expression emerge as important aspects of slow emergency, with its practical effect – emigration – the result:

> I'm quite sure that all of these main sources of employment, have at some stage or other crossed swords with a "good man". There usually being no give and take on the employer's side, the result – emigration and many a good man has left the company for good […] Employees still retain the old-fashioned Victorian view of "if you don't like it, get out" rather than examine the trouble of anguish to try to involve a solution (Ron 'Pseudo' Reeves in *Falkland Islands Times,* 14 April 1977, p. 4).

An anachronistic Falklands is depicted by Ron Reeves ('Victorian'), which aligns with the earlier description of 'almost feudal' (Phipps 1977, p. 2) in conveying a sense that these were backward-looking, temporally left behind Islands; whichever of these two chronopolitical framings is applied, it is clear

that contemporaries perceived the experience of slow emergency as a present belonging to the past, offering little – if not no – future. What is quite remarkable is that the way the Falkland Islands Company presented itself to the British public as a progressive actor, which supported Islanders' independence and resilience, in contrast to the anachronistic dependency and demoralisation that resulted from experiencing the effects of slow emergency 'on the ground'. In a post Shackleton Report advertorial (Fig. 6.2) about the Falklands in *The Times* on 26 August 1976 – entitled 'They may be small but they stand on their own two feet'– Charringtons, as owners of the Falkland Islands Company, informed readers;

They may be small, but they stand on their own feet

Many readers of the Times may well think that even if the Falkland Islands received large subsidies from the home government, it would still be our duty to give them all the support they need to keep their way of life, and their independence from their powerful neighbour.

But the fact is that the islands are not a "grant-in-aid" colony, and they make a very healthy contribution to the sterling area's balance of trade, with the £2m worth of superb wool they send us every year–most of it to be re-exported. They are entirely self-supporting.

This is due chiefly to their own enterprise and efforts. But Charringtons are happy to think that they may be of some help. The Falkland Islands Company is a Charringtons subsidiary. It is responsible for transporting and marketing the wool crop; and if this were not done efficiently, the island's economy would indeed be sickly.

The Company is by far the biggest employer on the islands, and it tries to discharge the responsibilities which this entails–not just as regards conditions of employment, but in sponsoring social activities and community efforts, and helping the islanders to keep in touch with friends and relations in Britain.

It is pledged to do its best to see that Britain does not let them down.

Charringtons Industrial Holdings Ltd.
Charringtons House, Bishop's Stortford, Herts.
SOLID FUEL · FUEL OILS · BUILDERS MERCHANTS · VEHICLE PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION · TRANSPORT WAREHOUSING AND SHIPPING SERVICES SHEEP FARMING · NORTH SEA OIL SERVICES · COMPUTER SERVICES

Fig. 6.2. Charrington's 'advertorial'

Source: **The Times, *26 August 1977, p. 10***

> he Company is by far the biggest employer on the islands, and it tries to discharge the responsibilities which this entails – not just as regards conditions of employment, but is sponsoring social activities and community efforts, and helping the islanders to keep in touch with friends and relations in Britain. It is pledged to do its best to see that Britain does not let them down.

This representation of the Falkland Islands Company as beneficently operating for the wider good of the Islands, patriotically upholding the 'wool man's burden' in the South Atlantic, stood in stark contrast to the reality of slow emergency in the Falklands.

It is interesting to note how the Islands are cartographically represented, in cloud – or wool – like form, helping foster an atmosphere for readers of reassurance. It is also noticeable how, in the the advertorial, the Falkland Islands Company provides 'cover' for the British government over the lack of subsidies to the failing colony, instead laying emphasis on the Islands' economic benefits to the inhabitants of Britain. The narrative moves from the counter-factual 'Even if the Falkland Islands received large subsidies […]' to the factual 'But they are not a 'grant-in-aid' colony, and they make a very healthy contribution to the sterling area's balance of trade, with the £2m worth of superb wool they send us each year [...] They are entirely self-supporting'. It is, indeed, hard to reconcile this advertorial with the grinding reality of life in the Falklands 'slow emergency'.

Crosby offered a more accurate assessment of the socio-economic decline of the Islands under the duumvirate of the British government and the Falkland Islands Company; he argued that that Islands were, in fact, being run down and asset stripped: 'It becomes harder every day to re-float the economy of the archipelago, and they are sinking it before surrendering power to us' (*Panorama,* 26 November 1974, p. 34). Interestingly this suggests that chronoeconomic considerations ('exploit the Islands while one can') preceded chronopolitical ones, such as 'accepting the inevitable' and yielding to Argentina's sovereignty demands, albeit according to Crosby over an economically denuded archipelago.

Whilst the Falkland Islands Company had a captive market in the Islands, the

geopolitical and chronopolitical uncertainty about the Islands' future militated against investment both from the Company itself, and any other economic actor that might seek to challenge its monopoly. Reflecting on the atmospherics of economic and social ossification over the years prior to the 1982 conflict, Joan and Terry Spruce, in a research interview for this chapter, recalled the apprehension and stagnation that made up slow emergency:

> Joan Spruce: Why would you invest in a country where you've got no idea what you're going to end up as? […]
>
> Terry Spruce: […] the social structure was Victorian! What were we watching the other night? [...] Downton Abbey! *(laughter)*
>
> (Terry and Joan Spruce, 23 October 2012, recorded interview with author)

The reference to 'Victorian' again reinforces the sense of the Falklands as anachronistic, in many ways less a relic of the British Empire than a splinter of 19th-century Britain 'out of time' enduring in the South Atlantic, where the Falkland present was the British past. In this reading the Falklands can be seen to resemble more a domestic provincial backwater than a colonial outpost.

Yet, as this section has sought to establish through drawing on a range of contemporary observers – Islanders, British and Argentine – there was little, or no, future for Islanders. Slow emergency was, over time, reducing the Falklands to the chronopolitical point of non-viability, effectively a 'slow clearance'. The combination of demoralising atmosphere and outcomes underscored Slow Emergency's potential to remove the Falklands as an irritant in Anglo-Argentine relations, this ongoing socio-economic disintegration progressively putting Islanders under chronopolitical pressure.
The eventual elimination of the Islanders as a non-state actor in the dispute would allow the British and Argentine state actors to definitively resolve this geopolitical dispute. We now turn to the Shackleton Report and its role in addressing, but eventually becoming subsumed by, the Falklands' slow emergency, with Whitehall prioritising the logic of prevention over pre-emption.

6.3 Slow Emergency in the Shackleton-French era: the Shackleton Report

The Shackleton Report of July 1976 provides a diagnosis of the nature of the slow emergency that affected the Falklands in the years prior to 1982 but rather than helping pre-empt its continuation, it became a factor compounding it. Its significance lies not simply in its findings, but in what these reveal about constituent elements of slow emergency – the sub-emergencies which collectively make up slow emergency – as well as in the atmosphere it generated in the Islands at the time, and how the non-implementation of its recommendations deepened the chronopolitical pressures of slow emergency. Indeed, the reluctance of the British government to act on the Shackleton Report recommendations also reflected its clear role as a major contributory factor in slow emergency.

In terms of mapping out the key areas of slow emergency as experienced in the Falkland Islands context, a framework of constituent elements can be constructed (as per Table 6.1 below). It should be noted that this is intended to be a flexible, rather than fixed, framework of constituent elements. Whilst sub-emergencies 1, 2 and 3 (socio-economic, geopolitical and governance) are very likely to be widely applicable as constituent elements in other empirical cases, sub-emergencies particularly specific to the area of study in question are to be expected, as per sub-emergency 4.

In the event that an emergency materialises, the speed of emergency over time can be expected to be in flux, accelerating or decelerating as determined by the unfolding of the constituent elements that function as sub-emergencies. Slow emergency in the Falklands or elsewhere can be seen as a supra-emergency incorporating sub-emergencies, the latter contributing to overall acceleration or deceleration according to their respective impact at any point in time, thus determining its overall speed and chronopolitical significance. Acceleration is taken as when a sub-emergency, either individually or in sync with another sub-emergency, speeds up the rate of decline socio-economically and/or geopolitically; deceleration will be taken to mean the

opposite. Whether acceleration or deceleration occurs, the impact is felt directly in the Falklands' strategic chronopolitics, with the speed of emergency providing less or more time for actors to pre-empt or prevent envisaged future outcomes. In applying the logics of pre-emption and prevention to the respective sub-emergencies, Islanders and the British authorities can be seen as having distinctly contrasting perceptions of the present and future (see Table 6.1 below).

Constituent elements of the Falklands' slow emergency (as experienced by Falkland Islanders and British authorities)	*Sub-emergency* *Descriptor:*	*Logic - from the Falkland Islander perspective*	*Logic - from the British authorities' perspective*
Sub-emergency 1: Socio-economic	*Coping with ongoing socio-economic decline. Attitude to present/future.*	*Pre-emption (to correct the failing present and secure a future of socio-economic renewal).*	*Prevention (to avoid the Islands socio-economic rejuvenation and allow slow emergency to run its future course).*
Sub-emergency 2: Geopolitical	*Containing/managing Argentine pressure for the eventual cession of the Falklands.*	*Pre-emption (to correct the present in which the Falklands faced the prospect of Argentine absorption and secure a future British-backed geopolitical existence).*	*Prevention (to avoid adding to present Anglo-Argentine tension over the Falklands and allow slow emergency to run its future course).*
Sub-emergency 3: Governance	*Corrosion of trust between the British authorities and Falkland Islanders.*	*Pre-emption (to correct the present in which Islander faith in the governance of British authorities was strained, and*	*Prevention (to avoid Islanders undermining present official governance of the Islands, and secure a future*

		secure a future of Islander-British trust).	*in which conditioned Islanders co-operated with British authorities).*
Sub-emergency 4: Information control	*Controlling dissemination of information to Islanders/ censorship over time.*	*Pre-emption (to correct the present in which Islanders access to news was officially managed, and secure a future of open information).*	*Conditioning (to avoid Islanders having access to politically sensitive information, and secure a future in which Islanders were conditioned to accepting official control of information flow).*

Table 6.1 Constituent elements of the Falklands' slow emergency with logics

For Islanders, their present and past had been shaped by slow emergency, and pre-emption was required to avoid slow emergency determining – and ultimately eradicating – the Islands' future as a British geopolitical entity. In contrast, slow emergency offered a much more comfortable future for Whitehall, offering as it did a means to extricate itself from this temporal/colonial South Atlantic relic, achieve improved Anglo-Argentine relations, and remove the Islands as an anachronistic problem for future British foreign policy to manage. These different logics – 'instruments we choose to modify the present, namely, normalizing procedures in the first case versus reforming procedures in the second' (Kaiser 2015, p. 171) – reflect the vital importance of influencing the strategic chronopolitics for the Falklands' future, with the Shackleton report a key episode in this.

The origin of the Shackleton report can be traced back to British Prime minster James Callaghan who, in commissioning the report, preventatively envisaged it as a future means to economically develop the Falkland sub-region, to contain Argentina through economic engagement and to demonstrate to Islanders the benefits of co-operating with Buenos Aires; in so

doing, sub-emergencies 1 (socio-economic) and 2 (geopolitical) could be addressed, the logic of prevention from the official British perspective being to 'buy time' to resolve the dispute with Argentina satisfactorily.

> The purpose was to explore the possibilities of economic development in the Falkland Islands and southwest Atlantic, in a way in which we could engage the cooperation of the Argentine government. Throughout the whole period I had anything to do with this, my assessment was that, provided the Argentines' believed that we were willing to keep discussing these matters, and to find various formulae, that would enable them to satisfy their public opinion, then the issue would not come to a head. It was insoluble. There was *no* solution that could satisfy both sides […] So, not in any attempt to dodge the issue, but to try to create conditions in which the Argentine government could feel satisfied, it was this that led me to propose the Shackleton Commission (Callaghan in Freedman 2005, p. 45-46).

What became known as the Shackleton Commission potentially offered a way to manage slow emergency, containing an irredentist Argentina over time through developing economic collaboration, with the socio-economic benefits accruing to the Falklands from this illustrating the 'wisdom' of engaging with Argentina to the Islanders. It offered the possibility of creating a future 'preventative architecture' for a geopolitical resolution of the dispute. Subsequently, and counter-productively to Callaghan's aims, the report produced by this Commission, under Shackleton's auspices, effectively evolved into a schema to pre-empt and disrupt deepening slow emergency in the Falklands with only a marginal role for Argentina; in the report's emphasis on sub-emergency 1 (socio-economic) rather than 2 (geopolitical), Callaghan's ambition of creating 'conditions' (Callaghan in Freedman 2005, p.46) to satisfy the Argentine government had become compromised and pre-empted. This development will be unpacked more fully later in the chapter, but it is important to draw attention to the implications of how slow emergency was addressed. Any deceleration of slow emergency which subsequently resulted from implementing Shackleton's recommendations would implicitly function as a 'reforming' chronopolitical and geopolitical act which would, if only for a limited temporal respite, perpetuate the territorial status quo – to the benefit of Islanders, and Argentina's disadvantage.

Left unaddressed, however, the corrosive decline of slow emergency on the Falklands offered a straight path to the fulfillment of Argentine irredentist

hopes, the resulting non-viability of the islands as a British colony anticipating an Argentine geopolitical future. It is hardly surprising therefore that the Shackleton commission and its work became a source of Anglo-Argentine geopolitical tension rather than cooperation, even before its recommendations were announced.

The impending Shackleton Commission was announced in an October 1975 *Times* article, entitled 'Lord Shackleton for Falklands' (*The Times,* 17 October 1975, p. 6), in which correspondent Roger Berthoud revealed that an 'economic and fiscal' survey of the Falkland Islands had been commissioned by the Callaghan government, which was an implicit acknowledgement of the cumulative impact of slow emergency through past and present economic weakening (sub-emergency 1):

> The move reflects British concern at the weakening of the islands' economy […] The British Government's aim remains to balance its moral obligations to the islanders, who enjoy vigorous support at Westminster, with cooperation with Argentina and Britain's broad national interest on an issue where it has few friends (*The Times,* 17 October 1975, p. 6).

Whilst this 'weakening of the islands' economy' was said to be a concern for the British government, the reference to Anglo-Argentine 'cooperation' was code for managing Argentine behaviour, namely sub-emergency 2 (geopolitical).

The following day's editorial in *The Times* endorsed this tackling of slow emergency; emphasising the chronopolitical dimension of the Shackleton Commission initiative, it noted that whilst such an initiative should have been adopted in previous years, it would now help ensure a less troubled future:

> The Government's initiative in dispatching Lord Shackleton and a small team of wool, oil and fishing experts to examine the prospects for diversifying the one-crop economy of the Falkland Islands is the more welcome for being several years overdue. A bad year for wool – still the Islands' sole exportable product – and the likelihood of renewed pressure from the Islanders' effective Westminster lobby no doubt contributed to the decision. For once, it was decided to forestall trouble, rather than react to it (*The Times,* 18 October 1975, p. 13).

Yet contrary to *The Times*' expectations, this initiative accelerated rather than decelerated emergency in the Falkland region through sub-emergency 2 (geopolitical) intensifying Anglo-Argentine confrontation, the opposite to the future cooperation the British government sought, compromising the logic of prevention. The Shackleton initiative was interpreted by Isabelita Peron's government as a cynical British attempt to advance their interests at Argentine expense – Argentine historian Bullrich articulated this perception in these terms:

> From 1975, faced with Argentina's deteriorating internal situation, the British decided to take unilateral steps to consolidate the status quo. To this end, the Shackleton mission was sent to look at the options for the independent economic development of the islands (2000, p. 162).

The perception that Britain was exploiting Argentina's current socio-economic turmoil (in managing sub-emergency 2) to consolidate the territorial status quo and develop the region's untapped resources, particularly oil, provoked an atmosphere of renewed Anglo-Argentine tension.

British domestic comment, such as *The Times* editorial of 20 January 1976, added intensity to sub-emergency 2 (geopolitical); neither in its tone towards Argentina, or in its description of the Islands' economic value, was an atmosphere of Anglo-Argentine co-operation fostered, which suited Islander hopes of winning more British support to help resist the effects of slow emergency and Argentine irredentist aspirations.

> The slippery slope to appeasement with Argentina over the sovereignty of the islands began in the late 1960s and had now been accelerated […] The Islanders have always declared their intention to remain British, and part of Lord Shackleton's brief, is to confirm their views and to examine the resources of the colony and its dependencies. From an economic point of view, the islanders are far from being a drag on the British economy, as the income from the wools sales contributes some £2 million worth of hard currency to our balance of payments. Approximately 80 per cent of all the islands' trade is with British companies, and in addition there is no tax relaxation for the islands. With such a small population, the Falklands Islands have one of the highest per capita incomes in the world' (*The Times,* 20 January 1976, p. 12).

The profitability for Britain which the article refers to was at the expense of denuding the Islands of wealth, primarily through the Falkland Islands Company, itself a major cause of slow emergency, specifically through sub-

emergency 1 (socio-economic). What is also interesting is the reference to 'The slippery slope to appeasement of Argentina' (*The Times,* 20 January 1976, p. 12), and how this was said to have been 'accelerated' (*The Times,* 20 January 1976, p. 12). Taken at face value, this suggests that the Anglo-Argentine sovereignty dispute was more of a catalysing element than economic considerations in the Falklands' slow emergency, that is that sub-emergency 2 (geopolitical) held more accelerative force than sub-emergency 1 (socio-economic).

The catalysing, though sporadic, activation of the sovereignty dispute in speeding up slow emergency was soon evidenced in the February 1976 Argentine attack on RRS *Shackleton*, approximately 80 miles off the Falklands. Here sub-emergency 2 (geopolitical) had 'flared up' into a faster emergency, the acceleration of which was conveyed in a dramatic headline on the front page of *The Times*, 'British ship fired on by Argentine warship', describing the incident. In the account written by reporter Robert Fisk, it was stated:

> The unarmed British research ship Shackleton, carrying a crew of 30 and with explosives on board, last night reached the safety of the Falklands Islands after being shadowed for six hours by an Argentine destroyer which had fired across its bows when it had refused to stop […] The shooting – during which the Argentines ordered the British vessel to heave to – is by far the most serious incident in the dispute over the ownership of the Falkland Islands (*The Times,* 5 February 1976, p. 1).

The slow emergency facing the Falklands had escalated, if only momentarily, into a dangerous present, suggesting the possibility of further Anglo-Argentine clashes; the 'preventative' future the Callaghan government sought was proving difficult to construct. Whilst a misplaced belief that Shackleton himself was on board the vessel named after his explorer father may have served as the trigger for the incident, it nonetheless reflected genuine Argentine hostility to the Shackleton initiative, with an 'unhelpful' consequent intensification of sub-emergency 2 (geopolitical). Robin Edmonds, former Head of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Latin American desk, recalled the gravity of the moment (although not without certain humour):

> They adopted an attitude towards the whole Shackleton exercise, long before his report, from the word go, of complete hostility. So violent was the reaction that I can recall – it was February of the following year, by which time Shackleton and his team were out there – walking down the corridor [in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office] when the Falkland Islands desk officer rushed up to me [referring to the incident] and said "They've shot Shackleton!" (Edmonds in Charlton 1989, p. 48).

Whilst it was the RRS *Shackleton* rather than Lord Shackleton which had been shot at, it is evident that the very existence of the Shackleton initiative had, through activating/destabilising sub-emergency 2 (geopolitical), counter-productively led to the acceleration of emergency, to the point of actual military confrontation. Under the charged headline 'Argentine Aggression Angers Islanders', the *Falkland Islands Times* (11 February 1976, p.1). reported that 'The 'Shackleton Incident' last week angered, annoyed or bewildered many Islanders'. Subsequently, to better manage sub-emergency 2 (geopolitical) and provide future chronopolitical leverage should it be needed, Callaghan deployed a precautionary task force to ports in southern Brazil and Uruguay to contain any further acceleration of emergency. Ironically, this strategy had strayed into pre-emption, as it showed that the British government recognised, militarily, 'the importance of *pre-empting* trouble, and leaving Argentina in no doubt about its political will in defending the islands' (Donaghy 2014, p.213-14). This in itself was recognition that the Shackleton initiative had already counter-productively exacerbated sub-emergency 2 (geopolitical), the opposite to Callaghan's professed aim.

The arrival of Shackleton and his team in the Falklands which had accelerated Anglo-Argentine tensions and sub-emergency 2 (geopolitical), bringing an intensification of the Islands slow emergency, had chronopolitically preceded the RRS *Shackleton* Incident by a month. Shackleton's arrival in Stanley had provided an opportunity for chronopolitical performance for a declining micro-population experiencing the effects of sub-emergency 1 (socio-economic). Falkland Islander resistance to the effects of slow emergency, and Argentine sovereignty aspirations, was expressed through organised expressions of loyalty such as patriotic flag-waving and cheering.

With the headline 'Sun Shines for Shackleton', the *Falkland Islands Times* (11 February 1976, p. 1) reported the 'Britishness' of the reception that Shackleton and his party received, notably an enthusiastic large crowd who had timed their assembling at Government House to coincide with his arrival there; Shackleton himself soon joined in and was waving the Union Jack, in an affective performance which helped lift the 'Falkland spirit', which in its assertion of British identity was implicitly 'unfriendly' to Argentine sovereignty ambitions and encouraging to Islander 'pre-emptive' hopes.

> January 3 1976 for many Islanders will be remembered as Shackleton Day. The morning dawned warm and sunny – the finest we have had for some time. At around 9am. HMS *Endurance*, carrying Lord Shackleton and his Economic and Fiscal team, steamed into the harbour firing a seventeen-gun salute to His Excellency the Governor. A crowd of about two hundred people gathered at the east entrance to Government House and to their delight Lord Shackleton with the Governor alighted from their car when they arrived just after 10am. Three cheers are given in response to which Lord Shackleton said 'I shall do all I can to help you'. The Governor then introduced him to some members of the Community and photographers were busy while Lord Shackleton posed for them. The highlight of the welcome was when he asked a lady for her Union Flag which he then held high and waved it for all to see (*Falkland Islands Times,* 11 February 1976, p. 1).

The *Falkland Islands Monthly Review* also gave an account of Shackleton's loyal reception by Falkland Islanders on 3 January 1976, again emphasising the stirring, affective patriotic crowd performance of the occasion, in defiance of the draining quotidian realities of slow emergency:

> On approaching the Eastern Driveway to Government House he was greeted by an impressive sight – dozens of people waving Union Jacks and bearing banners with 'Keep the Falklands British' on them'. To three hearty cheers 'for Lord Shackleton' he stepped from the car. After being introduced to the chairman of the Falkland Islands Committee, Lord Shackleton posed with a number of children and borrowed a union jack, for photographs. He then continued his interrupted run to Government House, waving to the Crowd (*Falkland Islands Monthly Review,* January 1976, p. 6).

The role of the crowd as a factor in accelerating or decelerating slow emergency is of particular interest. Aradau, citing Canetti (1960), offers insights into the 'nature' of crowds, placing emphasis on different 'types':

> The attributes of crowds immediately translate into different types of crowds: open and closed crowds, stagnating and rhythmic crowds, slow and quick crowds, visible and invisible crowds. Crowds are then distinguished by their predominant emotions: baiting crowds, flight crowds, prohibition crowds, reversal crowds and feast crowds (Canetti, 1987 [1960]: 65). The workers who strike become a 'prohibition crowd', a crowd of refusal, negation and resistance, which emerges through dis-connecting from the coordinates of the workplace (Aradau 2015, p. 169).

The Falklands crowd at Government House can be seen as one characterised by both 'loyalty' and 'prohibition' (Aradau 2015, p. 169), with the highly visible patriotic 'waving' of hands and flags described in both the preceding accounts affirming past and present loyalty to 'Queen and country', in order to prohibit being maneuvered through economic and political pressure into a future 'unpatriotic' accommodation with Argentina. This too can be seen as a highly chronopolitical crowd performance. It had chosen to assemble at a most opportune time, when Shackleton and the British press had arrived in Stanley, and sought to enlist their support for the pre-emptive cause of rebuilding the Falklands as a viable British colony, a future which would require resisting slow emergency and Argentina.

This well-timed and emotionally affective crowd performance which bodily engulfed Shackleton into this living assemblage may also have influenced his subsequent view of what his report 'should be'. Similarly it is likely to have stiffened Islanders' pre-emptive instincts, so helping perpetuate and moderately accelerate the Slow Falklands Emergency. Irrespective of the precise impact of the crowd dynamic on Shackleton's arrival, neither Shackleton nor the Islanders would prove able to exercise sufficient agency to extricate the colony from the slow emergency processes which in little over half a decade would lead to Argentine invasion, in what effectively played out as the Fast Falklands Emergency of 1982.

Certainly, in the manner of his morale-boosting arrival at Stanley, Shackleton had given the Islanders succour and the Argentines more reason to be antithetic to the work of his commission; the findings of his subsequently produced Report gave them further reason to do so. It addressed key features of the slow emergency that were degrading the colony, that is sub-emergency

1 (socio-economic), and implicitly suggested that a future without Argentina was possible, so guaranteeing Argentine hostility to its recommendations.

Even before its July 1976 release, supporters of the Falkland Islanders were hopeful as to the forthcoming contents of the Shackleton Report. Former Governor Miles Clifford, who in his gubernatorial duties from 1946-54 had introduced the Falkland Islands Government Air Service and Radio-Telephone to the Islands, wrote forthrightly to *The Times;* in his letter (27 March 1976, p. 15), he rejected an acceptance of the Falklands' economic decline, and by implication a terminal slow emergency for the colony, emphasising the scope for improvement.

> The population is wholly British and is intensely loyal to the Crown; they have been repeatedly assured that there will be no change in status unless they, themselves, demand it, and of this there is not the remotest likelihood. That the economy can be improved – it rests at present entirely on wool – is not in question and they will await with interest, and with hope, the recommendations of Lord Shackleton's recent mission.

Published in July 1976, the Shackleton Report sought to address the socio-economic problems facing the Falkland Islands – sub-emergency 1 (socio-economic) – and thus key elements of slow emergency. The Report placed emphasis on the past and present degradation of the economy, declining population, socio-economic difficulties and a culture of dependency, the cumulative logic of which was that, even without the further corrosive impact of the sovereignty dispute, the Falklands' future collapse as a micro-community was entirely foreseeable. Indeed, the overview the Report came close to being an autopsy, rather than an anatomy, of the state of the Falkland Islands. Over time, without remedial pre-emptive action, sub-emergency 1 (socio-economic) would catalyse, as slow emergency accelerated into an epistemic emergency.

The past and present drain of resources was emphasised, evidencing how the enduring intensity of sub-emergency 1 (socio-economic) was a key reason for slow emergency: 'If there is any one cause of the decline in population and the Falkland Islands economy, it is this drain of resources from the Falklands

to the UK' (Shackleton Report (1), 1976, p. 28).This posits the clear implication that the shareholder-driven imperatives of the monopolistic Falkland Islands Company were responsible.

Diplomatically, the Shackleton Report ascribed the Falkland Islands Company's attritional depletion of the Islands' wealth to the latter's historical developmental stage. The Report observed that: 'There is no doubt that the FIC plays a dominant role in the Falkland Islands economy similar to that of other trading companies in the early stages of their respective territories' (Shackleton Report (1), 1976, p. 334). As the chief actor of economic exploitation in the slow emergency (rather than through calculated neglect and strategic chronopolitics in the case of the British government), the Falkland Islands Company – despite what Charringtons' 'patriotic' publicity claimed – was 'sucking the economic lifeblood' out of the Islands, eroding the capacity of the Falklands to 'stand on their own two feet' (*The Times,* 26 August 1977, p.10). So entrenched was the FIC's contribution to slow emergency through denuding the Islands of resources that, without pre-emptive change, a future of continuing decline appeared inevitable, indeed systemic to the Islands' economic life.

The Shackleton Report's assessment was a sobering one; with the vulnerability of its over-reliance on the sheep industry, and underinvestment in development, there was no prospect of the Islands avoiding a future of further decline. A further, gradual acceleration of decline, as sub-emergency 1 (socio-economic) progressively deteriorated, was thus anticipated in the Island's economy by the Shackleton Report:

> Based as it is on the ranching of sheep for wool production, supported by a service sector of just sufficient size to provide basic services, the Islands' economy is static, but showing an underlying tendency to decline. The Falkland's current development plan is insufficient in terms of capital and current expenditure to reverse the situation (Shackleton Report (1), 1976, p. 334).

Whilst the economic aspect of slow emergency was reversible with greater investment, a further aspect of sub-emergency 1 (socio-economic) – emigration – would make this significantly more difficult to achieve. Emigration functioned both as a significant causal factor, and consequence, of slow emergency; the Shackleton Report explained how emigration from this micro-population had been a constant drain over the past four decades, and anticipated not only future loss of population, but a possible 'acceleration' (Shackleton Report (1), 1976, p. 334) of this. The Report found that:

> Gradual emigration has persisted for at least the last forty years; there was a resultant decline in population, which was temporarily halted in 1975 due to the commencement of work on the permanent airport. The decline is likely to continue, and possibly accelerate, without the emergence of economic opportunities and social changes (Shackleton Report (1), 1976, p. 334).

There was also a slow emergency amongst the indigenous Islander population that stayed in the colony; this aspect of sub-emergency 1 (socio-economic) again over time seriously threatened the future viability of the Falkland Islands community. The use of the word 'stock' should also be noted, a term which in the Falklands would appear more applicable to sheep rather than its inhabitants. This collective framing is used to describe Islanders, with the reference to 'lower birth rate' highlighting the decline in Islander women maintaining 'stock' numbers: 'Taken with the lower birth rate and higher death rate, the decline of the indigenous stock seems confirmed as one of the most significant features of the population situation (Shackleton Report (1), 1976, p. 12).

This aspect of slow emergency was serious enough; as Fig 6.3 illustrates, a Falkands funeral provided a formal and important for the small Falkland community to come together to pay their respects; the growth in the death rates since this particular funeral (1966) meant these had become a more frequent event in Falkland life.

Fig. 6.3. The passing of an unknown Falkland resident in 1966

Source: **Panorama*, October 1966, pp. 10-11***

To make up for this loss of population, the colony needed to ensure there were sufficient younger Islanders to ensure the survival of the community. However, the decline of the birth rate instead looked set to accelerate this demographic slow emergency, particularly due to the loss of Islander women of reproductive age, who had married Royal Marines.

The same Royal Marines whose presence in the Islands was intended to help forestall a geopolitical emergency (sub-emergency 2) had themselves become a potent causal factor in sub-emergency 1 (socio-economic) and the ongoing exacerbation of slow emergency, chronopolitically undermining the community that they were meant to protect (effectively serving the purpose of those in Whitehall who sought to use slow emergency to resolve the Falklands issue).

Fig. 6.4 (below) is a photo of young Islander women participating in the Falklands 1966 Beauty Queen Competition, the year after the arrival of the Royal Marines in 1965. I was told by informants on the Islands that many of the young Islander women wanted to 'marry a Marine', and so embark on a life outside the Islands. The slow emergency could be thought of as a highly gendered depletion as fears were expressed that the Falkland community would be an aging society short of women. Argentina's ambitions were not the only 'danger' facing the Falkland Islands.

Fig 6.4. Young Islander women participate in the 1966 Beauty Queen Competition
Source: Panorama, October 1966, p. 15

The Shackleton Report highlighted the grave demographic implications of this:

> A significant feature in regard to female emigration is that about two-fifths of the local women who left in 1975, were married to, or about to marry, Royal Marines who had been stationed in the Islands. In a population as depleted of women […] as the Falkland Islands this represents a significant loss (Shackleton Report (1), 1976, p. 13).

Nor did the Shackleton Report find Islanders well equipped to face the challenges of the present day, let alone the future; they were perceived as dependent, and lacking initiative: 'the population shows a marked degree of dependence on government, employers, and on the UK – which has largely

contributed to low levels of confidence and enterprise' (Shackleton Report (1), 1976, p. 334). Neither was it felt to be a population that was well integrated. Indeed, the reverse was seen to be the case, both in the present and past:

> The pattern of economic activity and settlement history has brought about an unusually fragmented social structure' (Shackleton Report (1), 1976, p. 334), again emphasising the importance of sub-emergency 1 (socio-economic) in the colony's slow emergency that was inexorably shaping its future.

As the Shackleton Report recognised in its anatomisation of the elements of slow emergency, the past was very much the present in these colonial Islands, tied as they were to Victorian and quasi feudal practices, and struggling with the vicissitudes of the wool market and the need for the Falklands Islands Company to add value for its shareholders. Slow emergency offered a genuinely uncomfortable future for Islanders both individually and collectively, with the socio-economic collapse of the colony a very real prospect..

Offshoring the future of the Islands was Shackleton's answer to transitioning to modernity, and in the process deferring, if not resolving, the slow emergencies facing the colony. He saw the potential of commercial fishing to 'be on scale larger than any other existing or likely potential economic activity in the Falklands. It would undoubtedly confirm the long-term economic future of the Islands and raise overall living standards' (Shackleton Report (2), 1976, p. 13). A fishing industry would provide a modern future of 'post-feudal' economic activity, and held out the prospect of a re-population of the Islands as 'It should also be recognised that the fisheries development would irreversibly change the size and constitution of the population, many of whom would not originate from the UK' (Shackleton Report (2), 1976, p. 13). Whilst fisheries offered a pre-emptive future of economic regeneration, helping outflank the apparent economic death spiral of slow emergency, there is a certain irony in a proposal which potentially would help 'keep the Falklands British' bringing in many non-British nationals to the colony. Such a diversification of the Islands' population offered the rejuvenating prospect of developing an island micro-nation more in line with modern Britain; for those of a more 'traditional' perspective amongst Islanders and their supporters, this

would, however, be at the cost of homogeneity amongst Islander 'stock' (Shackleton Report (1), 1976, p. 12).

Shackleton's proposals for an offshore future for the Falklands were, for understandable diplomatic reasons, articulated more circumspectly in relation to oil and gas, and foregrounded with the comment: 'First, it should be said that no offshore developments are likely without a form of cooperation agreement with Argentina' (Shackleton Report (2), 1976, p. 14). The report sought to further reassure Argentina about how a future oil industry might function, carefully noting:

> The production stage, if oil were discovered in commercial quantities, would not necessarily involve a pipeline to the Falklands, and there would be several advantages in building a pipeline to Argentina. If distances from land and water were such to make laying a pipeline to the Falklands the most economic method of evacuating oil from the discovered field, the impact in terms of population influx, both in the construction phase and the permanent operating phase would literally be overwhelming in relation to the size of the existing population. This could more than double and it would impose severe strains on the existing economy of the Islands (Shackleton Report (2), 1976, p. 15).

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Shackleton sought to present this offshore future for the Islands as not uncomfortable for Argentina, at the same time neatly not ruling out the possibility that an oil pipeline would go to the Falklands rather than Argentina, and presenting the socio-economic regeneration that would follow as problematic for the Islands. The operative point is that Shackleton had dared to imagine a Falklands future with hydrocarbons which did not necessarily revolve around Argentina, disrupting the narrative that the Falklands' future was bound to Buenos Aires.

Shackleton's proposal to enhance the Stanley airfield represented another bid to offshore the Falklands' future, this time aerially, linking the Islands to airports in proximate countries, and not exclusively Argentina. His recommendation was that:

> The permanent airfield should be strengthened and extended to a length necessary to receive short/medium haul jets and part loaded long haul jets,

> such as Boeing 707's, on the final leg of international flights […] Action should be taken at the earliest opportunity (Shackleton Report (2), 1976, p. 66).

This proposal, had London been prepared to action it at the time, offered the creation of a future for the Falklands in which aerial mobility, tourism and commerce could also bring the Islands into the 'modern world'. Whilst Shackleton diplomatically noted that 'this is another area where close cooperation with Argentina is highly desirable', in practice it offered a means for the Falklands to remove Argentina's monopoly of international air travel to the Islands (Shackleton Report (2), 1976, p. 66).

Indeed, so significant and symbolic was this proposal, that in late 1976, by which time it had become very clear that the Shackleton Report had been shelved, the call for the extended runway was adopted as a particular (and unsuccessful) campaign focus from the Falkland Islands Committee, to use as a litmus test that British Government would evidence a serious commitment to the future of the Islands.

Shackleton's pre-emptive offshoring of the future, extricating the Falklands from slow emergency, ran counter however to London and Buenos Aires' strategic chronopolitics, in which the Falklands' present and future would be the continuation of the past through slow emergency, until such time as a definitive diplomatic solution determining the archipelago was achieved. In terms of the Falkland Islanders, the pre-emptive future which Shackleton's offshore recommendations constructed offered a future which was not in thrall to slow emergency, offering instead a measure of hope to this socio-economically beleaguered community. Shackleton's forward-looking report had, in essence, sought to defer the numerous emergencies comprised within slow emergency; in this way, Shackleton had disrupted the view (as one Islander informally put it to me) that 'decline meant the Argentine'.

This is important as it helps explain Islanders' chronopolitical militancy once it became clear in the weeks after July 1976 that London wished to ignore the report, October 1976's protests providing Islanders with the occasion to express their dissatisfaction against 'London's man', the unpopular Governor

French, who approached slow emergency pressures as a means to 'encourage' Islanders to accept the logic of accommodation with Argentina.

As has been observed, appreciating 'people's longstanding images of the future and belonging, their 'lieux de future' is a useful way into understanding present tensions' (Feaux de la Croix 2014, p. 62). This view was based on research in contemporary Kyrgyzstan (Feaux de la Croix 2014, p. 51), and is I believe similarly applicable in this context. As will be explained, there was a profound acongruence between Governor and governed over the Falklands' future, the former seeing co-operation and territorial accommodation with Argentina as desirable, the latter resisting a collusive co-operation which resulted in such an absorption. As will also be evidenced through Falkland Islander public actions and discourse cited later in this chapter, London's preventative frustration of Shackleton's positive counter-future – its disruption of his disruption - proved chronopolitically radicalising in a community whose hopes for the future had been dashed.

Notwithstanding the Shackleton report, slow emergency would remain the defining feature of mid-1970s Falklands. *Times* correspondent David Spanier summed up the Shackleton Report in an article entitled 'Falklands report urges local initiative', with a summative comment which reflects why slow emergency is key to understanding the Falklands in this period. He noted: 'An economic survey of the Falkland Islands published yesterday, says that their economy shows an underlying tendency to decline' (*The Times,* 21 July 1976, p. 6). This implicitly emphasised the relevance, chronopolitically, of slow emergency in the attritional socio-economic and geopolitical unwinding of the Falklands colony. *The Times* editorial of 21 July 1976, entitled 'Economy of the Falkland Islands', did however praise the recommendations of the Shackleton Report in seeking to pre-empt future decline; it commented:

> Lord Shackleton and his team of experts have produced an impressive and comprehensive survey of the possible ways of boosting the economy of one of Britain's remotest remaining economies, the Falkland Islands. Virtually every conceivable source of extra revenue, ranging from gigantic stocks of fish and krill and offshore oil and gas, to increased trade in live specimens of the common penguin and a more aggressive philatelic marketing policy, has

> been examined in detail and judiciously commented upon (*The Times,* 21 July 1976, p. 6).

Whilst Shackleton generally judged 'the Islands viable' (Freedman 2005, p. 47) and so pre-emptively retrievable from slow emergency, the hard truth was that the Shackleton Report's economic recommendations did not exist in isolation from the wider geopolitical context, that is, that in addressing the Falklands' slow emergency, sub-emergency 1 (socio-economic) needed to take account of sub-emergency 2 (geopolitical). In essence, existing Argentine cooperation, and the possibility of this being lost, functioned as a subtle but potent form of 'slow violence' (Nixon 2011, p.8) against the adoption of Shackleton's proposals. This can be seen in relation to the Reports' gingerly recommending that the runaway be extended by 2,500 feet. Whilst this potentially enabled non-Argentine international civilian flights access to the Islands, it also made British military flights possible in the event of an accelerated sub-emergency 2 (geopolitical). *The Times* editorial of 21 July 1976 argued that:

> In his introduction, Lord Shackleton conceded that the sovereignty issue overhangs the report, and that in any major new developments of the island's economy, notably in exploiting offshore resources, cooperation with Argentina, even participation, should be secured. Given this underlying assumption, it is some ways unrealistic to examine economic possibilities largely divorced from political considerations (*The Times,* 21 July 1976, p. 6).

The chronopolitical dimension was central to *The Times*' understanding of the Falklands' prospects, as is conveyed in its (somewhat misleading) use of the phrase 'steady decline'. 'Steady' implies a broadly constant development over time, yet as has been discussed, there are a number of sub-emergency constituent elements which can accelerate at any point and do not necessarily present themselves in a 'steady' fashion, as the chronopolitical 'spike' of the RRS *Shackleton* incident illustrates. This said, *The Times* awareness of the multi-causal nature of the Falklands' decline implicitly recognises the interconnectedness of sub-emergency 1 (socio-economic) and sub-emergency 2 (geopolitical) as two vital elements of slow emergency. It also showed a clear appreciation of the choice between the logics of pre-emption

and preservation, the former throwing a chronopolitical 'lifeline' to the Falklands in arresting 'steady decline'.

> The basic choice is whether to allow the steady decline in the situation of the islanders to continue; or whether to arrest the decline and exploit some of the possibilities examined by Lord Shackleton, at the same time putting relations with Argentina on a more stable basis. This will not be easy, given the volatile nature of Argentina's domestic politics and the complications likely to arise from the Law of the Sea Conference (*The Times,* 21 July 1976, p. 6).

Sub-emergency 1 (socio-economic) and sub-emergency 2 (geopolitical) have, in this section, been our areas of focus for slow emergency; sub-emergency 3 (governance) and sub-emergency 4 (information control) are now addressed through the gubernatorial experience and implosion of Neville French, who took advantage of the slow emergency malaise to erode the 'democratic space' in the colony and had a much less 'happy' experience of the Falklands crowd than Shackleton. Whereas the essentially pre-emptive, forward-looking Shackleton Report would become part of the morass of slow emergency through being largely ignored by a prevention-focused Whitehall, French's governorship experienced a similar outcome, through bringing new exacerbatory intensities to sub-emergency 3 (governance) and sub-emergency 4 (information control), and very conspicuously losing control of chronopolitical developments.

6.4 Accelerating Slow Emergency in the Shackleton-French era – erosion of trust between Governor French and Islanders

An acceleration of slow emergency resulted from Neville French's tenure as Governor (27 January 1975 to 2 December 1976) with the intensification of sub-emergency 3 (governance) and sub-emergency 4 (information control). Unlike sub-emergency 1 (socio-economic) and sub-emergency 2 (geopolitical), neither of these sub-emergencies were, in themselves, likely to lead to the disappearance of the Falklands as a colony; they did, however, prove decisive causal factors in creating an atmosphere of profound mistrust in the Falklands between Governor and governed, which prematurely ended French's time in Government House, Stanley, making him too a

chronopolitical casualty.

As Governor, Neville French's priority was to address sub-emergency 2 (geopolitical), and deepen the present and future cooperation with Argentina that the Foreign Office had sought to develop since the 1971 Communications Agreement; as he said, in what can be seen as his leitmotif during his time in office: 'We must have co-operation with Argentina' (*The Times,* 26 August 1976, p. 11).

French sought to manage the decline of the colony; 'cooperation' meant proactively 'managing' Islanders' views and their access to information, so as to ensure a future of positive relations with Argentina was constructed. Managing an emergency atmosphere in the colony required political skill and subtlety, capitalising on everyday emergency as a means to encourage Islanders to see the benefit of accommodating Argentina; however, if enacted clumsily, such an approach ran the risk of losing Islanders' confidence and trust. As events would show, French proved unequal to the task of skilfully manipulating an atmosphere of emergency; his efforts to secure Islander cooperation led him to personally vet the contents of the *Falkland Islands Broadcasting Service* news bulletins, as he later publicly confirmed to *The Times* (26 August 1976, p. 11), resulting in a loss of Islander trust. This management, or censorship, of news soon became a publicly expressed source of concern, with sub-emergency 4 (information control) an accelerated element of the Islands' wider slow emergency. Writing to the *Falkland Islands Times*, under the pseudonym of 'A not so calm but vigilant Falkland Islander', one reader complained about the growing suppression of news stories, noting that:

> In recent months articles have appeared in the British press and elsewhere concerning the islands but we in the islands have never heard the broadcast on the only means of mass communication, the radio. All Falkland Islanders have a right and the Government a duty to keep us informed on all comments made regarding the islands be they political or not (*Falkland Islands Times,* 11 February 1976, p. 6).

French's 'information regime' applied different intensities of control in relation to news flow over time, with some amelioration earlier on in 1976, as was

recognised in the *Falkland Islands Times*:

> Overseas readers may be interested to know that during the last few weeks our local Friday night newsletter has included news cuttings which a few months ago would not have been read. Even the locally produced 'Magazine' programme recently featured comments from there Stanley residents about a lengthy TIMES article (U.K 22 March) about the Falklands. The Magazine programme scheduled for February 11th was not broadcast when, shortly before it was due to go on air out Chief Secretary – who is at present enjoying a holiday in a sunnier clime – heard at the Colony Club that the programme included an account of the 'Shackleton' incident as recorded on the ship's bridge on 4th February (*Falkland Islands Times,* 15 April 1976, p. 1).

As this account recognises, French's efforts to control the present and future dissemination of information (sub-emergency 4) were a 'source of interest' to both a domestic and overseas audience. Notwithstanding such scrutiny, French's efforts to build a Falklands future based on co-operation with Argentina were soon directed to 'determining' how Islanders would and should respond to the Shackleton Report. In announcing the publication of the Shackleton Report to its readership on 30 July 1976, the *Falkland Islands Times* reminded Islanders about how Government House expected them to respond to it, both in the present and future (key words/phrases indicative of this are italicised below):

> It's out! *Co-operation* – the keyword.
>
> The long-awaited Shackleton report was published in the colony and the United Kingdom on Tuesday, 20 July……The *much broadcast government commentary* on the report sounded *two notes of warning* about it. Firstly, it was *not a magic wand* which would dispel over like the problems facing the colony. The report was an independent one and its recommendations and their financial and political implications called for a careful and detailed study by Her Majesty's government and at this stage *no comment should be expected about acceptance of any of the recommendations* [...] The commentary went on to say that the *least helpful attitude of all would be to skim through the report for selected quotations to be deployed in support of political points*
> (*Falkland Islands Times*, 30 July 1976, p. 1)

French's dirigiste efforts to generate sub-emergency 4 (information control) in the interests of managing sub-emergency 2 (geopolitical), amounted to a kind of enforced 'Government House Party line', one which was repeated through radio broadcasts so that the Islanders understood what was expected of them, both then and in the future. Such an approach did little to endear

French to Islander opinion, which in turn led to the future of his governance of the Islands being brought into question, so activating sub-emergency 3 (governance).

David Tatham, himself a former Falklands Governor, cites how French had previously experienced difficulties in the past with (crowd) governance when, as Commissioner of Geita in Sukumaland, Tanganyika, he had authorised the use of force in July 1958, including tear gas, against an 'illegal' nationalist protest march at Mwanza (Tatham 2008, p. 231-32); in this way, French had suppressed the Mwanza crowd as an agent of emergency, and the incident has prompted the observation that:

> The interest in this incident lies in what it reveals about French's character in the light of his subsequent performances in the Falklands nearly twenty years later. Highly regarded as an administrator by his superiors, he found himself embattled and isolated in his single-mindedness and impatience in carrying out a policy which was not of his making against the increasing strength of African nationalist feeling (Tatham 2008, p. 232).

Whilst French's present methods of control in the Falklands did not involve the bodily violence meted out to the 'prohibitory' crowd (Aradau 2015) in Tanganyika, they were intended to support the Foreign Office's established policy of a future based on Anglo-Argentine cooperation. Such methods, however, proved counterproductive to domestic governance, generating unrest and protest amongst Islanders, and reached national prominence in Britain through an unsympathetic report in *The Times* on 26 August 1976. This important article, depicting French as an unpopular, isolated and controlling figure, holds particular purchase for unpacking perceptions of his gubernatorial rule, and examining the respective significance of sub-emergencies (as per the following summaries which precede each section of *The Times* report).

> Mr Neville French, Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Falkland Islands, is convinced that the future of the Islands lies with Argentina. He said: 'We are pinning our hopes on the Shackleton report. We must have cooperation with Argentina […] it makes very good sense and is absolutely essential[…] I keep telling them (the Argentines) that they are too impatient. They must realise they are dealing with hearts and minds here. I say to them;

> 'Do it on a *flamboyant* scale, it may take 10, 15 or 25 years'' (*The Times,* 26 August 1976, p. 11).

'Flamboyant' (which I have italicised) was an unusual choice of word, not a term that would ordinarily be associated with Falkland matters, and sits uncomfortably with the more 'down to earth' nature of the community over which he presided. French's comments, by his own admission, confirm he had been advising Argentines as to how Islanders could be won over to their 'side' through a policy of Buenos Aires pursuing high-profile acts designed to win Islanders favour over time; this would imply largesse and treatment of a more generous nature than that on offer from the British government. The logic of French's advocacy of Argentine wooing (or bribing) of Islanders was that British rule over the Islands would be progressively hollowed out, a slow opportunity rather than emergency to end British rule over the Islands.

Neither French's approach to Argentina, or his clumsy efforts to 'micro-manage' information had endeared him to Islanders, leaving him isolated from the community over which he presided, and undermining his capacity to fulfil his gubernatorial role. *The Times* highlighted this gubernatorial isolation, and French's practice of having the Royal Marines' commanding officer accompany him when 'off site' from Government House:

> He is certainly a lonely man, rarely seen outside Government House, and when he does go out he is nearly always accompanied by a Royal marine major who commands the detachment of 36 marines that defend the islands […] Mr French is undoubtedly sincere and genuinely has the interests of the islanders at heart. Unfortunately, he does not seem able to convince them of this and consequently his public relations image has evoked a considerable amount of criticism and bad feeling […] Previous governors of the islands have come in for their fair share of criticism from time to time, but none has had to withstand the comments and attack that the present governor has had to withstand in his 18 months in Stanley (*The Times,* 26 August 1976, p. 11).

French sought to justify the 'information management' methods which had alienated Islanders from his rule:

> Mr French denies that he does not keep people informed of what is going on "I strain to put out everything I possibly can." He is very sensitive to any controversial matters being broadcast and until the spring was personally censoring local broadcasts. Asked why, he replied: "Because we can't have what is an official broadcast service being used for what one might call party,

> or special, lobbies, or special pleading, or free debate. We have not got a full-blown party political system here; and you could have all sorts of if you like fabrications and extreme points of view being pushed out over the broadcasting system with apparent government blessing".
>
> He maintained he would have to spend all his time denying any such statements. "It is not censorship as such, just a sort of balance to make sure that you get them (the reports) run in some sort of rational controlled way". He feared that without control the broadcasting service would be used by every crank and everyone with an extreme view to sound off.
>
> He added that he could not have a "particular faction pre-empting or trying to circumvent the basis of government". In an obvious reference to the Falkland Islands Committee, he complained about people sending telegrams to London and said the councillors were supposed to keep their constituents informed of what is going on.
>
> He denied that anyone would dream of censoring anything but at the same time admitted that he personally saw copies of the local news bulletin which had to be submitted to the secretariat 24 hours before going out on the air. In fact, when a reference to this appeared in a *Times* report last March, restrictions were eased (*The Times,* 26 August 1976, p. 11).

The Times' report did not reflect well on French's methods, and gave succour to his vocal critics in the Falkland Islands, and the intermittently convened crowd of the Falkland Islands lobby; it also provides an insight into relationalities of slow emergency in the Islands and their relative significances. Whereas sub-emergencies 3 (governance) and 4 (information control) were a 'regular' source of a frustration amongst Islanders, neither of these in themselves would pose an immediate threat to the survival of the colony, hence warranting only 'moderate' ratings as to their overall importance in slow emergency. In contrast, an acceleration of sub-emergency 2 (geopolitical) as a result of Argentine 'impatience' (*The Times,* 26 August 1976, p. 11) had the potential to result in the chronopolitically hastened demise of the colony of the Falkland Islands, whereas French's 'co-operation' paradigm envisaged a drawn-out process, over a time of '10, 15 or 25 years' (*The Times,* 26 August 1976, p. 11) prior to absorption by Argentina.

The capacity of an individual sub-emergency to affect the supra-emergency, however, remains relative to its significance; for instance, sub-emergency 4 (information control) is not as serious a threat to Islands' economic survival as an accelerated sub-emergency 1 (socio-economic), or sub-emergency 2

(geopolitical) resulting from intensified pressure for a sovereignty transfer from Argentina.

Dissatisfaction with French's regime was publicly expressed in the Falklands, such as through Eddie Anderson Junior's letter to the *Falkland Islands Times* of 3 September 1976. Anderson's narrative of a decline in political life highlights the acceleration of slow emergency under French through the intensification of sub-emergencies 3 (governance) and 4 (information control). Symbolically Anderson claimed ownership of French's reference to dissenting Islanders as 'cranks' (*The Times,* 26 August 1976, p.11), reflecting the deterioration in the relationship between Governor and governed in the Islands.

> Perhaps a condition of passionate loyalty to the crown – as a defence against Argentina's claim to the Islands – makes us prepared to accept ideas which we would never have a short while ago.
>
> The word 'politics' is to most people here, synonymous of the sovereignty issue, but it may be a good idea to look closer home at our political system, which – despite minor innovations such as the elusive new constitution – has some room for change. Think of the censorship designed to prevent any number of cranks (that's us!) from expressing extremist views (*Falkland Islands Times,* 6 November 1976, p. 7).

The strained and mutually suspicious relations between Governor French and the Islanders foregrounded an acceleration of sub-emergencies 2 (socio-economic), 3 (governance) and 4 (information control), to a point of real emergency, although in a manner reflective of the Lilliputian nature of domestic Falklands politics, it did not immediately accelerate slow emergency in relation to sub-emergency 2 (geopolitical), that being a crisis for Islanders and British, rather than Argentine, authorities.

It was a radio-telephone-related emergency, involving a critical, invisible crowd, that escalated sub-emergencies 1 (socio-economic), 3 (governance) and 4 (information control) to the point that Governor French became a catalyst of unfolding emergency, his chronopolitical efforts to control future events and the dissemination of information causing him to lose control of

both in the period from August to December 1976. Chronopolitically, his failure to govern the difference between the present and the future resulted in a disastrous end to his Falklands gubernatorial career.

The French Administration's handling of the New Island Incident proved a decisive moment in exacerbating the already strained Governor-Islander relations. On 11 August 1976, a Falkland Islands Government Air Service (FIGAS) Beaver float plane capsized. This development represented an emergency for Islanders' present and future aerial mobility, and distribution of vital portable objects such as mail, medication and produce, in essence an existential threat to the viability of everyday life in the colony. The stark gravity of the event was relayed in the *Falkland Islands Times* headline 'STRICKEN BEAVER SENT BACK TO STANLEY', informing readers it was 'one of the two 'planes that form our internal air-service. The aircraft, now a write-off, capsized at New Island on 11 August […] struck by a freak wind commonly known here as a 'woolly' (*Falkland Islands Times,* August 1976, p. 1). It also denounced the way French had sought to have a closed and unannounced enquiry into what had happened:

> Although not officially announced, there was a Board of Enquiry into the incident. Many people were annoyed as this is not the first time that a freak wind has capsized a Beaver but it is the first time the pilot [Canadian 'Big John' Lavino] has been grounded as a result. There were pathetic Government announcements about the incident and the subsequent collapse of the air service due to the [unrelated] hospitalisation of our second pilot Jim Kerr (*Falkland Islands Times,* unspecified date August 1976, p.1).

Language invoked in this reportage such as 'unannounced', 'pathetic' and 'collapse' conveys contemporary Islander criticisms and scorn of French's handling of the New Island Incident and a palpable sense that sub-emergencies 1 (socio-economic), 3 (governance) and 4 (information control) were accelerating into a very uncomfortable future.

A combination of immense frustration of the interruption to FIGAS' flights, and an administration unwilling to be open about the reasons for the loss of the New Island Beaver, helped create an atmosphere of aerial emergency, and deepen suspicion about the French Administration. This was reinforced

through the next edition of the Falkland Island Times headline 'ONE BEAVER – NO PILOTS. Air Service Crisis worsens', with its representation of an aerial emergency which was deteriorating. It reported how pilot Jim Kerr had now been evacuated to the UK for medical treatment, and Islander pilot Ian Campbell, who had returned from overseas leave, had failed a medical test (*Falkland Islands Times,* 26 September 1976, p. 1), with Bill Luxton of Chartres stepping in to assist with his own Cessna Skyhawk.

Notwithstanding the British Government agreement to provide a loan towards the cost of two new Beavers (*Falkland Islands Times,* 26 September 1976, p. 1) offering some hope for the future, there was no immediate end in sight to this FIGAS emergency, this breakdown in the Islands' aerial provision evidencing the failure of French's Government House to ensure any depth in the 'shoestring' aerial provision, this aero-emergency a powerful metaphor for the colony's failing present and future.

This Falklands domestic aerial-emergency dramatically accelerated on 14 October 1978 when popular Falklands Islander pilot Ian Campbell, known as 'Cam', who by then was permitted to fly, was killed when his Beaver plane crashed. The efforts of the French administration to keep control of the circumstances of what had happened proved politically clumsy, exacerbating the Governor's unpopularity; reflective of suspicions circulating in the Falklands at the time, it has been claimed by 'Cam's' widow that: 'The circumstances of the crash were never satisfactorily explained and aroused deep public concern, which was aggravated by Governor French's maladroit handling of the enquiry' (Nadine Campbell in Tatham 2008, p. 138). Ian Campbell's death was a serious blow to the present and future of the colony, bringing together sub-emergencies 1 (socio-economic), 3 (governance) and 4 (information control). With FIGAS again out of operation, and the loss of their iconic Islander pilot, this was not the time to alienate Islander opinion anxious about the present and future; whereas French would inevitably have been faced with an accelerated sub-emergency 1 (socio-economic) through the loss of Campbell and FIGAS' renewed breakdown, mishandling sub-emergencies 3 (governance) and 4 (information control) at this critical

chronopolitical moment of developing emergency undermined gubernatorial authority over the Islanders. A sense of this affective emergency is conveyed in the *Falkland Islands Times* reportage;

> IN THE SUMMER OF HIS YEARS
>
> It is with deep regret that we have to report the death of Captain Ian Campbell MBE, after a 'plane accident on the afternoon of Thursday 14th October (*Falkland Islands Times,* 6 November 1976, p. 1).

This mournful atmosphere not only ensured criticism of the French Administration would continue, but would intensify, as it effectively made vocal Islander criticism of the Governor's management of the colony more permissible.

The search for the body led to tension between Islanders and the French administration, which also used the assistance of an Argentine F27 aircraft, a poignant demonstration of the present and future advantages of 'co-operation', as well as the Royal Marines. When Campbell's body was found at Mare Harbour, it won no appreciation of French's official efforts, with the *Falkland Islands Times* reporting it thus:

> It seems ironical that it was this [local] group that had no Government support (those taking part were required to sign a disclaimer which virtually said that what they were doing was pointless) and for whom assistance from the Royal Marines on Johnsons Is[land] was forbidden by their Commanding Officer, should be the ones who discovered Ian's body on November 2nd near the spot where [the Beaver] Alpha Kilo had grounded (*Falkland Islands Times,* 6 November 1976, p. 2).

Some indication of how an atmosphere of mourning was constructed both in Stanley and in the Camp is provided in this reportage, which with the sense of loss and bereavement resulting from Campbell's death is likely to have proved a profoundly affective experience for Islanders. In paying their last respects the mourners, who constituted over 20% of the entire Island population, were part of a highly emotional and visible crowd response to Campbell's death. In this key chronopolitical moment, French had allowed himself to be profoundly alienated from the 'mourning crowd', ensuring that in the Islanders resistance to an uncomfortable future of decline and 'cooperation' with Argentina, he had

become the embodiment of the Islands' malaise. As depicted in the following account, it was a sombre occasion; the description of the objects of flags 'at half-mast', the harsh elements through the "cold and grey' afternoon and the cessation of regular performances 'shops and offices were closed' give an affective sense of the poignancy of the event:

> Flags flew at half-mast yesterday and on that cold, grey afternoon of the funeral the Colony came to a standstill. Shops and offices were closed and the Camp settlements were able [sic] to the short service which was broadcast. Over 400 people came to pay their last respects to someone who was looked upon not as just another pilot but as everybody's friend and helper (*Falkland Islands Times,* 6 November 1976, p. 2).

Yet, prior to the discovery of Campbell's body (2 November) and subsequent funeral (6 November 1976), a political crisis which incorporated sub-emergencies 1 (socio-economic), 3 (governance) and 4 (information control) had erupted, with emergency in the Islands – with the exception of sub-emergency 2 (geopolitical) – accelerated, to what for French would prove a fast and destructive conclusion to his gubernatorial rule, as he lost control of chronopolitical governance.

An emergency Executive Council (ExCo) meeting was called for Monday 18 October, at which Councillors John Smith and Sydney Miller demanded that the French Administration (unlike in the case of the recent New Incident) accept an independent enquiry with inspectors from abroad. They then resigned and walked out, so seizing the initiative in a powerful pre-emptive political performance. French's efforts to regain the initiative backfired when a subsequent, and unattributed, sensitive conversation was leaked on the RT, which admitted that a now conceded Deputy Governor-led crash investigation was to be attributed to French's personal initiative, and not (chrono)political pressure from Smith and Miller. This apparent preventative misrepresentation of the sequence of events further damaged French's credibility, giving substance to rumours within the Islands of an official 'cover up' about the reasons for the Campbell's fatal plane crash.

> After much pressure and embarrassment, which included a most informative

> conversation on 4.5 MHz in which it was said much wool had been pulled over EX.CO's eyes, it was announced that evening that the Governor had appointed the Deputy governor to establish a Board of Enquiry into the accident. The announcement which was made before the one informing us of the [Smith and Miller] resignations attempted to give the impression that 'the Governor's action automatically followed official notification of the accident' (4 days after)' (*Falkland Islands Times,* 6 November 1976, p. 2).

Further dramatic chronopolitical performance followed over the next 48 hours, involving major crowd protest against the French administration, which grew so intense that it effectively became a pre-emptive, reforming uprising against the Governor, the Falklands own 'October Revolution', albeit without a storming of Government House. Not only was French now forced to accept that this time there was to be an independent enquiry into the causes of a Beaver plane crash but also demonstrated that he had lost control of the colony. For London this was particularly dangerous, given that sub-emergency 2 (geopolitical) had the potential itself to accelerate into Anglo-Argentine confrontation; in this politically and emotionally charged atmosphere of disturbance, an unexpected incident involving an Argentine citizen and Islander was entirely possible. The volatility which eventually convinced French's superiors that his position was untenable is conveyed in this reportage, the logic of which would compel London to adopt a pre-emptive policy towards the chronopolitically outmaneuvered Governor.

The role of crowds as an accelerant of slow emergency, and chronopolitical catalyst, is very evident, with 'crowd(s) of prohibition' (Aradau 2015, p. 169) playing a vital role in French's gubernatorial demise. The two visible and emotional crowds cited below both occurred in Stanley over a two-day period (19-20 October 1976), one seemingly a smaller 'mobile crowd', which acted as a precursor to a 200 strong 'crowd of place' that assembled the following day.

> On Tuesday 19th a crowd of people visited homes of Stanley councillors to express their support for the actions taken by John Smith and Sydney Miller and show their lack of confidence in the Administration. At about 7pm on Wednesday 20th a crowd of over 200 people gathered in Murdo's paddock to demonstrate their mistrust of Governor French and Chief Secretary Arthur Monk and at which most Councillors (including Councillors Blake, Monk and Hadden who had travelled from the Camp that day) attended (*Falkland Islands*

> *Times,* 6 November 1976, p. 2).

The catalyzing effect of the 'prohibitory crowd' (Aradau 2015) on slow emergency, both in its emotional rejection of French's handling of sub-emergencies 1 to 4, and effective incorporation within these, led to urgent counter-emergency measures from the British authorities to decelerate emergency and regain the chronopolitical initiative which French had spectacularly lost.

Of significance is Councillor Adrian Monk's 22 October initiative to use radio as a means to engage with, and calm, the invisible crowd of disaffected Islanders; this bid to decelerate slow emergency, and so pre-empt further physical crowds re-emerging in Stanley, was however not enough to restore Islander confidence in the (chrono)politically humiliated French:

> On 21st October it was announced that a team of three from the Accident Investigation Branch of the Dept. of Trade in London and headed by Mr. G.C Wilkinson would be arriving on the 28th. On Friday 22nd in what could be described as an attempt to bridge the widening gap between the people and Administration, Councillor Adrian Monk gave a talk over the air. Space is running out here […] but the announcement about our next Governor was most timely in that it was seen as a diplomatic move to take the heat off a potentially explosive situation (*Falkland Islands Times,* 6 November 1976, p. 2).

The announcement that French was to be pre-emptively withdrawn amounted to London stepping in to decelerate this emergency, so that sub-emergencies 1 (socio-economic), 3 (governance) and 4 (information control) were defused, and would not inadvertently accelerate sub-emergency 2 (geopolitical). French later broadcast to the Islanders that he would not be returning:

> On 16th November Governor French gave a broadcast address in which he announced that due to the desire of Her Majesty's Govt. to discuss with him directly a number of issues raised by the Shackleton Report he would be leaving the Islands on 2 December. His Excellency said that although Councillors felt strongly that he should return to the colony after discussions with Minsters on the future of the Falklands, it would be an unjustifiable charge on public funds (*Falkland Islands Times*, 7 December 1976, p. 2).

In understanding the factors that combined with Ian Campbell's death to create the chronopolitical and crowd-accelerated emergency which destroyed

French's governorship, Islanders' discourse in the *Falkland Islands Times* offers valuable insights. Stuart Wallace's letter of 3 September mapped out a culture of secrecy, rumour and censorship sub-emergency 4 (information control), and by extension sub-emergency 3 (governance) – to the degree that the author reimagined French's 'Falkland Administration' as a 'junta', the damaging implication being that the Governor's administration – like the Argentine junta – was acting autocratically, constricting the democratic space available to Islanders, with Chief Secretary Arthur Monk singled out for particular criticism.

The construction of Wallace's letter is of particular interest; words which scaffold a narrative of an untrusting and untrustworthy administration are placed in italics. Significantly, there is a clear sense of disseminated official narratives from the French administration being disbelieved, at least by some of the invisible crowd of Falkland radio listeners, and of an undemocratic administration's past and present failings presaging future ones:

> The events of the past weeks have given rise to much doubting of our administration's ability to run the day to day affairs of our community, the bulletins from the Mr Arthur Monk, have been largely *evasions* and contained nothing that any good 4.5 listener was not already aware of.
>
> The incident at New Island resulted in the loss of one of our aircraft, and with the hospitalisation of our other pilot, caused many Campers inconvenience and much anxiety. Yet we *did not hear officially* of the grounding of our pilot nor did a *whisper* of the results of any enquiry reach us.
>
> The Falkland administration seems incapable of conducting the simplest of our affairs in *anything resembling an open and honest manner*. I *hear* that our own people *supposedly* in positions of some authority are not allowed to make any real decisions without first trotting up to the Chief Secretary and getting his approval.
>
> 'Keep taking the pills' seems to be ExCo's current maxim. *Shrouded in secrecy* and, *reportedly*, constantly hampered by the Governor's directives on 'Correct Procedure', they meet regularly at dead of day on the outskirts of Stanley. At some recent meetings Mr. John Smith was the only elected member present. (Good on Yer John!) Did someone mention a Junta!' (*Falkland Islands Times,* 6 November 1976, p. 8).

Framings of rumour and suspicion such as 'evasions', 'whisper' and 'shrouded in secrecy' suggested an intensification of anxieties about sub-emergencies 3

(governance) and 4 (information control), articulating the collapse in trust between the Governor and a vocal section of Islander opinion, the latter key in the emergence of the invisible or visible 'prohibitory' crowd (Aradau 2015), and gubernatorial loss of chronopolitical control. The breakdown in relations between the Governor and a number of Islanders, itself a growing factor in accelerating slow emergency, brought a further exacerbatory intensity to sub-emergency 1 (socio-economic) by causing intra-Islander tensions about how to respond to the French administration. A readiness to think the worst of French was well established, and it has been noted too that he was suspected by Falkland Islanders of instructing the police to keep certain Islanders under surveillance on suspicion that they were considered violent towards resident Argentines (Dodds 2002, p. 153).

This narrative of decline, suspicion and mistrust, reflecting the intensification of sub-emergencies 1 (socio-economic), 3 (governance) and 4 (information control), was reinforced by Don Davidson of West Point Island, in his letter of 26 October 1976; in this he confirmed that he had been one of the radio-telephone users who had recently been outspoken about the French administration, so confirming his role as a member of the invisible but highly audible emotional radio-telephone crowd that denounced French in the aftermath of the recent protest crowds in Stanley. He asserted that the only controversial comment that he had made over the radio-telephone was that Governor French's Falklands 'could virtually be called a 'benevolent dictatorship' (*Falkland Islands Times,* 6 November 1976, p.11), so highlighting for the crowd of radio-telephone listeners the continuing (chrono)political pressure on a governor whose tenure was rapidly coming to a close, through amplifying the widespread view that French's administration was autocratic and controlling. His letter reads as somewhat contrite, but also self-justificatory, and certainly confirms the extended geographical spread of his crowd-audience:

> Firstly I was speaking to my elected representative Mr. L.G. Blake, on matters which were worrying me deeply, and in the only way available to people on islands (sic) at the present time, the R.T; exercising my right as a British citizen, to free speech. I do not ask members to agree with what I say but I expect

> them to uphold my right to say it [...] In my talk to my representative, after which eight Camp stations on the East and West came up and agreed with me, the only statement I made which I think might come under the ire of the councillors, is that I expressed the opinion that "we are living under what could virtually be called a benevolent dictatorship". Now one of the things about a benevolent dictatorship, is that people can live their lives as they wish as long as they keep their opinions to themselves and don't criticise the actions, or lack of them, of government […]. *People are unsettled* because of a *lack of facts* and *lack of contact* with the administration, which breeds *mistrust*' (*Falkland Islands Times,* 6 November 1976, pp. 10-11).

Davidson's letter makes clear how sub-emergencies 2 (socio-economic), 3 (governance) and 4 (information control) had all been negatively affected, with the 'unsettled' state of Islanders (*Falkland Islands Times,* 6 November 1976, p. 11) directly linked to French's information management style, itself disruptively accelerating, rather than usefully decelerating, slow emergency in the Islands, and his loss of chronopolitical control.

A similar critical perspective on the French administration is offered by Sydney Miller, one of the Stanley councillors who had resigned, in his letter of 29 October. Miller was robust in describing how he had sought to mobilise the radio-telephone as a crowd-inducing chronopolitical weapon against the French administration, in order to 'awaken' Islanders to aspects of 'the Administrations performance' (sub-emergency 3 – governance), and the 'secrecy' of the Islands Councils meetings (sub-emergency 3 – governance; sub-emergency 4 – information control) (*Falkland Islands Times,* 6 November 1976, p. 12). Miller explained his crowd-focused accelerative actions in these terms:

> Very recently by radio telephone undisguised criticism was used by this writer to *stir* the colony's people and in particular to *awaken* your members of council to some of the facts of the Administrations performance. People were stirred and the response was colony wide but the combined Councils which sat in total *secrecy* as is customary seem to have produced something of a damp squib. True enough in a subsequent broadcast which he told us was his own manufacture, one member [Adrian Monk] made lofty remarks, to use his own words, about ' talking in an immoderate way on the radio in deplorable bad taste which does harm to relations with Argentina'[…] This kind of pussyfooting towards a foreign country does nobody any good. Any internal criticism is within our own family of people and we are totally uninterested in any degrading appeasement of foreign opinion. That attitude has both annoyed and worried me during the recent ExCo years (*Falkland Islands Times,* 6 November 1976, p. 12).

In Miller's narrative, sub-emergency 4 (information control), and by extension sub-emergency 3 (governance), had become seriously compromised due to the geopolitical issue of the 'nature' of the relationship with Argentina (sub-emergency 2). Miller's critique, that over time, both during and before French's administration, the development of a culture of preventative 'secrecy' was attributable to 'pussyfooting' towards Argentina, represented a significant denunciation of the limits of freedom of expression in the Falklands. As conceived by Miller, an uncomfortable undemocratic present and, potentially, future had been created out of past 'kowtowing' to Argentina. Miller had deliberately sought to rouse Islanders and mobilise Councillors against pre-emptively talking (chrono)politics against the French administration, weaponising the radio-telephone as a source of disruptive, crowd-inducing discourse, so adding new exacerbatory intensities to sub-emergencies 3 (governance) and 4 (information control).

Further explanation of the accelerative factors in slow emergency, which is likely to have fed the frustration of the invisible and visible crowd, and added to temporal pressure on French, can be seen in Margaret Davidson's chronopolitically activist letter of 26 October 1976, addressed to 'the four elected members of the Legislature and the *Falkland Islands Times*'. Margaret Davidson argued that in the past and present under the French administration, 'the position continues to worsen' (*Falkland Islands Times,* 7 December 1976, p. 5), as exemplified in the New Island Incident, creating a bleak Falklands future.

Similarly, themes of secrecy – key aspects of the emergency in the governance of the Islands (sub-emergency 3) – were strongly articulated, through words/phrases such as 'silent' and 'in the dark' (as italicised below). The letter offers a powerful insight into emergency-acceleration in the Falklands, with Davidson subversively arguing that only in one respect was secrecy not being maintained, that is through Argentine monitoring of the radio-telephone.

> How can you ask a group of people whose very lives have and still are being

> gambled with to show restraint as *the position continues to worsen.* Rome may not have been built in a day but accidents - mortal accidents do happen in a day…(*Falkland Islands Times,* 7 December 1976, p. 5).

Granted some, repeat some, of the recent conversations were hysterical so but often they are the only information we have. How otherwise would we on the West have known anything about some recent events? – e.g. the reasons behind the Ex-Co resignations, the public meetings in Stanley. Government *tells us nothing*. The broadcasting system is *silent*. Our Leg Co members tell us nothing – admittedly in the case of our representative on the West, because he was probably *as much in the dark* as we were. I am sure *if a more free public debate* was the rule here in the Islands, the hysterical tone of such conversation would disappear.

> I am quite sure that our RT system is avidly *monitored* on the coast, but do you honestly think that anything we may say here will have the slightest effect on the United Nations? We must realise that our skins are the wrong colour to make any impression at the UN' (*Falkland Islands Times,* 7 December 1976, p. 5).

The emotional framing offered by Margaret Davidson – one of past, present and continuing (future) decline – sub-emergency 1 (socio-economic) – and resentment towards a culture of secrecy under Governor French (sub-emergencies 3 (governance), and 4 (information control) – maps out key accelerative elements in speeding up slow emergency, a chronopolitical process catalyzed by French's mishandling of the aero-emergency of latter 1976. Davidson's narrative acknowledges that some of the discourse of the invisible crowd on the radio-telephone had been 'hysterical' (*Falkland Islands Times,* 7 December 1976, p. 5), reflective of the highly charged, febrile 'state' of some Islanders in latter 1976. The question of how best to respond to the deterioration in relations between the French Administration and Islanders proved a source of tension within the Islander community, accelerating sub-emergency 1 (socio-economic). Whereas the Davidsons and Sydney Miller favoured a more robust approach, Adrian Monk took a more conciliatory, though not uncritical, line. In a letter to the *Falkland Islands Times* of 15 November 1976, Monk stated:

> I agree entirely with a great deal of what Margaret Davidson says. No one supports free speech more than I do. No one wants a more democratic form of council than I do. No one is more aware of administration's shortcomings all has felt more frustrated than I have on occasions (*Falkland Islands Times,* 15 December 1976, p. 6).

He then pointedly sought to re-frame Margaret Davidson's advocacy of free speech and freedom of information in the Falklands, maintaining that criticism of governance (sub-emergency 3) and the dissemination of information (sub-emergency 4) served to undermine the effort to manage Argentina (sub-emergency 2).

> The right of free speech brings responsibilities as well. Criticisms, questions, doubts, condemnations etcetera should be made in a reasonable manner, especially over the radio [...] If Margaret Davidson thinks nothing we say makes the slightest difference in the United Nations then I'm afraid she is living in cloud cuckoo land. Without strong lobbying of members of parliament by FI committee members and others in the past it is doubtful if we would still be British. If when we disagree with the Administration's actions, or lack of them, we indulge in scurrilous comments about senior officials of Her Majesty's personal representative [French] then we do nothing to strengthen the British government resolve in keeping us British and everything to help be part of Argentina's case which is that, we are a downtrodden colonial population under a despotic expatriat regime *(Falkland Islands Times,* 7 December 1976, p. 6).

In addressing Davidson's critique, and through that engaging with the anti-French visible/invisible crowd, Monk acknowledged – this time through the medium of the published letter rather than spoken word – that there were legitimate concerns about the dissemination of information in the Falklands; he 'even' pointed out that he had proposed that broadcasting – namely the dissemination of information – be transferred from the Falkland authorities to a group – or micro-crowd – of citizens. This initiative, a means to address sub-emergency 4 (information control), would however have compromised sub-emergency 3 (governance), as the chronopolitical management of information was seen to be directly related to governance in the Islands. In claiming that the usage of the radio telephone had validated some concerns from the French administration about misuse of media, he effectively sought to reclaim 'the RT' from crowd-inducing chronopolitical activism, and turn Margaret Davidson's critique against her.

> Finally I would like to point out that I recently introduced a motion and legislative council that would have taken the control of all broadcasting from the administration and put it in the hands of an autonomous body of citizens. The idea being to dispense with Administration censorship and to encourage more public debate on matters of interest and a better news service. In the course of the debate on this the chairman secretary faulted the issue with a lot of verbal red herrings. Anyway the motion was lost the majority of Legislative council members opposed it.
>
> I got the impression at the time that they believe in freedom of speech but doubtful if we were in all respects ready for it, thinking that our broadcasts might often degenerate into slanging matches. I entirely disagree with that thinking and still do though I am bound to state my confidence was somewhat shaken when I listen to some, and I repeat, some of the comments made on the RT in the last few weeks (*Falkland Islands Times,* 7 December 1976, p. 6).

The intensification of sub-emergencies 3 (governance) and 4 (information control) as accelerative factors was robustly addressed by the *Falkland Islands Times* of 7 December 1976; this included a provocative mobilisation of the term 'desiring the right', a direct allusion to 'Desire the Right' on the Falklands Coat of Arms, with the implied criticism that the French administration had subverted this. The highly critical tone of this piece, with its emphasis on sub-emergency 3 (governance), not only helped undermine the credibility of (departing) Governor French and his associates, but also functioned as a potential chronopolitical 'call-to arms' for further crowd-resistance.

> How many of us complain in the right quarters about some of our uncivil civil servants who act sometimes like mini-Hitlers or express their concern about the sorry state of our Police force (now down to one regular constable and two 'specials') or the way animals will roam around the Town or question the upsurge in expenditure on the upkeep of Government House or many other things that spring to mind when desiring the right (*Falkland Islands Times,* 7 December 1976, p. 1).

The *Falkland Islands Times* then accelerates its critique, alleging 'suppression' by the French administration, and confirms the past and present destabilising and disruptive impact of the New Island incident on Islander trust in governance (sub-emergency 3).

> As for suppression (using the least sinister meanings) we could give many instances such as the Alpha lima (New Island) accident'. It was never publicly reported that there had been an Inquiry but after reporting an incorrect statement made in the House of Commons on 15 November a Government

> announcement stated – 'As the public will be aware a formal Investigation under the Colonial Air Navigation Order was in fact held by the Chief Secretary who as appointed Inspector for the purpose and he was assisted by the Supt. Civil Aviation and the Airport manager (*Falkland Islands Times,* 7 December 1976, p. 1).

The operative point is that amongst some Islanders bad faith on the part of the French administration was widely assumed, and this had already led to the chronopolitical performance of Stanley's resistance crowds on 19-20 October 1976. French's methods of information control had provided grounds to assume the worst, another accelerative factor in slow emergency. Indeed, there appears to have been a perception, which the *Falkland Islands Times* confirms, that French's 'suppression' appears to have been more extensive than it actually was, giving French further opprobrium without any additional operational 'benefit'.

Sub-emergency 4 (control of information) had not deteriorated to the degree that some Islanders may have believed, as evidenced by the publication of the charge of 'suppression' on the first page of the *Falkland Islands Times*, and the unrestrained use of the radio-telephone by some 'members' of the invisible crowd. The *Falkland Islands Times* further illustrates this point in seeking to expose the 'dissembling' methods applied by the Chief Secretary in managing unwelcome discourse:

> Then, of course we have the more flagrant type of suppression – censorship, which contrary to the belief of some, we do suffer. A most recent example of this was when, after the completion of the last edition of *The Times*, and due to the embargo on all F.I.G.A.S operations (including medical flights) there were some 160 copies at the Post Office awaiting distribution to the Camp and it was obvious that most Campers would not be able to read theirs for some time. I [Editor] submitted page 3 of it (Don Davidson's fairy story) for inclusion in the 19th November newsletter. However, when I rang the Chief Secretary, who appears to be responsible for much unrest here lately, to ask him why it had not been read he told me that newsreaders did not make it a practice of reading newspaper articles (a downright lie) and that as 'editor' of the Newsletter programme he considered it unsuitable ….
>
> Until more people stand up and let themselves be counted there is an increasing danger that the aforementioned diseases will become terminal. The writing has been on the wall for some time now and it is up to us to heed the writing on the wall before it is too late' (*Falkland Islands Times,* 7 December 1976, p. 1).

From the opinions expressed in the *Falkland Islands Times*, whether in letters or the preceding editorial, it is clear that a range of factors – or at least Islander perceptions of these – drove the acceleration of slow emergency, and a bleak anticipated future; these included secrecy, dissembling, 'pandering' towards Argentina, with the chronopolitical activism of the visible and invisible Islander crowd the response to these concerns. The developing aero-emergency of late 1976 coalesced with such concerns to make a politically toxic amalgam for Governor French, resulting in an overall acceleration of slow emergency, gubernatorial loss of chronopolitical control and subsequent pre-emptive removal. Far from being able to preventively deliver British government objectives in the Islands, French had increasingly become an accelerative factor in sub-emergencies 1 (socio-economic), 3 (governance) and 4 (control of information); his lack of credibility in the eyes of many Islanders rendered him incapable of managing sub-emergency 2 (geopolitical). Damagingly, he had been unable to prevent Stanley's 'popular revolt' of 20-21 October 1976. Ironically French's excessive use of tactics such as information control and censorship prevented him from fulfilling the very strategy of 'cooperation' with Argentina upon which he had placed such emphasis; his inability to secure the confidence of Islanders proved self-defeating, incapacitating him from acting as a credible advocate of preventative cooperation with Argentina.

The Falklands 'slow emergency' claimed both the Shackleton Report and the French Administration as its casualties. Whilst the case can be made that, given the micro-population, sub-emergencies 1 (socio-economic), 3 (governance) and 4 (information control) in the Islands are Lilliputian concerns, this underestimates their significance.

French's gubernatorial failures and chronopolitical loss of control achieved national prominence – again – in *The Times* on 8 December 1976, which having informed its readership about the sour political atmosphere in the Islands, explained that matters had deteriorated to the point that he had now been withdrawn:

> The island [sic] is seething with discontent and uncertainty, and in October public protest demonstrations took place of a kind never before seen in the islands' history. Councillors and islanders accused the Governor Neville French, the Chief Secretary, Mr Arthur Monk, and his deputy Mr Doug Morrison of 'misleading and misinforming' them. Shortly after the latest demonstration involving about 200 people in Port Stanley, which only has a total population of 900, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office announced that Mr French would be replaced by a new Governor Mr J.R.W. Parker, a career diplomat (*The Times,* 8 December 1976, p. 16).

Whilst attritional, slow emergency over time remained the dominant feature of the Falklands in the Shackleton-French era, French's particular 'contribution' was to animate 'lesser' sub-emergencies to varying degrees, counter-productively reduce the Islanders' democratic space and provoke chronopolitical activist crowd-resistance; this in turn led to an overall acceleration of slow emergency, and his preventative removal from office in the uncomfortable present his past actions had created for himself.

6.5 Slow emergency in the Shackleton-French era – the neutralisation of the Shackleton Report, and atmosphere of demoralisation

The accelerated Slow Falklands Emergency of late 1976 which had resulted in French's gubernatorial scalp had coincided not only with the progressive side-lining of the Shackleton Report, but also Argentina's present emergency of the Jorge Videla-led military junta's rule; indeed, notwithstanding representations of the French administration as a 'junta' in the Islands, French's handling of sub-emergencies 3 (governance) and 4 (information control) bore no serious relation to that of Argentina's military governance. Whilst French's rule had expired by late 1976, the Falklands lobby in the United Kingdom had sought to keep the future envisioned by Shackleton Report alive, and pre-emptively reminded British domestic opinion that Falkland Islanders, as British subjects, should be protected from Argentine junta rule. In a letter to *The Times* entitled 'Future of the Falkland Islands', former Governor Sir Cosmo Haskard strongly made this point, emphasising the need for a future in Islanders could rely on British support against Argentina:

> Last night I heard on BBC 4 an interview with a correspondent recently returned from Buenos Aires. His description of conditions in Argentina, where

> the rule of law appears to be ignored, serves as a reminder of the state of affairs in which Falkland Islanders could be subjected if ever their homeland should be transferred to Argentine sovereignty.
>
> Is it not wrong that the inhabitants of these islands should in any way be subjected to pressure designed to compel them to opt for Argentina?
> (Sir Cosmo Haskard in *The Times,* 21 September 1976, p. 13).

As 1976 waned, it was clear that preventative official resistance in Whitehall to Shackleton's pre-emptive recommendations had to all intents and purposes prevailed, and that the future implementation of the Report was as effectively side-lined as (former) Governor French's career. On the same day [8 December 1976] that *The Times* had announced French's departure from the Falklands, correspondent Michael Frenchman reported on the British authorities' unwillingness to construct a Falklands future based on the implementation of Shackleton's recommendations, and so pre-emptively decelerate sub-emergency 1 (socio-economic), albeit at the risk of accelerating sub-emergency 2 (geopolitical) through 'disregarding' Argentina. He observed: 'Islanders fear that the Shackleton Report will be ignored. Unless something is done quickly they believe the noose is being tightened economically so that they will be forced into accepting an unwanted solution with the Argentine' (*The Times,* 8 December 1976, p. 16).

Frenchman symbolically contrasted the unwelcome future that awaited following the neutralisation of the Shackleton Report with the first ever group wreath-laying by Islanders at the Cenotaph in London, due to happen that day, in commemoration of the 8 December 1914 Battle of the Falklands. The juxtaposition of a supportive loyal Falkland crowd commemorating war dead, with elements of the British government, notably the Foreign Office, that sought to accommodate Argentina was not a helpful chronopolitical framing for the British government, the clear implication being that it was neither patriotic nor willing to follow through on the findings of the Report it had commissioned. Frenchman's article even implied that the Shackleton Report – through its non-implementation, and by extension compounding of sub-emergency 1 (socio-economic) – was being manipulated to create a future in which disappointed Islanders turned away from Britain. He warned that:

> It is now more than four months since the Shackleton report on the disputed British colony of the Falkland Islands was published. Whitehall has still failed to implement any of its recommendations and a Foreign and Commonwealth Office spokesman will only say that Lord Shackleton's team's proposal on the economic future of the Islands 'are under active consideration'. Any further inquiries, particularly over lengthening the permanent airstrip being built by the British government which could provide the islands' only lifeline for a growth economy would seem to indicate that the only thing Whitehall wants to do is to deny any economic development to the islands. This attitude appears to be adopted in the hope that it will lessen the demands to remain British (*The Times,* 8 December 1976, p. 16).

The geopolitical reality was that the Callaghan government preventatively wished to avoid accelerating the Argentine element of slow emergency (sub-emergency 1), and pre-emptively adopting the Shackleton Report would simply ensure a future of Anglo-Argentine tension over the Islands. Ignoring Shackleton's recommendations offered the prospect of a Falklands future in which the colony would be degraded to the point of socio-economic non-viability, managed decline presenting the opportunity of realising the inevitable outcome of manufactured slow emergency, namely accommodating Argentine sovereignty claims. Unsurprisingly, the sidelining of the Report had contributed to an atmosphere of growing pessimism in the Islands about the future, as was ruefully acknowledged in The Falkland Islands Association newsletter of November 1976. A narrative of demoralized Islanders struggling with present adversity, a neglected 'British crowd' in need of support, was powerfully conveyed, with particular emphasis placed on the pre-emptive importance of building an extension to the airfield, without which a future of slow emergency and Argentine domination looked unavoidable.

> The Falkland Islands are passing through one of the most difficult periods in their history and they need all the support we can give them. It is with regret that we have to report that morale in the Falkland Islands is at a low ebb. Unusually severe weather conditions, loss of confidence in the government executive and delay in a definitive announcement regarding the extension of the airfield at all contributed to this state of affairs. The United Kingdom Falkland Islands Committee is convinced that the answer to the problem of the colony lies in the extension to the airfield. The Committee has therefore concentrated its efforts over the past few months on this one aspect of the country's affairs (Falkland Islands Association Newsletter 1a, November 1976, p. 1).

French's December 1976 departure was no compensation for the enduring present of unaddressed socio-economic and governance sub-emergencies (1 and 3 respectively); with no prospect in sight of a post Shackleton future in which the malaise of slow emergency would be pre-emptively alleviated, an atmosphere of demoralisation prevailed. Evidence of the profound, ongoing tensions extant within the Islands at this time can be seen in a letter published in the 4 January 1977 edition of the *Falkland Islands Times*; its author, Dave Coalville offers a highly critical framing of past and present life in the Islander community, to the point of suggesting that those who lacked faith in the British government's good intent should remove themselves from the Islands, and so from being involved in the Islands' (chrono)political future. Whereas Coalville was generous, or perhaps naïve, about the British Government's bona fides, he did not hold back in singling out individual Islanders:

> Why don't […] Jimmy Alasia, Mr. Haddon, Mrs. Malcolm and the Spruces pack their gear and go somewhere else if they have no faith in the British government. I've lived under this present British government and it is surely one of the best Britain has ever had […] Self-determination I've heard a lot about, not to mention self-importance and self-pity. What a lovely place to work in. Huh! Yours sincerely, D. Coalville (*Falkland Islands Times,* 4 January 1977, p. 5).

A sense of post-Shackleton despondency within the invisible Islander crowd is palpably articulated by 'a Kelper', who warned of a present and future 'detention camp atmosphere' (*Falkland Islands Times,* 15 April 1977, p. 3). This demoralised atmosphere is constructed by the author through a feeling of the incarceration of Islanders, and loss of control of their mobilities, being subject to the bureaucratic *force majeure* of Argentine state power. That this perception existed within the Islander community, that the Falklands were de facto 'prison islands', shows the degree to which Falklands governance (sub-emergency 3) and geopolitics (sub-emergency 2) were intimately connected; of significance too, is that whilst the socio-economic neglect of sub-emergency 1 was a keenly felt feature of Islander life, this particular rendering exclusively focuses on feeling imprisoned:

> The Falkland Islands –
> A political prison for 2000 British subjects in the South Atlantic.

> A place where ingress and egress for all travellers, except VIPs is controlled by Argentina.
> That even Armed Forces personnel have to obtain a permit before they can enter the colony from the Argentine is disturbing enough and increases the detention camp atmosphere.
> That the Falkland Islands is in the hands of an oppressive harsh regime would be ideal for concentration camps has been noted and discussed.
>
> Contributed by a Kelper (one of the pawns) (*Falkland Islands Times,* 15 April 1977, p. 3).

Whilst this represents the affective experience of Falklands' slow emergency as felt by at least one 'pawn' Islander, the broader point – as the aforementioned Falkland Islands Association Newsletter of November 1976 noted – was that the British government's reluctance to extend the airport ensured Argentine aerial control, and that Islanders, or at least their mobilities, were ultimately in thrall to the Argentine junta, with their futures facing a similar prospect.

Hopes of pre-emptive improvement, which had been had momentarily aroused by the Shackleton Report, had largely flickered out for many Islanders by 1977. The British government's preventative prioritisation of addressing the geopolitical sub-emergency over the socio-economic sub-emergency was confirmed both in its sidelining of the Shackleton Report, and 1977's renewed Anglo-Argentine diplomatic efforts under minister Ted Rowlands. A sceptical editorial in the *Falkland Islands Times*, entitled 'A turning point for better or for worse?', directed its attention to Rowlands' upcoming March 1977 visit, striking a sceptical tone about Labour ministers in the past and how the Shackleton Report would henceforth be 'used' in the future:

> It was a Labour government minister of state (in the form of Lord Chalfont) who came here in 1968 hoping that it would take little persuasion to get us to embrace Argentina like some kind of foster parents. However next week's messenger will arrive with a trump card. He will no doubt tell us that Friend of the Falkland Lord Shackleton states in his Economic Survey that our future lies with cooperation and even participation of our neighbour Argentina – a country whose language, culture, history and political regimes are as foreign to us as a Circassian circle [popular Falkland dance] is to them (*Falkland Islands Times,* 11 February 1977, p. 2).

Socio-economic anxieties (sub-emergency 1) remained unresolved by Rowlands' visit, with the Shackleton Report now 'reclaimed' by the British authorities as a point of reference to encourage future 'co-operation' with Argentina (sub-emergency 2). Nor was trust in the British government's bona fide deepened; Velma Malcolm cites how when 'The (Falkland Islands) committee met him at Neil Watson's house on Pioneer row and we could barely get a word in but I'm nearly sure he reassured us. However no sooner had he left here than it was announced he was going back to Argentina to discuss sovereignty' (Malcolm 2002, p. 102).

The neutralisation of the Shackleton Report's pre-emptive recommendations was recognised in a Falkland Islands Association newsletter article entitled 'Implementation of the Shackleton report', in which an epitaph was effectively written for '[t]his imaginative and constructive survey', of which it stated that;

> the determination and will to build a strong diversified economy which would increase even the present economic contribution to Britain have been frustrated by political pressure and bureaucratic procrastination (Falkland Islands Association Newsletter 1b, June 1977, p. 1).

Falkland Islanders had, briefly, through the Shackleton Report had a glimpse of what would prove to be a counter-factual future; the slow emergency, which had defined both the colony's past, had a firm preventative on the present, with a strategic chronopolitical future of socio-economic degrading which looked set to lead to a geopolitical recrudesence of las Islas Malvinas in the space once occupied by the failed colony of the Falkland Islands.

6.6 Conclusion

The Falklands of the mid-1970s provide a valuable case study for unpacking the workings of slow emergency. This period sheds light on how speed can be seen to affect the unfolding of emergency over time through causing acceleration or deceleration, a process which, for the most part, was slowly played out over years rather than quickly in days, hours or minutes. The experience of slow emergency for the Falklands in this era was the socio-

economic equivalent of 'death by a thousand cuts' for this damaged and deteriorating British colony; there was no single, fatal blow such as the fast emergency of Argentina's attempted 'military solution' in April 1982, though the strategic chronopolitical logic of Whitehall's disregard for the Shackleton report had the potential to be that blow. The overall speed of slow emergency at any given time was relational to the sub-emergencies that caused it to accelerate or decelerate.

It is particularly sub-emergency 1 (socio-economic) where slow emergency sticks; whereas the other sub-emergencies (geopolitical: governance: information control) have moments of intensification which can reach the point of crisis (for example, governance under French), but can become less intense. In contrast, the Falklands' socio-economic decline, especially the demographic winter that depopulation was causing, was not becoming less intense; whatever might, or might not, ultimately happen with sub-emergency 2 (geopolitical), it was clear that without a population there was no future for the beleaguered colony of the Falkland Islands.

The chronopolitical dangers posed to the Falkland Islands from slow emergency may not have been as dramatic or immediate as those of the fast emergency of the 1982 Anglo-Argentine Conflict, but were no less profound; both emergencies – the slow Falklands emergency prior to April 1982, and the fast Falkland emergency of April-June 1982 – offered a means, albeit through different speeds and temporalities, to bring about the geopolitical extinction of the Falklands as a British colonial entity. In essence, the colony of the Falkland Islands was the product of a failed past and a failing present, both resulting from London's preventative continuation of slow emergency; the strategic chronopolitical logic that las Islas Malvinas would be the future appeared inescapable, so removing Britain's anachronistic South Atlantic liability.

This said, the compressed temporality of fast emergency does not necessarily lend itself to predictable geopolitical outcomes as readily as slow emergency. The slow emergency of the socio-economic degradation of the Falklands

under British rule in the pre-1982 period, not least the Shackleton-French era, offered a more certain path to the British withdrawal from the Islands than the 74-day misadventure of Argentina's 1982 fast emergency 'bid' to secure the Malvinas, and illustrates the importance of a considered strategic chronopolitics in achieving advantageous geopolitical outcomes.

The Shackleton-French era of 1975-77 helps reveal the subtle and preventative weaponisation of slow emergency by the British authorities against the Falkland Islanders through strategic chronopolitics, with the former directing the pressures of socio-economic decline against this micro-community's continued viability. Aradau's (2015) highlighting of role of the crowd as a factor in emergency provides a valuable starting point in our unpacking of the countervailing chronopolitical activism of the Falklands crowd – visible and invisible – in the Shackleton-French era, be that the warm crowd-reception that Shackleton received, or the destabilizing, pre-emptive crowd-resistance offered to the French administration. Whatever the accelerative or decelerative speed of slow emergency at any given point in time, 'drastic action' (Neocleous 2006, p. 194) was required to pre-emptively extricate the Falklands from its slow malaise, with the neutralisation of the Shackleton Report entrenching this, promising a very uncomfortable future for Falkland Islanders. Applying Nixon's notion of slowness (2011) to emergency rather than violence thus offers a valuable speed-related focus, a slow perspective emphasising as it does that emergency can be a long, drawn out and attritional process, in which slow years, rather than fast hours or minutes, prove decisive in determining outcomes, geopolitical or otherwise.

Chapter Seven – The 'Angry Islander' Controversy: Bodily Emergency

7.1 Introduction

Fig. 7.1. Slow emergency Stanley

Source: Panorama, October 1966, p. 5

This photo of Stanley, Fig 7.1 capital of the Falkland Islands, offers an elementally exposed Union Jack as a focal point, visually articulating Islander loyalty and expressing British sovereignty. The image captures a view of the worn, battered, and ramshackle nature of much of Stanley of the slow emergency era, hardly a jewel in what remained of the colonial crown. The rusted 'wriggly tin' roofs, and the battered and impermanent wooden structures, suggest that the Islands' capital was 'down at heel'. The picture was captioned 'The only city in the world without a housing problem', confirming that *Panorama* (October 1966, p. 5) had not intended it to convey a flattering image of Stanley; notwithstanding this, it succeeds in highlighting material features of the colony's slow emergency, such as buildings in slow deterioration and a lack of investment.

Through this photographic image of Stanley, one is offered an insight into what the future, and more immediately the present held, for young Falkland women and men growing up in the colony who, unless they emigrated, faced the prospect of spending their adult life in Stanley (or else an isolated Camp settlement). Whilst deliberately depicted as a loyal shantytown by *Panorama*, it is clear that this photographic framing of Stanley was not without some foundation; all *Panorama's* photographer had needed to do was to photograph what already existed, albeit selectively.

Unlike their male counterparts female Islanders of marrying age had an increasingly used way of avoiding a personal future living under a British slow emergency or incorporation into Argentina. Young women had the opportunity to date/marry a Royal Marine stationed in the Falklands, and so secure a new life outside of the Islands; many decided to do so, thereby exacerbating slow emergency demographic decline. This was a point that the 1976 Report affirmed.

This chapter specifically focuses on gender imbalance in the Islands, and the tensions this generated, which became highly exposed through the 'Angry Islander' controversy of November to December 1978. This was a divisive and contentious episode within the Islander community about the attritional loss of Islander women to the Royal Marines, and was conducted through the pages of the *Falkland Island Times*. It was initiated by a letter to the editor from an anonymous author 'Angry Islander'. The issues raised in the 'Angry Islander' controversy – gender imbalance, women's agency and depopulation – brought into question, irrespective of Argentine territorial ambitions, the very future of the Islands' community; this discourse understandably evoked strong responses from Islanders, as the original choice of the *nom de plume* 'Angry Islander' itself reflects. The framing of this chapter lies particularly in gender, but also takes account of race and domestic violence. Of the latter, Gray (2019, p.196) has argued that:

> the domestic violence which takes place in warzones should not be treated as external to 'what war really is', rather, like other aspects of how people in warzones negotiate their everyday lives, and like other aspects of violence *within* warring groups, domestic violence can be seen as part of the social

> relations of war itself.

Applying this logic to the pressures of life in the Falklands in the years leading up to 1982, it does not require a great leap to see intimate relationships as part of the social relations of slow emergency; while slow emergency does not presuppose that intimate tensions need exist between couples, where these did exist, it is likely that that wider slow emergency pressures affected the speed and amplified the intensities of strained relationships.

Brickell (2008, p.1674) has found, in respect of her research into the relationship between alcohol and gender-based violence post-conflict Cambodia, how various factors were used to explain alcohol-related domestic violence. She cites 'decline in the state of marital relationships, the prevalence of family and employment related difficulties and the broader political environment of Cambodia both past and present' as among the factors cited by her interviewees, noting 'the emphasis placed by men and women on external factors as largely responsible for gender-based violence' (Brickell 2008, p.1674). Brickell's reference to a 'decline in the state of marital relationships' suggests the relevance of the idea of intimate slow emergency. Pain (2014, p.132) too puts forward an argument that supports the idea of the embeddedness of emergency in strained marital relationships, where the 'routine' nature of domestic violence provides a measure of predictability about the frequency, and therefore likely speed and intensity, of the intimate emergency of domestic violence. Pain posits:

> in some ways, domestic violence is routine, for example compared with an assault by a stranger on the street, yet incidents of violence are always accompanied by a feeling of shock, and often experienced as coming 'out of the blue.

Such intimate violence is consistent with an emergency framing, with alcohol often functioning as a catalyst for emergency. It appears likely that such factors and mentalities were also at play in the Falklands, where wider slow emergency difficulties provided no shortage of reasons for domestic abusers to excuse/justify violence in the home.

7.2 Foregrounding the 'Angry Islander' controversy; its wider context and a paucity of female bodies

In foregrounding an evaluation of this controversy, and the role of the presence/absence of female bodies, it is important to consider gender, and also race. Male and female Islanders alike were offshore white British subjects, whose claim to be indigenous in their South Atlantic archipelago, rested on the successive generations of their forebears having lived in the archipelago since the 1840s. Taking this framing, the Royal Marines of our slow emergency era can also be said to assume the role of (white) colonisers, but rarely of colonists; when male marines married female Islanders, they rarely stayed on to settle in the Islands as colonists, only staying there until the end of their Falkland tour of duty.

British 'Kith and kin', euphemistic phrasing for 'white British' was how Falkland Islanders were often described in a rapidly decolonising world. When marital unions between an Islander female and a (male) Royal Marine took place, these were, racially speaking, 'white weddings', that is a marital union of white kith and kin. In this post war Second World War era, with its rising tide of decolonisation, a 'racialisation of British national identity in the face of black immigration from the Commonwealth and former colonies' (Ward 2004, p.50) occurred. A Falkland 'white wedding', in contrast, conformed with traditional representations that being British equated to being white. Of whiteness, Schwarz (2011, p.10) has observed 'It was perhaps most effective in informing Britons who they were not', and the ethnic homogeneity of the white British Falklands colony stood in contrast to the multi-cultural nature of modern Britain, or indeed the immigrant 'melting pot' of Argentina (even though, counterintuitively, Argentina was still overwhelmingly of white European descent).

Whereas the unofficial Falkland Islanders Councillors felt secure enough in the colony's white homogeneity to inform the British Parliament and Press in their February 1968 letter that 'there is no racial problem', gender proved to be a different matter altogether, and one of the most problematic aspects of

slow emergency for the Islands. That numerous younger female Islanders, the curators of indigenous Islander reproductivity, often chose a Royal Marine as a spouse, in preference to an indigenous male, represented both a demographic and reproductive loss, as well as female empowerment. In respect of the latter, in the slow emergency era, Islander women were able to reverse 'conventional' gender roles in leaving the colony; in asserting their own mobility, they left behind unmarried Islander males who had to stay home 'down on the (sheep) farm'. The numerical paucity of Islander women of reproductive age served to amplify female agentive power, and by extension their capacity to disrupt and reconfigure established gender hierarchies, to the disbenefit of unmarried male Islanders. This exercise of female agency, presented such Islander males with a personal slow emergency in which their prospects of a patriarchal role within a family context were being undermined by the lack of a female partner.

This gender imbalance was not, however, a unique occurrence in what had once been British Empire; in other former colonial territories inhabited by British descendants, achieving a numerical gender balance had been 'a painfully slow process. In Australia, for example, women did not equal the number of men until after the Second World War' (Johnson 2003, p.130). Unlike in Australia, New Zealand or Canada, the Falkland gender (im)balance grew more problematic, the slow emergency of the attritional loss of young Islander women as Royal Marine brides amounting to an asset-stripping of young females and their reproductivity from the Islands.

Not only did this reduction of female Islander presence place more pressure on those women who remained, it also had profound social and demographic impacts. Freedman assessed the declining Falklands demographic, and consequent social impacts, in these terms:

> The population decline was the result of migration and the exodus had worrying features. The decline was in camp more than Stanley, among kelpers more than immigrants, among women more than men. The result of this latter factor was that in critical age groups men were coming to exceed women by three to two. This had a number of unfortunate social effects, including a high rate of divorce (2005, p. 46).

The Islands were, as Freedman noted (2005, p. 47), visited 'a couple of months before Shackleton's team' by Colin Phipps for the Fabian Society, who produced his own aforementioned report *What future for the Falklands?*, in which he highlighted the challenges of Islander life, as seen through his male gaze.

He noted how emigration and particularly female depopulation accentuated its difficulties, raising questions about the Falklands' viability, with this bleak representation of the Islander community implicitly questioning whether this was a community that was even 'worth' saving. The following references (Phipps 1977, pp. 2-3) to 'drink and divorce'; 'adultery'; 'occasional incest'; and being outnumbered 'three to one' in Camp, highlight some of the key challenges which Islanders females faced.

> All of the principal social problems especially drink and divorce, arise from the isolation of a small tightly integrated community. It is the increasing impact of the outside world upon this community which is now breeding the most urgent social problem – emigration, mostly to the UK. It was the set intention of more than 60 per cent of the young people I met to emigrate at the first opportunity, and one of the local headmasters – an expatriate from the UK – has said he now regarded it as part of his duties to encourage this. Not for the first time in the Islands, it seems, that what had appeared a vision of romantic solitude from the UK soon shattered on the realities of an unending diet of mutton, beer and rum, with entertainment largely restricted to drunkenness and adultery, with occasional incest. Men outnumber women three to one in the settlements (Phipps 1977, pp. 2-3).

Phipps was not alone in flagging up the role of alcohol in Falkland life.
Fig. 7.2, a photo Argentine *Panorama* magazine had published a decade earlier, offers an insight into the drinking culture of Falkland life, showing Islanders socialising and drinking in a Stanley public house. While providing a framing of Islanders as substantial consumers of alcohol, the photographer's choice of subject was hardly pure invention, capturing alcohol-based male-

dominated socialisation.

Fig 7.3, from the same photo session, specifically shows (a) female drinking in Stanley. *Panorama* highlighted that, as performed by this Islander female, women were allowed to consume alcohol with men in Stanley's public houses, and further claimed that 'puritans' in the Islands denounced Stanley as 'the capital of infidelity' *(*Panorama*, October 1966, p. 14)*. In both these photos, drinking glasses are also prominently displayed, representing this object as a central feature of Falkland recreational life for male and female. Johnson (2003, p.130) relates how;

> In Australia and New Zealand, it was hoped that the emigration of women would force men to adopt more civilised patterns of behaviour, and improved work routines. Single men were thought to be susceptible to the vices of indolence, and drunkenness, but women would act as 'God's police'.

Fig. 7.2. Socialising and drinking in a Stanley public house.

Source: **Panorama*, October 1966, pp. 14-15***

In the Falklands, there were clearly insufficient women to 'patrol' alcohol consumption, or establish a more feminised drinking culture, and those

females who did imbibe in pubs appear, as in Fig 7.3, to have accepted the dominant masculine public drinking culture.

Fig. 7.3.: 'Mixed socialising and drinking in Stanley'

Source: **Panorama*, October 1966, p. 14***

The findings of the two-volume Shackleton Report (1976) similarly recorded these demographic trends and associated social impacts. Lord Shackleton has been commissioned by the British government to evaluate the viability of the colony of the Falkland Islands, and while overall the Report proved more positive than expected about the Falklands' prospects, it still bore witness to an Islander population base which was increasingly denuded and gender imbalanced, and highlighted the Royal Marines' impact on the Islander demographic. In reference to the preceding year 1975, Shackleton found that:

> the majority of migrants, are young (70 per cent under 30), that from among the locally born, women predominate […] A significant feature in regard to female emigration is that about two-fifths of the local women who left in 1975 were married to, or were about to marry, Royal Marines who had been stationed in the Islands. In a population depleted of women […] as the

> Falkland Islands this represents a significant loss (Shackleton Report (1), 1976, p. 13).

Of a total migration/bodily loss of 55 Islanders in 1975, the Shackleton Report in its recommendations found that 42 were female, of which 24 were adult female and 18 children, out of a population that 'at the end of 1975 is estimated at 1905, having declined from a peak of 2,400 in 1931' (Shackleton Report (2), 1976, p. 13). It also stated in its key findings that:

> 4. Sex structure – there is a significant surplus of males throughout the age range 15-64. In West Falkland in 1972, the age group 20-29 was made of 71 per cent males and 29 per cent females.
>
> 5. Marriage – doubtless because of the sex structure there are very few single women (8 per cent in 1972). The divorce rate is remarkably high' (Shackleton Report (2), 1976, p. 13).

As Shackleton confirms, retention of women was essential for the Islands' future, yet the diminishing presence of females to propagate the future of the community presaged a demographic collapse. It also foregrounded a collapse in the basis of British sovereignty over the Falklands in a post-colonial world, namely self-determination; by the mid-1970s the Islands' population had already slumped to under 2000 people, and continued female de-population held out the alarming prospect of a fatal erosion of self-determination, and by extension, the *locus standi* for British territorial retention. Hastings and Jenkins (1983, p.25) observed that:

> The islands' population may have been almost comically small, but in the context of post-imperial self-determination it had an emotional weapon to arm itself against change than any other community under the British Parliament.

Yet, this 'emotional weapon' (Hastings and Jenkins 1983, p. 25) was becoming increasingly blunted. Indeed, the Royal Marines' role, in conjunction with Islander females exercising personal agency in becoming their brides,, seriously weakened the Falkland demographically; this effectively turned the presence of the 'Royals' into a demographic 'Trojan horse', undermining the Islander community from within.

Smith (2014, pp. 1517-18) highlights the linkage between reproductive bodies and territory, relating how '[p]ronatal geopolitical strategy targets the fertile

potential of bodies and the territorial potential of babies'. Royal Marines providing the opportunity for women of reproductive age to exit the Falklands, and so preventing their future children 'territorialising' the Falklands, was doing Argentina's demographic work for it.

The Shackleton Report acknowledged the need to 'do something' about the Royal Marines' profound challenges, stating that: 'On civil/military relations, Lord Shackleton urged that consideration be given to accompanied tours and maximising the number of women in the garrison' (Hunt 1993, p. 353). This said, beyond their symbolic deterrant role, the Royal Marines' unchecked demographic depletion of female Islanders, increased the likelihood of a sovereignty transfer to Argentina, this presence/absence of female bodies being of profound geopolitical significance.

When Islander women exercised agency in choosing to marry a Royal Marine instead of a male Islander, this demographic loss was not without sovereignty implications. Smith further highlights the relationality between bodies and sovereignty:

> bodies become territory in a struggle to control what happens to each body (whether each reproduces or not, whether each is allowed to live or not) in the interest of projects of national territorialisation […] that is, that body counts determine sovereignty (Smith 2010, pp. 1516-17).

Owing to the presence of the Royal Marines, and consequent absence of Islander female bodies, this process was working in reverse – both existing (female) Islanders, and their future offspring, were lost to the Islander population.

There was a widespread contemporary understanding that there was a very real demographic problem, made worse by growing gender imbalance. There was a reluctance to acknowledge the awkward reality that Royal Marines and the Islander women who married them were indirectly doing Argentina's 'work', and that a demographic winter loomed. Shortly after the 1982 Conflict, Hastings and Jenkins commented that:

> The Falklands have long suffered from emigration and from a surplus of men to women. On West Falkland this ratio is more than two to one. The presence

> of a marine garrison, even just forty strong, marrying one or two a year and taking them back to England, has been a constant source of complaint. Girls of childbearing age in a community of just 1,800 people are a crucial local resource. One consequence has been a divorce rate estimated at three times that of a roughly equivalent Scottish community (1983, p. 24).

Captain Patrick Vincent of the Falkland Islands Association, also writing in 1983, similarly acknowledged the existence of a stark gender imbalance. He conveniently overlooked the individual agency of Islander women who chose to marry a Royal Marine, instead seeking to present Royal Marines' 'abduction' of females as 'positively' as possible, noting:

> Amongst the present inhabitants, there is some inequality in the numbers of men and women. On West Falkland, for example, at a count a few years ago there was one unmarried lady between the ages of 20 and 26, and 50 unmarried men. The Royal Marines detachments 'abduct' some half dozen or so Falkland Islands' girls each year, taking them home as Royal Marines brides, a sore point with the young men of the Islands! (Williams 1983, p. 16).

The severity of the demographic threat posed by this exodus of young women with Royal Marines was clear, and what this meant in practical terms for young men is explained in 'Prospect of the Falklands Islands' (Shackleton, Storey and Johnson 1977, pp. 5-6), published soon after the Shackleton report, in which R.J. Storey recorded how:

> one young man pointed out to me that a factor in migration (which could soon amount to a net loss of 2 per cent per annum) is the problem of finding a marriage partner. Bearing on this is the fact that some 10 girls left in 1975 with husbands and fiancés from the detachment of Royal Marines stationed in the Islands. This represented two-thirds of the women who left the Falklands that year. However, I should say that the Royal Marines have played a very helpful part in other areas of social life!

In a male-dominated micro-community such as the colony of the Falkland Islands, the loss of the bodily presence of so many women heralded a social and geopolitical disintegration, and many marriages with Royal Marines in fact failed. Ewan Southby-Taylor, Royal Marine Commander of NP8901 in the Falklands from 1978-79, outlined the scale of the social and demographic challenge in the period immediately before 1982 when he estimated:

> under two per cent of Royal Marine/Falkland Island girl marriages lasted beyond five years. The detachment before us married eleven out of an estimated fifteen eligible girls, and my Detachment was to have four, of which

> to my present knowledge, two have lasted, one in the Islands and one in the United Kingdom, fifty per cent being a remarkable achievement' (Southby-Taylor 2003, p. 44).

That so many Islander women were *still* prepared to marry Royal Marines when marital breakdown was a common occurrence says much about the determination of agentive Islander women to avail themselves of the opportunities presented by these geographically mobile soldiers, notwithstanding the risks of divorce. In this way (some) Islander women were reproducing demographic and intimate slow emergency by actively opting for males who were not Islanders. It was, in many ways, the case of the 'wrong bodies', that is a demographic combination of too few indigenous local females and too many colonising British male Royal Marines; fewer British males and more South American females would have better served the Islands' demographic needs, though the latter would have disrupted the racialised kith and kin' narrative that was a source of support in contemporary Britain

While Royal Marines were the main focus of 'everyday' female Islander interest, when other eligible males such as members of the Royal Navy and BAS (British Antarctic Survey) were in Stanley, they too were a source of interest, and female agency exercised. Expatriate Jean Austin, who unusually for a contemporary female in the Islands has her account published, and offers a female gaze on social occasions she witnessed, recalled how when the RRS *John Biscoe* was in port:

> Stanley's maidens (and matrons let it be whispered) also perked up and parties galore were held both aboard and onshore, with a preponderance of gallant males in attendance. The ratio of men to women was always greater in the islands, but with numbers swollen by the navy and BAS, the female of the species bloomed like a desert rose (Austin 2009, p. 83).

Austin's account highlights a proactive, agentive interest amongst Islander women in making the acquaintance of such British personnel; as observed by Austin, this alleged collective female gaze was apparently focused on these 'gallant males', the implication being this was not their 'type' of man they were used to, in the course of their daily lived experience in the Islands. Here

again, women were taking the 'masculine' role, with many unmarried Islander males (often shepherds) remote from Stanley and squeezed out of such occasions for reasons of socio-economic status and geographical proximity.

This endemic paucity of female bodies and the profound challenges this presented to the masculinity of unmarried male Islanders, was highlighted in the *Sunday Times Magazine* of 13 August 1978, in which correspondent Ian Jack, with photographer Philip Jones Griffiths, reported back from the Islands' sexual 'frontline'. The nature of the article – entitled 'A report on the Falkland Islands and their uncertain future' (*Sunday Times Magazine,* 13 August 1978, p. 14) – is such that it offers a wide-ranging contemporary perspective, extending to over eleven pages of this influential magazine, on the Islanders' 'experience'. Interestingly the article implies that 'only 500 miles away' was sufficiently proximate for Argentina to assert a 'logical' sovereignty claim to the Islands, but acknowledges Falkland Islands life presented a more complex situation which had little to do with logic, an illogical reality which a map would not convey.

> On the map the Argentine claim looks logical enough, Argentina represents the nearest land mass, the Patagonian coastline is only 500 miles away. On the ground, however, this logic confronts reality and quickly melts away (*Sunday Times Magazine,* 13 August 1978, p. 14).

He then proceeded to depict Islander life, paying particular attention to the lack of females, and consequent demographic and social difficulties. To have this *Sunday Times Magazine* photo-journalistic reportage on the Islands was to highlight the 'state' of the Falklands to a highly influential readership in the United Kingdom, with the involvement of Governor Jim Parker and his wife Deidre reflecting the importance that Government House attached to the visit.

The *Sunday Times Magazine* audience was presented through this article with a 'vision' of the Islands as an anachronistic British colony, as its male-only cover picture (Fig. 7.4) shows. Governor Parker (without his wife Deidre) and Islander chauffeur Don Bonner feature alongside the Governors' official car, and his special Union Jack, sheep-crest flag. Whilst this photograph

represents British sovereignty through these items, it does not represent this as a secure sovereignty; the title 'Whose flag over the Falklands?' implies that another sovereignty – Argentina's – may replace this quaint but dated British sovereignty.



Fig. 7.4. 'Whose Flag over the Falklands?',
Sunday Times Magazine *special report*

Source:* Sunday Times Magazine*, 13 August 1978, p. 1

The representation of the 1978 Darwin games, to which Jack and Griffiths were invited to fly with Parker and his wife, similarly conveys an affective quaintness, more a 1930s' than 1970s' shared experience for the Islands' community. Here was an important opportunity for masculine identity to be asserted by unmarried male Islanders, and to attract female interest. The games are described as:

> held every year at the end of the shearing season and go on for a week. They comprise dog-trials and shearing contests, ladies musical chairs and men's tug-of war, catch-the-rooster competitions and numerous horse-races […] [after which] The governor's wife presents a cup and the crowd breaks up (*Sunday Times Magazine,* 13 August 1978, p. 21).

Fig. 7.5. Male dominated performance and audience – steer-riding at 1978's Darwin games.

Source:* Sunday Times Magazine*, 13 August 1978, pp. 16-17

Mrs Parker's 'performance' as 'first lady' notwithstanding, Griffiths male photographic gaze/record of the Darwin games attests to the overwhelming prevalence of male bodies, as evidenced in Fig. 7.5. In contrast, nearby

Goose Green recreation hall is at first sight represented as a space where females are more in evidence, as Griffiths' photo shows with females to the fore; a closer inspection, however, reveals the preponderance of males, unaccompanied by females, on the sidelines of the hall, as can be seen in Fig. 7.6

While such photographic representation conveys gender imbalance, it would be naïve to suppose that this male domination implies that women were *ipso facto* therefore disempowered, their bodies rendered into unagentive objects of, and for, male 'possession'; indeed, the opposite appears the case, with some, though certainly not all, women empowered by the gender imbalance that provided a source of agentive power.


The men of Goose Green take their partners for the Circassian Circle. Some dresses are home-made, others come from mail-order firms 7000 miles away in the West Riding of Yorkshire

Fig. 7.7. The Circassian Circle as performed at the Goose Green recreation hall, after 1978's Darwin games.

Source: **Sunday Times Magazine*, 13 August 1978, pp.16-17***

Governor Rex Hunt recalled how two years later, also at the Goose Green recreation Hall: One attractive young girl came up to me and said 'Come on, Guv, let's 'ave a dance', whisking me off into a Military Two-Step before I could draw breath' (1992, p. 28). This young woman had exercised agency, deciding to enlist the Governor's body in the shared mobilities of dance. She had evidently not been intimidated by the construct of unequal power relations between herself as a 'junior female' and Hunt as the 'senior male', who she made apparently made more accessible through the appellation of 'Guv'; indeed, through enjoining him to dance, she had – if only for the duration of the dance – inverted these relations.

Hunt's depiction of her as 'attractive' indicates that her female body had not gone unnoticed, evidently catching his male gaze. The sexualised power that this young woman's body projected, brought to the fore through the performance of dance, had thus inverted power relations; the Governor was effectively the supplicant male to this appellant female, subverting the notion that gender imbalance, such as in Fig. 7.5, implied male domination over females.

Dance provided a unique opportunity in the Islands for the sexes to engage recreationally in a socialised, public space, with the possibility for some men of a measure of physical encounter with female bodies. The Circassian Circle dance (Fig. 7.6 above) was important in this respect; as also recalled by Hunt:

> One dance with which I was unfamiliar but quickly learnt after a fashion was the Circassian Circle, the dance equivalent of the Falklands' signature tune. A progressive dance for young and old, it was popular throughout the Islands and no festivity was complete without it (1992, p. 28).

Through the Circassian Circle, and other dances, female and male bodies interacted with each other, creating physically, visually and auditory affective experiences for participants. Yet, as Jack's written account highlighted for the *Sunday Times Magazine*'s audience the stark, numerical gender imbalance was pronounced. He illustrates (below) that the lack of women detracted from the Circassian Circle 'experience' for many men, affectively making it more a

source of frustration than celebration, which – depending on the individual – alcohol may or may not have mitigated. Jack makes use of the Circassian Circle as a 'gateway' for unpacking the multiple difficulties caused by the paucity of women, with the clear implication for readers that that gender imbalance made the Falklands far from ideal as a social – or sexual – space for men and women alike.

> Women aged from 13 to 60 range themselves down one hall waiting to be taken for the samba, the slow foxtrot and the Circassian circle by men who are drinking steadily. Whole tables lie covered with tins of the ubiquitous Tennants lager *(so ubiquitous that the cheesecake models on the discarded tins smile up at you from the remotest bog and beach – Linda lying low, Pat in Dreamland, Penny at bedtime).* When the men have drunk enough to dance, however, it quickly becomes obvious that they outnumber the women two to one […] The problem is acute. Over the Falklands as a whole, men between 34 and 64 exceed women of the same age by three to two, and in the Camp it is especially bad. At the last census in 1972 the island of West Falkland has one unmarried woman over the age of 19 and 51 unmarried men. The results are predictable. The Falklands have a declining population, increasing amounts of adultery and divorce, a little incest and illicit intercourse with girls below the legal age (though perhaps no more than in any isolated community) and much drinking. The presence of 42 Royal Marines does not help. They cheer the population at large by showing the flag and wearing off-duty T-shirts inscribed '*Don't Cry for me Argentina',* but they also foster gloom among the Islands' bachelors. Each detachment serves a year at its base in Stanley, and each year half a dozen Stanley girls marry Royal Marines and leave the Islands for married quarters in England.
>
> So the birth-rate declines and the population dwindles – over the past 25 years it has sunk from 2300 to 1800, with The Camp as the main source of emigration. But the reasons for this loss lie deeper than the availability of Royal Marines. They have to do with a feudal past and uncertain future' *(Sunday Times Magazine,* 19 August 1978, p. 23).

This account offers numerous aspects to the social dimension of slow emergency, as understood by a white British male, particularly relating to drink, types of sexual impropriety both legal and illegal in nature, and a dwindling population and birthrate, exacerbated by agentive Islander women marrying Royal Marines, the latter 'foster[ing] gloom among the Islands' bachelors'. The word 'gloom' gives a strong feel as to the affective experience of unmarried male Islanders, whose patriarchal prospects were seriously thrown into question by the number of Islander women who preferred (literally) to marry their own futures to Royal Marines,

Fig 7.7 is a photographic record of when one Islander woman married a Royal Marine, apparently thereby contributing to 'gloom' amongst unmarried local males; it offers an interesting and clearly gendered take on this marital coupling.


Local girl makes good. A Royal Marine steps out of Stanley's Catholic church with his bride and the Falkland's population threatens to fall still further. Husband and bride will settle in England

Fig. 7.7. A Royal marine marries an Islander bride.

Source: **Sunday Times Magazine*, August 19 1978, p. 16***

The caption explains how the Royal Marine 'steps out…with his bride', suggesting a male proprietorial role relationality to the new wife, as if the female spouse is without agency. Possibly mitigating this, if only in terms of agency, is the preceding phrase 'local girl makes good', which appears to suggest that the 'girl' has exercised some agency in what is framed as her self-betterment. That this bride is a woman in her own right, who has consciously exercised her own agency in making this marital choice, even if at the demographic expense of the Islanders, is an perspective that is entirely

overlooked. Neither is a racial dimension of this marital coupling considered; that this was a 'white wedding' of kith and kin is left unaddressed.

The role of alcohol in social interaction in this demographically declining, gender-imbalanced community was also recorded in the article, with Griffiths' photo of the Globe (Fig. 7.9) showing the *Sunday Times Magazine* audience the masculine alcoholised space in which Islanders imbibed and fraternised; alcohol-related items such as bottles, tins, glasses and the bar itself are all evident.

The bar of the Globe Hotel at Glory Hour – Stanley's 60 legally-permitted minutes of Sunday drinking

Fig. 7.8. Male bodies and alcohol dominate at The Globe, Stanley.

Source: **Sunday Times Magazine,** ***13 August 1978, p. 21***

The Stanley pubs provided spaces for social clustering, bringing individuals together in an alcoholic social interaction, including Islander girls and off duty Royal Marines – Stanley's pubs such as The Globe, Rose Public House and Victory Bar lay within close proximity of the Royal Marine barracks at Moody Brook, 1.5 miles north-west of Stanley. West (1997 p, 645) has drawn attention to the relationality of 'liquour and libido', citing how Southern

Rhodesian African husbands restricted uxorial access to beer halls to control their sexual agency; in the Falklands context, public houses provided similar opportunities for women and men to 'fraternise', the scarcity of women enabling them to be highly selective in their choice of man. Brickell (2008, p.1672) also points out how drinking can 'simultaneously solidify group identities while at the same time isolating 'others' who men are suspicious of', and in the masculinised, alcoholic space of the Falkland public house, the Royal Marines provided an obvious 'other' for small groups of Islander males marooned in their unsought gender exclusivity.

The risk of alcohol-catalysed disputes/violence, particularly over women, between Royal Marines and disaffected male Islanders meant that the presence of the latter had to be managed. Jean Austin highlighted one potential flashpoint, namely Royal Marines' intense drinking in The Globe at Sunday lunchtime.

> The latter [The Globe] is a favourite haunt of the Royal Marines for their Sunday 'glory hour', so called because the pubs are only open on that day from 12 noon to 1.00pm. From Sullivan House, we used to view the covered wagon transporting silently sober Marines towards town. An hour later whoops and catcalls would herald their jubilant return to Moody Brook (Austin 2009, p. 56).

Reflecting the numerous sensitivities that came with the proximity of the Royal Marines to the Islander community, Jack records how:

> A notice outside the Royal Marines mess in Stanley warns its men against the dangers of the slackened tongue. 'Need-to-know', it says 'In a curious (gossipy) situation, this principle is paramount.' A posting in the Falkland Islands is such a situation indeed. In a remote community of 1,800 people it is hard to keep anything quiet, though no doubt many adulterous husbands and wives have tried (*Sunday Times Magazine,* 13 August 1978, p. 26).

As will be evidenced later, relations between the sexes, prior to, during and after marriage was often the source of controversy in the Falklands, with the presence of the Royal Marines creating inter-gender and intra-gender complications.

Whereas the *Sunday Times Magazine* had not, in the reportage it contained,

glossed over the Islands shortcomings in relation to female bodily presence, and the problems this was causing, the *Daily Express*, a long-standing supporter of the Falklands' continuation as a British colony, re-framed this male-female imbalance more positively – as an agentive opportunity for women. For women who wished to be in the Falklands, there was said to be little difficulty in finding a male body and partner in the 'Isles of Love', as the *Daily Express* re-imagined the Falklands/Malvinas in 1981, when it described what would prove to be an unsuccessful initiative to generate additional (British) female bodily presence on the Islands.

> The lure of a romantic new life in the Falkland Islands, 7,000 miles away in the South Atlantic, is attracting a flood of applicants [….] Any girl who goes there would be almost certain to find a husband", said a Falkland Islands Office spokesman (*Daily Express,* 27 January 1981, no page number, cited in *Falkland Islands Times,* February 1981, p. 8).

Notwithstanding the claim that '[t]he rush to start a new life in the Falklands […] turned into a stampede yesterday after the *Daily Express* report' (*Daily Express,* 27 January 1981, no page number, cited in *Falkland Islands Times,* February 1981, p. 8), there was no sudden female bio-infusion into the Islands, and many of the women already there were actively choosing to leave, often with a Royal Marine.

Far from bodies 'new' to the Islands providing the demographically much-needed females, it was the male bodies of the Royal Marines that were depleting the 'existing' female bodies, in an unchecked, un-making of the Falklands population.

Although the body of the 'outsider', in this case Royal Marines, primarily removed Islander female bodies from the Falklands, male bodies were also 'lost', as the case of Alejandro Betts illustrates. Unlike with the British bodies of the Royal Marines, Argentine employees of the LADE operation in Stanley, brought with them the 'backstory' of the Argentine sovereignty claim. Bett's 'journey' is (critically) presented by the Falkland Islands History group in these terms:

> It's true that "some Islanders knew that Betts had abandoned his pregnant

> wife and baby for an Argentine girl-friend then working in the Islands. But for everyone this was just an extra-marital affair that had ended in a family break-up". However, "nobody in the Islands knew that Betts was so infatuated with his Argentine girl-friend that this had led him to change sides, given his past as a hardline critic of the Argentine position over the Falklands. And, as for his "well-known" opinions on the subject (in favour of Argentina), nobody had the remotest idea about these. He finally abandoned the Islands in 1982 in order to stay with the Argentine girl-friend he was so in love with.

***Source:* Mercopress, 'Falklands Group Reveals Details of the Life of "Veteran of the Malvinas" Alejandro Betts', on 12 July 2015**
http://en.mercopress.com/2015/07/12/falklands-group-reveals-details-of-the-life-of-veteran-of-the-malvinas-alejandro-betts

Whereas Bett's story of 'love and defection' is a rare one, it indicates perfectly well that for male and female Islanders alike, marriage held out the prospect of a new life outside of the Falklands.

Divorce and separation of married couples, the result of intimate emergency, however slow, proved a frequent occurrence in the Islander community, particularly for Islander wives married to Royal Marines. There was an 'extraordinary high incidence of divorce in the Falklands' (Shackleton, Storey and Johnson 1977, p. 5), and Stanley the place where this was obtained. Jean Austin, herself the wife of early 1970s Colonial Secretary J.A Jones, observed that

> the divorce rate is high, and Stanley is one of the easiest places to obtain one. Perhaps it has a future as the Reno of the South Atlantic, though how anyone could have energy left for intrigue after gardening, cutting peat, butchering, and all their other activities is beyond me (Austin 2010, pp. 52-53).

An undeclared war between the sexes – with female depopulation and marital breakdown as its frontlines – threatened the fabric of Islander life, and viability of the community, which in turn 'produced worrying social trends: incest and adultery were rife, and the divorce rate was high (more than one in four)' (Donaghy 2014, p. 10).

The absence of females was becoming painfully acute by the start of the 1980s, but the presence of Royal Marines as a fundamental cause of female depopulation had already been publicly exposed and brought conspicuously

into the public domain, through a letter from 'Angry Islander', published in the *Falkland Islands Times.* This letter disseminated a narrative of anger and fear about the damaging impact that the Royal Marines were having on the Falkland community. The correspondence which it subsequently generated in the *Falkland Islands Times* is remarkable in that it brought into public record the concerns that provided the battle lines of the low-intensity civil war between the sexes on the Islands.

7.3 'The Wilkinson Sword of Peace', revealing polaroids, and the 'Angry Islander' letter

It was the 'Wilkinson Sword of Peace' which brought about the 'outbreak' of the 'Angry Islander' controversy; it is possible that other items, such as 'incriminating' polaroid photos, were also involved. Set up in 1966, the 'Wilkinson Sword of Peace' (Fig. 7.10) was a prestigious annual award that was sponsored by Wilkinson Ltd, in recognition of units in the armed services which had made an important contribution to relations with the civilian community where they were stationed. In 1978 the Royal Marines in the Falkland Islands NP 8901 received this award; as can be seen in Fig 7.10, this militarised metallic object was intended to confer a prestigious recognition of the Royal Marines in the Falklands. Rather than becoming a source of strengthened civilian-military relations in the Islands, this award became a source of acute controversy.

Fig. 7.9. Item of emotion: the 1978 award of the Wilkinson Sword of Peace to Royal Marines Naval Party

Source: https://mayorofshrewsbury.wordpress.com/2012/05/02/24th-april-2012-raf-shawbury-royal-visitor-opens-new-sports-hall-and-presents-the-firmin-sword-of-peace/

An anonymous letter-writer to the *Falkland Islands Times* who used the pseudonym 'Angry Islander' was aghast that the 'Wilkinson Sword of Peace' had been given to NP 8901, prompting him to produce the object of a highly critical and subversive letter; this was published on 20th October 1978, being circulated throughout the Islands by being reproduced in the object of the *Falkland Islands Times*. The ensuing public debate is considered in Section 7.4; this section foregrounds the context, and the significance of, Angry Islander's contribution to Falklands discourse.

There is, in fact, the possibility that polaroid photographs may have been a relevant factor in the causation of the letter, which Royal Marine Commander Southby Taylor believes

> The authorship [of 'Angry Islander's letter] remained in doubt and still is, although I had my very strong suspicions and still do. The parents of a Falkland Island girl had presented themselves in my office […] they suddenly produced a collection of photos taken of their daughter with one of my marines. They were, to say the least, very intimate, and quite understandably, very upsetting to the parents who then demanded that the pervert (there was nothing perverted that I could deduce) be sent home immediately […] The matter was dropped but I long harboured the view that the subsequent anonymous letter was the result' (2003, p. 43).

Irrespective of the exact contribution of these polaroids in the origin of the 'Angry Islander' letter, these photographs evidence of at least one Royal Marine not practicing the type of community relations that the 'Wilkinson Sword of Peace' was awarded for. What is clear is that the interplay of the 'Wilkinson Sword of Peace', 'Angry Islander's' letter and the *Falkland Islands Times* precipitated an acrimonious debate about the Islands' imbalanced and declining demography, the presence of the bodies of Royal Marines being linked directly to growing absence of those of Islander women. From 'Angry Islander's' view, both parties functioned disruptively – Royal Marines had taken 'occupation' of the bodies of a number of younger Islander women, and Islander women were too willingly ceding their contested bodies to the Royal Marines through marriage – though not always so, as the 'polaroid' case suggests. The Royal Marine as 'geopolitical actor' (Woodward et al 2012, p. 507) in the Falkland/Malvinas is thus re-framed, from his 'traditional' role as

protector of Islanders against Argentina, to a depopulating predator who waged intimate geopolitical warfare on the Islands' females, claiming their bodies at the expense of 'Kelper man' and so jeopardising the Falklands' very demographic viability. This debate was of profound geopolitical significance for the Falkland/Malvinas because without either a viable Islander community, or the presence of British military bodies, there was a strong prospect of the Islands soon becoming 'transformed' into 'las Malvinas Argentinas'.

Fig 7.11 gives some indication of the challenging slow emergency existence facing Islander males; in this photo the only female presence is a pictorial one, namely photographs of Elizabeth II, and the monarch, like many Islander women, was already married with children, and living in the United Kingdom.


A shepherd and his Queen in the company store, Port Louis. Islanders are as loyalist as Ulster Orangemen, though they are still patiently waiting for a visit by a reigning British monarch

Fig. 7.10. 'God save the Queen' – Islanders' 'loyalist' support continued,

Source:* Sunday Times Magazine*, 13 August 1978, p. 17

The lyric 'No Future' had featured heavily in the contemporary British punk rock band the Sex Pistol's controversial 1977 Silver Jubilee re-imagining of 'God save the Queen'. Yet for this South Atlantic British colony, struggling with demographic decline, the sentiments of this then controversial lyric can

be seen as addressing the fundamental issue at stake: was there *any* future for the Falkland Islands community, or were they 'another' group of subjects who for whom there was 'no future'?

What is clear is that both the 'Angry Islander' and the Sex Pistols' lead singer Johnny Rotten were articulating anger, the latter professing 'And there is no future/In England's dreaming'. The 'Angry Islander' letter can be seen as the object that exposed the Falklands' 'dreaming' of a more secure British existence as seriously challenged by the harsh reality of life in a depopulated, gender-imbalanced, Marine-occupied, isolated and socially challenged geopolitical anomaly.

7.4 The 'Angry Islander' Controversy, November-December 1978

It was on 20th October 1978 that a letter from 'An Angry Islander', of unspecified location was re-produced/introduced in the *Falkland Islands Times*, then the colony's only newsletter, informing the many Islanders who read it that:

> There now follows the first letter for ages combining anger and anonymity. It is published to remind people that not everyone 'shares the same regard for the Royal Marines in Stanley (*Falkland Islands Times*, 10 November 1978, p. 2).

The author's decision to call himself/herself 'Angry Islander' associated this/her letter and body with this emotion, attesting to how heavily emotions feature in this object-inspired discourse. 'Angry Islander' presented his/her case thus:

> It was with profound shock that I learned of the award to our local Royal Marine detachment of the Wilkinson Sword Peace prize. It seems ironic that a band of men who have inflicted more damage on our community than any other should be honoured with this prestigious award. The utter stupidity and lack of thought behind the Wilkinson Sword award can only be equalled by the bestowal some time ago of the 'Freedom of Stanley' on the same Royal Marine detachment […] Anyone with any awareness will realise that during their many years in the Falkland Islands they have inflicted terrible, and I fear, done irreparable damage to our community, and they are still gradually destroying our community. For too long now the exodus of women with Marines has been treated as something of a joke […] No matter how much they contribute to charity, or how many of them entertain us on the radio or fly planes during pilot shortages, they will never be able to make up for the harm they have done and continue to do (*Falkland Islands Times,* 10 November

1978, p. 2).

In framing the loss of women as an 'exodus of women with Marines', the frustrated 'Angry Islander' conveniently attaches agency to the Royal Marines rather than Islander women (as though they were somehow inert in the matter, when their actions showed that they had chosen to leave the Islands) or Islander men. Nor did 'Angry Islander' see any compensating geo-military benefit in retaining the scourge of the Royal Marines:

> As a military force also they are useless […] If our giant neighbour decided to invade these Islands he would do so with a force that would swamp our meagre defences. We should do away with this small but troublesome force and request that we be given a force large-enough to be a real deterrent if the need ever arose (*Falkland Islands Times,* 10 November 1978, p. 2).

Angry Islander does not make clear precisely what the 'deterrent' would be against; whilst the 'obvious answer' suggests 'deterrent' against the Argentine military, a larger, more 'professional' force, which fraternised less with Islander women, would also be a deterrent to female exodus. Implicit in this charge is an attempt to demasculinise the Royal Marines as serious soldiers, re-framing them in a way similar to how unmarried Islanders males had been 'made' to look by the Marines' interactions with Islander women.

Predictably 'Angry Islander's' letter was a source of great controversy, and three issues of the *Falkland Islands Times* were dominated by it (Issues 14,15 and 16 1978) until the debate was 'closed down' in mid-December 1978. The strength of 'Angry Islander's' irate, iconoclastic yet fearful, denunciation of the Royal Marines, with references such as 'irreparable damage' and 'exodus' of women, depicted a near apocalyptic human geography of bodies, of invasive and disliked Royal Marines 'destroying' the embedded community, itself being progressively denuded of its women, so heralding the geopolitical and demographic demise of the Islander community.

There also appears to be a sexual micro-nationalism at play, in which the Royal Marines are the resented 'sexual other', whose predatory presence towards Islander females should be resisted – even if many Islander women had proven alarmingly susceptible to this 'sexual other'. Indeed, an intimate

geopolitics of agentive female resistance to Kelper-male domination is a recurring theme in the discourse that 'Angry Islander' instigated, to the point that domestic male violence applied to women emotionally and physically soon became exposed through the letters reproduced in the object of the *Falkland Islands Times.*

Pain and Staeheli (2014, p. 344), observe that 'all forms of violent oppression work through intimate emotional and psychological registers as a means of exerting control', and in many ways the Royal Marines provided Islander women with a means to circumvent Islander male control, whilst gaining new life-opportunities. 'Angry Islander's' letter can be seen as a bid to exert/re-assert demasculinised 'Kelper man's' control over 'rebellious' Islander women – an agenda which was, however, rejected by numerous further letters to the *Falkland Islands Times*. These (mostly) counter-narratives of anger were directed at the 'Angry Islander' rather than the Royal Marines, as Islanders offered their own emotional perspectives, which are considered in the next section.

'Angry Islander's' letter, re-produced in the *Falkland Islands Times,* had in turn made the paper a conduit of ire in its own right, with there now being many more angry Islanders in evidence**.** This anger-inspired discord had created an emotional geography in which the Royal Marines had publicly become a source of contention between Islanders who were for and against their presence, this discord being amplified through Islander networks: 'Islander was now set against Islander, with us rather bemused, but not wholly surprised in the middle. We had to remember that everyone knew everyone' (Southby-Taylor 2003, p. 43).

Yet, whilst 'Angry Islander's' letter largely provoked passionate disagreement in Stanley and in Camp, it should not be overlooked, as will be evidenced, that it did generate some agreement too. Bill Luxton from Chartres, West Falkland, was highly critical of both Angry Islander's letter and the *Falkland Islands Times* itself*,* remonstrating: 'What a gutless miserable little worm of a person your correspondent must be that he/she cannot put a name to the poisonous piece of tripe that you published on 10 November' (*Falkland Islands Times,* 15

December 1978, p. 5).

Hilda Perry from Stanley offered a female perspective which placed loyalty to Britain before any other considerations; indeed, she 'express[ed] doubt that such venomous criticism of Her Majesty's Forces was written by a true Kelper who has any real desire to remain British' (*Falkland Islands Times,* 15 December 1978, p. 5).

The concept of the 'true Kelper' is of interest, and appears to suit the Kelper female more than the male. In Perry's framing, the Kelper's patriotic duty as a loyal British subject is to support the Royal Marines, even though this was profoundly contrary to the colony's demographic interests, and eligible male Islanders' personal interests; in contrast, 'the true Kelper' woman was not expected to avoid marrying a (British) Royal marine, and had agency to do so.

This intensity of debate generated by Angry Islander's discourse can be seen in Fig 7.12, the front page of the Falkland Islands Times of 24 November 1978 dominated by the response of Islanders to this, with the Editor acknowledging that there had been about '50% more' letters than usual (Falkland Islands Times, 24 November 1978, p.1).

One group letter in this edition, evidence of how the controversy was networking in Stanley, came from a large group of Islander women and men, namely "Odette Goss + D.E Goss + S. Hewitt + Chic Felton + Walter Felton + Jeanette Dobbyns + Joan & Terry Spruce + A. Browning + Sheila Napier + Jean & Tim Dobbyns + E. Halliday +T. Halliday", in which, as nearly 1% of the population, they mobilised their collective 'anger and displeasure', (*Falkland Islands Times,* 24 November 1978, p. 7), conjecturing that: "Perhaps it is jealousy and the person concerned does not like the thought of some of the local girls marrying marines. So what? If they want to marry someone it's their life isn't it?" (*Falkland Islands Times,* 24 November 1978, p. 7).



THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

TIMES

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UP THE MARINES!!!

Most people moan like hell when the Times is full of letters but I make no apologies whatsoever for including three long ones in this edition. It was quite surprising to receive about 50% more 'Letters to the Editor' than per usual and not all of them can of course be printed in one edition. Those persons who have sent letters that have not been published in answer to the 'Angry Islander' letting off steam in the last edition will see their correspondence appearing in the next edition.

There is still no clue as to who the 'Angry Islander' is - even the Islander part is under some doubt, although Air-Commodore Brian Frow on a visit to the Colony, has told me that he knows and so do the Marines. If anyone can pass a hint my way I'd be grateful!! The first letter is printed below and there is also one on page 2 and page 3.

Stanley,
17th November.

Dear Sir;

We have read with anger and displeasure the letter entitled 'An Angry Islander' in the Times edition of 20/10/78. We are disappointed with our fellow Islanders or should we say 'Islander'?

We are grateful for what the Royal Marines have done for us and are continuing to do for us. They may be only small things but as the saying goes:- 'Every Little Helps'.

A few questions:-

1. Has this Islander done anything to benefit the Islands, large or small?
2. Would he/she waste his valuable time running to Port San Carlos and back for the sake of £110 which would be donated to the Museum, and not a penny to his own pocket?
3. Would he go to all the trouble of organizing sponsored walks, charity balls etc., for the benefit of the Senior Citizens of Stanley?

No doubt the answer to all these questions would be:- 'No, I couldn't be bothered'; 'No I haven't got time etc.'

We consider this outrageous letter as pedantic or as downright jealousy, more so the latter; otherwise why else would the person be worried about what the Royal Marines do? Perhaps it is jealousy and the person concerned does not like the thought of some of the local girls marrying marines. So what?, if they want to marry someone it's their life isn't it??

We do agree that the Islands population has and is gradually decreasing, but it is not only the girls marrying Marines that are going away and that have already left, there are also.....

Continued Page 7.

Fig. 7.11. Source of controversy;* Falkland Island Times *15/78, Friday November 24, 1978.

Source: Jane Cameron National Archives, Stanley, Falkland Islands

N.D. Buckett, wife of Ron Buckett, interestingly working on the assumption that 'Angry Islander' was male, wrote from Stanley to say: 'As the wife of a serving soldier and a friend of NP8901/1978, I was disgusted with the letter sent to this paper by someone who hadn't the courage or decency to put his name to it' (*Falkland Islands Times,* 24 November 1978, p. 7).

So, one letter of anger had generated further written letters of anger, but significantly there was some support for 'Angry Islander's' letter, which, as mentioned, in addition to being an expression of anger was also one of fear – fear of depopulation, of societal disintegration, of the general inadequacy of the Royal Marines as a deterrent, of Argentine invasion, and of whether the colony had any non-Argentine geopolitical future. Within all these fears can be seen a deep fear for the future of the masculinised unmarried 'Kelper man', whose body was seemingly not as 'desirable' to many Falkland women as that of the 'Royal Marine' as source of genetic/reproductive appeal, mobility or prosperity.

One reader called himself/herself 'Name withheld from publication by request' responded with a letter inspired by fear; this was reflected both in its concerns, and in its concealed authorship, with public anonymity sought because 'this issue seems to be a rather emotional one' (*Falkland Islands Times*, 15 December 1978, p. 2). 'Angry Islander' too had concealed his/her identity behind a pseudonym, which Ellen Burnsten of Port San Carlos ('K.C'), East Falkland criticised as 'a bit sly when they couldn't sign their name' (*Falkland Islands Times,* 15 December 1978, p. 3). Nonetheless, this letter from 'Name withheld from publication by request' confirmed that 'Angry Islander's' narrative of Royal Marine-perpetrated demographic destruction was certainly not unique to him/her:

> I feel I must voice my <u>partial</u> agreement with 'Angry Islander' […] the declining population is already under 1800 and showing no signs of reversing its alarming course, the problem is serious. It is a fact that if people continue to leave at this rate before long our population will not be enough to keep an industry or Government functioning – and that will be the beginning of the end. This is why every woman who leaves the Falklands on the arm of a Marine is a serious loss […] why not bring out married Marines with their families? Would it not be possible for our Government to offer incentives to Marines married to local girls to remain and work in the Islands? (*Falkland Islands Times*, 15 December 1978, p. 2).

'Name withheld's' linkage of depopulation, and by implication a reduced genetic pool, with the declining viability of the Islands' economically and governmentally, exposes the degree to which the Royal Marines were threatening the future geopolitical existence of the community and colony they were tasked to defend. Unlike much of the heated public discourse, this

anonymous correspondent had offered constructive suggestions to address the demographic threat of the Royal Marines, and manage the bodily mobility that came with their role.

This said, neither of 'Name withheld's' two suggestions offered any prospect that Islander girls would be any less interested in Royal Marines – bringing out Marines' families would only reduce, though not eliminate, the potential opportunity for their liaisons with members of 'the Royals', whilst encouraging Marines married to Islander girls to 'stay on' recognised that Islander girls would continue to marry Marines. What is embedded in 'Name withheld's' analysis is that the body of the Royal Marine was the 'object of choice' for many Islander women, rather than 'Kelper man'. Ironically, the 'sexual other' that most immediately threatened the demographic destruction of the Islander community was not the body of the young, 'hyper-sexualised' Argentine woman, but the militarised body of the 'colonising', young British soldier.

Even vocal critics of 'Angry Islander's' narrative, such as the fifteen Stanley residents who had authored the collective letter, conceded that there was a problem, albeit ascribing it to the wider lack of opportunity rather than the Royal Marines, affirming:

> We do agree that the Islands' population has and is gradually decreasing, but it is not only girls marrying Marines that are going away and that have already left, there are also a lot of other young people (not only girls) leaving the colony (*Falkland Islands Times,* 24 November 1978, p. 7).

Nor would 'traditional' solutions suffice to this pressing demographic problem, as Hilda Perry, also from Stanley, rhetorically asked: 'Should we return to the Victorian days and choose husbands for our daughters and make sure they marry local shepherds and settle in camp houses?' (*Falkland Islands Times,* 15 December 1978, p.5). Islander women had, in this framing, simply been exercising agency in their choice of husbands, to the disadvantage of the 'Kelper male'. Nor was the fact that 'Kelper man' was often overlooked simply due the Royal Marine as 'appellant', but also to the perception of the former as 'repellent'. This was brought into public record through a letter from Trudi Hazell that opened up an incendiary new 'front', about the very 'suitability' of

Falkland men when compared to Royal Marines, hitherto a 'hidden' feature of the debate, alcohol-induced domestic violence.

Although highly critical of the 'excreta' that 'Angry Islander' wrote, Trudi Hazell endorsed Royal Marine-inspired female exodus, and was supported in this by a 'counter-network' of three other Stanley women, Glenda McGill, Theresa McGill, and Winnie Miranda, who also put their names to this public criticism of Islander men, exposing intimate (slow) emergency, and its relationality to alcohol:

> As for the local dames flitting to the UK with the Royals – I DON'T BLAME THEM – look at the ill-mannered drunks a lot of women have to face when they decide to take the plunge and try their luck with a local. My God, at least the UK men treat their wives as something they love, not as a punch bag when he's had a few too many while he's been out at the pub and left his spouse to cook his supper and in some cases feed his kids (*Falkland Islands Times,* 24 November 1978, p. 2).

Whilst this prompted a number of Island women to write impassioned letters in support of 'Kelper man', it provoked further emotional, irate discourse, as with Stanley's Mary Jenning's pointed rejoinder to the author:

> Get your feet firmly on the ground and ask yourself 'Why did I return to this booze-sodden, sex-ridden, wife-beating country with the English husband who alone knows how to treat and respect a faithful and loving wife' Why? Because you know Trudi as well as I and dozens of others, the grass isn't as green over the hill as many would wish it to be – as you yourself found out and was only too pleased to return to the place you obviously think is hell (*Falkland Islands Times*, 15 December 1978, p. 1).

Far from being geographically imagined as enticing 'Isles of Love', the Falkland/Malvinas were framed as hellish 'Isles of booze, sex and wife-beating', in what had become a bitter debate, an emotional civil war. It offers an insight into the perceptions of the intimate geopolitics of 'Falkland life' for women such as Trudi Hazell, Glenda McGill, Theresa McGill, and Winnie Miranda, which Mary Jennings unintentionally endorsed in describing her English husband as being 'alone' in the community in knowing how to treat his spouse, namely herself, with respect.

It appears that for some women at least, the body of the 'Kelper man', with its

association with alcohol, domestic violence and rootedness in the Islands had become the 'melancholic object' (2009, p.16), offering marriages to be avoided, or else to be endured. The prospect of life of intimate slow emergency - in a geographically remote, male-dominated, depopulating colony with limited life chances for women – prompted numerous young women to escape this, through marrying the agent of mobility that was the Royal Marine.

For numerous young Islander women, leaving the Islands was evidently a higher priority than staying on to 'keep the Falklands British', which suggests that the narrative of a resilient Falkland community of the Kelper community, male and female united together resisting Argentine irredentism, is at some variance from the reality. The pool of Islander bodies able to participate in the shared experience of what Militz and Muller (2014, p. 25) have usefully framed as 'the banal affirmation of the nation through momentary encounters of compatible bodies and objects functions by means of sharing, enjoying and embodying the national' was depleted. The numerous 'Kelper women' of reproductive age who exercised agency in removing themselves, through emigration, from physical participation in the 'symbolic representations and practices of the nation' (Militz and Muller 2014, p. 25), reduced the persons available, for present and future, to engage in the identity forming/reinforcing experiences of Falkland life, such as the aforementioned Darwin games, 'Battle Day' commemoration, Stanley races and the Queen's birthday.

As this female Islander exodus indicated – unlike the 'sexual other' of the body of the Royal Marine – the 'Kelper male' was often not a source of physical or emotional desire. It was very evident that 'he' was losing the 'sexual war' with Royal Marines for Islander women, as well as the emotional civil war with agentive Islander women, which had been publicly exposed through the pages of the *Falkland Islands Times*. 'Angry Islander's' letter represented a rearguard action 'which is basically about limiting the *[Falkland micro-]*nation, determining who is qualified as legitimate subjects of nationhood, the People, inhabiting the national will, and who are turned into will-less objects of the nation' (Bilge 2012, p. 313).

In keeping the Royal Marines away, or at least at arm's length from Islander women, 'Kelper man' was better placed to reduce competition in his struggle for marriage with a local female. The 'Kelper male' was in a situation not dissimilar to 'surplus males' in Asia, whose lack of a female partner render them 'losers in societal competition' (Hudson and Den Boer 2002, p. 12, cited in Caluya 2013, p. 56). As potentially 'surplus' reproductive bodies, such Falkland males, whether born in or working in the Islands, were faced with highly limited opportunities for securing a female partner, in what might be termed a 'blue balls' (Caluya 2013, p. 54) archipelago of widespread male sexual non-fulfillment, 'blue balls' referring to epididymal hypertension.

As *Sunday Times* reporter Ian Jack was informed at Goose Green, alternatives included sexual disengagement, or masturbation – along with the suggested proposition that the bodily presence of Argentine women would be a very acceptable exchange for cession of the Islands to Argentina.

> That's the real trouble here; says a young labourer, gripping my elbow and shoving a fist towards the ceiling "You either forget it or you go blind". He came recently to the Falklands from Britain – he'd read a headline in the *Daily Express* "Young Britons happy in Penguin Land" – and apart from the woman problem was happy enough, saving '99 per cent' of his £2500 a year and living with his fellows in the farm bunk house. Others take a more treasonable view. "I'd let the Argies have the place tomorrow," says a shepherd, "if they would just send us over a couple of plane-loads of women" *(Sunday Times Magazine,* 19 August 1978, p. 23).

A 'blue balls' trope of sexually unfulfilled or frustrated men in the Falklands acting violently is worth considering, although as Culya (2012, p. 64) argues, one should not allow 'sexual reductionism' to simplify behaviours 'to not [being] ruled by their heads, or even their hearts, but by their genitalia'. The metaphorical 'blue balls' helps relate the experience of those males in the Islands who did not have a female partner, or had become separated/divorced from her.

Despite the 'Angry Islander' controversy bearing witness to major societal difficulties in the colony, no immediate improvement followed in the period up to 1982. The endemic tensions resulting from a paucity of women, however, did not diminish and in 1980 appear to have led to three murders.

'Tragedy at Goose Green' (*Penguin News,* No. 5, 5 March 1980, p. 12) was how the recently launched *Penguin News* described the fatal knifing of Tony Kirk, whilst the well-established *Falkland Islands Times* framed it a 'black day in the history of Goose Green Farm' (*Falkland Islands Times,* March 1980, p. 1). 'A violent death' was the chapter in Rex Hunt's *Falkland Days* which focused on this tragic event, in which Hunt (1992, p.28) describes how 'an Islander had been knifed in the stomach by one of the Chilean farm hands' at Goose Green – on the very same evening that earlier on he had danced the Military Two-Step with the agentive, 'attractive young girl'' (Hunt 1992, p. 28). Hunt offers a detailed account of how this incident had occurred, as he had learned about it from Eric Goss, Goose Green farm manager:

> The Chilean, Francisco Burgos, was an outside shepherd (that is, one who lived not in a settlement but on his own in one of the more distant shanties) and normally went into the settlement only at weekends for provisions. A quiet, retiring man and a good worker, Burgos had come in for the sports and, like most others at the dance, had been drinking. Leaving the men's lavatory, he had bumped into Tony Kirk's girlfriend, who was going into the Ladies. It was probably an accident but Kirk and his friends had chosen to think otherwise. Eric had heard about the incident and quietly advised Burgos to head for home. Burgos had followed Eric's advice, go into the bunkhouse and collected his riding gear (which included a knife), intending to saddle up and ride for home immediately; but his way out had been barred by Kirk and his friends, who had advanced on him along the corridor. Kirk had punched him in the face, breaking his nose, whereupon Burgos had drawn his knife and stabbed Kirk in the stomach. A simple tale no doubt enacted nightly in countless taverns around the world; but there had not been a violent killing in the Falkland Islands for over fifty years. The unforgivable crime in the Falkland Islanders' eyes was that Burgos had pulled a knife. Punch-ups occurred frequently, usually after drinking and over women, the men outnumbering women by five to one. Farm managers normally sorted out the culprits without calling in the police. To that extent the Islands were largely self-policing. But a knife was different; it was alien to the Anglo-Saxon culture. It was what those 'dagoes' used on the mainland […] I was learning fast (Hunt 1992, pp. 29-30).

As Hunt's account makes clear, notwithstanding its inaccurate racialised claim that 'Anglo-Saxon culture' eschews the use of knives, is that the fatal incident was initiated over a woman; on this occasion the escalation of male-on-male violence from 'punch-up' to knifing, attests to the potential for the frustrations and rivalries engendered by a lack of females in a largely un-policed community. That 'blue balls' violence, encouraged by alcoholic excess, had not more frequently resulted in knifings is significant. Whilst factors such as

farm manager policing, social restraints or cultural norms had helped keep such violence at a low intensity (if not frequency), this had broken down at Goose Green.

A letter from an anonymous reader of *Penguin News* who withheld his/her identity confirmed that some Islanders were very unhappy with Burgos' subsequent conviction of manslaughter rather than murder, with 'only' a 9-month imprisonment in the Islands.

> I was very shocked by the reaction of some people to the result of the Francisco Burgos trial.
>
> This 'wild west mentality' is surely out of place in this British colony, and if British rule is good enough for us, should not British justice be as well?
>
> The minority who seem to feel that Burgos should have been sent down for life cannot have any knowledge of the facts of the case. If they did, they would not realise that the event was not a cut-and-dried cold-blooded murder.
>
> Our justice is not based on the idea of an 'eye for an eye and a 'tooth for a tooth'. We should be grateful for that.
>
> Regrettably I am unable to put my name to this letter
>
> (*Penguin News,* No. 7, 8 May 1980, p. 20).

Tony Kirk's uncle, Arthur, responded from Harrow, Middlesex, expressing to the editor his dissatisfaction with the manslaughter verdict, the anonymous letter, and what he felt to be unduly sympathetic coverage given to Burgos by the *Penguin News*:

> Your anonymous [letter] writer on the Burgos trial states that he was shocked at the [negative] reaction of some people to the result of the trial. As an uncle of the victim, I am shocked at the result, perhaps the people who showed resentment didn't think the punishment fitted the crime, as I most certainly didn't.

(*Penguin News,* No. 8, 25 September 1980, p. 10).

Gladys Minto's demise in December 1980 was the result of uxoricide by long-standing Falkland resident Leonard Minto, and was described by the *Penguin News* as 'one of the most tragic murders in Falklands History' (*Penguin News,* No. 11, 5 February 1981, p. 5). This incident, in which domestic emergency resulted in fatal violence, was picked up by the *New York Times* and, along

with Tony Kirk's murder, explicitly linked to the unresolved female demographic issue, and the violent, intimate geopolitics that existed in some quarters.

The scalar leap from the micro-circulation *Falkland Islands Times* to that of the mass-circulation *New York Times* could hardly have been greater, but recurring themes such as the contested presence of the Royal Marines, violence, separation and sexual frustrations remained. Reporter Edward Schumacher filed a dispatch from Goose Green on 7 May 1981, a significant account entitled:

> ON A DESOLATE ATLANTIC ISLAND, A RARE CASE OF MURDER; The Talk of The Falklands':
>
> 'They say Leonard Minto tried to slit his throat after slitting that of his wife… Mr. Minto is now in Toddy McMillan's jail, charged with murder. Just nine months earlier a Chilean hand pulled his shepherd knife and killed a British worker in a drunken brawl. They were the first killings in at least 40 years […] Mrs. Minto's death was probably to have been expected. She and her husband were separated and she was living with another man…
>
> The Problem: Too Few Women.
> At the root of the problem is a simple statistic: for every three men between the ages of 30 and 64, there are two women. It is even worse in the outlying areas. In a census of West Falkland Island eight years ago, there was one single woman over the age of 19 and there were 51 single men.
> There is little reason to believe that the situation has changed. More men come from Britain for the work available here. More women go to Britain for the life style there, often as the bride of one of the 40 marines stationed here on one-year tours. This galls the local men. "Women here are like hen's teeth – bloody rare," said Peter Clement, a 31-year-old sheep shearer.
>
> (Edward Schumacher in *New York Times* [online], 7 May 1981).

What is striking is that this murder was explicitly linked to the 'problem' of too few women; indeed, in placing Leonard Minto's backstory in the wider setting of Island behaviours, noting that there were many instances of this sort, Edward Schumacher presents Mrs Minto's murder as somehow 'expected', in other words a predictable homicide in the Falklands context. Governor Rex Hunt too had been aware of the threat posed by Minto to his estranged wife, and had sought to help her, cognisant of her husband's violent disposition, particularly after a few drinks.

> He had beaten his wife several times, she had finally left him and the magistrate had warned him not to attempt to molest her. For her own safety, we had allowed her to sleep in the hospital and, to give her some money of her own, we had engaged her to be a maid at Government House (Hunt 1992, p. 130).

Far from being contested matters on letters pages, the issues which the Angry Islander discourse in 1978 had brought into the public domain about life in this 'booze-sodden, sex-ridden, wife-beating country' (Mary Jennings, *Falkland Islands Times,* 15 December 1978, p. 1) had proven to be *in extremis* emergency matters of life and death. With two murders of Islanders in 1980, as per our earlier extrapolation of Gray's (2019) argument, it is clear that extreme (domestic) violence was becoming part of the social relations of the Falklands slow emergency , with the use of the shepherd knife assuming an alarming new significance. The *Falkland Island Times* emphasised the emotional impact of the murder on Islanders, alliteratively reporting:

> MINTO MURDER MAKES MANY MAD
>
> Boxing Day did not bring the usual 'Spirit of Goodwill' to Len Minto, for this was the day when the Falkland Islands Police Force formally charged Minto with the murder of his wife Gladys
>
> Mrs Minto had been found dead at her home in Stanley on the morning of Thursday December 11th – her throat had been cut
>
> (*Falkland Islands Times,* January 1981, p. 1).

It then placed the Minto murder in a wider setting through a further article:

> 'THE MINTO MURDER: CUT-THROAT CAPERS CAUSE CONCERN
>
> The recent death of Mrs Gladys Minto, and the subsequent charge of Murder made on Glady's husband Len, caused concern among most people in Stanley, who seemed to be asking the question 'What the hell is going to happen next?' 1980 produced 2 murders.
>
> (*Falkland Islands Times,* January 1981, p. 11).

Rex Hunt commented: 'Not a murder for fifty years, and now two in my first year' (Hunt 1992, p. 130), and this may well be a one hundred per cent underestimation as it is entirely possible that there were a further two murders, both at North Arm in the far south of East Falkland. The suspected murder victims were Royal Marine Alan Addis, who is said to have

disappeared there in August 1980, and a witness in the Addis case, Johnny Biggs, who died shortly afterwards in a fire at his North Arm cottage.

Various rumours were disseminated in the colony regarding the events at North Arm. *Penguin News* noted that:

> Although virtually nothing is known concerning his loss, several theories have been put forward […] After a little over one month, and bearing in mind the wintry weather that prevailed over the period, it is very unlikely that the Marine is still alive' (*Penguin News,* No. 8, 25 September 1980, p. 3).

Diplomatically, *Penguin News* did not report, or speculate on, the specifics of these rumours. Subsequently, the *Falkland Islands Times*, in reporting on the Coroner's 'open verdict', posited that'it is assumed that he either fell into the water from North Arm jetty upon attempting to board R.M.S Forrest, or that he wandered into the surrounding Camp and perished' (*Falkland Islands Times,* 5 February 1981, p. 1). It avoids any reference to 'darker' explanations. Rex Hunt, though diplomatic, commented that 'Addis' body was never found […] There were many theories – some exceedingly wild' (Hunt 1992, p. 88), and cites R.M.S Forrest Captain Jack Sollis' theory that Addis slipped off the jetty to a hypothermic death as the "most likely' explanation'.

Independent journalist Ian MacKinnon, writing on 29 August 1995 nearly fifteen years after the Alan Addis' disappearance, claimed that:

> The favoured theory is that Alan Addis got into a row with locals and was "cold-bloodedly" murdered, his body burned and the remains buried' ('Final act in a Falklands drama: Marine Alan Addis disappeared from a Falklands social club 15 years ago'*, The Independent [online]*, 28 August 1995).

The absence of a definitive explanation for Addis' demise has created space for 'wild' theories (Hunt 1992, p. 88), one of which linked the August 1980 death of shepherd Johnny Biggs in a house fire at North Arm to the Addis case, about which he was due to give evidence to the police (cited in 'The disappearance of Alan Addis', *Wikipedia* entry, provenance undisclosed).

Such speculation within the Islands suggests that there was a contemporary perception that the Falkland authorities had not been able to uphold law and order in the pre-Conflict Camp, in respect of the missing Royal Marine.

Notwithstanding the Devon and Cornwall's Police later involvement in this matter, and the arrest of four Islanders in 1995, no charges followed; neither did a 2010 Metropolitan Police investigation lead to any conclusive outcome, with the case remaining unresolved.

What this case does show is that *in extremis* the Falklands prior to 1982 were a place, for whatever reason, from which a Royal Marine might not return alive; that in the region of 0.7% of the Islands' pre-war population have been arrested (1995), though not charged, is in itself a thought-provoking statistic. After the Addis case, the Royal Marines sought to reduce risk in the Camp through adopting 'the 'buddy system', whereby Royal Marines always went in pairs when travelling in camp (Hunt 1992, p. 89). Although Hunt (1992, p. 89), ascribes its adoption to 'the need to respect the natural elements', this new system made it less possible for a 'disappearance' of a Royal Marine to re-occur for reasons unconnected with the weather or physical environment.

Significantly, Royal Marine George Thomsen in his memoirs confirms his awareness in 1981 that Marines lives were said to be at risk in the Islands. He records how, soon after his April 1981 arrival in the Islands, he had been told about a recent occasion when the Addis case had been used to 'manage' the behaviour of a young Islander woman.

As recalled by Thomsen, fellow Naval Party P8901 member 'Ginge' informed him:

> We'd been chatting up some of the local birds, at the [unspecified] settlement. We'd had a good time the night before […] Anyway in the morning we were just off when I heard this local talking to one of the girls in the kitchen[…] He was telling her to wind her neck in and told her that unless she wanted to see a repeat of what had happened at North Arm she'd better keep well away from any Marines (Angel and Thomsen 2009, Chapter 4, no page number provided).

However accurate the substance of its claims, this account reflects the very real tension and suspicion that existed between an unknown number of male Islanders, and the Royal Marines. The contested bodies of Islander women provided the *casus belli* for this undeclared conflict, with young Islander men and Royal Marines as respective protagonists in this manifestation of the

Falklands slow emergency.

It is clear that the *Falkland Islands Times* had, back in 1978, already opened the lid on a 'Pandora's box' of profound intimate societal and sexual tensions through 'Angry Islander's' letter criticising the Royal Marines, and that tensions would remain entirely unresolved in the period up to 1982. An emotional civil war between Islander women and men; a war for womens' bodies between Islander males and Royal Marines; depopulation; domestic violence and murder, were all evident in the slow emergency period up to 1982. The Falklands were at serious risk of progressive societal and demographic disintegration, a 'Wild South' emerging in which alcohol and shepherds' knives were readily available, and women's bodies were subjects of aspiration, contention, and violence – even to the point of murder. Agentive, younger Islander women too were able to 'territorialise' the bodies of Royal Marines and gain mobility through marriage, making the Islands an even more difficult social and sexual space for 'overlooked' young Islander men.

The *Falkland Islands Times,* in fact, transformed itself into a source of division through initiating the 'Angry Islander' discourse. The tensions exposed through its pages in 1978 made 'saying the unsayable' in an Island publication – that the Royal Marines were resented by a minority – possible, and exposed Islander-Royal Marine divisions, and opened up printed discourse about domestic violence and gender relations amongst Islanders. It also sowed further division between the sexes, encouraging Islanders and their networks to speculate about the identity of the 'Angry Islander'. In late November 1978, it informed its readers:

> 'There is still no clue as to who 'Angry Islander' is – even the 'Islander' part is under some doubt, although Air Commodore Brian Frow told me that he knows and so do the Royal Marines. If anyone can pass a hint my way, I'd be grateful!' (*Falkland Islands Times,* 24 November 1978, p. 1).

Editor Dave Colville's approach was fostering a South Atlantic 'witch-hunt' through the *Falkland Islands Times'* efforts to enlist readers, and therefore Islander networks, to establish 'Angry Islander's' identity (which had meant the latter had been able to avoid the type of written, personal attack that Trudi Hazell had received). By mid-December's edition an editorial volte-face had

materialised, in which a newly responsible Colville finally closed down the heated discourse. Indeed, the (previously) Colville-encouraged networked rumours had become so 'hot' for Roddy Napier that he felt compelled to produce a letter disassociating himself from the suspicion then circulating that he was the 'Angry Islander':

> ANGRY ISLANDER CASE NOW CLOSED[...] I wonder if the 'Ms. Mystery' who wrote the original letter condemning the Royal Marines stationed in this British colony realised what a hornets-nest he/she stirred up. Mr Roddy Napier of West Point Island has written to me stating that it WAS NOT HIM who wrote the original, contrary to the rumours abounding recently (*Falkland Islands Times*, 15 December 1978, p. 1).

The *Falkland Islands Times'* previous readiness to publish 'Angry Islander's' pseudonymic letter had created the climate of rumour in the first place; in a further volte-face, it now ceased to publish such letters, prompting Bill Luxton to write that: 'I am glad to hear that in future you will ignore anonymous letters and treat them with the contempt they deserve' (*Falkland Islands Times,* 15 December 1978, p. 5).

Clearly, the 'Angry Islander' controversy provides a cogent demonstration of contested discourse, rumour and suspicion amplified and circulated by local networks, with divisive results for the wider community and the individual, as Roddy Napier's experience illustrates. The disseminative, and potentially damaging, power of networks in a small community is also recognised in Southby-Taylor's advice to the family whose daughter's image had been objectified in polaroids, which he used to 'settle' the matter, not least by highlighting the daughter's agentive actions:

> Much as I supported their distress, I had to point out that the incident had been obviously carried out with the full participation (and as far as I could make out, the full enjoyment) of their daughter, and that any marine to be dismissed from the Colony for such an 'offence' would become public knowledge within minutes, adding, certainly public shame to their private embarrassment (2003, p. 43).

7.5 Conclusion

The politicised, contested nature of the 'Angry Islander' case is clear, though many subjectivities remain. What did the Royal Marines' bodies most signify for individual Islanders – de-masculinisation, further depopulation, military

protection, 'better' husband material than the local alternative, 'a passport' out of the Islands, an 'enemy within' depriving Islander males of the chance of a female partner? And what of the letters written to the *Falkland Islands Times*, and the newsletter itself – were these widely perceived amongst Islanders as evidence of legitimate expression or dangerous disruption? As letters cited in this chapter evidence, individual opinions varied, sometimes starkly; the one point of commonality is that all mobilised strong emotional responses, and quite remarkably, exposed certain intimate aspects of Islander life in the slow emergency were published in the *Falkland Islands Times*, notably about domestic violence and excessive drinking. Similarly, that the 'Wilkinson Sword of Peace' – which had its pacific political meaning made very explicit in its name – was 'reinvented', as a source of intensely emotional discord rather than one of peace.

Whilst many factors shaped quotidian discourse in the slow emergency Falklands in the years prior to 1982, the 'Angry Islander' letter stands out for its emotional force in provoking/stimulating a succession of letters in the *Falkland Islands Times* which uncomfortably exposed and exacerbated divisions within the Islander community. Angry Islander' as an individual of unknown gender (and race), clearly struggled with Islander women exercising agency over their life choices and the demographic implications of this; blaming and othering the Royal Marines, under the cover of anonymity, he sought to defenestrate their standing in the Falklands community, and so halt the defeminisation of the Islands. As with our development of Gray's argument about domestic violence, 'Angry Islander's' letter and the discourse it generated 'can be seen as part of the social relations' (Gray 2019, p.196) of slow emergency, exposing its intimate workings and manifestations within the Islander community.

8. Conclusion – 'whose emergency is it anyway?'

Writing this thesis has been a rich and varied experience, which in its research, discussion and writing has geographically extended from the Falklands to the United Kingdom to Ireland to Singapore. It has been an independent research project undertaken over eight years of part-time study, whilst in full-time work in Singapore and the United Kingdom. With work commitments, undertaking the research and producing this thesis has not been without challenges, but it has been a rewarding experience throughout. Beyond being a journey of personal academic growth, the importance of the research has, I believe, grown during the course of this project.

The Falklands have been, and continue to be, about more than the fate of these Islands, and discourse about their fate often centres on what Britain's role in the world should be, a question which has acquired renewed importance following the outcome of the 2016 Brexit referendum, which has highlighted the absence of a national consensus as to whether Britain's national home is, or is not, in the European Union. For its critics, Brexit, both in its emergence and in the drawn processes of its implementation functions as a slow emergency. There seems a striking alignment between issues of unresolved modern British identity and the Falklands issue, which as this thesis shows, have been in evidence for over half a century.

One of the factors which enabled Brexit is a view of British exceptionalism, that Britain has agency to 'go it alone'. The outcome of the Falklands Conflict both helped encourage this view and exorcise the 'ghost of Suez', with Prime Minister Thatcher claiming on 3 July 1982:

> 'When we started out, there were the waverers and the fainthearts. The people who thought that Britain could no longer seize the initiative for herself.…
>
> There were those who would not admit it—even perhaps some here today—people who would have strenuously denied the suggestion but—in their heart of hearts—they too had their secret fears that it was true: that Britain was no longer the nation that had built an Empire and ruled a quarter of the world.

> Well they were wrong. The lesson of the Falklands is that Britain has not changed and that this nation still has those sterling qualities which shine through our history'. (https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104989)

In this speech, the recovery of the Islands is used to symbolise a national renewal, in which a global Britain was reforged, true to its imperial roots; as this speech reflects, the outcome of the Falklands conflict did little to encourage a sense of European as opposed to a British identity in the United Kingdom, with a vision of 'global Britain' now often used by advocates of Brexit. So I see this research as providing important insights into mentalities that have resurfaced in Brexit, itself a development which seemed unlikely at the outset of this project in 2010.

This has been a unique investigation one which has the benefit of the involvement of the now sadly departed Sir Cosmo Haskard, a research opportunity which can never be repeated. Similarly, the focus on the everyday experience of Falkland Islanders in this thesis, with the research undertaken on the ground in the Islands, helps makes its content an original contribution to studies of the Falkland Islands.

The project's aim has been to reinterpret the Falklands/Malvinas, with a focus on emergency, territory and loyalty. The more I investigated the Islands, the more I came to see the Islands as enveloped in emergency, usually though not always, operating at a slow speed. As reflected in the question 'whose emergency is it anyway?', there is no one single 'owner' of the Falkland emergency (of whatever speed). Rather there are multiple owners who experienced it in varied ways, though clearly the Falkland Islanders were most exposed to the vicissitudes of emergency, even if a pre-1982 Falkland emergency has yet to be recognised historiographically. Slow emergency operated on many different levels, such as on the intimate, socio-economically, temporally and geopolitically.

It was also key to the success of this project to engage with visuality, to better understand – or see - the experience of emergency, be that of an everyday or exceptional nature; an example of the latter can be seen in the loyal crowds

which channelled emergency protests against Chalfont's efforts to encourage a territorial transfer to Argentina.

The Falklands/Malvinas can be understood as an assemblage of emergencies, islands that exercises a polarity in attracting emergencies, a supra-emergency enveloping the Islands. In unpacking this supra-emergency, it can be seen that these component emergencies extend to different actors, such as the Falkland Islander community faced with quotidian emergency, the Falkland Islands Emergency Committee seeking to forestall the emergency of a sovereignty transfer, the Argentine government accelerating emergency to achieve precisely this, or a beleaguered British Lord Chalfont seeking to contain domestic parliamentary and press opposition.

It was the use of the designation *Falkland Islands* ***Emergency*** *Committee* that prompted the focus in this project on what emergency in the Falklands means both empirically and theoretically, and the multi-causal and multi-layered nature of emergency soon became evident, as well as the speed at which emergency often ran its course. Regarding the latter, the theoretical work of Adey and Anderson (2010) and Nixon (2011) was crucial in developing the paradigm of slow emergency. As this thesis has sought to demonstrate, the accelerative and decelerative capacities of emergency, and its variable temporalities and intensities, have been vital in developing new perspectives on the Falklands/Malvinas.

What this study has helped reveal is that the sources of emergency are varied, and 'emergency actors' can function in various ways, as enablers, activists or victims. Angry Islanders, mobilised crowds, loyalist politicians and other actors played a distinct part in enacting the practices of Falkland emergency. Emergency functions at both micro and macro levels; in his own way, the fulminating 'Angry Islander' of the *Falkland Islands Times* was as significant at a micro-level emergency in exacerbating relations between Islanders and Royal Marines, as was the Wilson Government in exacerbating Anglo-Argentine relations through failing to deliver the Falkland sovereignty transfer it had purported to offer Buenos Aires. What is also striking is that

what I have called angry loyalty is intimately connected with emergency, being both a response to, and a factor in the development of, emergency.

The role of the press as an actor in its own right in accelerating and intensifying emergency has been highlighted, as can be seen through examining the output/conduct of printed news sources ranging from the Lilliputian *Falkland Islands Times* to the *Daily Express.* This also attests to the importance of the role of the storyteller in framing and disseminating Falklands 'emergency' narratives, which then become contributory factors in shaping the course of the emergency. Certainly, there is no doubt that newspapers such as *The Daily Express, The Daily Telegraph, The Times* and *The Daily Mail* played a powerful role in framing the Falkland emergency. Such newspapers frequently offered characterisations of a weak British government appeasing Argentina, rather than one of anachronistic Islander loyalism obstructing official British efforts to broker a territorial settlement with Buenos Aires, the latter being argued in *The Guardian* by Richard Gott. Representations by loyal politicians such as Bernard Braine and John Biggs Davison of the Falklands as a beleaguered and betrayed micro-Britain resisting a territorially aggrandising neighbour gained traction in a Britain, where many were frustrated by having to confront white-minority UDI Rhodesia which still claimed loyalty to Elizabeth II, as well as needing to suppress numerous other colonial Emergencies that accompanied the decolonisation process, 'from Aden to Zanzibar' (Reynolds 2017, p. 32).

Schwarz (2012, p. 12) draws our attention to contemporary perceptions of 'a lost time of whiteness… an age – in the past, a generation ago, in metropole or colony, somewhere, sometime – where white authority had prevailed', the perceived diminished status of the 'white Briton' highly unwelcome to many members of the British public. In contrast, Enoch Powell's vision of race relations, itself accelerating a racial emergency in British political discourse with April 1968's 'Rivers of Blood' speech, proved popular with many, helping mobilise nativist sentiment against the perceived 'foreign other', both within and beyond Britain's borders.

A populist narrative of resistance, particularly channelled through the *Daily Express,* to 'selling out' the ethnically white, kith and kin Falklands to a South American dictatorship state actuated significant domestic British support for the Islanders, effectively a mobilisation of whiteness and lingering sentiment for a lost era of British dominions. The visual impact of press photographs of Falkland Islanders waving union jacks against Chalfont's plans should not be underestimated, narrating Islanders as 'us' rather than 'other'.

The subaltern nature of geopolitics for the Falkland community is also clear. Craggs (2014, p. 42) has drawn attention to how ''subaltern geopolitics opens up a space to explore those not outside or against the geopolitical system', and this thesis has endeavoured to throw light on the everyday experience of Islanders, through investigating how slow emergency was experienced on an everyday basis, and mobilising Islander voices. Although on the margins, there were moments Islanders became more empowered, such as in their successful protests against Governor French in 1977. The capacity of emergency to lead to a subaltern micro-populism, with a dislike of paternalism and the 'conspiratorial outsider', can be seen in this incident, reflecting what 'Angry Islanders' could achieve together.

The Falkland Islands emergencies of the latter 1960s and 1970s can be understood as part of a greater, British emergency about the challenges of adapting both internally and externally to the post-World War Two era (with Brexit arguably the latest, 'updated' manifestation of this). Loyal framings of the Falklands firmly associated the colony with Britishness through tropes such as loyalty to the crown and (white) kith and kin; as the Wilson Government, and Chalfont in particular, learnt in 1968, it was politically inexpedient to be seen to act against the wishes of the Islanders. In many ways, the Islands functioned as a barometer of how Britain was managing its own national slow emergency adapting to a diminished status in a rapidly decolonising world. The very term 'Falklands' came to signify an emotional geopolitics, in which the name and survival of this beleaguered colony and its loyal inhabitants functioned as a micro-proxy for British nationhood, sovereignty and identity, arguably a 'last stand' for a lost pre-war Britain.

Representations of this nature were visually and memorably mobilised in *The Daily Express'* famous October 1968 photo-shoot of white, kith and kin Falkland Islanders standing in front of Stanley's Anglican cathedral and Whalebone Arch, the elemental sea in the background serving as the 'Atlantic bridge' between the colony and Britain.

In respect of the Islands themselves, this insular territory faced a very different type of emergency to the ones in colonies such as Malaya, Kenya and Aden. Often framed as 'Victorian', 'Edwardian' or 'anachronistic' by contemporary commentators, the Islands appeared asynchronous with the post-colonial era, territorial relics of a departed era and deceased Empire. Yet the colony struggled on with quotidian life, notwithstanding numerous and often temporally extended - usually slow - emergencies, emerging at different speeds and degrees of intensity. Intersectional, overlapping slow emergencies 'constructed' the realities of Falkland life, manifested in areas such as ongoing economic decline, Argentine volumetric absorption, depopulation, socio-sexual tensions and British Government neglect.

The practices, experiences and performances of emergency were played out on a quotidian basis in the Islands, to the degree that Falkland life became an assemblage of intersectional emergencies. The frequent reference to the future in the Islands, be that in relation to socio-economic or political survival, is entirely connected with emergency, the latter being an uncertain process with unknown outcomes.

Falkland emergencies such as demographic decline and the 'wrong bodies' (too few Islander females; too many British males) exacerbated matters. This was particularly attributable to young Islander women marrying Royal Marines, who in pursuit of a personal 'better life' reproduced demographic emergency, rather than, biologically, the next generation of Islanders. There is an (unfair) argument that in exercising agency in this way these women were complicit in emergency; unfortunately, the result of the loss of young Islander women stimulated other emergencies such as those between some male Islanders and Royal Marines. Similarly, the ongoing socio-economic decline of

the colony encouraged uncertainty about the future of the Islands, which in turn encouraged further depopulation, and validated the choice of those Islander women who sought to make a life elsewhere through marriage. Slow emergency in the Falklands amounted to a progressive zombification of the colony. In many ways, slow emergency's remorseless erosion of the quality of Falkland socio-economic life presented a greater threat to the colony's future than a major political event such as Chalfont's November 1968 visit. Whereas the latter dramatically galvanised both Islander loyalism as well as domestic British loyal support, the former attritionally sucked life out of the colony.

The support of Governor Haskard, the Falkland Islands Emergency Committee, and press and parliament had helped stave off cession to Argentina in 1968, but subsequent developments continued to erode British sovereignty, with an ongoing volumetric emergency for the survival of the colony as a geopolitical entity distinct from Argentina. Nowhere was this more evident than through the 1971 Anglo-Argentine Communications and 1974 YPF Agreements, which effectively ceded aerial volume to Argentina and enabled the establishment of the shadow government of the aerotectorate. Nicholas Ridley's 1980 stillborn leaseback initiative represented an attempt to apply this approach territorially, whereby British title to the Islands would be similarly hollowed out; in return for sovereignty, Argentina would then permit a temporally finite grace period for British rule to expire, so adding a future, temporal slow emergency for Islanders who remained. There appeared, indeed, to be no future for the Falkland as a British colony, a point which the shelving of the Shackleton Report in 1977 effectively confirmed, and Chalfont had predicted on his 1968 mission. At best, there was a shadow condominium in the Falklands/Malvinas, in which the British retained the everyday appearance of territorial control, but in reality Argentina dominated the archipelago three-dimensionally.

By early 1982, Argentine de facto, three dimensional domination of the Falkland/Malvinas archipelago was over a decade old; literally time was on its side, as Argentine objects of aerial power, such as LADE's planes, exercised effective geopolitical control over archipelagic volume, with Britain and

Islanders largely neutralised. Argentina simply had to wait for slow emergency processes to lead to the end of the Falkland Islanders as a viable community, and a formal British de jure recognition of de facto reality. The Galtieri junta's hasty decision to invade in 1982 instead led to an unexpected British geopolitical and volumetric archipelagic reassertion, and subsequent re-invigoration of the previously moribund colony.

To conclude, for those studying political geography and decolonisation, the thesis brings out that emergency is multi-faceted, integrates the everyday to the high political and is three dimensional and visual in nature. It shows that emergency should be understood as more than a series of state sponsored performances and practices designed to achieve desired behavioural and political outcomes from populations, that it is a 'bottom up' as well as a 'top down' experience. It demonstrates that speed and intensity matter, and that in examining how these affect a people and a place on the fringe of Empire, we open up a new perspective on the workings of colonial emergency.

In the case of the Falklands, it can be seen that emergency is long lasting and multi-dimensional, with different temporalities, consisting of a hydra of emergencies of different speeds and intensities which coalesce into an overall emergency. This is not an emergency in which the British military applied emergency decrees and force against a hostile members of an indigenous community; it was more subtle, requiring the application of strategic neglect to secure to achieve Islander co-operation. Unlike the other 'white' emergencies of Cyprus and Northern Ireland, there was no anti-British resistance movement to neutralise, and no formal emergency was declared (until the 1982 Argentine invasion). Notwithstanding times of escalation, for the most part emergency in the Falklands moved slowly; this slowness, however, does not denote a lack of long-term effectiveness, and the schema of four sub-emergencies reflects specific ways emergency played out in the Falklands.

Slow emergency attritionally ate away at the fabric of the Falklands socially, culturally, geographically, politically, and psychologically. What becomes evident is how difficult it is for a community on the geopolitical margins to

withstand a drawn out emergency of strategic neglect. However, the traditional challenges and hardships of Falkland life meant that struggle and survival were longstanding features of the Falkland community, and slow emergency was a toxin to which there was already a measure of inbuilt immunity, albeit one which threatened to close down the colony's 'vital signs' over time.

In sum, this thesis has made the case for a temporally extended slow emergency, with periods of acceleration and deceleration, and, for the first time, has examined the Falkland Islander experience through an island-centred study. Slow emergency offers an original framing which can be productively applied to case studies on many different levels, ranging from high political to intimate geopolitics; as an example, applying slow emergency to Rwanda from independence in 1962 to the events of 1994 would help shed light on the processes and experiences which ultimately catalysed into mass genocide.

The research for this thesis leads one to conclude that Falklands from 1964 to 1982 experienced a drawn out and largely 'overlooked emergency', The term 'The Confrontation' or *Konfrontasi* is used to describe the 1966-69 British-Indonesian Emergency over the territorial status of Sarawak and Sabah; similarly 'The Slow Emergency' provides a fitting way to describe the Falklands in the period from 1964 to early 1982.

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10.1 APPENDIX A

Developments relating to the Falklands 1964-1970

DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO THE FALKLANDS 1964-1970		
Falklands	**British Government**	**Argentina/UN**
1964 May – Colonial Secretary Thompson takes over as acting Governor from Governor Arrowsmith. 9 October – Governor Haskard arrives – learns of renewed Argentine interest and Fitzgerald's flight whilst in transit by sea. No specific briefing from Commonwealth Office before appointment. (Islander John Leonard takes photograph later used on front of *Panorama* magazine shortly after his arrival). 8 December – 50th Anniversary of Battle of Falkland Islands.	**1964**	**1964** 8 September – Miguel Fitzgerald flew Cessna 185 to Falklands – leaves notes claiming Argentine sovereignty and returns to Rio Gallegos. On Governor Haskard's recommendation, permanent Royal Marine detachment established. .

1965	**1965**	**1965**
March/April – Governor Haskard visits Antarctica in HMS *Protector.*	25 January – Michael Stewart becomes Foreign Secretary.	16 December – UN Res. 2065 passed (87 votes to nil, 13 abstentions) inviting Britain and Argentine governments 'to proceed without delay in finding a peaceful solution to the problem'.
1966	**1966**	**1966**
March/April – Governor Haskard visits Antarctica in RRS *John Biscoe.*	January – Stewart visits Buenos Aires, first ever visit there by British Foreign Secretary Main British aim is to improve communications between islands and mainland – Argentina rebuffs this.	
	July UK – Argentina talks in London end agreeing to resume in October after consultations.	
24 July – ExCo meets, further to which Governor Haskard telegraphed Commonwealth Office telling London that that the empathic wish of the Islanders was to stay British.	23 July – broadcast of a talk by a member of the Bank of London and South America over the BBC World Service appearing to advocate a sovereignty transfer.	
	11 August – Michael Stewart replaced by	

September – Governor Haskard in London for talks at the Foreign Office about the sovereignty dispute.	George Brown. November – Further Talks – Britain	Late September – hostile reception from Argentines to Duke of Edinburgh visit to Buenos Aires to mark Argentina's 150th birthday – leaflets thrown at him by students, shots fired at his residence, rumour of a ransom plot in which a captured Duke of Edinburgh would be exchanged for the Falklands. 28 September – Operation Condor, hijacking of DCC4 airliner, Aerolineas Argentinas Flight 648, to Stanley racecourse. Activist role of Hector Garcia, editor of *Cronica*, passenger, in this, and September 1964 and November 1968 Fitzgerald episodes. That hijacking occurred embarrassing for Argentine government but does draw attention to Falklands dispute. Leads to temporary cooling of British-Argentine negotiations. Argentine leader Ongania did not appear to take advantage of the Condor Incident, and went through the motions of being severe with the hijackers.

	proposes sovereignty freeze for a minimum of 30 years, at which Islanders could choose between Britain and Argentina, which the latter rejects.	
1967	**1967** March – British government accepts for the first time in meetings between officials that they would be willing to concede sovereignty under certain conditions, provided the islanders wishes are respected. Genesis of the eventual Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). 23 June – Brown meets Argentine Foreign Secretary Costa Mendez, the latter confirming that making a sovereignty transfer dependent on islander wishes was unacceptable. Brown tells him he could not defend any other type of sovereignty transfer to parliament and public opinion. This remains Brown's position from here on, maintained by his officials through 1967-1968. July – Account of general thinking about human, cultural and property rights which would accompany a sovereignty transfer is	**1967**

August – Governor Haskard on home leave and attends meetings at the Commonwealth Office. September – Governor Haskard's return; he becomes seriously concerned about British Government's position October – December Governor Haskard writes a number of letters and telegrams to the Commonwealth Office re. islanders' ignorance of negotiations, lack of knowledge/aversion to Argentina and Britishness. Urges delay as the Islanders are not ready for a statement on the lines envisaged in a draft treaty and MOU. Governor Haskard's views not given much weights/welcome, as he is aware at the time.	given to ExCo via Colonial Secretary Thompson, then acting for Governor Haskard. December – paragraph 4 of the draft MOU cites 'interests' of the islanders.	
1968 January – Governor Haskard requested to come to London to present his views, which was approved.	**1968** 16-26 January – Councillor Summerhayes, from the British Embassy in Buenos Aires, 'fact-finding' mission to the Falklands.	**1968**

	9 February – British Ambassador to Argentina, Sir Michael Cresswell, having read Councillor Summerhayes' report, advises that the MOU is likely to lead to friction with Argentina, and is sympathetic to Haskard's arguments to proceed with caution.	
14 February – Further to a number of discussions, Governor Haskard has a difficult meeting with George Brown, who had alcoholically imbibed at lunch, about the future of the Falklands. 15 February – Governor Haskard has to see Brown to 'make amends' for some angry remarks he had made in their meeting on the previous day. 20 February – Back in Stanley, Governor Haskard gives ExCo an account his visit, and ExCo showed members a draft MOU – he was authorised to tell them in confidence about the latest version of the MOU and the Argentine alternative version. In public he must avoid reference to unresolved issues in the MOU, and to Gibraltar. 21 and 22 February – ExCo meet and discuss a	14 February – George Brown had seen Governor Haskard in London. FCO minutes says Brown' exceedingly angry at the situation', having been told there was 'no division of opinion on our side', now found out that both Governor Haskard and Ambassador Cresswell, said that the policy could not succeed owing to Islander opposition.	

redacted draft MOU summary, which Governor Haskard has prepared for public announcement. Members appreciate Haskard's position as Governor; like Haskard, they do not like its non-committal tone regarding maintaining British sovereignty. The statement is broadcast on the eve of 22 February and predictably is the subject of much anxious comment. 24 February – Unofficial members of ExCo present Governor Haskard with a declaration of their dismay that so little attention is being paid to their wishes by the British Government and are concerned that at some future point it would act against their wishes. Governor Haskard transmits this to the Commonwealth Office. Initiative now passed to the unofficial members of ExCo AG Barton, R V Goss, Sydney Miler and Christopher Bonner, who on…		
27 February – publish a statement asking for urgent intervention to stop a sovereignty transfer, which was sent to each member of the British Parliament and a number of national newspapers, in a bid to put British government policy under much more scrutiny.	27 February – four ExCo Councillors sent a statement to all members of parliament and national newspapers asking for urgent intervention to stop a sovereignty transfer. Falkland Islands Emergency Committee	

	soon formed. 12 March – *Times* claims that there is 'no sign that the British government is changing their position up to now'. 15 March – *Times* refers to Chalfont's 'flaccid equivocations' in defending the Governments' position, and Costa Mendez's hopes, running a leading article 'Betrayal or Barter'. 16 March – Stewart Foreign Secretary again – inherits the MOU situation and Falkland councillors telegram. 26 and 28 March – debates in Commons about Falklands much made of Falkland island councillors appeal.	
April/May – *Daily Express* reporter Jack Comben spends fortnight on the islands, leading to… 2 October – *Express* reporter Aubrey Mathews takes a well-publicised photo of a larger crowd at the whalebone arch in Stanley proclaiming their loyalty to Britain.	17 October – Foreign Secretary now responsible for Foreign and Commonwealth affairs following merger of Foreign and Colonial Offices. November – Queen and Prince Philip visit Brazil and Chile,	

	accompanied by Chalfont. No royal visit for Falklands but Chalfont and Arthur Galsworthy, senior official responsible for dependent territories announce they are coming.	
24 November – Chalfont arrives Falklands, greeted by Islanders waving union jacks and placards saying 'Chalfont go home!' photo with Michael Tait, Chalfont and Governor Haskard). Series of meetings held in Stanley, with bodies from ExCo to Sheep Owners Association. Chalfont explains to council members the nature of the proposed MOU content and of a parallel unilateral statement that could be made to Parliament. In a radio broadcast, he offers reassurance to islanders about not ceding sovereignty without their agreement. On 27 Chalfont speaks to large meeting in Stanley Town Hall. Chalfont fails to reassure/persuade islanders.		27 November – Fitzgerald lands at Eliza Cove but plane damaged, and was sent back to the mainland. Chalfont visits site of plane crash.
	3 December – Chalfont visit reported back to, and critically received in, Commons. 11 December – cabinet decision to abandon negotiations based on MOU because Argentina refused to accept that	

	a sovereignty transfer should be subject to Islander wishes. 11 December – Stewart tells Commons that there was a basic divergence over the British government's insistence that no sovereignty transfer could take place against Islander wishes. Rejected suggestions Islanders were under pressure to change their wishes. Talks continue. 12 December – Commons discusses Falklands.	
December – after Stewart' s announcement, situation in Islands becomes more relaxed.		
1969	**1968**	**1968**
May – Colonial Secretary Thompson retires.		21 November – British and Argentine governments tell the UN Secretary General that talks continue.
1970	**1970**	**1970**
March/April – Governor Haskard visits Antarctica. April – SS 'Great Britain' returned to UK.	19 June – Stewart no longer Foreign Secretary.	
September – Governor Haskard ends governorship.		

10.2 APPENDIX B

MercoPress ***announces that the author of this project would be undertaking research into the Falklands in the period 1965-82 (on next page).***

Source: http://en.mercopress.com/2012/10/03/shackleton-fund-with-new-website-makes-important-falklands-announcements

MercoPress.
South Atlantic News Agency

Shackleton Fund with new website; makes important Falklands' announcements
Wednesday, October 3rd, 2012 - 21:07 UTC

Patrick Watts MBE, first Falkland Islander to receive an Academic Award for his book on the history of the Stanley Sports Association

"The Christmas Sport" book

The Shackleton Scholarship Fund which is closely linked to the South Atlantic and the Falkland Islands has announced the launch of their new website: www.shackletonfund.com.
The SSF Committee say that they hope this will prove more user friendly for potential scholars and gives them a platform to more readily update the public on activities, projects and research funded by the Scholarship Fund.
The Shackleton Scholarship Fund is shortly to welcome 2011 Academic scholar Max Hull to the Islands. Mr Hull will visit between the 15th & 30th October to research his project "Understanding the Falklands in the period 1965 to 1982 – and their significance in a wider context".
On the scientific front, Melanie Mackenzie, a 2012 Academic Scholar, will be in the Islands in February or March 2013 to research sea cucumbers.
Turning to sport, the Falkland Islands Archery Association, 2012 Quality of Life scholarship winners, will welcome a coach and technical adviser to the Falklands shortly to coincide with their first anniversary celebrations.
The Committee is also pleased to announce that Patrick Watts' book on the history of the Stanley Sports Association should be on sale by the middle of November.

10.3 APPENDIX C

PROGRAMME FOR FALKLANDS VISIT, 14-30 OCTOBER 2012	
Sunday 14 October	• Depart from RAF Brize Norton
Monday 15 October	• Arrive at Mount Pleasant Airport; travel to Malvina House Hotel, Stanley
Tuesday 16 October	• Meet Tansy Newman at Archives. Research in Archives
Wednesday 17 October	• Initial meeting with Sally and Tim Blake to set up interview • Research in Archives
Thursday 18 October	• Initial meeting with Terry and Joan Spruce, at 29 Ross Road West, to set up group interview with themselves and Sam and Hay Miller • Interview with Gerald Cheek at 9 Biggs Road
Friday 19 October	• Research in Archives • First interview with Tim and Sally Blake at 1 Ross Road
Saturday 20 October	• Interview with Willie Bowles at Malvina House Hotel • Second interview with Sally and Tim Blake at 1 Ross Road
Sunday 21 October	• Research • Observational tour of Stanley
Monday 22 October	• Research in Archives • Interview with Eric Goss at Malvina House Hotel • Interview with Ron Binnie at Malvina House Hotel
Tuesday 23 October	• Patrick Watts and Gerald Cheek to go to Mount Langdon • Interview with Richard Fogerty at Malvina House Hotel • Group interview with Terry and Joan Spruce, and Sam and Hay Miller at 29 Ross Road West

Wednesday 24 October	• All day Camp field visit with Tony Smith, including interview with Aisla and Tony Heathman at Estancia (Aisla Heathman is daughter of Velma Malcolm)
Thursday 25 October	• Research in Archives • Meet Shackleton Committee members at Government House and tour of Government House afterwards with Governor Nigel Hayward
Friday 26 October	• Research in Archives • Visit to Camp/Volunteer Point with Patrick Watts
Saturday 27 October	• Interview with Bill Luxton and Grizelda Cockwell at Chartres, West Falkland
Sunday 29 October	• Visit Gypsy Cove/Canopus Hill with Tony Smith • Review research materials gathered; identify any gaps
Monday 29 October	• Complete research in Archives
Tuesday 30 October	• Depart from Mount Pleasant Airport
Wednesday 31 October	• Arrive at RAF Brize Norton

10.4 APPENDIX D

Research interviews and meetings with Islanders and geographical location within Islands: Falklands Visit, 14-30 October 2012

Stanley		**Camp**	
East Falkland			**West Falkland**
Terry Spruce - former manager of the Falkland Islands Company (FIC)		Eric Goss – had been manager at Goose Green	Tim Blake – had been manager of Hill Cove
Joan Spruce – wife of former manager of the Falkland Islands Company (FIC)		Tony Heathman – runs Estancia Farm	Sally Blake – had been farm manager's wife at Hill Cove
Patrick Watts – had formerly run the Falkland Islands Broadcasting Service (FIBS)		Aisla Heathman – runs Estancia Farm	Bill Luxton – had been farm manager at Chartres
Gerald Cheek – had been in charge of the Falkland Islands Government Air Service (FIGAS)			Grizelda Cockwell – had been farm manager's partner at Chartres
Richard Fogerty – had worked for the Falkland Islands Government as a teacher			Sam Miller – had been farm manager at Keppel Island
Willie Bowles – local builder and former Stanley Councillor			Hay Miller – had been farm manager's wife at Keppel Island
Ron Binnie – local builder and former Stanley Councillor			

10.5 APPENDIX E

Chalfont's Falkland Schedule, 23-28 November 1968

Chalfont's entourage (officials & journalists)	Lord Chalfont; Sir Arthur Galsworthy (Deputy Under-Secretary of State); Mr. C.E. Diggines (Head of Latin American Department); Mr. Tait (Chalfont's Private Secretary; Mr. Gott (*The Guardian*); Mr. Seaman (*Daily Express*); Mr. Wigg (*The Times*); Mr. Field *(Telegraph*); Mr. McLachlan (*Daily Mail*) [as described in *Falkland Islands Monthly Review*, 2 December 1968)		
Date	**Geographical locations**	**To meet**	**Party's Mode of mobility**
Saturday 23 November 1968 ***Geographic focus: West Falkland***	1. Arrive off Port Howard 2. **Port Howard** disembarkation **3. Carcass Island** 4. Fly over West Point Island and Roy Cove to **Hill Cove** **5. Fox Bay West** 6. **Port Howard** to re-join Endurance	1. Sir Cosmo Haskard joins Chalfont on HMS *Endurance* 2. Mr. D.M. Pole-Evans (Manager) and Mrs. Pole-Evans; Sydney Miller ExCo and LegCo 3. Mr. and Mrs. Bertrand (owners) 4. Mr. L.G Blake and Mrs. Blake 5. Mr. James Robertson (manager) and Mrs. Robertson 6. Supper with Mrs. D.M. Pole-Evans (manager) and Mrs. Pole-Evans	HMS *Endurance*, Beaver aircraft, helicopters
Sunday 24 November 1968 ***Geographic focus: Stanley***	1. Arrive **Stanley** harbour; to public jetty for disembarkation 2. Ross Road Walkabout 3. Government House 4. Christ Church cathedral	1. Arrive Stanley harbour at 09:30; to public jetty to meet Sir Cosmo Haskard (who had flown back to Stanley) and Council members 2. Meet members of public in walkabout 3. Meet 120 Stanley Residents at 12 noon, followed by afternoon ExCo meeting 4. Join congregation for 7pm Evensong	HMS *Endurance*, boat, foot, Governor's official car
Monday 25 November **Geographic focus: Stanley**	1. Government House 2. Colony Club	1. Meet members of ExCo 2. Meet Falkland Island Sheep Owners' Association	Governor's official Car
Tuesday 26 November	1. From Stanley, fly over Bluff Cove and Fitzroy, to **Goose Green** – visit	1. Accompanied by Governor and Mr. Robin Pitaluga (ExCo), to meet	Beaver Aircraft

Geographic focus: East Falkland	included settlement, shearing pens, and Darwin Boarding School. **2.** Fly over Ajax Bay and Port San Carlos to **Cape Dolphin** **3. Salvador** **4. Teal Inlet** 5. Fly over Port Louis to **Green Patch** 6. Fly over SS Great Britain to **Stanley**	Mr. Vinson (manager) and Mrs. Vinson 2. Meet Mr. A. Miller (manager of Port San Carlos), and Mr. and Mrs. J. Berntsen 3. Hosted by Mr. R. Pitaluga (who was accompanying Chalfont as part of his entourage that day) 4. Lunch with Mr. J.D. Barton (manager) and Mrs. Barton) 5. Meet Mr. K.J McPhee (manager) and Mrs. McPhee 6. Meet Mr. A.G. Barton, Mr. R.V. Goss and Mr. R. Gott for a broadcast interview	
Wednesday 27 November ***Geographic focus: Stanley and vicinity for remainder of Chalfont's visit***	1. From Stanley, to **Moody Brook** 2. **Stanley** locations 3. Stanley Town Hall	1. Meet naval personnel 2. Visit Junior and Senior School; King Edward II Memorial Hospital; Falkland Islands Company Office; General Employees; Union HQ; and Town Council Office 3. 19:00-21:30 to speak at meeting attended by hundreds of Stanley residents.	Hovercraft Governor's official Car
Thursday 28 November	1. **Stanley** 2. HMS *Endurance*	1. Meet ExCo 2. 5pm back on HMS *Endurance*	Governor's official Car HMS *Endurance*

10.6 APPENDIX F

Full translation for this thesis of October 1974 Article from *Panorama* 'MALVINAS: Will we have to invade them?'

Lately it has been observed that some Argentinean authorities have set barriers for the journalists and legislators that wish to travel to the Malvinas. Meanwhile, angry voices are rising in the parliament demanding a definite end to the prolonged dispute with Great Britain.

In the first days of November, a Panorama editor attended the office of the 'General Direction of Antarctica and the Falklands' intending to ask for the credentials that allows one to travel to the Falkland Islands. As he arrived to this elegant building located in Arroyo 1034 he went to the first floor and asked for Minister Carlos Lucas Blanco. The Minister referred him to his adviser, retired Colonel Luis González Balcarce, to whom the journalist explained the reasons that compelled him to travel to the islands. After a long conversation he put him in contacted him with Mrs. Beatriz Zawells, an administrative employee, who explained that this kind of procedure would normally take 50 days. The journalist asked then how was it possible that a credential issued by a Chancellery takes more than seven weeks when getting a passport would only take one week. Mrs, Zawells explained that this delay was due to other bodies intervening apart from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A few days later the reporter realised it would be hard to obtain this credential, precisely because of his status as a journalist. He also heard of other colleagues that had not been able to travel to the Falklands and numerous legislators who were faced with unexplained delays. To know in depth the reasons behind this approach, which basically prevented any journalist and legislator from traveling to the Falklands, Panorama decided to investigate the current status of the dispute over the possession of the islands.

On January 3rd, 1833 Captain John James Onslow, head of a British naval force, lowered the blue and white flag that fluttered in Puerto Soledad, expelled the Argentine authorities commanded by the Colonel José María de Pinedo and occupied the islands. Since that fateful day every Argentine government with no exception has tirelessly claimed at the court of Saint James the usurpation of this taken archipelago. With the same obstinacy, the Britannic Majesty has always refused, systematically, to listen to any complaints. However, when talking about international politics there is no guarantee that a situation will not change. On the contrary, in this secular dispute over the Falklands it is possible that some short-term fundamental changes will occur. And because of the magnitude of the conflicting interests, it is very possible that this old conflict will provoke a severe Argentine-British crisis.

A NEW KUWAIT

Far from being a heterogeneous set of bare rocks, as some people imagine, whose only interest lies in its strategic value, the Falklands are located on the rich Argentinian marine platform and they encompass unsuspected possibilities for the future. Undoubtedly, the most important are oil-bearing. The famous *bolsón de Namuncura* is a large area of the epi-continental platform that extends from the coast of Santa Cruz to the northern end of the Great Malvina, the westernmost of the two main islands. Clearly, until drillings are carried out there is no way of knowing what are the real possibilities of extracting oil in that area. Yet a year ago American capitalists declared in the American magazine *United States and World Report* that the Falkland oil would lead to a "New Kuwait" and they expressed their interest in the exploitation of Argentine oil.

"There are big reservoirs" entrepreneurs said, and they added that the advantage of our sub-marine platform for oil is that you don't have to look for it in the jungle, cross mountains or build ports in the ocean, like in Ecuador and Peru.

The progress of the ocean exploration shows the growing importance of the captive archipelago. Large deposits of manganese nodules were detected in

the south of the Drake Passage and huge reserves of iron ore near Antarctica. In a world where the stock of raw materials on land are being depleted every day and investigations are being directed into the use of oceans, the discovery of iron and manganese is a result as important as the discovery of oil. Hence, the Falkland Islands become an irreplaceable key.

Add to this the increasing fishing opportunities in the maritime platform plus the seaweed harvesting in its costs, and you can get an idea of what the possession of the archipelago means in economic terms. But not only future interests are driving England. It is also vested interests during 140 years of economic exploitation of the islands, which are powerful enough to mobilise Lord Mountbatten himself, uncle of the Queen, and other aristocratic characters. 50 per cent of the island´s suitable lands and 55 per cent of the wool production have a single owner: The Falkland Islands Company, owning 7 of the 31 establishments spread in the Falkland´s surface. Every year wool production in the Island reports back to the UK around 2 million sterling pounds, which is split between less than a hundred owners. None of them live in the Falklands; only employees, managers and pawns live in there. Landownership scheme in the Falkland is accentuated as the Crown has banned the trading of the shares of the Falkland Islands Company on the London Stock Exchange. Because the ownership of the lands cannot be changed, it is concentrated on a few owners, and the Islanders have zero possibilities of owning the lands.

THE GREAT CHANGE

Until 1960 (over 127 years) the Argentinian claims to the British government had no repercussions. It was the Special Committee of Decolonization, a new UN agency, that has proved Argentina's best ally in the secular quarrel with England. In 1960 the committee achieved the remarkable. They managed to approve by a large majority Resolution 1514, which stated the necessity to "quickly and unconditionally end the colonialism in all forms".

On December 16, 1965 Argentinian diplomacy accomplished another triumph in the international forum. After several years of patient work our country was able to get the UN assembly to approve Resolution 2065.

This means a definite break on the silence imposed by England to Argentine claims, the recognition that there is a colonial domination in the usurped archipelago and the international commitment to end this anomaly. The reversal of the situation has left Great Britain in big trouble, being compelled to negotiate with Argentina.

DELAYING OPERATIONS

On January 14, 1966 both countries signed a declaration in which they committed to find a peaceful solution to the problem. As it was seen afterwards, far from resigning themselves to a defeat, Britain diplomacy was trying to gain time while waiting for a saving formula or manoeuvre. Signing the declaration was a move to settle UN pressure. Nothing else happened in 1966 and neither during the first months of 1967. At the end of that year the UN Special Committee on Decolonization took office once again. Venezuela and Uruguay, members of this committee, got maximal international assembly support for demanding information from Argentina and Great Britain about the status of the negotiations. Pressured by the committee, in 1968 the Labour Chancellor Michael Stewart declared in London that the problem of sovereignty in the archipelago would be treated directly between England and Argentina.

Meanwhile, that March, the wealthy landowners, owners of the archipelago unified in one British Committee for the Falkland Islands with the purpose of defending their rights before the English parliament and government.

As a group leader they named a prominent banker from the City, Sir John Barlow, and among the most conspicuous members Lord Mountbatten, uncle of your Majesty, was affiliated. Once this important pressure group was established, a gradual distortion of the negotiations, claimed by the UN, started in England.

INTERESTS OR WISHES?

First of all, Great Britain proposed having "conversations" rather than "negotiations". Secondly, they gave special importance to communication agreements and carefully avoided talking of sovereignty. Thirdly, they argued that any resolution should be in line with the "wishes" of the current inhabitants of the islands. In this way, Great Britain showed itself to be jealous of the sacred right of "self-determination of the People". On the one hand, Argentina has carried on with its duty of improving communications with the people of the island with no interruption. On the other hand, they have never acknowledged the fact that negotiations are based upon the wishes of the inheritors of an act of colonization and usurpation, as the Argentine inhabitants were forcibly expelled, and these territories were held without adequate titles, and colonisation was done purely by the mere will of the usurper country.

ARGENTINE EFFORTS

After arduous procedures, on the 19th July 1971 in Buenos Aires, English and Argentinean officials signed an agreement for the improvement of communications between Falklanders and the Argentinean Republic. As a result of this agreement, Argentinean air forces built in Stanley Port an 800 metres long aluminium track that was officially inaugurated on November 15th 1972. At the present time, every Monday at 10 AM a LADE (State Airlines) Fokker plane takes off from *Comodoro Rividavia,* and lands in Stanley port at 12.30 Argentinean time. Two hours later, 14.30, it takes off again and lands at 17.00 in *Comodoro*. The return trip costs 74.000 old pesos. Regarding transportation, the National Service of Naval Transport carried loads throughout the whole year to Port Stanley. Finally last week the first regular trip of the "Bahía Buen Suceso" departed to the Falkland, a vessel that will monthly depart to the islands carrying passengers and loads. Moreover, YPF (Fiscal Oil Deposits Company) has built up big fuel reservoirs and has been able to exclusively supply the Falkland people.

Morover, the Argentinean Army has given Port Stanley's athletes three cabin boy type yachts, and sailors at the Buenos Aires University Club have, for the

first time in history, run a competitive race against the Falklands helmsmen, in April this year.

ENGLISH LACK OF AWARENESS

In April 1973 Henry Henley, Undersecretary of State in the Foreign Office, said that Great Britain "will not transfer the Falkland Islands sovereignty without the previous consent of its 2.000 inhabitants". The United Kingdom showed, at that time, that the conversations and progress in transport and communications are very much welcome, but that they did not even wish to hear about the sovereignty problem. But Argentina did not stay behind. In November last year the UN Argentinean ambassador, Carlos Ortiz de Rosas presented a large document to the United Nations in which he refuted the Britain concepts.

"I must recall' the note said 'that although there has been much progress on opening communications between the mainland and the islands, the collateral issue of negotiation of sovereignty should not be affected or delayed, much less replaced by, the continuation and completion of all this."

Based on the extensive Argentine document, the Special Committee on Decolonization requested through a report the end of Great Britain's colonial power, not only on the Falklands but also on the Seychelles islands, Saint Helena, Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Pitcairn Island, Solomon Islands, Virgin Islands, Montserrat, Turks and Caicos Islands, Bermuda and Brunei.

Finally, last December 13th, the UN general assembly approved this report in which the UK and Argentina were exhorted to resume, without delay, their negotiations. The voting resulted in 99 votes cast for the Committee report, none against it, and only 14 votes were abstentions. The countries that abstained were the US, Portugal, Canada, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, France, Cameroon, Finland, Belgium, Germany, South Africa and Holland.

Despite the fact that the UN was very clear when they requested England to stop delaying the solution to this actual conflict, Britain continued its empire with deaf ears.

AN EVENING IN LONDON

Last July, in the ultra aristocratic rooms of Lincoln's Inn, the Britain Committee leaded by Sir John Barlow received 40 Falklanders that were especially invited to London. Employees were received by their employers. The lavish reception featured the ubiquitous presence of Lord Mountbatten and a conspicuous group of English nobles. The Committee finished the meeting saying they have requested the English government to ensure the "total incorporation of the colony to the United Kingdom, according to the departments and overseas territories formula". Otherwise- the committee warned - the people from the Islands would need to appeal to their right to self-determination to maintain the current status quo".

VOICES OF PROTEST

National deputy Antonio Moreno's voice sounded imperious: "I have requested the Chamber to assign a commission within them to directly enter the case facing the English Parliament and the Queen, for the purpose of arranging the peaceful eviction of the islands and the pure recognition of our sovereignty over the archipelago".

"Despite the order of early eviction - the Federal Vanguard Party of Tucuman representative trusted *Panorama* to report this - and the recommendation of the Chamber and the Foreign Affairs Commission, they have never attempted to leave the islands."

"Subsequently, I requested to place my order to be addressed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He will inform about the current status of our claim and, if he considers it necessary, take direct action after a hundred and forty years of peaceful claiming along diplomatic lines."

"The Honourable Minister has not attended, and neither a correction in the policy, or the handling of the claim, has been obtained. I have always maintained on site that England does not have, or ever had, any intention to return the invaded and occupied territories."

"As a man of the law – he said at last - I have strongly maintained that the policy used in pursuit of our claim and rights, through cultural exchange,

investments, by supplying the invaders and the various constructions, were only used to legalise the occupation. A hundred and forty years of notes, presentations and negotiations are enough to demonstrate the peaceful spirit of our people. Today, we have no other choice than the previous position and the end of diplomatic relations with the invaders. We have exhausted all of our peaceful petitions."

National deputy Fausto Mombelli, from Acción *Chubutense*, was even more categorical: "We must invade them", he affirmed to *Panorama*.

"The sovereignty we have over the Falklands is beyond argument- he carried on-. For that reason, continuing arguing about this topic will only delay us from obtaining the right we have to occupy the territory. Consequently, I understand that strong measures must be implemented to occupy the archipelago without delay, thus avoiding future generations criticising our lack of decision."

Finally, last October 24th the UN British ambassador, Ivor Richard, sent a note to Kurt Waldheim, UN general secretary, identical to the one sent last year by the Conservative ambassador Sir Douglas Maitland.

"I have been given the instruction to affirm- the note stated- that my government does not harbour doubts about your sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and I officially want to reserve the UK government's rights regarding this issue. My government reaffirms their authentic desire to reach a fair and peaceful resolution of this issue as long as it is in line with the desires expressed by the current inhabitants of the islands.

DUAL POLICY

Adolfo Holmberg, Argentinian doctor and scientist who has kept track of this issue very closely, thinks that England's view is very clear: "They want to keep the islands".

Dr. Holmberg is finishing a book that will be published by the Naval Centre with a very suggestive title: "Do you really think England will give us the Falkland Islands back? Because I don't"

"It is evident that the British are operating with a dual policy- he adds-: they make us believe that the surrender of the islands is a matter of convenience of the residents and that it takes a long, long time, when what they really want is to create a false independent State that will blindly respond to the British interests. This way they will not only please the UN, but they will also ensure the huge reservoirs of oil, algae, fish, iron and manganese."

INVASION?

The Argentinian government is investing increasing amounts of money with the intention of benefiting economically and culturally a certain sector of the population. Apparently, this social elite is intended by England to constitute an autonomous State functional to the British requirements and needs. During 141 years England has not respected the Argentinian claims, and it has been almost ten years since the historical UN petition to find a peaceful resolution.
The British Committee of the Falkland Islands is fulfilling an ambitious plan based on dissemination, conferences and meetings not only in England but also in every European country.
The fact that a Chancellor's office can deliberately forbid journalists and lawmakers to travel to the Falklands does not change the underlying problem but it makes it worse.

FALKLAND ISLANDS COMPANY'S MONOPOLY

Forty-one years old Dr. Ronald K. Crosby, veterinary surgeon, married with 5 children, from *Rosario* though based in *Formosa,* has completed one of the most accurate social-economic reports about the Falkland Islands. His observations, product of seven-weeks staying in the archipelago, are summarized in a book called *El Reto de las Malvinas* (The Falkland Islands challenge). This book addresses the features of wood production, the Falkland Islands Company monopoly and the attitude taken by residents regarding the Argentinian Republic.

How many establishments are there in the Falkland Islands?

There are 31 farms, 7 of which they belong to the Falkland Islands Company, among them the "Darwin North Arm", with 170,000 sheep and almost 300,000 hectares. In total, 120,000 hectares are exploited, and the sheep rodeo exceeds the 600,000 head.

What type of farms are these?

All establishments are facing the sea since wool transportation can only be done through sea-lane.

Each farm has matrimonial houses, big bachelor houses, a schoolhouse, a shearing shed, sheep bathroom, a cemetery, farmyards and a dock. They vary in size and the stage of the recent improvements oscillates between excellent conditions and semi-abandoned conditions. Water is abundant since it comes from natural watersheds that flow through numerous transparent gorges and streams. The pastures are generally too big (some of them reach the 8000 hectares), which has caused an indiscriminate overgrazing due to the grass mismanagement. Generally speaking very little has been done during the last forty years to maintain or improve soil fertility.

Is there a Monopoly managed by the Falkland Islands Company?

Doubtlessly, there is. Not only because they own 46 percent of the territory, but also they exert a real monopoly over the trading of the Islands. From 31 farms existent in the islands, only 4 of them do not sell their production through this company. Besides, this company sells the farms most of the supplies arriving to the archipelago, as well as what they sell at the two convenience stores they own at Stanley Port.

What type of population is living in the islands?

A decreasing population. In 1946 there were 2.239 people. Currently there are no more than 1.900 inhabitants. In the 60s the decreasing dropped to 30 Falklanders per year.

What causes this exodus?

Mainly the lack of communication, the poor level of education and training, the lack of opportunities to progress in work and the inability to acquire lands. The only port from the whole South American continent they have been in touch with for decades was Montevideo, 1.600 kilometres away.
The lack of inner routes and the *Estrecho de San Carlos* (Falkland Sound), which divides the main islands, increases the isolation feeling. There is no secondary education and children between 5-15 years old receive a very poor level of education, in fact below to our Primary School. Therefore, important job positions are given to native English or Scottish people, with a higher level of education. There are also very few entertainment opportunities. I think due to these factors, isolation and lack of incentives, a very serious drinking problem arose. Added to the negative factors just mentioned, this exerts a very unfavourable influence upon the home life, resulting in a very high divorce rate.

What do you think about the current stage of negotiations?

Argentina has showed to be patient and honourable, distinctive features from someone who is acting in their own rights. We have done everything we were asked to do and more. It would be a shameful if England were confusing courtesy with frailty and gave us no choice but to resolve the issue in a different way, thereby also achieving ultimate success but at the expense of leaving us without that final sweet taste of winning what we deserve with class. It becomes harder every day to refloat the economy of the archipelago, and they are sinking it before surrendering power to us.

10.7 Appendix G

Unpublished account of Cinema in the Falklands by Steph Middleton

Thanks are due to Sally Blake for forwarding this to me from Steph Middleton in November 2012, after I had concluded my research visit to the Islands.

It would appear that an early form of cinema-style entertainment existed in the late 19th century when Reverend Brandon made his camp visits on horseback along with his famous magic lantern to educate and entertain. As the moving picture became popular world-wide, Falkland islanders were not left behind. One of the first Falkland cinemas was in the Catholic School Room on Saturday evenings organised by the Catholic Father who was both producer and censor of films shown, apparently cutting out scenes deemed unsuitable for viewing. These early films were mainly the silent movies of Charlie Chaplin and Buster Keaton accompanied by the nuns playing on the piano.
Forrest McWhan organised the showing of films in the Tabernacle for which a payment of tuppence was made on the way in. His entertainment was popular with children and included Charlie Chaplin, Abbott & Costello and Laurel & Hardy.

Les Hardy took over from the Catholic Church and converted his boy's club in to a cinema hall. When the 'old' gymnasium opened Les rented this three times a week as a cinema hall. He showed a range of silent films imported from Montevideo, transferring to the Town Hall on its opening in 1950 and continuing showings on Wednesday, Saturday and Sunday evenings. The Saturday showings were for children. Seats on the stage cost extra to provide better viewing. The National Anthem was played at the end of every showing. Les handed over to his son Tony.

Joe Booth commenced shows in the parish hall in early 1965, using two 16 mm projectors, with shows on Tuesday evenings and Sunday afternoons.

Initially he showed cartoons and newsreels plus films from the Government library, then added films hired from Montevideo brought on the RMS *Darwin*. Two very popular imports at the time were “Rock around the Clock” with Bill Haley and “Twist around the Clock” with Chubby Checker.
Joe went further when the LADE air link was established by obtaining films from the UK sent by air parcel post on a three week hire. These were hectic times as the film would take one week to arrive, had to be shown every night of the week to recoup costs, then put back in the post for return to the UK. Two specials from this period were “My Fair Lady” and “The Sound of Music”. He would also borrow films from visiting ships to give the community a chance to see the popular features of the time.

Following Tony Hardy’s death in the early 1970’s, Peter Short and subsequently Val Berntsen ran the Town Hall cinema for a time before Joe took over. This enabled shows to be held in the Parish hall during the week and in the Town Hall on Sunday evenings and continued until the Argentine invasion in April 1982. Joe had many helpers ensuring the shows continued on a regular basis, the main ones being Phil Summers, Ted Clapp and Wallace Hirtle. All film shows were well attended and enjoyed by the Stanley community.

After showing in Stanley films from the Government library were sent to Camp settlements for weekly screenings – sometimes more often if there was a good supply of films.

Today the Islands have just one cinema situated within the Mount Pleasant Complex (MPC). Civilians have access to this according to the usual admittance procedures to MPC. The “Services Sound and Vision Corporation” (SSVC – a registered charity) operated the Phoenix Cinema which has 134 cinema-style seats. The SSVC are able to show West End films within a few weeks of Uk release and offers “the complete cinema experience”.